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1. DEFINING TERMS 
 
I do not intend here to weary you with more than a small portion of even my 
present knowledge, for I have great collections of facts that I keep only to 
compare with those of other hunters of the wild idea, and which in their 
present state are valueless to the cabinet ethnologist. Some of these may be 
rank lies, some of them mere individual mind-freaks, others have underlying 
them some idea I am not at present in touch with. 
 
Mary H. Kingsley, Travels in West Africa (2003: 430). 
 
In 1893, Mary Kingsley went to West Africa to hunt the wild idea. In contrast, this 
thesis is the work of a cabinet historian who went only to various libraries to recover 
a fossilised idea: the res publica of the Roman Republic. It explores the increasing 
politicisation of a key concept in the Roman political vocabulary, that of the political 
sphere itself. Since this concept was politically ubiquitous, often used emotively, and 
is consequently very hard to define, the temptation to take it as a universally 
understood and relatively uncontroversial given is rarely resisted. A closer look at 
how res publica was perceived and manipulated helps to clarify not just the crisis of 
legitimacy that occurred in the late Republic but also various attempts to clean it up 
through dubiously legal (and often outright illegal) emergency measures. It should be 
noted that this is not a contribution to the debate over just what sort of political 
system the Republic was, i.e. whether it can or should be classed as a democracy, a 
debate that might be characterised in the broadest terms as a disagreement between 
those who argue that the Republic was formally democratic and those who argue that 
it functionally was not.
1
 I am not concerned with the mechanics of how Republican 
politics worked, nor am I trying to locate the sources of ‘true’ legitimacy or 
examining whether people were actually justified in doing the things they did. Rather, 
                                                          
1
 On the democratic side, cf. especially Millar 1984, 1986, 1998, also Williamson 1990: 274-5, 
Yakobson 1992, 2006, Morstein-Marx 1998; contra: North 1990, Burckhardt 1990: 89-98, Jehne 
1995, Flaig 1995, Mouritsen 2001: 128ff, Hölkeskamp 1995, 2010: 1-52. The current scholarly debate 
is a largely semantic one over whether the formal role of the populus in political decision-making was 
sufficient to justify describing Rome as some form of “democracy”. 
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my argument concerns what people said to justify themselves and how they thereby 
contributed to the disintegration of civic life. 
To explain why I raise ‘politicisation’ as a problem, it will be worth 
reviewing some recent contributions to the field by K.-J. Hölkeskamp, not least 
Reconstructing the Roman Republic (2010), a survey of modern scholarship on the 
hotly contested issue of where power and sovereignty should really be located in the 
classic (that is, functioning) Roman Republic. Since this is the subject of much 
modern debate, it should be sufficient to describe the classic Republic as a complex 
and delicately calibrated system regulated largely by custom and tradition rather than 
legal prescriptions; the absence of a formal constitution meant political practice was 
characterised by both flexibility (because there was space to adjust to new 
circumstances) and instability (because when accepted practice was disrupted by 
unprecedented and divisive issues, formal controls were lacking to stop the situation 
spiralling out of hand). Whatever rights and concepts of sovereignty may have been 
technically vested in the citizen body, it lacked initiative; it had no formal way to 
express opinions, desires, resentment and so on other than by electing magistrates 
and voting on matters put to it by those elected magistrates
2
 (although individual 
sections of the populus could make their opinions felt in various venues, such as in 
contiones or at the games
3
). In contrast, while the senate could express opinions, 
desires, resentments and so on as loudly as it wanted, it could act only indirectly, by 
exerting influence on the elected magistrates (who were responsible for summoning 
it, as they were responsible for convoking the popular assemblies) to take whatever 
action it deemed necessary.
4
 These elected magistrates were drawn from the ranks of 
the highly competitive Roman elite and would go on to become, or continue to be, 
senators.
5
 
The ways in which this system was maintained form the subject of 
Hölkeskamp’s complex and densely layered discussion, in which he sets out a model 
of Republican civic and political identity as ‘based on a broad consensus about social 
norms and values’.6 This ‘broad consensus’ concerns the way in which political 
activity should be carried out, rather than the particulars of everyday politics, where 
                                                          
2
 North 1990: 16. 
3
 Cf. Flaig 1994. 
4
 Lintott 1999b: 65-88, Hölkeskamp 2000: 213-4. 
5
 On the role of the magistrates, cf. Richardson 1991: 2, Rosenstein 2007: 142, Beck 2011. 
6
 Hölkeskamp 2010: 56; cf. also Meier 1966: 56, Gruen 1996: 216. 
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consensus demonstrably did not exist,
7
 and Hölkeskamp’s interest lies not with 
‘actual politics, such as the decisions and actions of magistrates’,8 nor with ‘the 
social framework and/or the “subsystem” of the political institutions and formal 
procedures of decision making’, at least as an isolated subject of enquiry. 9  For 
Hölkeskamp, the dog that did not bark in the night is ‘the peculiar “degree of 
obedience” of the populus Romanus’10 and the area for study becomes ‘what was not 
(and could not be) politically addressed, explicitly debated, and put on the agenda of 
decision making’: anything ‘that remains implicit in the discourse of politics, but 
must nevertheless be considered a fundamental part of the system and its basis of 
legitimacy’.11 
As heuristic models go, this has its merits; as a programme for future 
scholarship in the area, one expressed purpose of the book,
12
 it is less straightforward, 
since (as Hölkeskamp concedes
13
) disconnecting our attention from concrete issues 
such as institutions or political actions renders it hard to specify exactly what anyone 
working in the field should be interested in. It is difficult to recover evidence of what 
was not said and ‘not debatable and not discussed’, which is to say this ‘deeply-
rooted’, ‘pre-theoretical and unreflected’ shared consensus.14 If consensus is defined 
more by what is not said than by what is, modern observers are at risk of perceiving 
consensus only when it is on the wane or lost altogether, because people can be seen 
to talk explicitly about issues that were formerly the subject of general consensus, or 
we are obliged to impose modern conceptions of the sort of things that should be a 
matter for political debate on the ancient world. Furthermore, for those (early) 
periods when the appearance of consensus prevails, we generally lack the sort of 
evidence that would allow us access to contemporary political debates; it is easy to 
conclude that consensus prevailed when we have no way to detect the politicisation 
of the fundamentals of politics. Finally, the model in its simplest form appears to 
consist of the assertion that the Roman Republic survived for so long because most 
of its politicians for most of the time accepted the system into which they were born 
                                                          
7
 Hölkeskamp 2010: 39. 
8
 Hölkeskamp 2010: 53. 
9
 Hölkeskamp 2010: 54. 
10
 Hölkeskamp 2010: 52, citing Flaig 1993: 194. 
11
 Hölkeskamp 2010: 54; cf. also Gruen 1996: 216. 
12
 Hölkeskamp 2010: 98. 
13
 Hölkeskamp 2010: 54. 
14
 Hölkeskamp 2010: 54. 
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and through which they gained power and social status; and while this model has the 
great merit of being obviously true, it is also somewhat banal. It would be one thing 
to talk about a consensus model of doing politics, both because it is possible (where 
the evidence exists) to trace what people actually did and also because Republican 
political activity does seem to have been characterised by a search, not always 
successful, for a generally acceptable consensus among its different elements. Since 
Hölkeskamp is explicitly not interested in actual political activity, however, this 
cannot be quite what he has in mind. Rather, his ‘broad consensus’ seems to be a 
way of saying that most people played by the rules, which is not only not unique to 
the Roman Republic, but is in fact a necessary feature of any functioning political 
system. As Syme remarked, ‘no oligarchy could survive if its members refused to 
abide by the rules, to respect “liberty” and “laws”’.15 
It may be unfair to reduce Hölkeskamp’s complex arguments to this level, 
and in any case he concedes that this broad consensus was in meltdown towards the 
end of the Republic,
16
 which presumably implies that the basis of political activity 
(rather than the particulars of everyday politics) became itself a matter for political 
debate and dissension. Since Hölkeskamp is not interested in how this happened, 
however, it is hard to tell how he thinks things broke down, or even where he locates 
the beginning of the end. This is a problem, because hints of debate over the rules of 
political engagement can be traced at most stages of the Republic’s development. 
We might, for example, take the formalisation of the cursus honorum by the lex 
Villia annalis in 180 BC and associated legislation to be an expression of waning 
consensus in the face of a surplus of candidates and correspondingly ferocious 
competition for office. That is to say, the system of holding office had become so 
politicised that the cursus honorum could no longer be left to customary practice, so 
legislation had to be imposed to keep things from getting out of hand. Once the 
cursus honorum was subject to legal requirements, however, it became even more 
contentious when individuals diverged from it, most prominently P. Scipio 
Aemilianus, who managed to make himself so popular with the plebs that when he 
stood for the aedileship in 148 he was exempted from the lex annalis by popular 
demand and elected consul instead.
17
 His career continued on this uneven keel,
18
 but 
                                                          
15
 Syme 1939: 57-8. 
16
 Hölkeskamp 2010: 22. 
17
 App. Lib. 112; Scullard 1960: 60, Astin 1967: 61, Develin 1978. 
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he was not the only person involved in controversial behaviour during this period, 
just the most prominent. Morgan and Walsh list examples of the politicians of the 
period engaged in decidedly non-consensual activity
19
 and conclude that ‘to maintain 
that the Roman oligarchy was pursuing consensus politics between 146 and 133, 
therefore, flies in the face of a substantial body of evidence’.20 
The year 133 supplies the classic failure of consensus politics: the death of 
the plebeian tribune Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus at the hands of Publius Scipio 
Nasica, pontifex maximus and private citizen, and a mob of senators armed with 
broken benches. Between 133 and 88, similar violence was deliberately used twice 
on the domestic political stage in Rome (in 121 against Gaius Gracchus and in 100 
against Saturninus and Glaucia). After 88 (to pass over the Social War of 91–88, a 
political failure of a different sort and on a larger stage), five years of civil war, 
capped by Sulla’s victorious return in 83 and political settlement of 82–1, was 
followed by political instability (Lepidus’s rising in 78, the ‘Catilinarian Conspiracy’ 
in 63) and eventually yet more civil war (from Caesar in 49 to Octavian’s victory at 
Actium in 31). Such violent outbreaks are both symptoms (civic violence arising 
from the failure of political consensus) and causes (their legacy being resentment and 
an increased willingness to take up arms the next time the opportunity comes round). 
One important theme in all these incidents was the stress laid on the res publica, a 
concept that had always been politically charged but which became increasingly 
politicised as the Republic stumbled towards collapse. From Nasica’s efforts to keep 
the res publica salva to Sulla’s res publica constituta and Pompey’s fight to defend 
the res publica against Caesar, the perceived condition and needs of the res publica 
were a source of concern, controversy, division and self-justification throughout this 
period. In particular, private citizens invoked the needs of the res publica to 
legitimise often strikingly illegal actions. Just what it meant to appeal to the res 
publica and how far this marked tendency to do so contributed to the dangerous 
fragmentation of political legitimacy and the breakdown of the consensual 
Republican political system are the key questions for this thesis. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
18
 He was elected consul again in 134, despite the law of 151 that forbade iteration of the consulship, 
and raised an army using private funds when the senate proved uncooperative with his special 
command against Numantia; on this cf. Scullard 1960: 72, and further Raschke 1987 on the 
increasingly tense relationship between Aemilianus and his political peers and his movement towards 
the populus. 
19
 Morgan-Walsh 1978: 208-9. 
20
 Morgan-Walsh 1978: 210; cf. also Hillard 2005: 10-11. 
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The first challenge for such a discussion is to work out what res publica 
meant. Drexler (1957, 1958) has examined the range of vocabulary and metaphors 
associated with res publica, Stark (1967) provides ‘semasiologische 
Untersuchungen’ that aim to reconstruct res publica from its constituent parts (res, 
populus, publicus, privatus, sacer and other relevant terms), Suerbaum (1977) 
explores the relationship between res publica and monarchic power in Cicero’s De 
Republica and various imperial authors, and Turcan (2011) discusses Roman 
‘notions de l’État’ chiefly from the perspective of status rei publicae, the condition 
of the res publica. Others engage with iterations of res publica in specific ancient 
texts, most commonly Cicero’s De Republica; so Schofield (1999) examines 
Cicero’s use of a property metaphor to describe it, Kempshall (2001) traces the 
reception of Cicero’s definition of res publica in mediaeval and Renaissance thought 
and Márquez (2012) addresses the conception of the political community it reveals. 
The main problem is that res publica is a common term in our surviving sources, is 
used in a variety of ways across those sources, and very few Romans themselves 
ever seem to have tried to produce any sort of theoretical definition (in, again, our 
surviving sources). The marked lack of ancient theorising, whether political or 
philosophical or legal, over what res publica entailed suggests the Romans were 
more interested in engaging with it than in developing a fully articulated concept of 
what it might be. 
This is a problem for modern readers: either we struggle to translate res 
publica in a way that accurately captures the nuances of a given context, in which 
case any one of a dozen different translations may stand in for the Latin term, or we 
resort to leaving it untranslated and assuming that everyone knows what we mean by 
it, which risks resulting in an equally misleading (because dangerously vague) 
reification. Julius Caesar might be taken to have been expressing just such a 
conceptual hollowness when he said notoriously that ‘res publica is nothing, a mere 
name without body or form’.21 Morgan, in fact, in the course of arguing that Caesar 
was making an extremely pedantic grammatical point, dismisses res publica as a 
meaningful concept at all on the basis that it was by this point a ‘slogan’.22 While it 
is true that ‘in the interests of the res publica’ (the slogan in question) might be little 
more than an empty refrain, this does not mean that the concepts it appeals to are 
                                                          
21
 Suet. Jul. 77, nihil esse rem publicam, appellationem modo sine corpore ac specie. 
22
 Morgan 1997: 27. 
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meaningless; although ‘the public interest’ may be a slogan, for example, ‘the 
public’ is not. To put it another way, Morgan fails to distinguish between rei 
publicae causa, which is indeed a slogan, and res publica, which is simply a concept. 
As I will argue in section 5.2, Caesar’s engagement with this concept was much 
more imaginative than taking his words at face value would suggest. Without 
understanding what res publica did or could mean, however, it is impossible to 
understand what people like Caesar were doing (or perceived to be doing) when they 
invoked it in order to further their political activities. 
 It may be easiest to start with what res publica was not. Despite the 
temptation for translators, it did not mean ‘the Roman Republic’ in the sense of the 
political superstructure that succeeded the monarchy and lasted until the Augustan 
principate.
23
 Nor was it the term for Rome’s corporate identity: ‘Die offizielle 
römische Staatsbezeichnung ist nämlich nicht etwa res publica, sondern populus 
Romanus, in offiziellen Dokumenten meist noch erweitert zu senatus populusque 
Romanus (SPQR)’.24 However, it also was not ‘a republic’ in the sense of a specific 
type of political system,
25
 defined by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as any 
state ‘in which supreme power is held by the people or their elected representatives’ 
or by Flower as fundamentally ‘“government with the participation of the governed”, 
rather than anarchy or tyranny’. Flower considers res publica to be the term through 
which ‘Romans who came after the end of the hereditary monarchy defined the new 
government as the “public matter”’,26 but Feig Vishnia points out that res publica 
only acquired the sense of ‘a state that was not subject to the rule of one man’ under 
the emperors
27
 and the Republican evidence bears her out. Cicero writes in De 
Republica that ‘when the supreme authority is in the hands of one man, we call him a 
rex, and the form (status) of this res publica a regnum’,28 Livy has Tullus Hostilius 
express his intention of making ‘one city, one res publica’ by resettling the Albans in 
                                                          
23
 As pointed out by Meier 1966: 1, Schofield 1999: 180-1, Flower 2010: 10-11, Barlow 2012: 218; 
for less careful associations of res publica/the Republic, cf. for example Mitchell 1979: 86, Ramage 
1987: 39, Nicgorski 1991: 233, Millar 2002, Vasaly 2009: 123, Arena 2012: 215, Tracy 2012: 90, 
Feig Vishnia 2012: 57. 
24
 Suerbaum 1977: 3-4. 
25
 Suerbaum 1977: 11-14, 15. 
26
 Flower 2010: 11; cf. also Taylor 1949: 167, Wirszubski 1950: 14, 88, Stark 1967: 90, Seager 1977: 
10, or the casual translation of res publica as ‘republic’ by e.g. Dyer 1990. 
27
 Feig Vishnia 2012: 61, Suerbaum 1977: 16; cf. Tac. Ann. 1.3, for example. 
28
 Cic. Rep. 1.42. 
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Rome,
29
 and Sallust’s potted history of the strengths and downfall of regal Rome is 
revealing: the early Romans had a commanding element based on laws (imperium 
legitumum) which they called rex, and a select few ‘Fathers’, elderly but wise, who 
took counsel (consultabant) for the res publica. Later, however, ‘when the command 
of kings (regium imperium), which in the beginning had tended to preserve freedom 
(conservandae libertatis) and advance (augendae) the res publica, had degenerated 
into pride and domination (in superbiam dominationemque), they altered their 
custom (immutato more) and appointed two commanders (imperatores) with annual 
power (annua imperia)’.30 
 It is impossible to recover the terms used by the early Romans themselves, 
and these are late sources, but this usage is casual enough to indicate that these 
writers saw no inherent conflict between regnum and res publica because they were 
not equivalent concepts. Regnum was a system of political organisation, whereas res 
publica was not. A fragment of Pomponius on the beginnings of law, which relates 
that after the civitas expanded to a certain size Romulus divided the populus into 
thirty curiae ‘because he managed the care (cura) of the res publica through the 
votes of those parts’, 31  suggests what res publica was instead: not a system of 
organisation or government, but rather the public affairs and property that the civitas 
was organised to take care of. When P. Lucilius erected an inscription to 
commemorate his aedileship, for example, he stressed his exemplary use of public 
funds and his restoration of various temples with his own money; this presumably 
explains his boast that he had donated HS XV CC to the res publica.
32
 In a regal 
system, the king was in charge, but res publica refers to neither the king nor the 
system of government. These sources suggest a genuinely literal reading of the term: 
fundamentally, the res publica is something that should be managed for the public 
good, but need not necessarily be managed by the public and certainly should not be 
read as synonymous with the public. 
 I stress this last point because Schofield, for example, expresses surprise that 
res publica is translated into Greek in inscriptions as ta dêmosia pragmata, ‘public 
                                                          
29
 Liv. 1.28, unam urbem, unam rem publicam facere. 
30
 Sall. BC 6.6. 
31
 Millar 2002: 52-3. 
32
 CIL I.ii.iv 3031a; the date is debated, but it may be imperial. 
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affairs’, rather than to koinon, ‘the community’.33 Res publica does not refer to ‘the’ 
or even ‘a’ community, except insofar as a res publica belongs to a community and 
is administered by an elite, highly politicised subsection of that community that may 
get very confused about the difference between its interests and those of the public 
affairs entrusted to its administration for the common good. This foreshadows the 
reason why, despite everything that has just been said, reading res publica literally as 
‘the public thing’ can often be misleading and should usually be avoided: different 
parts of the same community will have different perspectives on their shared res 
publica. On the one hand, the res publica is the communally possessed 
property/business that needs to be administered. On the other hand, it is clear from 
our texts that this was not the only way to relate to the res publica: not only is in re 
publica a common idiom meaning ‘in public affairs’,34 but junior politicians are said 
to enter ‘into public life’ (ad rem publicam).35 Opposed to this is the conscious 
retreat from public life, a re publica, a much rarer phrase.
36
 These idioms convey a 
sense of metaphorical space or motion: within, into, or away from. From the 
perspective of the political insider, then, the res publica is the communal space 
within which those concerned with the administration of public affairs move, and so 
means something closer to ‘the internal political space (however it may be organised) 
of a given civic community’. This distinction might be described as a concrete 
reading versus a metaphorical reading, since P. Lucilius’s inscription suggests a 
distinctly concrete res publica, except for two things: (1) these readings are not 
necessarily in opposition to one another; (2) the crucial difference here is between 
res publica as public business (which must be managed) and res publica as a sphere 
of action (within which political actors move). Res publica may be better expressed 
as a field of positions that changes in meaning dependent on where a person stands 
in socio-political space: whether, for example, someone moves within the field, is 
responsible for managing public business, represents the field to outsiders, elects 
                                                          
33
 Schofield 1999: 182; on τὰ δημόσια πράγματα see further Stark 1967: 86-9. Also taking res 
publica to be a (political) community: Ando 1999: 15, Márquez 2012: 192, 195. 
34
 E.g. Sall. BJ 31.28, Rhet. Her. 1.8, Q. Cic. Pet. 41, Cic. Fam. 1.9.18, 1.9.21, 2.3.1, 2.8.2, 2.11.1, 
6.12.4, 8.1.2, 11.1.1, 12.1.2, 12.5.3, 13.29.7, Att. 1.13.2, 1.16.1, 1.16.9, 1.18.2, 1.19.2, 1.19.6, 2.1.6, 
2.7.4, 2.11.1, 2.15.1, 3.8.3, 5.13.3, 5.14.3, 8.14.2, 9.9.3, 15.10.1, 16.5.2, Q. fr. 3.2.2, 3.3.2, 3.4.2, 
3.5.1, ad Brut. 1.1.8, 2.1.1, 2.3.16, 5.3.2, 18.3.17, 23.9.6, Div. Caec. 8, Ver. 2.5.152, 2.5.153, 2.5.177, 
Font. 26, Clu. 85, Agr. 1.22, Rab. Per. 27, Sull. 9, 11, Dom. 113, De Or. 1.78. 
35
 E.g. Sall. BC 3.3, Cic. S. Rosc. 3.7, Ver. 2.1.33, Har. Resp. 43; used also of those who have entered 
ad rem publicam, e.g. Cic. Q. fr. 1.2.2, Leg. Man. 70. 
36
 E.g. Sall. BC 4.1, BJ 4.3. 
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administrators to manage the field, or discusses the field with other cohabitants. 
 This point is worth considering in more detail, since most of the surviving 
texts that relate to res publica were produced by political insiders and keeping in 
mind the particular perspective adopted by particular speakers or authors makes the 
muddle produced by translating res publica using terms like ‘community’ and ‘state’ 
and ‘the Roman government’ interchangeably much clearer. One text in particular 
that demands closer examination in this context is Cicero’s De Republica, not least 
because the existence of a dialogue de re publica in the middle of the first century 
BC might make it surprising that even by this point the concept of res publica seems 
to have remained mostly unarticulated. Although the dialogue is often read as a 
rather unsatisfactory attempt at a Roman version of Plato’s Politeia that equates the 
ideal ‘state’ or ‘constitution’ with an idealised form of the Roman Republic,37 de re 
publica is another very common idiom, usually translated as ‘about political 
matters’, 38  and the principal speaker of the De Republica, Scipio Aemilianus, 
explicitly denies any intention of philosophical precision or comprehensiveness, 
since, he says, his audience consists of ‘intelligent men (prudentes homines) who 
have been involved with great glory (summa cum gloria), both in war and at home 
(belli domique), in the greatest res publica’.39 While Cicero’s Aemilianus goes along 
with the prevailing philosophical tradition of beginning by defining his terms, he 
claims to have the luxury of providing only cursory definitions, because he is talking 
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 So Degraff 1940: 149, Taylor 1949: 153, Wood 1988: 66, 126, Nicgorski 1991: 231, 234-8, 
Schofield 1999: 155, Lintott 1997: 80-81, Morford 2002: 70, 77, Asmis 2005: 377-9, Turcan 2011: 
625. Contra cf. Barlow 1987, arguing that Cicero’s main concern in the Rep. is with civic education 
of future politicians, and that philosophy is a means to this end; Gabba 1991: 207, ‘Cicero’s aim in 
the De re publica, written in 54–1 BC, was to show the historical development of the Roman state, 
which, through wise adjustments and increased political acquisitions, had eventually attained its finest 
stage after the Decemvirate, achieving a balance of the different political powers in what amounted to 
a true mixed constitution’; Powell 2001: 20-32, who argues against the presumption that the dialogue 
discusses an ‘ideal state’ along Platonic lines; Cornell 2001: 55-6, Cicero is ‘outlining the essential 
features of the principal forms of government, and the changes to which they are subject, using the 
historical example of Rome; it is essentially a theoretical discussion within a historical framework’; 
Fox 2007: 80-110, for whom Cicero’s ‘ironic’ use of history in the Rep. represents an interesting and 
imaginative engagement with Plato and ‘De re publica does not provide a clear outline of the Roman 
state; what it does instead is confront the very question of how to combine an understanding of 
Rome’s history with theoretical discussions of ways of making states work more effectively’ (104). 
The issue is complicated by the dialogue’s fragmentary condition and its genre, which invites 
scepticism over which, if any, of the characters speaks for their Academic author; so Barlow 1987: 
357, Nicgorski 1991: 232, Annas 1997: 172, Fox 2007: viii, 2-8, 43-67, 80-82. On possible relevance 
to contemporary events cf. Geiger 1984. 
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 E.g. Caes. BG 1.34, 6.20, Sall. BJ 85.44, 110.6, Q. Cic. Pet. 5, Cic. Fam. 1.9.6, 2.4.1, 2.10.4, 5.2.8, 
7.32.3, Att. 1.20.2, 2.4.4, 2.21.1, 2.22.6, 3.7.3, 4.6.2, S. Rosc. 2, Ver. 2.1.37, Clu. 141, Cat. 1.9, Mur. 
54, Sull. 65, Dom. 3. 
39
 Cic. Rep. 1.38, apud prudentes enim homines et in maxima re publica summa cum gloria belli 
domique versatos cum loquar. 
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to people who already know what he means. The dialogue therefore features a 
Roman political insider talking to other Roman political insiders about how Roman 
politics should be conducted (albeit using a Greek theoretical framework to do so), 
although the fragmentary condition of the text leaves us struggling to recover much 
of what this entails. Scipio’s distinctly cursory definition of res publica is provided 
as a stage along the way to explaining how said res publica should be managed and 
the emphasis is on almost everything but res publica itself, as at 1.39 where the 
famous dictum that ‘the res publica (public thing) is the res populi (thing of the 
people)’ leads into a definition not of what that thing might entail but of how to 
define a populus: 
 
‘Est igitur’ inquit Africanus ‘res publica res populi; populus autem non 
omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis 
iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.’ 
 
“The res publica is therefore,” said Africanus, “the thing of the people. But a 
people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of 
way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an 
agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good.” 
(Cic. Rep. 1.39.) 
 
This is a definition, as Zetzel observes, that ‘implies no presupposition about the 
form of the res publica, which may include even monarchy’;40 it is ‘defined not in 
“organizational” or “legal” terms (as the civitas is) but in “affective” terms as 
whatever the people care about in common or can be understood as their common 
property’.41 Such vagueness should not be taken to be a Ciceronian innovation, even 
though Aemilianus notoriously expresses a preference for monarchy as the best 
‘pure’ (simplex) form of political organisation, 42  but rather as supplementary 
evidence that regnum and res publica are indeed neither equivalent terms nor 
mutually exclusive.
43
 The focus on the populus continues (insofar as we can tell, 
                                                          
40
 Zetzel 1995: 128. 
41
 Márquez 2012: 192; cf. also Stark 1967: 43, Suerbaum 1977: 1-2. 
42
 Cic. Rep. 1.54; cf. Fox 1996: 9-12, Powell 1994: 26-7, 2001: 27-9, Gallagher 2001: 511-12, 
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since about fifteen lines of it have fallen into a lacuna) throughout 1.39–41, which 
covers the first cause of such an association, the nature of humans that leads them to 
associate with others and the eventual establishment of a physical dwelling for this 
human association, the oppidum or urbs. At 1.41, the definition is recapped: 
 
‘Omnis ergo populus, qui est talis coetus multitudinis, qualem exposui; omnis 
civitas, quae est constitutio populi; omnis res publica, quae, ut dixi, populi 
res est, consilio quodam regenda est, ut diuturna sit.’ 
 
“Therefore every people, which is such a gathering of large numbers as I 
have described, every civitas, which is an orderly settlement of the people, 
and every res publica, which, as I said, is the property of the people, must be 
ruled by some decision-making process if it is to be permanent.” (Cic. Rep. 
1.41.
44
) 
 
Again, the cursory definition of res publica is repeated to provide a stepping-stone to 
Scipio’s next topic: that the key to the longevity of a res publica is that it is ruled by 
a decision-making element (consilium), the discussion of which occupies the rest of 
Book 1. The publica half of the equation is thus fully accounted for – that is, it is 
clear to whom a res publica belongs (the organised populus, or civitas) – but the 
thing itself, the res ipsa, has not been discussed at all.
45
 All we know is that it 
belongs to the populus and must be ruled by some form of consilium, a definition 
that suggests more than the management of public property; regere is a strong verb. 
Kempshall’s study shows how much influence Augustine’s interpretation of 
Cicero’s definition at De Republica 1.39 had on what res publica came to mean for 
later writers.
46
 As far as recovering a Republican understanding of res publica goes, 
however, Cicero’s brevity is further evidence that res publica was not equivalent to 
‘state’ or ‘government’, since his omissions might raise eyebrows if he were thinking 
about it in such terms. What powers does a res publica have and how should it use 
them? Is it concerned with the assignment of magistracies, or the administration of 
justice, or police action within the civitas, or raising taxes, or commanding armies 
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 Schofield 1999: 183, Cornell 2001: 50-52, 55. 
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and waging war? None of this is discussed. It is significant, however, that Cicero 
distinguishes between populus and civitas, and that the burden of the discussion 
feeds into the definition of a civitas as an organised populus, or, as it will later be 
characterised, as a ‘partnership in justice’ (iuris societas).47  Cicero had his own 
reasons for setting up such a definition,
48
 to which I shall return in section 2.4; for 
my current purposes, the important thing to abstract from the De Republica is the 
distinction between civitas and res publica, and the notion of a res publica as the 
political (that is, public) sphere of a given autonomous civic community (civitas). 
This is not actually a distinction much observed throughout the rest of the dialogue, 
where res publica and civitas tend to be used almost interchangeably.
49
 This 
semantic blurring may be at least partly due to the ‘insider’s perspective’ presented 
in the De Republica, since in texts that discuss communities external to Rome the 
distinction is clear and maintained. When Caesar addresses non-Roman communities 
in the Bellum Gallicum and the Bellum Civile, for example, he consistently uses the 
term civitas, rather than res publica;
50
 and when he mentions local notables, they are 
not the principes in their res publicae (as Cicero characterises Pompey, among 
others
51
) but the nobilissimi or principes or primi of their civitates.
52
 The reason is 
not that res publica is a concept restricted to Rome, as BG 6.20 makes clear: 
 
Quae civitates commodius suam rem publicam administrare existimantur 
habent legibus sanctum, si quis quid de re publica a finitimis rumore aut 
fama acceperit, uti ad magistratum deferat neve cum quo alio communicet. 
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 Cic. Rep. 1.49; cf. also Cic. Leg. 1.23, 2.12. 
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Those (Gallic) civitates which are thought to administer their res publica to 
greater advantage have it prescribed by law that anyone who has learnt 
anything concerning the res publica from his neighbours by rumour or report 
must bring the information to a magistrate and not impart it to anyone else. 
(Caes. BG 6.20.
53
) 
 
It is the civitas that manages sua res publica, its public business. Likewise, when 
Cicero accuses Verres of mismanaging the appointment of local censors during his 
praetorship in Sicily, he says that ‘in that census, the res publica of no civitas could 
be administered’. 54  In both examples, the res publica, in accordance with the 
definition of De Republica or Sallust’s summary history, belongs to the civitas: that 
is, the civic community. Hence, in a despairing rhetorical fragment used as an 
example of antistrophe (conversio) in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, a rhetorical 
handbook written by an unknown author and generally dated to somewhere between 
86 and 82 BC,
55
 it is the res publica that is said to have vanished from the civitas, 
rather than the other way round.
56
 Without a civitas, there can be no res publica, 
because without a concrete public, there is no public sphere. In contrast, a group of 
people can physically coexist in the absence of shared legal, political and civic 
structures, although the rhetorical point comes from the fact that they may not be 
able to coexist for very long. 
The pains Cicero takes to move from populus to civitas at Rep. 1.39–41 are 
remarkable mostly because, unless a similar point has fallen into the lacuna, he 
passes up the most obvious etymological option, as used by Varro, who notes that 
‘civis (“citizen”) and civitas (“civic community”) are not the same, but both come 
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 Cf. also the Epistula Praetoris ad Tiburtes of 159 (CIL I.ii 586; cf. Clackson-Horrocks 2011: 147-
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from the same origin and are connected’.57 Feig Vishnia explains the etymological 
derivation of civitas from co-viria (curia), ‘meaning “a congregation of men/men 
assembled together”’.58 It would have been simple to define a civitas as a community 
of cives: anyone with Roman citizenship was a member of the Roman civic 
community. Quintus Cicero had previously characterised Rome in the 
Commentariolum Petitionis as ‘a civitas constituted from an assembly of nations (ex 
nationum conventu)’ with attendant vices and snares for the up-and-coming 
politician, a description that may reflect the greatly enlarged civitas of the post-
Social War period.
59
 Because all the (male, adult) cives of the civitas are imagined as 
being technically capable of and/or expected to take part in public life (the res 
publica) in one way or another, the practical distinction between res publica and 
civitas is a fine and often rhetorically blurry one, especially when Roman politicians 
are talking to other Roman politicians about the internal workings of Roman politics. 
The Rhetorica ad Herennium, for example, demonstrates synonymy with an angry 
accusation: ‘you have overturned the res publica from its roots, you have demolished 
the civitas from its foundations’. 60  This goes some way towards explaining the 
semantic slippage observable in Cicero’s De Republica, where the difference 
between talking about the organisation of the shared public sphere (res publica) and 
that of the civic community (civitas) shrinks to irrelevance. The civic community is 
the public sphere. 
Res publica, then, can mean both the public property/affairs of a given civitas 
and the communal political spaces within which those who administer the property 
and affairs of the civitas move. In itself, the term implies no particular political 
organisation, and the version that dominates in a given text will depend on the socio-
political position and immediate aims of the text’s author. In most of our surviving 
texts, of course, the authors are Romans and referring to the res publica that belongs 
to the populus Romanus. Now, while referring to a generic res publica might not 
connote any particular political organisation, talking about the res publica that 
belonged to the Roman civitas at any given historical moment certainly did. I isolate 
‘any given historical moment’ because Roman political structures were as subject to 
change and development as those of any other polity; to take the most obvious 
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example, the res publica of the regal period (or indeed the later imperial period) was 
organised in a markedly different way from the res publica of the Republic, and even 
the classic, pre-crisis Republic did not comprise an unchanging political system held 
static in a kind of metaphysical amber, as Flower’s recent Roman Republics (2010) 
shows.
61
 Rather than a written constitution to articulate and give permanent shape to 
its political structures, Rome had laws and traditional ways of doing things (mos 
maiorum),
62
 and laws and traditions change over time. 
It is at this point that res publica does begin to look deceptively like a slogan. 
The politicians of the late Republic were not thinking about Rome’s res publica from 
the truly external perspective of modern scholars seeking a holistic, theoretically-
informed account of Roman political structures and superstructures; rather, like 
Cicero’s Scipio Aemilianus and his audience, they were political insiders concerned 
with specific aspects and problems of contemporary public life. When they 
complained about the state of the res publica or the loss of the res publica,
63
 what 
they meant was not so much that a coherent political superstructure (‘the Republic’) 
was crashing down as that established political structures, as inherited from the 
maiores, were being corrupted or discarded. To appeal to “the res publica” in the late 
Roman Republic was therefore to invoke an inherently fluid concept in a condition 
of particular flux, both because political turbulence was impacting materially on the 
organisation of “the Roman res publica” and also because quarrelling public figures 
exploited, appealed to, or aimed to create diverging perspectives on what that system 
of organisation was or should be. Since res publica was used as a key prop by all and 
sundry, the different ways in which it was used inflected its meaning. That this was 
more than an interesting phenomenon, in fact (as I hope to show) an important 
element of the disintegration of the political superstructure now known as the Roman 
Republic, is the main reason to examine the invocation and manipulation of this 
protean res publica by Republican politicians; that it happened at all, however, 
makes it important to be sensitive to conceptual negotiation and innovation on the 
topic in all ancient texts. 
There are serious problems with the evidence to be explained and choices in 
handling these problems to be justified at this point. On the one hand, res publica is 
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a very common term in Latin political literature, thanks in no small part to Cicero; on 
the other hand, Cicero aside, the material is sparse, unrepresentative, frequently 
fragmentary and often lacking useful context. This puts us in the unhappy position of 
having both too much evidence to analyse each piece on its own merits and too little 
evidence to stitch together an intelligible narrative easily from the lacelike, moth-
eaten material that remains. I have therefore organised the material thematically, as 
follows: 
 
 Chapter 2 (rem publicam administrare) focuses on the res publica as public 
business, which is discussed in terms of (2.1) purely formal claims to 
legitimacy resting on the occupation of a magistracy; (2.2) ‘acceptable self-
aggrandisement’: the traditional contest for personal dignitas accumulated by 
capitalising on successful past activity on behalf of the res publica and how 
this was contested by other politicians; (2.3) ‘personal integrity’: somewhat 
subtler claims to personal dignitas based on impeccable behaviour within/on 
behalf of the res publica (and disclaiming other people’s claims to personal 
dignitas by decrying their personal qualities, rather than their political 
achievements on behalf of the res publica); (2.4) ‘paradigm shift via 
technicality’: the decidedly non-traditional subversion of elite claims to 
dignitas by shifting responsibility and credit for administering the res publica 
onto the populus Romanus. 
 Chapter 3 (res publica salva) focuses on various concerns for the long-term 
wellbeing of the res publica as the structured political sphere, which is 
discussed in terms of (3.1) the distinction between ‘moral decline’ (the 
concern that the res publica is endangered by the declining morals of those 
responsible for administering it) and ‘sporadic anticipations of imminent 
danger’ (the concern that the res publica is endangered by the specific 
activities of specific individuals), leading to (3.2) the concern that the res 
publica has passed the point of no return and requires rebuilding from the 
ground up; (3.3) ‘res publica constituta’: inheriting Sulla’s res publica and 
the development of res publica as rhetorical fiction to conceal unease with 
aspects of the current political situation. 
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 Chapter 4 (res publica ipsa) traces the interplay between these aspects of res 
publica in our main source of continuous contemporary political evidence, M. 
Tullius Cicero. The main strands of discussion for this chapter concern the 
changing relationship between Cicero and the res publica over the course of 
Cicero’s public life, covering (4.1) a consul’s duty to the res publica, the 
expression of which locates said res publica very firmly in Rome; (4.2) the 
“Catilinarian Conspiracy”, a sporadic anticipation of imminent danger; (4.3) 
Cicero’s vulnerability after his consulship; (4.4–5) ‘self and state’: working 
out new relationships between private individuals and the res publica in the 
aftermath of exile, with particular resort to the rhetorical fiction of the res 
publica that first appears in uneasy reaction to Sulla’s res publica constituta. 
 Chapter 5 (res publica reciperata) explores the impact of Caesar’s civil war, 
which falls into (5.1) the ‘Republicans’ and the defence of res publica abroad, 
which challenged the res publica’s geographical location in Rome; (5.2) 
Caesar’s reduction of res publica to public business, which located it firmly 
in Rome; (5.3) Cicero’s res publica reciperata and general despair in the face 
of both versions; (5.4) the res publica libera of the ‘Liberators’ after Caesar’s 
death, which specifies a political condition (‘free’); (5.5) Cicero’s attempts to 
reconstruct a res publica in the Philippics in the hope of resurrecting a new 
and improved political order. 
 Chapter 6 (pro re publica) examines how individuals invoked the res publica 
to legitimise illegal and divisive political activity (sometimes euphemised as 
privatum consilium, as at Aug. RG 1.1). This chapter traces the development 
from P. Scipio Nasica’s murder of Tiberius Gracchus to Cicero’s promotion 
of the privatum consilium of Octavian and Decimus Brutus during the 
difficult period following Caesar’s death. Section (6.1) examines how 
Augustus’s Res Gestae echoes the rhetoric used to justify Nasica’s actions in 
133, and how this rhetoric was used against Cicero during the 50s. Section 
(6.2) considers other acts of privatum consilium, including Pompey’s early 
career and Caesar’s decision to cross the Rubicon nullo publico consilio. 
Section (6.3) looks at Cicero’s strategy in the Philippics and (6.4) explores 
some of the opposition Cicero faced. 
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Except where otherwise indicated, I cite OCT texts and Loeb translations (slightly 
amended). The terminal limit for my enquiry is Cicero’s death, which I take to be the 
end, if perhaps not of the Republic itself, then at least of clear and direct access to 
Republican discourse. I am not going to chase res publica through the thickets of the 
‘Second Triumvirate’, let alone into the dark wood of the Augustan principate, 
although Augustus’s epitaph reflects usefully on the conventions of the political 
system he helped to bring to an end. Finally, to return to the quotation with which I 
began, it may well be (in fact, it is certain) that my chosen themes do not exhaust the 
range of things that can be said about res publica and the Roman Republic. I hope, 
however, that within these limits it will be possible to say something constructive 
about the ways in which res publica was perceived and manipulated during this 
period. 
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2. REM PUBLICAM ADMINISTRARE 
 
The key heuristic tool for my discussion, both here and in following chapters, is the 
point that res publica meant different things to different people at different times. At 
its simplest, it means either ‘the public business to be administered’ or ‘the 
metaphorical arena in which the administration of the public business is 
considered/organised’. In ordinary politics, these positions express complementary, 
in fact overlapping, perspectives, rather than contradictory ones; still, the perspective 
that individual speakers choose to foreground in addressing specific audiences can 
be revealing. This chapter is concerned with the most literal position on this 
spectrum of possibilities: res publica as ‘public business’, which manifests most 
transparently in the intimate relationship between the res publica and the 
magistrates, who managed it (2.1). It was through this relationship, and more 
precisely through any notable achievements carried out while managing the res 
publica, that most individual politicians established their personal dignitas within the 
res publica, which led their rivals to seek ways to circumvent it (2.2). The most 
obvious attack was on the achievements for which individuals claimed credit, but it 
is possible to trace at least two more subversive tactics: the elder Cato’s valorisation 
of impeccable behaviour while engaged in re publica (2.3) and the popularis focus 
not on the magistrates but on the populus, which elected managers to manage its res 
(2.4). 
 
2.1 THE GARBAGE AND THE FLOWERS 
When Verres governed Sicily, ‘the res publica of no civitas could be administered’.64 
Administrare (‘to administer’) and gerere (‘to conduct, engage in’) rem publicam are 
two of the most common terms for magistrates managing public business, whether 
that business is overseeing law-courts, administering provinces or waging war.
65
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Those who held office stood in the position of managers to the res publica, whereas 
the relationship of the senate to the res publica was more oblique (hence the usual 
term for senatorial activity, consulere rei publicae, ‘to look after the interests of the 
res publica’66). While res publica perceived as political space implies horizontal 
relationships, because it concerns political insiders talking to each other about 
matters of shared interest within a metaphorical arena, res publica perceived as 
public business implies vertical relationships, since it concerns property or affairs 
that must be directly managed by one or more managers. It is therefore also possible 
to describe this relationship in terms of direction: so, for example, as far as the 
consuls and other magistrates were concerned, their vertical perspective on the res 
publica was a top-down one, since they were the managers. All magistrates were 
responsible for administering aspects of the res publica (their provincia), especially 
the consuls, who traditionally began their term in office by taking the auspices, 
dressing themselves in the magisterial toga praetexta in front of their Penates and 
holding a salutatio before making separate processions to the Capitol, where they 
would sacrifice an ox each to Jupiter and make vows ‘for the welfare (pro salute) of 
the res publica’.67 The actual words of the vow are not known, if there was even a 
standard formula,
68
 but Pina Polo argues that the vows should be seen as ‘public 
vows (vota publica)’ and that ‘the consuls did not act as individuals but as supreme 
magistrates, and, as a result, they did not plead in their vow for the success of a 
specific venture that they might have to undertake, but for the welfare and safety of 
the Roman state in general during their term of office’.69 Circumstantial evidence 
that such public vows invoked the salus rei publicae comes from Varro’s report, 
extracted from the censors’ records, of what the censor commanded the herald to tell 
the men after the censor had gone to the templum to take the auspices: ‘May this be 
good, fortunate, happy and salutary (bonum fortunatum felix salutareque) to the 
Roman people – the Quirites – and to the res publica of the Roman people – the 
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Quirites – and to me and my colleague, to our good faith (fides) and our office 
(magistratus)’.70 
Although a late source, Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum is highly revealing on the 
relationship that Republican magistrates enjoyed with Roman res publica and the 
ways in which they might draw on this relationship to legitimise their actions, since 
it preserves the sole extant, extensive account of a legally appointed senior 
Republican magistrate’s exploits abroad in office. Caesar was in Gaul as a proconsul, 
but prior to Sulla’s reforms most consuls would have spent most of their term of 
office commanding armies in the field;
71
 this, too, was ‘managing the res publica’. 
In Plautus’s Amphitruo, the slave Sosia has been sent by his master Amphitryon to 
tell Amphitryon’s wife, Alcmena, ‘how he had managed (ut gesserit) the res publica 
under his leadership, command, auspices’ by successfully waging war on the 
Telaboians;
72
 later in the play, Jupiter, masquerading as Amphitryon, tells Alcmena 
that he had stolen away from the legion in secret ‘so that first from me you might 
know the first news about how I managed (ut gessissem) the res publica’.73 Plautus’s 
characters are Greeks in a Greek setting and embroiled in a Greek mythological plot 
(the unlikely circumstances surrounding the conception of Hercules), but the 
language is Latin and the terms used are those appropriate to a Roman commander 
on campaign away from the city.
74
 To wage war for the Roman people was to 
manage their public business. Those magistrates sent abroad kept the senate and 
people informed on how their affairs were being managed through letters and 
reports, commentarii,
75
 a genre for which the Caesarian corpus now forms our entire 
data set. While the lack of literary ornament in all Caesar’s commentarii is 
notoriously misleading,
76
 the technique relies on creating an impression of 
artlessness and innocent fact. It would have been counterproductive to innovate too 
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obviously on generally accepted topics, so it is noteworthy that Caesar, when 
invoking the res publica to justify his various actions as proconsul in Gaul, 
consistently depicts insults or injuries to the res publica as insults or injuries to 
himself, or vice versa. Reflecting on the sorry state of the Aedui in Book 1, for 
example, Caesar takes their condition personally: 
 
Et secundum ea multae res eum hortabantur quare sibi eam rem cogitandam 
et suscipiendam putaret; in primis quod Aeduos, fratres consanguineosque 
saepe numero a senatu appellatos, in servitute atque in dicione videbat 
Germanorum teneri eorumque obsides esse apud Ariovistum ac Sequanos 
intellegebat; quod in tanto imperio populi Romani turpissimum sibi et rei 
publicae esse arbitrabatur.  
 
And straightaway many considerations induced him to suppose that he must 
take thought and action in the matter. In the first place, he could see that the 
Aedui, often hailed by the senate as brethren and kinsmen, were fast bound in 
slavery and subjection to the Germans, and he was aware that their hostages 
were with Ariovistus and the Sequani. This, considering how great the rule of 
the Roman people was, he considered to be an utter disgrace to himself and 
to the res publica. (Caes. BG 1.33.) 
 
The subjection of the pro-Roman Aedui to the Germans is a disgrace both to Caesar 
and to Roman interests, sibi et rei publicae, because of the greatness of the imperium 
of the populus Romanus. Since it is not obvious from the text how Caesar could be 
considered personally responsible for the degradation of the Aedui, he must shoulder 
the public responsibility as the local Roman magistrate, even though this is 
expressed as reflecting not just on the Roman res publica as a corporate identity but 
also on Caesar himself in a distinctly personal way. As Raditsa notes, ‘there is no 
discrepancy, certainly no antagonism between his self-respect and the public 
interest’.77 
This duality, responsibility of (or injury to) both the res publica and its local 
representative, occurs again in the Bellum Gallicum. At 1.20, petitioned by the loyal 
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Diviciacus to show mercy to his erring brother Dumnorix, Caesar ‘consoled him, 
bidding him end his entreaty, and showing that his influence with Caesar was so 
great that he excused the injury to the res publica and the vexation (dolor) felt by 
himself’.78 At 2.5, appealing to the same Diviciacus to back up his preferred military 
strategy by attacking the Bellovaci, Caesar explains ‘how important it was for the res 
publica and for the communal welfare to keep the contingents of the enemy apart’.79 
At 5.7, Caesar decides to see to it that the overly ambitious Dumnorix should not be 
able to harm ‘himself (Caesar) or the res publica’.80 When the proconsular Pompey 
accedes to Caesar’s request to lend him previously levied recruits, he concedes to 
‘res publica and private friendship (amicitia)’; 81  this is murkier than the other 
examples, because it links res publica with doing a favour to an amicus rather than 
with the welfare of a specific person or their campaigns, but it reflects the same dual 
perspective: not a choice between res publica or amicitia, but rather a combination 
of res publica and amicitia. The duality makes the public personal and the personal 
public: we are concerned not just with the res publica, but with the specific 
individual(s) legitimately entrusted with the power to act in the res publica’s 
interests. An insult or injury to the holder of such power is an insult or injury to the 
Roman res publica, whose representative he is; he is obliged to respond to it as a 
public, not just a personal, insult or injury. Correspondingly, the interests of the res 
publica are cited to legitimise actions taken while acting on its behalf. 
All of this is interesting not so much because it is surprising (after all, it is 
obvious that any disaster incurred by Roman magistrates engaged on public business 
would be a disaster for the Roman res publica) but because it is spelt out, not just 
once but repeatedly, and because it invests the specific responsible individual with a 
prominence that makes him more than a mere spokesman for some kind of corporate 
Roman identity. It is well within the bounds of probability that Caesar’s political 
aims in publishing this particular set of commentarii might have encouraged him to 
bring the specific individual magistrate concerned (himself) to the fore in the Bellum 
Gallicum.
82
 That said, however, while it may not be possible to compare Caesar’s 
approach to the commentarii of other magistrates, what does exist is a number of 
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letters written by Cicero from his proconsular province in Cilicia in 51–50 BC. Here 
again the same duality crops up. Writing to the magistrates and senate on 21 or 22 
September 51, Cicero explained that having arrived at his province on 31 July, ‘I 
considered that I should best conform to my duty and the public interest (officium 
meum resque publica) by making appropriate provisions for the army and for 
military security’.83 Probably in early April 50, Cicero wrote to Minucius Thermus 
about M. Anneius, a legate lent to Thermus and now required back in Cicero’s train, 
that ‘his services, advice, and military experience can clearly be invaluable to me 
and to the res publica’.84 Joining Cicero in Cilicia, Cicero told Coelius Caldus in 
June 50, would be ‘in my and the public interest and most of all in your own’.85 
Cicero tends to use more sophisticated variation in his phrasing (or, perhaps, 
Caesar’s commentarii employ more careful artlessness), but again the link between 
public and personal is made: the balance of magistrate and res publica. Cicero, like 
Caesar, had reasons eminently open to analysis to identify himself with the res 
publica whenever possible,
86
 but the banality of these references addressed to the 
senate and private individuals alike suggests that self-promotion is not the only thing 
at work here. Something similar appears in a fragment of the elder Cato’s Origines, 
where a brave military tribune (Q. Caecidius) volunteers himself and four hundred 
unlucky non-volunteers for certain death in order to save a reckless consul: ‘“If you 
find no one else,” said the tribune, “you may use me for that dangerous enterprise. I 
offer this life of mine to you and to the res publica”’.87 Either the unnamed consul or 
the res publica would have been sufficient; the hero of the hour, however, expresses 
his willingness to sacrifice himself for both. 
It is hard to access discourse, political or otherwise, outside the golden 
decades of the late Republic. The Tabula Bembina, a fragmentary inscription with a 
lex repetundarum on the obverse and a lex agraria on the reverse, is therefore a gift 
from antiquity.
88
 It preserves a formula that occurs at least once on a fragment of the 
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lex agraria, which can be firmly dated to 111 BC:
89
 the injunction that in certain 
circumstances, ‘the consul, praetor or censor, whoever [he shall be,] is to have 
jurisdiction [concerning that matter] and the right to grant trial and appoint a judge or 
recuperatores, just as shall seem to him [to be] according to the public interest (e re 
publica) and his own good faith (fides)’.90 Two Greek translations of Latin decrees 
provide supplementary epigraphic material: (1) the Senatus Consultum de 
Thisbensibus (170 BC), which records the senate directing the Roman magistrate Q. 
Maenius to delegate five senators ‘who[se selection] seemed to him consistent with 
the interests of the republic and his personal integrity’; here Clackson and Horrocks 
detect a translation of ita utei/queie ei e re publica fideque sua videatur/videantur;
91
 
and (2) the Lex de Provinciis Praetoriis,
92
 a law that may date to 100 BC on which 
there has been a substantial amount of scholarship and to which Crawford 1996a 
provides a substantial introduction;
93
 the editors propose to reconstruct a Latin 
original in which ‘[ita uti e re publica] fideque sua [videbitur esse] consulito’ lurks 
behind the Greek of the Delphi copy.
94
 Prior to either Caesar or Cicero, then, and in 
purely abstract contexts – that is, absent any specific individual with an interest in 
self-promotion – the magistrate’s personal good faith was placed on a par with the 
good of the res publica.
95
 Furthermore, this is not just empty rhetoric. Senatus 
consulta are unlikely locations for such material and the lex agraria is a legal 
document; the duality was enshrined in Roman law. This is reflected in Varro’s 
censorial proclamation, which invokes not just the bonum, fortuna, felicitas, 
salusque of the Quirites and their res publica, but also the fides magistratusque of 
the censor and his colleague.
96
 Well before Varro, Caesar or Cicero, Ennius had 
placed a similar blessing in Romulus’s mouth: 
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Quod mihi reique fidei regno vobisque, Quirites, 
Se fortunatim feliciter ac bene vortat. 
 
And may this, I pray, turn out in fortune prosperous and fair for me, our task, 
our plighted troth, our kingdom, and for you, Quirites. (Enn. Ann. 102–3.97) 
 
When he identified himself with the res publica in the Bellum Gallicum, Caesar was 
therefore exploiting an existing relationship rather than creating one. Roman 
magistrates were not faceless civil servants. Rather, the res publica and the 
individual magistrate entrusted with managing it were placed on a par. It was 
understood and expected that a magistrate with something to justify could invoke 
either his fides or his special relationship with the res publica, or preferably (as 
enjoined by the lex agraria of the Tabula Bembina) both. During the magistrate’s 
term in office, especially when he was commanding in the field or governing a 
province and so separated from Rome and the political insider’s metaphorical res 
publica, the community of consulting political peers, his personal interests were 
bound up with the public affairs he managed. He was not just responsible for 
administering the local interests of the res publica; in some sense, thanks to his 
office, he embodied it. 
 
2.2 HEROES 
Magistrates, then, enjoyed a particularly intimate relationship with the res publica. 
On the one hand, they managed (administrare, gerere) the res publica, a position 
that implies a top-down relationship of managers to the thing managed. On the other 
hand, this relationship did not subsume the individual into his office: rather, his 
individual character became all the more important, because he was entrusted with 
the conduct of public business. He could say, as Caesar and Cicero did, that a 
particular action was beneficial or detrimental to both himself and the res publica. 
This was of immediate political advantage to the magistrate while he was in office 
and could benefit his political future too, since a magistrate’s management of the res 
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publica, if carried out successfully and preferably including some significant 
achievement marked by a thanksgiving, ovation or triumph, gave him a base for 
future activity as a privatus within the res publica of political space. 
This is apparent from one relatively substantial source of surviving evidence 
for elite self-aggrandisement in the ‘classic’ Republic: the funerary context, attested 
principally by laudatio fragments and funerary inscriptions, in particular the 
Scipionic elogia.
98
 The ways in which elite families commemorated their deceased 
members were far from innocent, since, as Flower observes, ‘from the late third 
century BC onwards the laudationes which we know about are overtly political’.99 It 
is therefore significant that these fragments generally depict the great deeds of the 
individuals they commemorate as deeds of management, while foregrounding not 
activity within the res publica (that is, the political sphere) but rather primacy within 
the civitas (that is, the community of citizens). Consider, for example, this fragment 
of Q. Caecilius Metellus’s funeral laudatio for his father, L. Caecilius Metellus, 
given in 221 BC: 
 
voluisse enim primarium bellatorem esse, optimum oratorem, fortissimum 
imperatorem, auspicio suo maximas res geri, maximo honore uti, summa 
sapientia esse, summum senatorem haberi, pecuniam magnam bono modo 
invenire, multos liberos relinquere et clarissimum in civitate esse. Haec 
contigisse ei nec ulli alii post Romam conditam. 
 
for he wished to be a prime war-maker, an excellent orator, a very brave 
general, to manage the greatest affairs under his own auspices, to hold the 
greatest office, to be supremely wise, to be held the supreme senator, to 
acquire great wealth in a good way, to leave many children and to be 
outstanding in the civic community. This he achieved, unlike anyone else 
since the founding of Rome. (ORF 6.1.2 = Pliny NH 7.139–40.) 
 
If res publica can be recovered here, it must be seen as being subsumed into 
maximae res, the greatest (military) affairs. What is stressed is L. Metellus’s position 
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in the civitas, achieved by ending this particular rendition of “what a Roman nobilis 
wants to be” with it. Flower points out the significance of such a speech praising ‘the 
man who was in effect the founder of the family’s name and fortunes’: since there 
had been a dearth of office-holding Metelli prior to Lucius, apart from the consul of 
284 who was defeated and killed at Arretium, Q. Metellus ‘worked to stress his 
father’s excellence in comparison with earlier Romans in general’.100 These are the 
‘ten most important aristocratic virtues’ and L. Metellus is presented as having 
excelled in all of them, thereby winning a competition not only with his 
contemporaries but with past generations.
101
 Similarly, not one of the Scipionic 
elogia contains a res publica but all of them go to considerable lengths to place their 
subject apud vos, ‘among you’, where ‘you’ presumably refers to the massed ranks 
of ancestor-adoring Scipiones in the first place, but also functions generally as a way 
to locate a given Scipio within the civic body.
102
 
Van Sickle highlights the themes shared by the Metellan fragment and the 
oldest two elogia;
103
 he also argues that the elogia should be read as epigrams, in 
which case (contra Zevi, who takes apud vos as indicating a real civic audience
104
) 
the imagined civic audience of apud vos need not be taken literally, but rather as a 
convention of the genre.
105
 The contentious issue of whether the elogia were viewed 
by anyone other than the Scipiones is not at stake, however; what matters is the 
message conveyed, which is similar to that of Q. Metellus’s laudatio. So the oldest 
elogium, that of L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus (consul in 298, censor possibly in 280), 
runs: 
 
Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbatus Gnaivod patre | prognatus fortis vir 
sapiensque – quoius forma virtutei parisuma | fuit – consol censor aidilis 
quei fuit apud vos – Taurasia Cisauna | Samnio cepit – subigit omne 
Loucanam opsidesque abdoucit. 
 
Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbatus, born of his father Gnaeus, a brave and 
wise man – whose beauty was equal to his manliness – who was consul, 
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censor and aedile among you – he took Taurasia, Cisana and Samnia – he 
subjected all Lucania and led off hostages. (CIL 1.ii.7.
106
) 
 
The date of composition for this elogium is debated, since it seems to have replaced 
an erased inscription.
107
 It seems reasonable to take it as c. 270–250 BC, rather than 
a later composition, despite the peculiarities of the sarcophagus.
108
 Flower suggests 
the erased inscription ‘must have been controversial or unsatisfactory from the 
family’s point of view’, possibly the claim to have been first of the family.109 The 
valorised properties in its replacement are: (1) lineage; (2) character-based; (3) 
physical; (4) offices held; (5) military achievements. What is not invoked is any 
explicit conception of the res publica or indeed any kind of public service clause, 
despite the common interpretation of the elogia as a group that ‘reflejado el ideal 
aristocratico romano de servicio simultaneo a su propia familia y al Estado’. 110 
Rather than talking about such texts in terms of simultaneity (or indeed service), it 
might be better to view this as a reflection of Roman nobiles taking it for granted that 
their public activities, which they report to honour themselves and their families 
report to add to the corporate family lustre, also served the common interest: instead 
of an equal duality, in other words, these funerary scripts betray a subordination of 
abstract public interests to concrete personal achievements. 
All this testimony, both in the Scipionic elogia and Q. Metellus’s laudation 
of his father, is principally concerned with jockeying for position within the citizen 
body. These gentlemen are interested in themselves and their own achievements (or 
those of their family), which are measured against those of their fellow citizens. 
Their end-of-life resumés stress not that they have contributed to the shared public 
property, the res publica, in their magisterial roles but simply their achievements: 
holding office, outstanding reputations, position within the civitas (whether the 
microscopic version of Cicero’s societas iuris, the family, or the macroscopic 
version, the citizen body as a whole), military victories. This ultimately self-
aggrandising focus fleshes out the magistrate’s half of the res publica/magistrate 
duality: such decisions as a magistrate makes on behalf of the res publica he will 
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eventually be able to claim (or be obliged to disclaim) in his own right as a private 
individual. When L. Aemilius Paullus appropriated the Macedonian king Perseus’s 
monument at Delphi to advertise Perseus’s defeat at Pydna in 168, Rome was 
nowhere to be seen on the inscription; it was Paullus, the responsible imperator, 
whose victory over King Perseus and the Macedonians was commemorated.
111
 
Likewise when L. Mummius Achaicus, the consul of 146 and conqueror of Corinth, 
dedicated a temple promised in the field to Hercules Victor in c. 142, his inscription 
emphasised his personal responsibility for the victory: 
 
L. Mummi(us). L.f. cos. duct(u) | auspicio imperioque | eius Achaia capt(a), 
Corinto | deleto, Romam redieit | triumphans. Ob hasce | res bene gestas 
quod | in bello voverat, |hanc aedem et signu(m) | Herculis Victoris | 
imperator dedicat. 
 
Lucius Mummius, son of Lucius, consul, Achaia having been captured and 
Corinth destroyed under his leadership, auspices and command, returned to 
triumph in Rome. Because these affairs were achieved successfully, the 
commander dedicates what he vowed during the war, this shrine and image 
of Hercules Victor. (CIL 1.ii.626 = CIL 6.331, Tabula Lapidis Tiburtini, my 
translation.) 
 
There is no suggestion of any broader public interest here: the inscription begins 
with the individual consul, L. Mummi(us) L.f. cos., and ends with him, imperator 
dedicat. This temple was erected during a flurry of temple-building by self-
promoting politicians; also significant is the temple dedicated to Jupiter Stator c. 143 
by Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus (who defeated Andriscus and turned 
Macedonia into a province as praetor in 146, then almost stole the war in Greece 
from Mummius), and the temple dedicated to Mars in Circo c. 132 by D. Junius 
Brutus Callaicus. Ziolkowski points out that all three generals followed the 
outstanding P. Scipio Aemilianus Africanus by adopting new names based on their 
significant military achievements, indicating their competition with him in the 
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military arena.
112
 Military achievements on behalf of the res publica were excellent 
material for individual self-aggrandisement; even if consuls began their year in 
office by praying to the gods on behalf of the res publica, any vows they might make 
on the battlefield established a personal contract between general and god. Similarly, 
public buildings constructed by the proceeds of manubiae won in foreign wars 
enabled the victor to carve his name on Rome’s civic landscape at no personal cost, 
assuming he did his sums correctly when dividing up the spoils. ‘The credit claimed 
by Augustus in the Res Gestae and by every other magistrate who financed public 
projects from manubiae testifies to the fact that Roman magistrates could, to this 
extent, have their cake and eat it, too: they were credited for the public benefit from 
projects funded from manubiae even though they did not own them’.113 
This indicates one major reason why most politicians were unlikely to 
challenge the principle that actions performed by magistrates holding public office 
could afterwards be chalked up to individual credit: it was one that they all expected, 
or at least hoped, eventually to employ on their own behalf. Further, it gave their 
descendants a place to start their climb up the ladder to public office. What 
politicians could and did challenge, however, was whether such actions actually 
were in the common interest or demonstrated suitable virtus/fides on the individual 
magistrate’s part. This tension is prominent in the tradition concerning Fabius 
Maximus Cunctator, who earned his name for the delaying strategy he used against 
Hannibal in Italy and is the subject of a famous fragment of Ennius: 
 
 Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem. 
Noenum rumores ponebat ante salutem. 
Ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria claret. 
 
One man by his delays restored the state;  
Hearsay he would not put before our safety; 
Hence to this day the warrior’s glory shines – 
In after time, and more than it shone once. (Enn. Ann. 363–5.) 
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A recent article by Roller dissects the ‘unusual moral ambiguity’114 of the Fabian 
exemplum, for which the historiographical tradition preserves both praise and 
criticism. The criticisms cited by Ennius attacked Fabius on a personal level 
(because his failure to attack Hannibal when given the opportunity indicated a lack 
of the virtus appropriate to a Roman commander)
115
 and on a moral level (because 
leaving the colonies and Italian towns vulnerable to Hannibal’s slash and burn tactics 
was dishonourable).
116
 In response, Fabius argued that he held back in the interests 
of the res publica.
117
 Rather than defending his virtus or his fides (either rhetorically 
or materially, i.e. by attacking Hannibal), Fabius justified his apparent personal 
failings as the result of a deliberate strategy carried out in the public interest. 
Attacked on one count, he defended himself by way of the other. 
Roller observes that the tradition allows Fabius’s critics only moral 
arguments ‘couched in terms of courage versus cowardice and honor versus 
dishonor’, while Fabius alone ‘is given a monopoly on the larger pro re publica 
argument’.118 Ultimately, it was Fabius whose claims were validated. Had Fabius’s 
tactics failed against Hannibal, however, he might have faced worse than criticism, 
since a general’s personal virtus could be the decisive factor when disaster loomed. 
In his study of imperatores victi, Rosenstein outlines how generals might get away 
with being defeated if they managed to display sufficient virtus in the process: ‘a 
general was expected to display courage and self-control when things were falling 
apart all around him – a willingness to fight hard, take risks, and, if necessary, meet 
death fighting bravely’.119 A defeat was in no way in the public interest, but the 
individual concerned might manage to shake off responsibility for it if he could 
convince everyone that he had behaved in every way as an exemplary Roman 
magistrate, getting defeated aside.
120
 It helped considerably if he got killed in the 
process: ‘to die resisting desperately was thus not only to avoid the shame of capture 
but possibly even to achieve a certain measure of gloria as well’, 121  whereas 
emerging alive from a disaster invited awkward questions about how the general had 
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survived amid the slaughter of his men.
122
 All of this indicates not only that the 
tension between virtus and res publica was genuinely two-sided but also that 
pushing for the good of the res publica as the pre-eminent criterion for judging an 
action, rather than prioritising what said action expressed about the personal (the 
commander’s) and collective (the soldiers’) character of the actor(s), was actually a 
rather unusual tactic. Fabian caution, it seems, was generally remembered rather than 
imitated: he was viewed ‘as an exceptional man in exceptional circumstances’ and 
his model, ‘although enduring, does not seem to have played a major part in shaping 
the Roman aristocratic ideal of the proper behaviour for a general’, which was 
consistently aggressive.
123
 
This is a good note on which to return to the supremely aggressive Caesar 
and his exploitation of his magisterial claim to administer and embody the res 
publica in Gaul. Above, I focused on the Bellum Gallicum as evidence for the formal 
relationship between magistrates and res publica,
124
 but like the fragmentary 
laudationes and the Scipionic elogia these commentarii are not innocent texts. It is 
generally accepted that the Bellum Gallicum is not just an artless account of Caesar’s 
campaigns but a highly artful work of ‘personal propaganda’,125 and furthermore that 
Caesar wanted to establish himself as a world-class general to rival the resident 
Roman Alexander, Cn. Pompeius Magnus.
126
 Caesar in Gaul was doing what Scipio 
Aemilianus, Mummius and the elder Scipiones had done before him: using his time 
in office to construct a personal reputation to compete with current and historic 
Roman generals. The Bellum Gallicum was written and published at least partly to 
further this aim.
127
 In principle, there was nothing wrong or remarkable about 
accumulating personal political capital from exploits carried out in office; in practice, 
however, Caesar could expect to face opposition, firstly because his consulship had 
earned him enemies in Rome
128
 and secondly because the legality of conquering 
Gaul was dubious: Caesar ‘had no instruction to make conquests, no authority to do 
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so. For there were laws – including his own lex repetundarum – that forbade a 
governor to make war on his own initiative’.129 At best, he may have had the right to 
get involved in military operations beyond his borders if it was in the national 
interest, but only to sort out trouble spots, not take over whole countries. His 
aggression was particularly ugly because the villain of the first book of the Bellum 
Gallicum, Ariovistus, had been named rex et amicus during Caesar’s own consulship. 
Caesar therefore exaggerates the danger and arrogance of the enemy,
130
 depicts his 
campaigns as stemming from a series of defensive acts on behalf of Rome’s local 
allies and presents himself ‘in all innocence as a Roman governor who performs his 
multifarious tasks in a traditional fashion, conscientiously and circumspectly, as duty 
requires’. 131  When Caesar represents himself as thinking that the sorry state of 
Rome’s regional allies is ‘most disgraceful for him and for the res publica’,132 he 
trots out a standard formula in order to justify starting a war that may or may not be 
good for the res publica but which he certainly expects will benefit himself. 
Conversely, when his opponents in Rome attacked him in 55, it was not because his 
Gallic activities up until then had done any material damage to the res publica, but 
rather on the grounds (specious or otherwise) that Caesar had broken faith with his 
Germanic opponents. This breach of fides, the younger M. Porcius Cato argued, 
should be repaired in the traditional fashion: by handing the offender (Caesar) over 
to the Germans, thus averting from the soldiers and Rome itself any divine wrath 
Caesar might have incurred.
133
 In short, a magistrate or pro-magistrate’s claim to 
represent the res publica could be turned against him if he failed to demonstrate the 
virtus or uphold the fides appropriate to a Roman commander and, by extension, the 
Roman res publica as a whole. Given the rewards available to a magistrate who 
substantially outperformed his fellows, it was by no means guaranteed that such a 
magistrate’s claim to be acting pro re publica would be accepted uncritically. 
 
2.3 HIS LONELY WOODEN TOWER 
What I outline above is straightforward: when those who had held office made 
political hay out of their public achievements, their peers generally retaliated by 
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challenging whether those achievements had been appropriately conducted rather 
than their right to do so in the first place. Having said this, however, there were at 
least two ways to circumvent the link between public achievement and personal 
dignitas entirely. The first can be most securely identified with the famous forebear 
of Caesar’s Catonian opponent, the elder M. Porcius Cato, consul of 195, censor in 
184 and the first writer of Latin historiography, for whom an unusually substantial 
collection of rhetorical and historiographical fragments survives.
134
 As a homo novus, 
Cato faced various well-examined challenges which he surmounted in various well-
examined ways,
135
 thereby establishing himself in ‘the Roman historical memory’ as 
someone who built his political career ‘by challenging the notion that aristocratic 
authority was the exclusive possession of a few clans even while affirming the 
aristocratic commitment to the replication or reperformance of ancestral practices 
and behaviours’. 136  Since Cato lacked the sort of family that accumulates in 
impressive tombs and produces inherently competitive epitaphs, in other words, he 
competed not with his own uninspiring family history but with the serried ranks of 
Rome’s collective past; and his principal strategy of self-promotion relied not so 
much on his individual achievements in office as on the construction of a public 
persona as one who devoted himself to the public sphere even when not even holding 
any public office at all. On the one hand, Cato held that such offices were ‘duties to 
be performed in the interests of the res publica, with strict attention to the particular 
tasks and proper procedures, and with equally strict avoidance of all personal gain 
from the opportunities afforded by public offices and commands’, and on the other 
hand he thought prominent men were obliged to spend their time usefully in the 
public interest.
137
 
Cato did promote his various individual achievements as well. Like most 
other consuls of the pre-Sullan period, he commanded an army abroad during his 
year in office;
138
 this was, however, his only active military command held under his 
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own auspices, and although his activities in Spain earned him three days of public 
thanksgiving, a triumph and an opportunity to promote himself as a military hero on 
his return, it is noteworthy that most of his preserved remarks to do with his Spanish 
campaign concern the propriety of his personal behaviour (what he ate and drank, 
that he did everything as cheaply as he could, that he behaved scrupulously in regard 
to public money).
139
 A few years later, he made as much political capital as possible 
out of a flanking mission performed against the Aetolians at Thermopylae in 191,
140
 
but this mission, while successful and pleasingly dramatic, was carried out as a 
military tribune under the command and auspices of the consul, M’. Acilius Glabrio, 
to whom the credit for the victory properly belonged.
141
 Cato was not averse to self-
promotion on military grounds; his problem was that his achievements could not 
compete with those of such genuinely outstanding contemporary generals as the 
elder P. Scipio Africanus and his brother L. Scipio Asiaticus. He cemented his 
reputation as summus imperator for posterity by writing a handbook on military 
matters,
142
 but this was not what underpinned his political self-promotion. Rather, he 
downplayed the extraordinary occasional efforts of individuals and valorised instead 
extraordinary long-term devotion (especially his own) to the res publica in the sense 
both of public affairs and of the communal political arena within which he and his 
political peers moved. 
This is reflected in the fragments of his historical work on the origins of the 
various Italian communities. Cato notoriously left generals (other than himself) 
unnamed in the Origines,
143
 thereby breaking the accepted public 
achievement/individual credit link (for other people). The anecdote of the brave 
tribune and the escaping consul was cited above;
144
 in the actual fragment from Cato, 
even the tribune (eventually named by Gellius as Quintus Caedicius, although 
Gellius reports that Claudius Quadrigarius calls him Laberius) is unnamed, and in 
the paraphrase of Cato’s anecdote that precedes the quotation neither the tribune nor 
the consul is named. While this spares the anonymous consul discredit for having led 
his army into a dangerous situation, the tale as preserved by Gellius imputes no 
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explicit guilt but does transfer credit for escaping the Carthaginian trap from the 
consul to the self-sacrificing tribune. (Cato’s own stint as a heroic military tribune 
may be relevant to this point.) Gotter argues that the absence of names ‘is a matter of 
devaluing individual heroics as a whole’; it is not ‘a devaluation of norms’ (since the 
stressed norm remains virtus) but rather a matter of shifting those norms from the 
individual actor to ‘the Roman people as a whole’.145 In other words, Cato’s refusal 
to name (other people’s) names brings the exemplum to the fore, as opposed to the 
person or their gens. Whereas wandering Greek heroes and the protagonists of 
foundation myths are named, ‘the entire aristocracy of the “classical” Republic’ 
coalesces into a collective mass.
146
 This marked absence may also be taken as ‘an 
application of Cato’s concept of duty: service for the state, not for personal glory’,147 
albeit one not applied to Cato himself, who included two of his own speeches in the 
Origines and must have done so in a context that made his own role clear.
148
 To 
quote Gotter, ‘Catonian historiography is politics by other means’.149 
To place the res publica above the individuals who managed or moved 
within it was to render anonymous those (other, extraordinary) individuals and 
opened up opportunities for self-promotion on the grounds of ordinary political 
activities excellently conducted. Cato stressed fiscal propriety throughout his life, 
whether in opposing the repeal of the Oppian sumptuary law during his consulship or 
inveighing against extravagance and misuse of public funds and going to extreme 
lengths to ensure profitable contracts for public works and vectigalia as censor.
150
 
Furthermore, Cato’s treatment of past Romans like the military tribune (who are 
identified ‘through the political and military offices that provide the key to their 
place in Rome’s civic and social hierarchy, but which fail to individualize them’151) 
stands in contrast to his treatment of contemporaries, who are denounced and 
attacked by name in a very personal way (so, for example, Ser. Servius Galba, 
praetor in 151 and consul in 144, is roughly treated).
152
 While praise is anonymous, 
criticism involves named names. Mehl takes this to indicate more than Cato making 
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points against select contemporaries; rather, it is part of Cato’s crusade against the 
influences that he perceived as corrupting the mos maiorum during his own lifetime 
and should be read as ‘moral critique’.153 Appeal to the res publica is prominent in 
Cato’s oratorical fragments,154 of which the most relevant comes from the speech De 
Sumptu Suo of 164: 
 
Iussi caudicem proferri, ubi mea oratio scripta erat de ea re, quod 
sponsionem feceram cum M. Cornelio. Tabulae prolatae: maiorum benefacta 
perlecta: deinde quae ego pro re p. fecissem leguntur. Ubi id utrumque 
perlectum est, deinde scriptum erat in oratione: ‘numquam ego pecuniam 
neque meam neque sociorum per ambitionem dilargitus sum’. Attat, noli, noli 
<s>cribere, inquam, istud: nolunt audire. Deinde recitavit: ‘numquam 
<ego> praefectos per sociorum vestrorum oppida imposivi, qui eorum bona 
liberos diriperent’. Istud quoque dele; nolunt audire: recita porro. 
‘numquam ego praedam neque quod de hostibus captum esset neque 
manubias inter pauculos amicos meos divisi, ut illis eriperem qui cepissent’. 
Istuc quoque dele: nihil <e>o minus volunt dici; non opus est recitato. 
‘Numquam ego evectionem datavi, quo amici mei per symbolos pecunias 
magnas caperent’. Perge istuc quoque uti cum maxime delere. ‘Numquam 
ego argentum pro vino congiario inter apparitores atque amicos meos 
disdidi, neque eos malo publico divites feci’. Enimvero usque istuc ad lignum 
dele. Vide sis quo loco re<s> p. siet, uti quod rei p. bene fecissem, unde 
gratiam capiebam, nunc idem illud memorare non audeo, ne invidiae siet. Ita 
inductum est male facere inpoene, bene facere non inpoene licere. 
 
I ordered the book to be brought out in which had been written my speech on 
that matter concerning which I had made a judicial wager with Marcus 
Cornelius. The tablets were brought out; the services of my ancestors were 
read out; then those things which I had done for the res publica were read. 
When the reading out of both of these was finished, the speech went on as 
follows: “Never have I lavished my own money or that of the allies in order 
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to win favour.” “Oh no!” I said, “Don’t, don’t write that.” Then he read out, 
“Never have I imposed prefects on the towns of your allies, to plunder their 
property and children.” “Delete that too; they don’t want to hear it. Read 
further.” “Never have I divided booty taken from the enemy or prize money 
among the small circle of my friends and thus snatched it away from those 
who had captured it.” “Erase as far as that as well: there is nothing they less 
want said than that. It is not needed; read on.” Never have I granted a travel-
order to enable my friends to gain large sums by means of the warrants.” 
“Get on and delete there too, immediately.” “The money intended for wine 
distribution I have never shared out among my attendants and friends nor 
have I made them rich to the detriment of the public.” “Most certainly erase 
that, right down to the wood. See, if you please, what condition the res 
publica is in, when for fear it should be a cause of ill will I dare not recall the 
very services I performed for the res publica, from which I used to gain 
gratitude. Thus it has become normal practice to do ill with impunity, but not 
to be permitted to do well with impunity.” (ORF 8.44.173 = Fronto, Ad A. 
Imp. 1.2.9; translation from Astin 1978: 135–6, slightly amended.) 
 
Unsurprisingly, the homo novus Cato does not linger on the maiorum benefacta, the 
services of his ancestors. At the same time, however, he passes just as fast over 
‘what I had done for the res publica’, that is, his actual achievements in office. 
Rather, the stress is solely on the negative: what Cato had not done, from misusing 
his own or allied money to enriching his friends at public expense. Cato concludes 
that all these disreputable activities are now common practice and his audience will 
not thank him for reminding them of his own pristine career; it will only harm his 
cause to stress his exemplary past conduct. The implicit competitive claim involves 
not what Cato did (which plenty of consuls past and future could reasonably claim to 
have matched or surpassed) but how he did it (with a clean-handedness no one in 
these debased days will appreciate). For Cato, it is through this clean-handedness, 
rather than any specific office or act, that he served (bene fecissem) the res publica; 
and it is through such service to the res publica that one gains gratitude (gratia) and 
thus political capital. This tactic neatly circumvents the standard public 
office/personal credit political economy apparent in the funerary texts and might 
have produced a different outcome for the Roman Republic had more major 
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politicians seen fit to stake their careers on it. Since it was a tactic available to 
anyone with a talent for literary self-promotion, however, and did little to 
differentiate a given individual from his competitors (recall L. Caecilius Metellus’s 
wish to be clarissimus in civitate and the Scipionic stress on where a given Scipio 
stood apud vos), it is obvious why most of them did not. 
 
2.4 THE MIRROR 
Cato’s subversion of the aristocratic code remains just that, however: aristocratic. 
The promotion of one’s perfectly proper conduct in the administration of the res 
publica was a strategy available only to those who had been involved in 
administering the res publica, having undergone the aristocratic business of election 
to (preferably high) office. Furthermore, as subversions go, it is not particularly 
subversive; it politicises the res publica only insofar as it lays stress on individual 
conduct within the res publica rather than individual achievement on behalf of the 
res publica, a shift of emphasis that is hardly inimical to the principle of elite 
administration. From an elite perspective, the other way in which the public 
office/individual credit link was circumvented was much more worrying: the 
popularis invocation of the supreme authority of the populus Romanus. 
One anecdote sometimes cited as a locus classicus of elite/populus 
interaction is retailed by Valerius Maximus and concerns the consul of 138: 
 
Qui enim licet hoc loci Nasicam praeterire, fidentis animi dictique 
clarissimum auctorem? Annonae caritate increscente C. Curiatius tr. pl. 
productos in contionem consules compellebat ut de frumento emendo adque 
id negotium explicandum mittendis legatis in curia referrent. Cuius instituti 
minime utilis interpellandi gratia Nasica contrariam actionem ordiri coepit. 
Obstrepente deinde plebe, ‘tacete, quaeso, Quirites,’ inquit: ‘plus ego enim 
quam vos quid rei publicae expediat intellego.’ Qua voce audita omnes pleno 
venerationis silentio maiorem auctoritatis eius quam suorum alimentorum 
respectum egerunt. 
 
For how at this point can I pass over Nasica, the famous author of a saying 
that expressed his confident spirit? The price of corn was on the rise and the 
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tribune of the plebs C. Curiatius brought the consuls before a contio and 
urged them to make a motion in the senate about buying corn and sending 
envoys to arrange the matter. Nasica began to speak in a contrary sense, in 
order to obstruct this highly inexpedient course of action. Then, when the 
people shouted in protest, “Be silent, I ask you, Quirites,” he said, “for I more 
than you grasp what is expedient for the res publica.” When they heard that, 
all fell reverently silent, paying more regard to his authority than to their own 
nourishment. (ORF 38.1.3 = Val. Max. 3.7.3.) 
 
P. Scipio Nasica’s later political activities will be discussed in due course; here, it is 
sufficient to observe that the man who as a privatus five years later would invoke the 
welfare of the res publica to suppress with violence the tribune Tiberius Gracchus 
was on record as consul invoking the res publica to shut down the activities of an 
earlier tribune channelling popular discontent. Reading between the lines, Nasica’s 
comment indicates something to the effect of “You selfish plebs may think a grain 
law would be in your interests, but actually this is an expression of your narrow-
minded self-interest; I can see the broader picture and therefore you should sit down 
and shut up when I tell you that a grain law would not be in the interests of that 
broader picture, that is to say: res publica.” Nasica exerts the consul’s claim to know 
what was best for the res publica (since the consul was, after all, responsible for its 
administration) when his audience proved unreceptive to more reasoned arguments. 
This incident has occasionally been treated as representative of how the elite 
classes kept the populus under their thumb during the classic Republic (that is, 
through the exertion of sheer auctoritas),
155
 probably because of Valerius Maximus’s 
claim that Nasica’s audience dutifully shut up, but the broader historical context is 
one of general and increasing tension between the tribunes and their senior 
colleagues. Taylor’s 1962 study of tribunician conduct in the two decades prior to 
133, which emphasises the ‘revolutionary character’ of incidents like the 
imprisonment of the consuls in 151 and 138,
156
 has recently been expanded by 
Williams, who argues that such behaviour was normal tribunician activity; although 
some tribunes at any given point in Roman history may have acted as tools of the 
senate or individual politicians, the tribune body as a whole functioned to further the 
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interests of the populus.
157
 The contio encounter Valerius Maximus describes is the 
antagonistic sort: the consul had been dragged before a presumably hostile contio by 
a definitely hostile tribune in an attempt to compel him to do something about the 
high price of grain. Nasica’s eventual response was not conciliatory, but rather a 
straightforward appeal to authority: to tell the contio to stop nagging because he 
knew best. Even if this particular contio did fall silent, as Valerius Maximus claims, 
138 was a difficult year for all concerned; at some point the levies for the Spanish 
war became a hot issue and Nasica and his colleague, having refused to accede to the 
demand by two tribunes to release a number of men from the levy, were hauled off 
to prison by the same tribunes in a repeat of an incident in 151.
158
 In short, Nasica’s 
relationship with the tribunes and by inference any section of the populus for which 
such tribunes could claim to speak was antagonistic from the start. (Either this 
Nasica or his son is also the subject of another famous anecdote from Valerius 
Maximus in which an untimely witticism on a voter’s calloused hands won the wit a 
repulsus at the elections for the curule aedileship;
159
 the family was not known for its 
ingratiating approach to the electorate.) It seems unduly generous to take Nasica’s 
autocratic shortness as characteristic of elite dealings with the populus in general, 
since the year was not one of ‘politics as usual’ and Nasica had begun by attempting 
to talk his way out of a sticky situation. On the other hand, it is comprehensible that 
Nasica, backed into a corner by a hostile audience, should resort to exploiting the 
consul’s responsibility for managing the res publica (more usually exhibited on the 
battlefield) to shut down popular discontent in a domestic political spat. 
The incident reflects two important issues: firstly the growth of political 
tensions surrounding popular interests and secondly the use of magisterial auctoritas, 
derived especially from the magistrate’s privileged position in relation to the res 
publica, to silence discussion when argument fails. This nasty little nexus gave rise 
to the disastrous tribunate of Nasica’s eventual bête noire, Tiberius Gracchus. The 
events of 133 will be examined below in sections 3.1 and 6.1, but it is pertinent that 
when Tiberius was attacked for arranging the deposition of a fellow tribune, Marcus 
Octavius, he defended himself on the grounds that whereas a tribune who engaged in 
something illegal like arson was a bad tribune, a tribune who annulled the power of 
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the people was no tribune at all (and could therefore be removed from office, as 
Octavius had been).
160
 Tiberius and his turbulent successors in the tribunate 
represented themselves, as tribunes, as the instruments of the populus; whereas Cato 
had subverted the public achievement/personal credit link in the interests of co-
opting more personal credit for himself, the populares generally aimed to break 
through elite opposition in order to pass whatever the controversial bill of the day 
happened to be. Their attitude to magisterial dignitas derived from the administration 
of the res publica was consequently considerably less respectful. 
It is difficult to find examples of genuinely popularis rhetoric, let alone 
popularis rhetoric on any specific topic, but an illuminating fragment of Gaius 
Gracchus does survive: 
 
Nam vos, Quirites, si velitis sapientia atque virtute uti, etsi quaeritis, 
neminem nostrum invenietis sine pretio huc prodire. Omnes nos, qui verba 
facimus, aliquid petimus, neque ullius rei causa quisquam ad vos prodit, nisi 
ut aliquid auferat. Ego ipse, qui aput vos verba facio, ut vectigalia vestra 
augeatis, quo facilius vestra commoda et rempublicam administrare possitis, 
non gratis prodeo; verum peto a vobis non pecuniam, sed bonam 
existimationem atque honorem. Qui prodeunt dissuasuri ne hanc legem 
accipiatis, petunt non honorem a vobis, verum a Nicomede pecuniam; qui 
suadent ut accipiatis, hi quoque petunt non a vobis bonam existimationem, 
verum a Mithridate rei familiari suae pretium et praemium; qui autem ex 
eodem loco atque ordine tacent, hi vel acerrimi sunt; nam ab omnibus 
pretium accipiunt et omnis fallunt. Vos, cum putatis eos ab his rebus remotos 
esse, inpertitis bonam existimationem; legationes autem a regibus, cum 
putant eos sua causa reticere, sumptus atque pecunias maximas praebent, 
item uti in terra Graecia, quo in tempore Graecus tragoedus gloriae sibi 
ducebat talentum magnum ob unam fabulam datum esse, homo 
eloquentissimus civitatis suae Demades ei respondisse dicitur: ‘mirum tibi 
videtur, si tu loquendo talentum quaesisti? Ego, ut tacerem, decem talenta a 
rege accepi’. Item nunc isti pretia maxima ob tacendum accipiunt. 
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For you, fellow citizens, if you wish to be wise and virtuous, and if you 
inquire into the matter, will find that none of us comes forward here without 
pay. All of us who address you are after something, and no one appears 
before you for any purpose except to carry something away. I myself, who 
am now recommending you to increase your taxes, in order that you may the 
more easily serve your own advantage and administer the res publica, do not 
come here for nothing; but I ask of you, not money, but honour and your 
good opinion. Those who come forward to persuade you not to accept this 
law, do not seek honour from you, but money from Nicomedes; those also 
who advise you to accept it are not seeking a good opinion from you, but 
from Mithridates a reward and an increase of their possessions; those, 
however, of the same rank and order who are silent are your very bitterest 
enemies, since they take money from all and are false to all. You, thinking 
that they are innocent of such conduct, give them your esteem; but the 
embassies from the kings, thinking it is for their sake that they are silent, give 
them great gifts and rewards. So in the land of Greece, when a Greek tragic 
actor boasted that he had received a whole talent for one play, Demades, the 
most eloquent man of his community, is said to have replied to him: ‘Does it 
seem wonderful to you that you have gained a talent by speaking? I was paid 
ten talents by the king for holding my tongue.’ Just so, these men now 
receive a very high price for holding their tongues.” (ORF 48.12.44 = Gell. 
11.10.1.) 
 
The fragment comes from Gaius’s speech against a proposed law of 123, the lex 
Aufeia, on a quarrel between Mithridates V of Pontus and Nicomedes II of Bithynia 
over the proposal to give Phrygia to Mithridates.
161
 Gaius makes a show of letting 
the populus in on the great political secret of the day: those who propose legislation, 
or attack proposed legislation, or are involved in politics in any way whatsoever, 
himself included, are motivated by self-interest. This enables him to set up a contrast 
between his own laudably self-interested motivation (bona existimatio, ‘good 
opinion’, and honor, which might be ‘honour’ or ‘office’) and the purely mercenary 
motives of those currently arguing against him or keeping quiet, who do so in the 
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hope of monetary reward from one king or the other. What is interesting is how 
Gaius justifies his opinion that the vectigalia should be increased on the grounds that 
this will make it easier for ‘you’ (his audience, the populus), to administer to ‘your’ 
good (vestra commoda) and the res publica. By now administrare rem publicam 
should be familiar as a standard term for carrying out public business; in the majority 
of cases, however, it refers to the activities of magistrates and those who advise them 
(that is, the senate).
162
 It is easy to see Gaius’s logic, which rests on the familiar 
premise that the populus, comprising the civic body (civitas) to which the res 
publica ultimately belongs, elects magistrates to administer the res publica on its 
behalf.
163
 Gaius removes the middleman: his populus, by passing laws and electing 
magistrates, directly administers its res publica. Mackie argues that the populares 
‘constructed ideological justifications for extending the rights and powers of the 
populace, justifications based on values which the proponents of senatorial power 
also shared’.164 This particular justification up-ends the magisterial perspective on 
the res publica; the perspective Gaius Gracchus provides here is that of a vertical 
relationship seen from the bottom, in which the focus is less on the administration of 
the res publica than on the selection of the administrators (and potentially also the 
removal of those who administer unsatisfactorily). 
Gaius’s perspective both clarifies and may be clarified by a minor puzzle that 
was partially addressed in Chapter 1: Cicero’s definition of a res publica as the res 
populi in the De Republica. Schofield, approaching De Republica from the angle of 
the Greek theoretical models Cicero employs, is struck by Cicero’s use of a property 
metaphor; he argues that the definition of res publica as res populi is ‘designed to 
furnish the grounds of a distinction between constitutions/politeiai/set-ups/“regimes” 
(in the Straussian parlance) that are legitimate and those that are not’, and 
furthermore that ‘this interest in discriminating between set-ups on grounds of 
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legitimacy is a distinctly Roman and Ciceronian input into the theory of Rep.’ (his 
italics).
165
 While this argument is broadly plausible, the novelty of Cicero’s 
metaphors is questionable, since much of my discussion so far leads to the 
conclusion that the res publica was precisely conceived of as the property 
(amorphous and undefined a property as it may be) of its constituent public, whether 
that be the citizens of Rome or the Gallic and Sicilian civitates of Caesar’s Bellum 
Gallicum and Cicero’s Verrines or the nationes of ORF 48.3.22 which Gaius 
Gracchus says have lost their res publicae through avarice and foolishness (avaritia 
atque stultitia). If a res publica can be ‘handed down’ (tradere) by the maiores to the 
current generation, or by the current generation to future magistrates,
166
 it must be 
conceived of as property in some respect. Moreover, several fragments of Ennius 
follow the res maximae of the Scipionic elogium for L. Scipio Barbatus by 
compressing res publica into simply res;
167
 historically it was res that was the 
indispensable part of the formula, the ‘thing’, not publica, perhaps because such 
texts address a stratum of society that took for granted its unquestioned right/duty to 
administer said thing(s) and had no particular concern to stress that it did so on the 
public’s behalf. Conversely, the point may be that it is precisely not the public that is 
administered: the populus selects its stewards to manage matters of communal 
concern, not to manage itself. In any case, Cicero’s definition aligns perfectly well 
with existing traditions of Roman thought and practice, even if it causes problems 
for those who want to map his categories onto Greek theorising. What does begin to 
look odd, however, is Cicero’s insistent stress on defining the publica (that is, the 
populus) to which the res belongs. 
The Gracchan fragment indicates the more contentious political 
circumstances in play well before and during the time De Republica was written, and 
also suggests a reason why this concept of the res publica as the property of the 
populus might be obscured in what remains of ‘live’ Republican discourse. As the 
discussion of popular government at De Republica 1.47–50 shows, the ‘raw’ claim 
that res publica res populi est lends itself very easily and very obviously to popularis 
political exploitation. This discussion disembowels the jingle in a way that lays out 
the political capital available for those inclined to take such a definition at face value: 
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Si vero ius suum populi teneant, negant quicquam esse praestantius, liberius, 
beatius, quippe qui domini sint legum, iudiciorum, belli, pacis, foederum, 
capitis unius cuiusque, pecuniae. hanc unam rite rem publicam, id est rem 
populi, appellari putant. 
 
But if the people would maintain their rights, they [those arguing in favour of 
popular government] say that nothing would be more outstanding, more free 
or more happy, for they themselves would be masters of the laws and of the 
courts, of war and peace, of international agreements, and of everyone’s life 
and property. For this alone, they think, can rightly be called a res publica, 
that is, ‘the property of the people’. (Cic. Rep. 1.48.) 
For those inclined to popular politics, that is, defining a res publica explicitly as the 
res populi supports the idea that the populus should exert direct control over all 
aspects of public affairs. All three ‘pure’ forms of government (monarchy, 
aristocracy, popular) come in for criticism in the De Republica, but it is harder to 
deny that a res publica controlled by the people does not count as a res populi: ‘there 
may seem to be logical difficulties’ (videbuntur fortasse angustiae), says Scipio, in 
denying that a res publica exists when everything is in the power of the populus.
168
 
Of course his interlocutors are vehement that this is not the case (perhaps especially 
so because of the apparent paradox involved) and triumphantly declare that no res 
publica exists here either, mostly by way of rejecting the claims of a disorganised 
rabble (multitudo) to call itself a populus – and at this point the reasoning behind 
Cicero’s emphatic definition of a populus as a community held together by common 
bonds of justice (consensus iuris), rather than simply a civitas of fellow cives, 
becomes clear. Once again, it is not the definition of res that is attacked, but rather 
the publica/populus half of the equation. What exists in the classic popularly 
governed community, according to Laelius, is not the rule of the populus but rather a 
beast (belua) that imitates the name and appearance of the people (quae populi 
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speciem et nomen imitatur).
169
 It is generally agreed that a popular government is the 
worst of the three possible ‘pure’ forms.170 
While there is more to be said about what Cicero is doing with these 
arguments, especially in relation to his Greek models,
171
 my main point here is the 
way in which casting the res publica as property played into a certain theme of 
contemporary Roman politics. The populares insisted on the formal powers of the 
populus, which they used to break through senatorial and magisterial opposition;
172
 
to make the point that the res publica belonged to the populus, rather than to the 
magistrates who administered it or the senators who advised them, was, at the very 
least, a way to ingratiate oneself with a popular audience. Although only fragments 
survive for the most important figures in the popularis tradition, comparisons can be 
drawn with Cicero’s contio speech on the lex Manilia of 66, in particular the section 
setting the (pro-Pompeian) judgement of the populus against the (anti-Pompeian) 
judgement of the elite.
173
 Tan argues that prior to the events of the Catilinarian crisis 
Cicero ‘was actively, vehemently and successfully fostering a popularis image’,174 
and the argument in the Pro Lege Manilia echoes the Gracchan line that the populus 
has, or at least should have, the final word on political affairs (assuming – an 
important caveat that does not appear in the fragment from Gracchus – that what the 
populus wants is indeed what is best for the res publica). At stake is Q. Catulus’s 
protest that the proposed command for Pompey is a novelty. ‘Let no innovation be 
made contrary to usage and the principles of our ancestors’, 175  Catulus said, 
according to Cicero, who passes over (at considerable length) various historic 
novelties in order to focus on the novelties already committed by Pompey with 
Catulus’s approval.176 It would be unjust and not to be borne (periniquum et non 
ferendum) if, after the positive judgement of men such as Catulus upon Pompey had 
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previously been confirmed by the populus, the current ‘judgement and authority of 
the Roman people’ (iudicium populique Romani auctoritatem) about Pompey (that is, 
that he should have the extraordinary command proposed by Manilius) were to be 
disapproved by Catulus and his supporters (Man. 63), especially after the populus 
had chosen Pompey (despite the outcry of the same elite gentlemen) to command the 
war against the pirates: 
 
Hoc si vos temere fecistis et rei publicae parum consuluistis, recte isti studia 
vestra suis consiliis regere conantur. Sin autem vos plus tum in re publica 
vidistis, vos eis repugnantibus per vosmet ipsos dignitatem huic imperio, 
salutem orbi terrarum attulistis, aliquando isti principes et sibi et ceteris 
populi Romani universi auctoritati parendum esse fateantur. 
 
If you [the Roman people] did this rashly and with too little care for the 
interests of the res publica, these men are right in trying to rule your 
enthusiasm by their counsel. But if it was you, rather, who at that time saw 
more clearly for the res publica, you who, in their despite and by yourselves 
alone, brought honour to this empire and safety to the world, these great ones 
should at last admit that they and all other men must bow to the authority of 
the Roman people. (Cic. Leg. Man. 64.) 
 
Strikingly, Cicero uses terms that would more usually be used in connection with the 
senate (consulo, consilium, auctoritas), but here applies them to the populus. He 
casts his audience, the populus Romanus, as a decision-making body capable of 
taking political action against the wishes of the elite. 
Steel points out how the exordium and peroration of the speech combine 
‘unashamedly popularis language’ with ‘a conservative view of what the people can 
and ought to do’,177 and it is noteworthy that Cicero here talks not about senators 
generally but about isti principes; that is, he depicts the opposition, who wish to 
‘rule’ (regere) the enthusiasm of the people, as overbearing individuals rather than 
the senate as a whole. This is still half a step away from talking explicitly about the 
populus as administering its res publica in its own right (rather than elected 
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magistrates or senatorially appointed pro-magistrates administering the res publica 
on its behalf),
178
 even if the same implications lurk beneath the surface. Something 
similar appears in Sallust, who describes the ancient populus as having ‘watched 
over (curare) itself and the res publica’ by practising ‘boldness in warfare’ and 
‘equity when peace came’,179 and who elsewhere narrates that before the destruction 
of Carthage, the senate and people ‘held the res publica between themselves 
peacefully and with moderation’.180 Such ideas were evidently in circulation and 
available for use by anyone pushing a popular cause on which elite politicians 
looked with disfavour, something that in itself explains why such ideas are hard to 
recover from the rhetorical record. Cicero might have begun his career as a popularis, 
but he was never a popularis on the order of a Gracchus or a Saturninus and after his 
consulship he consistently identified himself and his policies with elite interests, if 
only because the execution of the ‘Catilinarian conspirators’ made him a target for 
popularis politicians. It is Cicero, however, who dominates the surviving material. 
Finally, it is worth noting how emphasising the role of the populus in administering 
the res publica de-emphasises the responsibility of individual elite politicians, which 
is only one reason why it might have annoyed them but is nonetheless significant 
given how far the dignitas of politicians rested on their achievements in public office. 
For those who credited the Roman public with the administration of its own res, the 
claims of more senior magistrates and politicians to know better how to advance the 
res publica were not impressive: what mattered was whether the populus agreed. 
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3. RES PUBLICA SALVA 
 
Chapter 2 focused on res publica as the object of management: the res publica that 
magistrates were responsible for administering and from the administration of which 
they gained credit; in the administration of which Cato stressed his perfectly proper 
and clean-handed behaviour; and which the populares proposed as the property, and 
therefore responsibility, of the populus. Even if the debate was not always explicit, 
res publica was the site of significant political negotiation: it provided cover for the 
actions of the magistrates elected to manage it and supplied those magistrates with a 
source of self-aggrandisement once their term in office was up, which led political 
rivals to develop methods of challenging this. The obvious line of attack was on the 
personal virtus and fides exhibited by the vaunted achievements, but there were also 
ways to subvert the link between achievement and dignitas: the Catonian emphasis 
on good behaviour and the popularis paradigm shift by which responsibility was 
transferred from the elected magistrates to the electorate. 
These were all aspects of everyday political behaviour and it seems 
reasonable to assume that most of these aspects were grist to the political mill right 
from the start, even if the evidence is patchy; the popularis paradigm shift may be to 
some extent the product of historical developments in the second and first century. I 
turn now to something grimmer: how politicians reacted to the conviction that the 
behaviour of their competitors endangered the res publica. It would be too simple to 
say that what follows in this section is devoted to the res publica as an arena for 
political interaction, largely because it would be difficult and probably misleading to 
impose such a clear-cut distinction on the surviving evidence, but in the various 
critical episodes in which “the Roman res publica” was conceived to be at stake due 
to the actions of Roman citizens, politicians appealed to a conception of res publica 
that was at least as much concerned with constituent persons, their political activity 
and the traditional organisation of the political arena (lex, cursus honorum, mos 
maiorum and various institutions such as the senate and the magistracies) as with 
ordinary public business. This chapter therefore breaks down into: (3.1) the 
conviction that Rome’s res publica is endangered, and not just by a general moral 
malaise brought on by personal immorality and fiscal corruption in elite circles, but 
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rather that specific policies promoted by one or several politicians present an 
immediate danger to the res publica. Closely linked to this is the belief that the res 
publica has already collapsed, in which case only reconstruction (res publica 
constituta) will suffice (3.2). Finally, I examine the unease with this res publica 
constituta apparent in Cicero’s early speeches, which feature ‘res publica as 
rhetorical fiction’, a rather tentative personification that glosses over awkward 
political truths (3.3). 
 
 3.1 THE PANIC 
Whether sincere or assumed, concern for the morals of one’s political peers could be 
positioned not as a way to eliminate rivals but as a farsighted awareness of the 
dangers that personal corruption posed to Rome’s internal political world. One 
notorious moraliser was Cato Censorius, whose self-promotion as a clean-handed 
politician went in tandem with his censorial severity
181
 and denunciation of various 
named and unnamed contemporaries as precisely the opposite;
182
 he feared that the 
bad habits of individuals were setting in place a downwards spiral for the Roman res 
publica. Cato is often thought to have been behind ‘a number of tribunician assaults 
on the foremost personalities of the day’,183 especially P. Scipio Africanus, the hero 
of the Second Punic War. During the 180s, the tribunes seem to have been 
particularly concerned about such excessively powerful individuals;
184
 in the 170s, 
though, Cato, the senate and the tribunes apparently acted in conjunction against 
various homines novi who were plundering the provinces, such as Popillius Laenas, 
for whom a special quaestio was set up in 172.
185
 Such activity against top-heavy 
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nobiles and overreaching homines novi had the same aim, whoever was behind it: to 
curb magisterial abuses.
186
 Africanus should not be mistaken for ‘the familiar 
haughty patrician who lashes out against the plebeians and their tribunes’ of the 
Livian tradition; rather, he was ‘a new phenomenon: a member of a most 
distinguished patrician family, a brilliant and charismatic general who did not 
hesitate to turn directly to the people over the senate’s head to achieve his goals and 
who showed contempt towards sacred traditional values – in short, a popularis in an 
age when the via popularis had not yet been defined’.187 Not unnaturally, this made 
him more popular with posterity than with his political peers.
188
 Cato’s gloomy 
views on his contemporaries’ political morals may have influenced Polybius189 and 
the historian L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, who proposed a lex de repetundis as tribune 
in 149 and went on to be consul in 133 and censor in 120.
190
 Forsythe perceives a 
Catonian theme in the fragments;
191
 he remarks on the ‘patriotic, moralizing and 
austere character’ of various fragments and argues that ‘Piso shared Cato’s old 
fashioned Roman traditionalism in the face of perceived contemporary moral 
decline’.192 The parallels are close enough that Frugi may have been using Cato as a 
direct model;
193
 their shared pessimism is reflected in Sallust’s later conviction that 
the fall of Carthage and influx of luxuria caused a sharp decline in Roman morals.
194
 
The bad habits of individual administrators might well impact negatively on 
the everyday administration of the res publica (i.e. the res populi), but this was 
probably not the main concern for people like Cato, Piso and Sallust. A single bad 
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magistrate could only administer the res publica badly for a year, or however long 
his command might be prorogued; too many bad politicians within the political arena, 
however, and its long-term future might be in doubt. The idea that the (good) moral 
character of those engaged in political activity is important for the overall health of a 
given polity is a familiar truism of political rhetoric; what matters here is the 
distinction between (a) general narratives of moral decline, with detail only insofar 
as the behaviour of specific individuals is singled out for moralising criticism and 
complaint, and (b) sporadic anticipations of imminent danger, in which the political 
activity of specific individuals at specific historical moments is singled out as liable 
to result in immediate and permanent damage to the Roman res publica, and which 
must therefore be stopped by any means available. The first unarguably historical 
episode of this sort comes courtesy of P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, previously 
observed shutting down a contio through the exertion of consular auctoritas in 
138.
195
 
In 133, the plebeian tribune Tiberius Gracchus proposed agrarian legislation 
to reclaim and redistribute public land (ager publicus) that had been gathered into 
private hands.
196
 His legislation was not debated by the senate; instead, Tiberius took 
it directly to the concilium plebis,
197
 where it was vetoed by a fellow tribune, M. 
Octavius. Tiberius responded with a revised, tougher version of his original 
legislation, which Octavius also vetoed.
198
 After an attempt to seek reconciliation via 
the senate failed, Tiberius broke this impasse by having the concilium plebis vote on 
a bill to depose Octavius from his tribunate.
199
 Tiberius’s legislation was then passed. 
Together with his father-in-law Appius Claudius and his brother Gaius, then serving 
with the army in Spain, Tiberius was elected to the commission responsible for 
putting his legislation into practice; the senate, however, expressed its displeasure by 
granting the commission a derisory per diem amount to carry out its duties.
200
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Coincidentally, King Attalus of Pergamum had died and Eudemus of Pergamum 
now brought his will, in which the Roman people were made his heir, to Rome. 
Tiberius moved to accept the bequest by way of the concilium plebis before the 
senate could express an opinion on the matter and claimed there was no need for the 
senate to debate on the matter of the Pergameme cities either: he would draw up a 
relevant bill and put it to the people without the senate’s input. His commission was 
thereby funded at the expense of the senate’s increased displeasure.201 At this point, 
Tiberius decided to stand for re-election to the tribunate for the following year. His 
rural supporters failed to turn out for the election in full force, but he managed to get 
the first voting session postponed until the following day, when, amid a great deal of 
turbulence, it seemed he was about to get re-elected.
202
 Simultaneous stormy scenes 
took place in the senate, where the consul Scaevola (one of Tiberius’s early 
backers
203
) declined to take action against Tiberius despite rumours that Tiberius 
aimed to make himself king. Nasica, the pontifex maximus and Tiberius’s cousin, led 
a gang of senators and their attendants to the Capitol; according to both Plutarch and 
Appian, Nasica covered his head with his toga, while Plutarch reports that his 
followers wrapped their togas around their left arms and Valerius Maximus and 
Velleius Paterculus report only that Nasica did this.
204
 In the ensuing chaos, Tiberius 
and some three hundred supporters were clubbed to death with pieces of broken 
benches.
205
 
The historiographical reception and messy fallout of Tiberius’s death will be 
discussed below in section 6.1; the relevant point here is Nasica’s expressed 
conviction that an imminent danger to the res publica needed to be averted.
206
 Just 
what else he might have said to justify this conviction is murkier. Cicero is 
uninformative (his claim in the Tusculan Disputations that Scipio does not seem to 
him to have been angry when he left the ‘languid consul’207 must be based on the 
role of this exemplum as an illustration of calm action and Stoic sagacity), Velleius 
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Paterculus has nothing to say about Nasica’s dispute with the consul,208 and Valerius 
Maximus provides a suspiciously neat rhetorical exchange: 
 
Cum Ti. Gracchus in tribunatu profusissimis largitionibus favore populi 
occupato, rem publicam oppressam teneret, palamque dictitaret interempto 
senatu omnia per plebem agi debere, in aedem Fidei Publicae convocati 
patres conscripti a consule Mucio Scaevola quidnam in tali tempestate 
faciendum esset deliberabant cunctisque censentibus ut consul armis rem 
publicam tueretur, Scaevola negavit se quicquam vi esse acturum. Tum 
Scipio Nasica, ‘quoniam’ inquit ‘consul, dum iuris ordinem sequitur, id agit 
ut cum omnibus legibus Romanum imperium corruat, egomet me privatus 
voluntati vestrae ducem offero’, ac deinde laevam manum <im>a parte togae 
circumdedit, sublataque dextra proclamavit: ‘qui rem publicam salvam esse 
volunt me sequantur’, eaque voce cunctatione bonorum civium discussa, 
Gracchum cum scelerata factione quas merebatur poenas persolvere coegit. 
 
Ti. Gracchus in his tribunate had captured popular favour by profuse 
largesses and held the res publica under his thumb. He said often and openly 
that the senate should be killed and everything handled through the commons. 
The conscript fathers were called together by the consul Mucius Scaevola in 
the temple of Fides Publica and were deliberating on what should be done in 
such a crisis. Everybody thought the consul should protect the 
commonwealth by armed force, but Scaevola refused to take any violent 
action. Then Scipio Nasica said, “Since the consul, while following the order 
of justice, acts so that he topples Roman imperium along with the laws, I 
offer myself, as a private citizen, as the leader for your will.” Then he 
wrapped the hem of his toga around his left hand and raised his right, 
shouting, “Let those who wish the res publica to be unharmed follow me.” 
With that call he dissipated the hesitation of good citizens and made 
Gracchus and his criminal supporters pay the penalty they deserved. (Val. 
Max. 3.2.17.) 
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This is polarised and unclear; the accusation that the juristic Scaevola was being 
unduly strict about following strict legal process and thereby allowing a tribune who 
rem publicam oppressam teneret through his monopoly on popular favour to 
overthrow the laws as a whole is a comprehensible rhetorical paradox (‘more law, 
less equity’), but the relevance of imperium Romanum is less obvious. Plutarch 
provides a less embroidered version of the scene: 
 
ὁ δὲ Νασικᾶς ἠξίου τὸν ὕπατον τῇ πόλει βοηθεῖν καὶ καταλύειν 
τὸν τύραννον. ἀποκριναμένου δὲ πράως ἐκείνου, βίας μὲν 
οὐδεμιᾶς ὑπάρξειν οὐδ’ ἀναιρήσειν οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν 
ἄκριτον· εἰ μέντοι ψηφίσαιτό τι τῶν παρανόμων ὁ δῆμος ὑπὸ τοῦ 
Τιβερίου πεισθεὶς ἢ βιασθείς, τοῦτο κύριον μὴ φυλάξειν, 
ἀναπηδήσας ὁ Νασικᾶς “ἐπεὶ τοίνυν” ἔφη “προδίδωσιν ὁ ἄρχων 
τὴν πόλιν, οἱ βουλόμενοι τοῖς νόμοις βοηθεῖν ἀκολουθεῖτε.” 
 
Nasica demanded that the consul should come to the rescue of the polis and 
put down the tyrannos. The consul replied with mildness that he would resort 
to no violence and put to death no citizen without a trial; if, however, the 
demos, under persuasion or compulsion from Tiberius, should vote anything 
that was unlawful, he would not regard this vote as binding. Thereupon 
Nasica sprang to his feet and said, “Since, then, the archon betrays the polis, 
let those who wish to save the laws follow me.” (Plut. TG 19.3–5.) 
 
In this account, the rhetoric is briefer and neater. Valerius Maximus’s speech is 
compressed into a straightforward accusation (that the consul betrays the polis, a 
word that could conceal either res publica or civitas) and the follow-up involves not 
the safety of the polis (that is, res publica, as in the three Latin sources) but the 
salvation of οἱ νόμοι, the laws. This switch from a betrayed polis to a need to save 
the nomoi reads as a direct challenge to Scaevola’s legalistic take on the situation 
and may indicate Plutarch tidying up the tradition. It also betrays the difficulty Greek 
authors have in rendering res publica. Similarly Appian, who is surprised that the 
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people (οἱ πολλοι) did not appoint a dictator at this point, is under the impression 
that: 
 
κρίναντες δ' ὅσα ἔκριναν ἐς τὸ Καπιτῶλιον ἀνῄεσαν. καὶ πρῶτος 
αὐτοῖς ὁ μέγιστος ἀρχιερεὺς λεγόμενος ἐξῆρχε τῆς ὁδοῦ, 
Κορνήλιος Σκιπίων ὁ Νασικᾶς· ἐβόα τε μέγιστον ἕπεσθαί οἱ τοὺς 
ἐθελοντας σῴζεσθαι τὴν πατρίδα. 
 
After reaching such a decision as they did reach, they marched up to the 
Capitol, Cornelius Scipio Nasica, the pontifex maximus, leading the way and 
calling out with a loud voice, “Let those who would save our fatherland 
follow me.” (App. BC 1.16.) 
 
This, at least, provides something closer to the Latin tradition, even if Latin has its 
own perfectly good cognate for ἡ πατρίς that also is not res publica (i.e. patria). 
Secondary scholarship has little to say about these various versions. In 
general, scholars either select one version of the episode, usually Plutarch,
209
 or they 
blur all the versions into a coherent narrative and gloss over the differences between 
them.
210
 What is apparent from the Latin tradition, if not the Greek one, is that 
Nasica roared something like ‘Since the consul betrays the res publica, let those who 
wish the res publica to be salva follow me!’ (using ‘the formula which in earlier 
times had been used to summon citizens to arms when the enemy was at the gate and 
it was too late for an ordinary levy’211) before dashing off to put down the original 
turbulent tribune. Several points may be made here. First, Nasica’s opinion on the 
consul’s role remained consistent with the line he took during his own consulship: 
the consuls were the magistrates with supreme responsibility and competence to 
administer the res publica; if anything was to be done, it should be the sole consul 
currently in Rome who did it. Scaevola’s failure to act against activities that Nasica 
perceived as seriously threatening to the wellbeing of the res publica was therefore 
(in Nasica’s eyes) a betrayal of the res publica itself. The exchange shows how the 
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relationship between competent magistrates and the res publica could be used 
against said magistrates, either to force them into action or to castigate their failure 
to take action that someone else considered necessary for the res publica. Second, 
the critical factor was Nasica’s conviction that what was happening on the Capitol 
(the re-election of Tiberius) presented a real, immediate danger to the res publica, 
and one that could and should be prevented, in which case the public sphere would 
remain salva, ‘safe, secure, unharmed’. As far as Nasica was concerned, the solution 
was to remove the threat, preferably through consular action; that done, the status 
quo would be restored and everyone could resume politics as normal. Third, the 
incident highlights how divisive this sort of rhetoric (and action) was: the consul 
disagreed with Nasica’s reading of the situation and had ius, not to mention consular 
potestas and the auctoritas that emanated from that, to back him up. Whether a 
politically shaky situation actually did represent a real and immediate danger to the 
res publica was debatable; the fallout might not confirm the judgement of the 
politician who cried wolf too soon. 
The public debate on these or any other topics during the uneasy period 
between the tribunates of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus is poorly attested.
212
 What we 
do possess are fragments: one striking remnant of a funeral laudatio, a piece of 
moralising invective, and various decontextualized relicts from the annalistic 
historians, in whose histories res publica now begins to surface, generally in fraught 
contexts.
213
 The testimony of the annalists supplies (1) a paraphrase of an incident 
recounted both by L. Cassius Hemina (flor. c. 146) and Cn. Gellius (flor. 120–100) 
concerning the military tribunes whose rule was detrimental to the res publica.
214
 (2) 
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Three fragments from Coelius Antipater (flor. 123), who recounted (a) C. 
Flaminius’s death at Trasimene in 217 as the result of neglected religio and attended 
by great damage to the res publica;
215
 (b) a partial fragment preserved by Nonius 
involving the res publica and a most beautiful town that has been lost and wholly 
uprooted;
216
 (c) a fragment on the topic of emulation or rivalry within the state (in 
statu) of a fortunate res publica.
217
 (3) Sempronius Asellio (c. 158–91), talking about 
writing history, balances being sharp to defend the res publica with being slow to 
attend to one’s own affairs.218 This material is difficult to use and will not support 
detailed arguments, but it may suggest unease about the condition and long-term 
prospects of the Roman res publica. A hint of this appears in the invective of Scipio 
Aemilianus, who in 129 gave a speech against the lex iudiciaria of Tiberius 
Gracchus in which various aspects of the tempora moresque and the habits of 
contemporary youth move him to grieve (quod me… miseritum est) for the res 
publica.
219
 Such unease is clearest, however, in the funerary fragment, which comes 
from a laudatio written by C. Laelius Sapiens and delivered by Q. Fabius Maximus 
for the by now defunct Aemilianus later that year: 
 
Quiapropter neque tanta diis inmortalibus gratia haberi potest, quanta 
habenda est, quod is cum illo animo atque ingenio hace civitate potissimum 
natus est, neque <tam> moleste atque aegre ferri quam ferendum [eum] est, 
cum eum morbus tum remouit et in eo dem<um> tempore periit, cum et vobis 
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et omnibus, qui hanc rem publicam <salvam> volunt, maxime vivo opus est, 
Quirites. 
 
Wherefore it is not possible to give sufficient thanks to the immortal gods for 
this above all, that he, endowed with that mind and with those talents, was 
born in this particular community; nor is it possible to feel sufficient distress 
and bitterness that illness carried him off and he has finally perished at that 
time when both you, citizens of Rome, and all who wish this res publica well 
had most need of him alive. (ORF 20.5.22/49.1.2 = Schol. Bob. in Mil. p.118, 
11, tr. Astin 1967: 243–4, slightly amended.220) 
 
The fragment is seriously corrupt. That said, note (a) the expression of position with 
respect to the civitas, following the precedent of Q. Caecilius Metellus’s laudatio for 
his father and the Scipionic elogia; and (b) assuming <salvam> is correct,
221
 the echo 
of Nasica’s cry in rem publicam salvam volunt, indicating continued concern over 
just how salva the res publica remained after a sacrosanct tribune’s untimely 
death.
222
 Laelius and Fabius were not issuing a call to arms against an immediate 
danger, but rather voicing a feeling that continued hard work was required to keep 
the res publica salva in this difficult period, a programme for which the great 
Aemilianus would certainly have been very useful, says the ventriloquist via Fabius 
Maximus, if only he hadn’t just fallen off the censors’ roll. Even if Tiberius 
Gracchus is taken to have been a genuine danger to the res publica and Nasica to 
have been acting wisely (or at least reasonably) in averting it through the enthusiastic 
application of natural justice, the episode was not conducive to civic harmony and 
general goodwill. 
A decade after Tiberius’s death, Nasica’s cry of “Wolf!” was regularised by 
the senatus consultum ultimum (SCU) used against Tiberius’s younger brother Gaius 
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in 121.
223
 The point of this decree seems to have been to avoid repeating the 
irregularities of 133, which hung uneasily over Gaius and his opponents alike. This 
is not the place for a discussion of Gaius Gracchus’s motivation, legislative 
programme, allies, enemies, or eventual end.
224
 I do, however, want to discuss how 
the SCU untangles the implication of Nasica’s res publica salva: the idea that the res 
publica is about to come to harm and that the consuls and other responsible 
magistrates should prevent this from happening by whatever means necessary. In the 
usual formula of the SCU, the senate instructs X (where X is primarily the consuls, 
but may include other magistrates in the vicinity of Rome, as when it was used 
against Saturninus and Glaucia in 100, when Saturninus and Glaucia themselves, 
then tribune and praetor respectively, were pointedly excluded
225
) to see that the res 
publica should come to no harm.
226
 The decree expresses the senate’s opinion that 
there is an immediate danger to the res publica (but not a state of war, which 
required a tumultus decree
227
) and that specific people must do something 
unspecified about it. It is negative (it focuses on taking no harm rather than keeping 
something unharmed; the distinction in formula is perhaps between what the senate 
decrees – ‘take no harm’ – and what the consuls then proclaim – ‘let those who 
wish’228), vague (so any resulting bitterness is directed at the responsible magistrates, 
who decide what the decree means
229
), and articulates a political consensus that the 
imminent danger currently anticipated is genuinely a danger to the res publica.
230
 It 
increases the pressure on the magistrates to act and gives them a defence after the 
event against any dissenters who may consider the advertised danger not to have 
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been a danger at all. This was a defence that seems to have worked for the aggressive 
consul of 121, L. Opimius, who was prosecuted after leaving office in 120 and 
acquitted.
231
 That he was prosecuted at all, however, indicates the limits of elite 
consensus on the issue (and indeed the rather good chance that consensus was 
limited to the elite). 
Some interim conclusions may now be drawn. Whereas ordinary magisterial 
action and popularis rhetoric seems to have focused on res publica as the object of 
management (in the latter case specifically the object of management by the populus, 
whose technical ownership of its res was never challenged), the res publica that P. 
Nasica, L. Opimius and the senate of 121 held to be endangered by popularis 
political activity is a rather larger beast. They were not spurred to action by the 
concern that Tiberius and his successors were detrimental to everyday public 
business, although there may have been a justifiable feeling that the tactics of the 
populares were not conducive to the conduct of public affairs. Rather, the concern 
seems to be that the populares were adversely impacting on the current structure of 
the political sphere, with negative implications for its long-term future. 
This may seem an unduly precise way to talk about an emotionally charged 
concern; after all, what is often translated as ‘patriotism’ appears in Latin as studium 
or amor for the res publica.
232
 But even if the grievance against the Gracchi was 
more emotional than rational, it was primarily a concern for those individuals who 
moved within that structured res publica, rather than for the populus more generally, 
which perceived itself as electing managers to manage its business on its behalf
233
 
and was probably less interested in maintaining the inherited political structure than 
it was about the res publica being administered competently, without undue 
corruption, in its perceived interests and by its chosen favourites. The Rhetorica ad 
Herennium illustrates paranomasia (adnominatio) with what must be a popularis 
fragment: ‘Tiberius Gracchus, while administering the res publica, was prevented by 
an unworthy death from abiding any longer therein. There befell Gaius Gracchus a 
like fate, which tore suddenly from the bosom of the community (civitas) a man 
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most dedicated (amantissimus) to the res publica’.234 As far as the populares were 
concerned, it was the Gracchi and their successors (the fragment goes on to mourn 
the deaths of Saturninus, Livius Drusus and Sulpicius) who had been managing 
public business and demonstrating their dedication to the public sphere. After the 
suppression of Gaius and his supporters, Opimius conducted a lustrum to wash out 
the spilt blood and went on to build a temple to Concordia, ‘the first temple that 
could be associated with an armed victory over fellow citizens within the city’.235 
Opimius evidently felt that the res publica had been saved from harm, civic harmony 
had been restored and his actions as consul had increased his personal dignitas with 
positive implications for his future actions as a privatus within the res publica. For 
whoever added the famous graffito, ‘A work of discord made this temple to 
concord’,236 the situation was the opposite. 
 
3.2 THE LIMITS 
The conviction that specific people/actions endanger the res publica and must be 
stopped to prevent harm coming to it has several possible outcomes, of which the 
most obvious are: (a) the troublemakers are suppressed and any damage is declared 
averted; (b) the troublemakers are not suppressed, but the cry of wolf was hyperbolic 
and the political sphere does not collapse; (c) the troublemakers are not satisfactorily 
suppressed and those who had cried wolf declare the wolf has arrived, i.e. (i) the res 
publica has suffered some serious damage that must be repaired, or (ii) the res 
publica has collapsed altogether and must be entirely refounded. In the cases of 
Tiberius Gracchus in 133, Gaius Gracchus in 121, and Saturninus and Glaucia in 100, 
the troublemakers were suppressed and their suppressors declared the damage 
averted: the would-be tyrants had been removed from the res publica and ordinary 
political activity could be resumed. In 88, just as the Social War was winding down, 
a new burst of civil discord centred on a turbulent tribune erupted.
237
 This particular 
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iteration was P. Sulpicius, who proposed various laws to do with Social War issues; 
when the opposition proved implacable, he gained the elderly C. Marius’s support by 
transferring to him the consul Sulla’s command against Mithridates, something that 
proved unpopular with Sulla himself, who escaped to his army at Nola and together 
with his colleague, Q. Pompeius Rufus, marched on Rome.
238
 
The outcome of this march, Sulla’s ‘first settlement’, fits best into the 
category (c.i), an attempt to repair the damaged res publica, especially since the 
more striking features reported in our sources may well be a retrojection of the 
settlement of 82–1.239 Sulla claimed to be acting with perfect propriety in freeing 
Rome from its current mob of troublemakers, of whom twelve (including Sulpicius 
and the six-times-consul Marius) were declared hostes. Sulla had Sulpicius’s 
legislation removed on the grounds that it had been passed per vim and oversaw 
elections for 87 in which the successful candidates were accepted whether or not 
they were his nominees, although they were compelled to swear to uphold his 
settlement.
240
 He then headed eastwards in pursuit of Mithridates and a simpler sort 
of glory, which suggests he thought the removal of the malefactors and their 
legislation was enough to repair the damaged res publica. That this was not the case 
became apparent almost immediately, as civil war erupted between the consuls of 87, 
Cn. Octavius, who was backed by the senate, and L. Cornelius Cinna, who resumed 
the late Sulpicius’s activities regarding the new Italian citizens.241 By following the 
lead of previous consuls, including Marius himself in 100, and attempting to avert 
the traditional sort of tribune-related harm from the res publica, the consuls of 88 set 
in play an unprecedented and highly unstable chain of events. 
The first time a Roman army occupied Rome itself, it did so in reaction to a 
domestic crisis of the sort that had seen various previous tribunes suppressed to 
senatorial applause. Sulla and Pompeius, however, not only acted without senatorial 
approval but ignored multiple embassies from the senate and marched a Roman army 
across the pomerium in what Flower calls ‘a devastating choice that led to the 
complete collapse of the traditional republican culture of the nobiles’.242 The march 
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reflects ‘the great problem of Roman political life – how to compel the independent 
magistrates who have the absolute power of imperium to carry out the instructions of 
the People or the Senate’.243 In a provocative recent article, Morstein-Marx argues 
that a genuine contest for political legitimacy can be seen in the actions of first Sulla 
and then Cinna,
244
 both of whom he takes to have staked their claims to legitimacy 
on their possession of the consulship in their similar responses to political chaos and 
rebuff. Although Appian’s ‘very sketchy’ account of Sulla’s self-justification to his 
troops implies that Sulla focused on his sense of personal injury, reading backwards 
from the speech Appian puts into Cinna’s mouth the following year (BC 1.65) 
enables a more generous interpretation of the issues at stake.
245
 Where the tribune 
Sulpicius’s transfer via the populus of the Mithridatic command to the privatus 
Marius in 88 was ‘a direct offense against the traditional prerogative of the 
consulship and its war-making role’, and perceived as such by Sulla and his army,246 
Cinna protested the abrogation of his consulship in 87 as an insult to the voters who 
had elected him, these voters having been conveniently assembled in the form of an 
army.
247
 Following Meier, Morstein-Marx holds that Sulla’s immediate intention 
was police action against a turbulent tribune,
248
 that Sulla’s complaint about the 
hubris of his opponents towards him was really an invocation of ‘republican civic 
values, which included the highest respect for the consuls, whom the Roman people 
had elected’,249 and that there is no reason to suppose that Sulla’s soldiers were not 
convinced of Sulla’s claims (rather than simply being disaffected and mercenary).250 
Furthermore, Morstein-Marx proposes that rather than analysing Sulla’s actions 
through a prism of legality, we should instead use ‘the sociological, Weberian 
concept of “legitimacy”’, on the grounds that during a civil war ‘citizens, not 
lawyers, are the ones who really matter, since citizens determine political legitimacy 
by their active or passive support for a regime (or the reverse), whatever the lawyers 
have to say on the matters referred to their jurisdiction’.251 The ‘republican political 
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system’ cannot be identified with ‘the senate’ at any given moment and the senate 
certainly should not be taken to be ‘the locus of political legitimacy’ (especially not 
when, for example, it has voted a consul out of office).
252
 On Morstein-Marx’s 
reading, the reverence of the citizens (especially soldiers) for their consuls, 
expressed by voting them into office, means that ‘the consulship is a symbol of 
legitimacy whose potency derives from its nature as the embodiment of a decision of 
the people’, and during this crisis of legitimacy both Sulla and Cinna succeeded in 
convincing the armies that their causes (as wronged consuls) were legitimate
253
 – 
with the implication, presumably, that those causes therefore were. 
There are two problems here. The first is Morstein-Marx’s reliance on 
Appian having transmitted something very close to what Cinna said to his army in 
87, if not an actual translation,
254
 which is justified on the grounds that ‘it is doubtful 
that Appian on his own could have fabricated a speech that is so neatly consistent 
with distinctive themes of late-republican contional oratory’. 255  This does a 
disservice to Appian, who was capable of inventing a Fifth Philippic for Cicero at 
BC 3.52–3 even though that speech survives; it is true that Appian’s version is not 
especially ‘Ciceronian’, but it is perhaps more appropriate (and certainly more 
statesmanlike) in its historiographical context than the speech Cicero actually gave. 
It is unclear why Appian, who potentially had access to much more contional oratory 
than we do today, could not have done the same for Cinna. If so, the observation that 
“Cinna” addressing his soldiers as citizens (πολῖται) recalls Caesar in 47 calling his 
soldiers to heel by calling them Quirites rather than milites (Suet. Jul. 70) is telling; 
for Morstein-Marx, ‘by addressing the soldiers before him as “citizens” Cinna 
appeals to them specifically in their capacity as members of the civic community’,256 
but this relies on the assumption that Appian’s account can be taken at face value. It 
might instead be that Appian is playing off that Caesarian anecdote to construct a 
proto-Caesar who addresses his soldiers as citizens because he has been demobbed: 
if Cinna is no longer consul, he cannot command his army, unless he can persuade 
them that he is still a consul and that they are still his soldiers. 
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Secondly, it seems clear that a crisis of legitimacy had erupted, if not before 
Sulla marched on Rome then certainly afterwards. That said, however, if ‘the 
sociological, Weberian concept of “legitimacy”’ is to be exchanged for ordinary 
legality, it is not clear why Sulla’s claims should be given priority. To reduce the 
issue to the superior right of consuls to wage war is to fall back on the legality that 
Morstein-Marx rejects: if the consuls’ special claims rested on their election by the 
populus, what was there to prevent the populus from deciding to bestow its favours 
elsewhere? If Sulpicius could persuade the populus in its voting assemblies that 
someone other than the responsible consul should be selected for the command 
against Mithridates, surely that legitimised Sulpicius’s proposal? Absent legal 
protocol, what remains is what resulted: a conflict between the judgement of that 
section of the populus that voted (legally) for Sulpicius within the city and the 
judgement of that section of the populus that marched (illegally) on Rome with Sulla. 
It is not obvious how to decide which judgement should be taken to confer greater 
political legitimacy, except perhaps on the basis that those left standing when the 
dust settled must have cared more about the issue at stake and were therefore entitled 
to pass the final judgement. (And after all, those who do not survive, as Sulpicius did 
not, cannot express their consent for or withhold their consent from a regime.) This 
seems unsatisfactory. Furthermore, while legality and legitimacy are indeed 
problematic concepts in civil war situations, it seems similarly unsatisfactory to 
suspend judgement on actions that precipitate civil war. Street violence, 
controversial legislation and depriving a consul of his command made for dangerous 
politics but not necessarily civil war; if the situation had been perceived as such, the 
senate (which, while not ‘the locus of political legitimacy’, at least had a reasonable 
claim to express the opinion of the political class as a whole) might have passed the 
SCU or invited the consuls to march on Rome, rather than trying to discourage them 
from doing so. If the consuls’ intention was police action, it was not welcomed by 
those who might be expected to have been most eager to be policed. 
The problem here is one endemic to any system where ‘popular consent’ 
stands as the defining political principle: the voice of the populus may override all 
others, but how and where can the populus itself (rather than specific subsections of 
the populus, often already armed and regimented) be heard to speak? Over the years, 
the Romans had developed a complicated and sometimes redundant system of 
comitia for the express purpose of providing specific physical spaces and times 
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where those assembled to vote on a proposed measure or elect individuals to office 
could do so as the populus Romanus. The popularis tribunes could claim to be the 
instruments of the populus not just because of the office they held but also because 
the populus voted for their measures. Despite the questions raised by Mouritsen’s 
2001 study over just how substantial a percentage of the population could ever have 
voted in these comitia, at no point in the turbulence of the late Republic did anyone 
raise low participation as a problem or challenge the conceit that the outcome of a 
properly conducted vote was the will of “the populus”.257 It might be argued that 
Sulpicius’s legislation was improperly conducted, and very probably Sulla did argue 
this, but what did not count as the populus Romanus was an army assembled and 
harangued in the field by an injured consul. 
Of particular relevance to this point is an episode narrated by Livy at 17.16, 
where the consul Cn. Manlius Capitolinus is said to have successfully proposed a 
law to tax manumissions while with his troops at Sutrium, where he ‘may have made 
citizens under his command vote there after ordering them to organize by tribes 
(tributim) for the ballot, as in normal comitia’.258 The actual law seems not to have 
been challenged, but the plebeian tribunes responded with a bill severely penalising 
anyone who summoned an assembly of the people outside Rome, since they were 
concerned that ‘the soldiers, linked to a commander through their oath of obedience, 
might approve measures that would be detrimental to the Roman people as a 
whole’.259 This is a peculiar episode, so much so that some scholars fall back on the 
‘too peculiar not to be true’ explanation;260 whether true or not, it indicates that 
allowing generals to pass laws or claim legitimacy for their actions on the basis that 
their army agreed with them was not an acceptable tactic and became a viable 
political gambit only through the removal of anyone with a divergent viewpoint (and 
their diverging armies). It was clear to contemporaries which way allowing consuls 
to decide that their armies counted as the populus Romanus for the purpose of 
furthering their own political aims could go. The temptation to do so when this 
action could be depicted as in the interests of the res publica, however, proved 
irresistible to Sulla and Q. Pompeius, and the speed with which their gambit was 
repeated after Sulla and his army left Italy foreshadowed how hard it would be in 
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future to rein in a magistrate with imperium, an army, and no desire to play nicely 
with his political peers. 
If Sulla’s first march on Rome was justified on the basis of arresting and 
repairing damaging political activity, his victorious return from the east, dictatorship 
and ‘second settlement’ can be classed as the first example of (c.ii) the collapse and 
refoundation of the res publica. Santangelo traces the shift in Sulla’s self-portrayal 
from ‘the legitimate representative of Rome and the only true defender of the res 
publica’ in 88 to emphasising instead ‘the cause of the Republic’ on his return in 83, 
by which time Sulla was concerned to be seen as ‘a victorious refounder of 
Rome’.261 Why did Rome need refounding? Because (and thanks in a large part to 
Sulla’s own earlier choices) the res publica was far past the anticipation of imminent 
danger: given the preceding decade and the fallout from Sulla’s return, it was 
plausible to argue that it had collapsed altogether. This claim is implicit in Sulla’s 
chosen title, ‘dictator for drawing up the laws and setting in order the res publica’ 
(dictator legibus scribundis et rei publicae constituendae).
262
 The majority of former 
dictators had or may be presumed to have been appointed dictator rei gerundae 
causa (‘dictator for managing the affair’);263  one was possibly magister equitum 
rather than dictator;
264
 fourteen were appointed dictator comitiorum habendorum 
causa (‘for holding the comitia’);265 another may have been appointed to this title;266 
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), Mam. Aemilius 
Mamercinus (434, 2
nd
), A. Postumius Tubertus (431), Mam. Aemilius Mamercinus (426, 3
rd
), Q. 
Servilius Priscus Fidenas (418, 2
nd
), P. Cornelius Rutilus Cossus (408), M. Furius Camillus (396, 1
st
), 
M. Furius Camillus (390, 2
nd
), M. Furius Camillus (389, 3
rd
), A. Cornelius Cossus (385), Ap. 
Claudius Crassus Inregillensis (362), C. Sulpicius Peticus (358), C. Marcius Rutilus (356), T. Manlius 
Imperiosus Torquatus (353, 1
st
 time), L. Furius Camillus (345, 2
nd
 time), L. Papirius Crassus (340), P. 
Cornelius Rufinus (333), M. Papirius Crassus (332), L. Papirius Cursor (324, 2
nd
 time), L. Cornelius 
Lentulus (320), C. Sulpicius Longus (312), L. Papirius Cursor (310, 3
rd
), L. Papirius Cursor (309, 4
th
), 
C. Junius Bubulcus Brutus (302, 2
nd
?), M. Valerius Corvus (302, 2
nd
), M. Valerius Corvus (301, 3
rd
), 
M. Aemilius Barbula (291-285), Ap. Claudius Caecus (291-285), P. Cornelius Rufinus (291-285), A. 
Atilius Caiatinus (249), M. Claudius Glicia (249), Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator (221, 
1
st
), Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator (217, 2
nd
), M. Minucius Rufus (217), M. Junius Pera 
(216). 
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one more was either this or dictator rei gerundae causa.
267
 Three were appointed 
dictator clavi figendi causa (‘for driving the nail’, a religious ritual);268 a fourth may 
also have had this title, or he might have been interrex.
269
 Oddities include: 
 
L. Quinctius Cincinnatus (439, 2
nd
), M. Valerius Corvus (342, 1
st
), Q. 
Hortensius (287): either seditionis sedandae (‘for restraining the sedition’) or 
rei gerundae causa 
T. Quinctius Cincinnatus Capitolinus (380), P. Manlius Capitolinus (368): 
seditionis sedandae et rei gerundae causa 
C. Julius Iullus (352): Rei gerundae et comitiorum habendorum causa 
P. Valerius Publicola (344): Feriarum constituendarum causa (‘for setting up 
the religious festivals’) 
Q. Publilius Philo (339): ? (responsibility for some legal reforms) 
A. Cornelius Cossus Arvina (322): Rei gerundae et ludorum faciendorum 
causa (‘for managing the affair and putting on the games’) 
C. Maenius (320, 1
st
): Quaestionibus exercendis (‘for administering the 
quaestiones’) 
C. Poetelius Libo Visolus (313): Rei gerundae et clavi figendi causa 
Q. Ogulnius Gallus (257): Ludorum faciendorum causa 
M. Fabius Buteo (216): Legendo senatui (‘for selecting the senate’) 
T. Manlius Torquatus (208): Comitiorum habendorum et ludorum 
faciendorum causa 
 
Historically, dictators had been appointed to domestic tasks (holding comitia or 
games, driving nails, selecting senators, sorting out seditions, managing quaestiones) 
or to deal with external threats (rei gerundae causa, ‘managing the affair’). The 
domestic tasks were pointedly more specific than the latter; there was no rei publicae 
constituendae for C. Maenius (320), for example, or for M. Fabius Buteo (216). In 
contrast, Sulla, when he picked up his unprecedented title, acquired legitimacy for a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Claudius Centho (213), Q. Fulvius Flaccus (210), M. Livius Salinator (207), Q. Caecilius Metellus 
(205), C. Servilius Geminus (202). 
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complete constitutional settlement, not just for setting up the odd quaestio or 
religious festival or adding men to the senate.
270
 Although Sulla’s dictatorship was 
not limited to the standard six months,
271
 there was an implicit end-date built into the 
title: when the task had been completed; that is, when the res publica had been 
suitably settled. 
Sulla’s resurrection of the dictatorship served to legitimise an irregular, 
illegal position based solely on overwhelming force, as was made clear after the 
battle of Porta Collina; as Mackay points out, addressing the senate in the temple of 
Bellona to the accompaniment of slaughtered captives was a gratuitous move 
intended to give the message that Sulla was in charge and anyone who opposed him 
could expect to regret it.
272
 All the same, it is interesting that the title distinguished 
between drafting laws and whatever Sulla was expected to be doing to the res 
publica as a whole.
273
 Sulla used his unique position to curb the plebeian tribunate 
(which lost its veto and right to summon the senate and became a dead end on the 
cursus honorum),
274
 remove the grain subsidy, confirm the senate’s right to appoint 
pro-magistrates,
275
 pass a lex Cornelia de maiestate (it was now a prosecutable 
offence not to vacate one’s province within thirty days of a successor’s arrival, to 
take an army outside one’s province or invade an allied kingdom without explicit 
senatorial permission),
276
 increase the numbers of praetors from six to eight,
277
 
tighten up the cursus honorum with a lex Cornelia annalis,
278
 increase the senate 
from the traditional level of three hundred to perhaps as many as six hundred,
279
 
transfer control of the courts from equites to senators, set up seven permanent 
quaestiones,
280
 institute various religious reforms,
281
 and impose sumptuary 
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legislation.
282
 In short, he followed the logic of his title and completely restructured 
the political sphere. This marks a break from former saviours of the res publica, who 
had held it (not very convincingly) to be kept salva by the suppression of individuals: 
for Sulla, simply removing his opponents was not enough. Flower makes the case for 
Sulla’s innovation most starkly. ‘Although he used the traditional names for the 
branches of government and office, Sulla’s system was fundamentally different from 
what had come before’;283 he produced ‘a political constitution based on laws and 
their regular enforcement by a system of courts’ which ‘did not correspond to the 
Roman experience of a traditional republic, namely a republic that had been based on 
deliberation in the senate, debate in front of the people, and on elaborate rituals of 
compromise and consensus building in both settings’ – ‘lex was to replace mos 
maiorum’.284 Sulla’s abdication of his dictatorship and retirement into private life 
demonstrated his belief that the res publica had been duly settled, thereby rendering 
his extraordinary position redundant. That his settlement constituted innovation 
rather than restoration, however, ‘can be gauged by the fact that it proved to be 
essentially unworkable, despite the logic and care that had gone into its complex 
design’.285 
 
3.3 THE WITNESSES 
In the opening to the De Republica, Cicero argues in his own persona that ‘the 
citizen who compels all men through imperium and the penalties imposed by law to 
do that which philosophers can scarcely persuade a few to do through speaking, must 
be considered superior even to the teachers who enunciate these principles. For what 
speech of theirs is excellent enough to be preferred to a civitas well provided (bene 
constituta) with law and custom?’286 This is a claim that invites identification with 
Sulla, although the historical account given in book 2 is explicitly Catonian in its 
subordination of individual contributions to the grander narrative: according to 
“Scipio”, the elder Cato used to say that Rome was great not because of a single 
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great law-giver but because of the cumulative genius of many great men,
287
 and the 
account “Scipio” gives of the historical development of the Roman res publica 
accordingly comprises a sequence of individuals and innovations.
288
 Prior to 82–1, 
the internal organisation of the res publica had been attributable to the maiores;
289
 
after Sulla’s settlement, however, the res publica was constituta, settled, and it had 
been settled by Sulla.
290
 It was now possible to identify a specific point in time when 
the res publica had been given its current structure (status) by a specific individual; 
said point in time (and said individual) provided a reference point for future 
politicians. Sulla’s res publica constituta was no more stable than the former res 
publica had been, however, thanks both to key figures like Sulla’s protégé Pompey, 
blatantly excused from Sulla’s rules,291 and to the disruptive activities of those who 
wanted to dismantle various of Sulla’s reforms. For the next ten years, political life 
developed into a dance around how much of Sulla’s res publica constituta to 
maintain or discard. The civil wars remained a locus for conflict and Sulla himself 
was a polarising and deeply controversial figure. This is illustrated by two 
Ciceronian ‘data points’: the Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino of 80,292 which demonstrates 
a junior orator positioning himself in relation to Sulla’s newly minted res publica 
constituta, and the Verrines of 70, in which Cicero angles his case around one of the 
issues of the day, the question of whether to undo Sulla’s transference of the courts 
to the senate. 
 The Pro Sexto Roscio was Cicero’s first causa publica and is the first of his 
speeches mentioned in Plutarch’s Life.293  It was delivered in defence of Sextus 
Roscius, who had been accused of parricide before Sulla’s new quaestio inter 
sicarios and during Sulla’s second consulship.294 Cicero casts his defence as a semi-
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heroic act of defiance on the part of a nervous young orator who could speak out 
because of his obscurity: none of the various illustrious persons allegedly lurking 
supportively at the trial dared to take on Roscius’s defence (S. Rosc.1), since it was 
impossible to defend Roscius without saying anything de re publica and they were 
bound to be misinterpreted (S. Rosc. 2). Cicero, however, had not yet entered the 
public sphere (ad rem publicam) and was therefore free to attribute anything he said 
now to youth and silliness; he claims to be largely free to speak, even if both pardon 
and legal inquiry had been removed from the civitas (S. Rosc. 3).
295
 According to 
Cicero, Roscius’s biggest problem was that his father’s property had been bought by 
Sulla’s influential freedman, Chrysogonus, who now wanted to get rid of Roscius 
himself (S. Rosc. 6). Cicero deploys Roscius as a stand-in for everyone present and 
Chrysogonus as the villain of the tale, thereby distancing Sulla from any wrongdoing 
(S. Rosc. 7); he asks the Sulla-proxy Chrysogonus to be happy with everyone’s 
money and fortune, rather than demanding their lives too, and he directs the usual 
request to the judges to resist audacious bad men (that is, Chrysogonus and his 
henchmen) and look out for unlucky innocents (that is, Roscius, and by extension 
themselves) (S. Rosc. 7, 12). Sulla himself is compared to Jupiter, who can cause 
great harm but who also grants mortals various good things: 
 
Etenim si Iuppiter Optimus Maximus cuius nutu et arbitrio caelum terra 
mariaque reguntur saepe ventis vehementioribus aut immoderatis 
tempestatibus aut nimio calore aut intolerabili frigore hominibus nocuit, 
urbis delevit, fruges perdidit, quorum nihil pernicii causa divino consilio sed 
vi ipsa et magnitudine rerum factum putamus, at contra commoda quibus 
utimur lucemque qua fruimur spiritumque quem ducimus ab eo nobis dari 
atque impertiri videmus, quid miramur, iudices, L. Sullam, cum solus rem 
publicam regeret orbemque terrarum gubernaret imperique maiestatem 
quam armis receperat iam legibus confirmaret, aliqua animadvertere non 
potuisse?  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Mitchell 1979: 91-2), cf. Berry 2004; on the chances of Roscius actually having been guilty (decent) 
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80 3. RES PUBLICA SALVA 
 
In fact, if Jupiter, greatest and best, whose nod and will governs heaven, 
earth, and seas, has often done grievous harm to men by furious winds, 
violent storms, excessive heat or unbearable cold, destroyed their cities and 
ruined their crops, we do not attribute any of these disasters to the divine will 
and a desire for causing destruction, but to the mere force and the mighty 
agency of nature. But, on the other hand, the advantages of which we avail 
ourselves, the light which we enjoy, the air we breathe, these are favours 
given to us and bestowed upon us by Jupiter. Why then, gentlemen, should 
we be surprised if Sulla, when he alone ruled the res publica and guided the 
world and was strengthening by laws the majesty of the command which he 
had recovered by arms, should unavoidably have allowed anything to pass 
unnoticed? (Cic. S. Rosc. 131.) 
 
As Gildenhard observes, this comparison ‘acquires its proper point and profile if 
read as a response to the dreadful dilemma that those inevitably face who live in a 
world in which the rulers do not necessarily guarantee justice. One way of 
maintaining a semblance of beneficial order and of a world governed by divine 
craftsmanship and intelligence is to clear those in power from responsibility for 
evil’.296 Sulla, as dictator, had been a god among men: destructive,297 politically all-
powerful, and the conveyor of basic blessings such as the ability to continue living, 
but too loftily positioned to notice the minor misdeeds of minor men,
298
 hence the 
currently unhappy state of the political sphere.
299
 The civil wars are largely glossed 
over: it had been a messy period in which, while that person with supreme power 
(Sulla) was occupied with the overarching political narrative, others were sneaking 
around bayoneting their wounded inimici: ‘these people, as if eternal night had 
enveloped the res publica, rushed about in the darkness and threw everything into 
confusion’.300 The impression given is of a regime revolving around a single person: 
Sulla, ‘who alone ruled (regeret) the res publica’ and who stands forth as its sole 
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representative, while his various eminent supporters blur into ‘the nobilitas’,301 
which ‘recovered the res publica by arms and the sword’. 302  All this political 
commentary, however, is attributed to Cicero’s personal outrage at the state of the 
res publica and his dolor at the injury done to Roscius (S. Rosc. 143); his client, 
meanwhile, is cast as a naïve countryman who believes Chrysogonus’s claim that 
everything was Sulla’s work and legally done. The only thing he wants (says Cicero) 
is to be acquitted of parricide.
 
Res publica here must mean both everyday public business and the structured 
political sphere; in forcefully recovering (reciperare) the former, the nobiles of the 
Pro Roscio Amerino gained control also of the latter, both by occupying the 
magistracies and Sulla’s new senate and by proscribing anyone left alive to oppose 
them. The individual nobiles who fought for Sulla in the civil war may lack names or 
faces (and their opponents are totally absent from the picture
303
), but Cicero supplies 
a model for them in the person of Roscius’s illustrious young patron, Messala, 
described as too young and modest to plead on Roscius’s behalf (S. Rosc. 149). His 
efforts on Roscius’s behalf become the very pattern of traditional elite virtues: 
 
ipse adsiduitate, consilio, auctoritate, diligentia perfecit ut Sex. Rosci vita 
erepta de manibus sectorum sententiis iudicum permitteretur. Nimirum, 
iudices, pro hac nobilitate pars maxima civitatis in armis fuit; haec acta res 
est ut ei nobiles restituerentur in civitatem qui hoc facerent quod facere 
Messalam videtis, qui caput innocentis defenderent, qui iniuriae resisterent, 
qui quantum possent in salute alterius quam in exitio mallent ostendere; 
quod si omnes qui eodem loco nati sunt facerent, et res publica ex illis et ipsi 
ex invidia minus laborarent.  
 
He himself, by his constant presence in court, his advice, influence, and 
unwearied attention, he succeeded in rescuing the life of Sextus Roscius from 
the hands of the brokers and getting it left to the verdict of his judges. There 
can be no doubt, gentlemen, that the greater part of the civitas took up arms 
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for such nobles as Messala; their object was that these nobles should be 
restored to the civitas who were ready to do what you see Messala doing – 
defend the civil existence of an innocent man, resist injustice, and show the 
extent of their power rather than ruining their fellow-men. If all those who 
have been born in the same rank were to do this, the res publica would have 
less to suffer from them, and they themselves would suffer less from the 
jealousy with which they are regarded. (Cic. S. Rosc. 149.) 
 
The young Messala defines what a nobilis should be and the blameless people on 
whose behalf the pars maxima civitatis allegedly took up arms: if only, says Cicero, 
all nobiles actually were like this! His moralising remains guarded (no names named, 
no details detailed) but the critique has become sharper: the res publica does suffer 
from them and they themselves do attract invidia. This gains point because by the 
time the speech was given Sulla had abdicated his dictatorship and therefore was no 
longer the sole source of power in the res publica. Technically the res publica had 
been constituta (albeit Sulla’s new and improved version of the res publica) and 
things were juddering back to normal (albeit, again, Sulla’s new and improved 
version of ‘normal’). The victors, Sulla’s supporters, the Pro Sexto Roscio’s pars 
nobilis, were now in charge, if in some uneasy limbo where they could be portrayed 
as still checking nervously over their shoulders for the Sulla-proxy Chrysogonus 
(more likely Sulla himself, currently consul). Their failure to take up their traditional 
duties was therefore damaging to the res publica and to their own reputations. 
Finally, both Sextus Roscius and the res publica are thrown upon the mercy of the 
judges: if Chrysogonus would not be content with money but insisted on robbing 
‘us’ of ‘our’ lives (again Roscius serves as the audience stand-in), then the only hope 
was for the judges to acquit him and thereby save the res publica by banishing this 
all too common cruelty from it (S. Rosc. 150, 154). Cicero casts himself as defending 
‘not only the interests of the defendant but the very survival of Roman civilization’ 
in a ‘thematic configuration’ that recurs time and again throughout his oratory.304 
The res publica might currently be in a bad condition,
305
 but if this progression was 
left unchecked, things would only get worse (S. Rosc. 153). Wise men in possession 
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of the auctoritas and potestas possessed by the judges should certainly apply the 
right remedy to the res publica (S. Rosc. 154): that is, acquittal. 
The Pro Sexto Roscio was delivered while Sulla was alive and in the early 
days of his res publica constituta. At the end of 80, Sulla vacated the consulship; in 
early 78, he died a natural death.
306
 The first major challenge came from that year’s 
consul, M. Aemilius Lepidus, who passed laws to distribute grain and recall those 
still in exile due to the proscriptions; he originally resisted calls to restore tribunician 
power, but later changed his mind.
307
 As proconsul the following year, he led a 
revolt that was sharply repressed.
308
 Agitation over the tribunate led to its 
replacement on the cursus honorum in 75 and the eventual restoration of its full 
powers in Pompey’s consulship in 70;309 in the same year, another of Sulla’s reforms 
was undone: juries would in future be chosen equally from senators, equites and 
tribune aerarii.
310
 The law was sponsored by ‘a nobilissimus, L. Aurelius Cotta, a 
praetor in 70 and brother of the consuls of 75 and 74, and, by all indication, a man 
similarly committed to the cause of the conservatives and held in similar high regard 
by the conservative principes of the senate’, whose future political career ‘shows 
continuing gratia in high places and consistent conservatism’. 311  Furthermore, 
although Pompey was involved in the restoration of the tribunes this year, his paw-
prints are missing from the judicial legislation. Mitchell argues that since the 
judiciary law was ‘conceived and sponsored by a loyal adherent of the views and 
ideals of the traditionalists’ and ‘enacted with no recorded opposition from 
conservative leaders’, it indicates the (Sullan) elite ‘implementing a widely desired 
reform, continuing a sustained policy of compromise and conciliation receptive even 
to major change under threat of its imposition, with more drastic consequences, by 
public pressure or demagogic dissidents’.312 
Mitchell discusses the issue in such detail because the record is clouded by 
Cicero’s attempts to link the trial of Verres in 70 to judicial reform by ‘presenting it 
as a vital test of senatorial integrity and a golden opportunity for the jury of senators 
to vindicate their order and stave off the impending threat to the senate’s monopoly 
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of the courts’.313 How the prosecution and the judiciary issue actually intersected, if 
at all, is hard to tell. Mitchell argues that the trial was probably a non-event as far as 
the political narrative of the late seventies is concerned,
314
 and is followed by Butler, 
who suggests that ‘this is precisely what leads Cicero to claim credit, ex post facto, 
for a “reform” that was not really a source of great friction between the orders’.315 
The tactic had additional attractions. Prosecutions were generally left to young men, 
whereas Cicero was now thirty-six and an aedile-elect;
316
 connecting the prosecution 
of Verres with the judiciary issue defused potential accusations that Cicero was 
misusing his dignitas, ‘for it likewise allowed Cicero as prosecutor to submerge the 
image of potential destroyer of the life of a fellow citizen beneath the more 
sympathetic persona of defender of the interests of the Roman people’. 317 
Consequently the focus of the Verrines is not the condition of the res publica, 
although this is certainly not perfect
318
 and Cicero justifies his decision to prosecute 
someone with whom he had no personal inimicitia by reference to the rei publicae 
causa.
319
 Rather, the populus Romanus is said to miss nothing in the res publica so 
                                                          
313
 Mitchell 1979: 134; he points out that the issue at stake in the trial (‘the senate’s capacity to 
convict a notoriously guilty but wealthy and influential associate’) was ‘peripheral to the central issue 
underlying the campaign for jury reform’, which ‘was part of a long-standing conflict surrounding the 
criminal courts in late republican politics, a conflict whose principal and persistent concern was not 
unjust acquittals such as Verres might procure through political camaraderie or plain purchase, but 
unjust convictions and threats to the lives and liberties of citizens through judicial oppression’ (135). 
For overviews of the trial see Mitchell 1986: 1-13, Frazel 2004: 129-33; for an overview of the 
Verrines see Vasaly 2002: 87-103. For aspects of the trial and Cicero’s Verrines generally, cf. 
Marshall 1967, Alexander 1976, Mitchell 1979: 107-9, 133-49, Steel 2001: 22-47 (on the 
characterisation of Verres), 2004 (reconsidering Verres’s activities at Lampsacus), Butler 2002: 26-70 
(on Cicero’s use of written evidence in the trial), 71-84 (on the publication of the speeches), Frazel 
2004: 129-33; Frazel 2004 (the composition and publication of the speeches); Vasaly 2009: 116-8 
(how the political elements of the speech further Cicero’s persuasive case), Gildenhard 2011: 69-73, 
90-91 (characterisation in the speeches), 114-6 (furor). 
314
 Mitchell 1979: 133; contra for example Ward 1970: 61 (‘Pompey found it necessary to weaken the 
Metellan factio and the dominatio of the pauci. Because they supported Verres, his trial was an 
important battle in Pompey's struggle with his enemies’), Griffin 1973: 204-5 (Cicero was channelling 
Pompey’s preferred take on judicial reform), Stockton 1973: 216-8 (‘Cicero names no names – he had 
no need to. But nothing in what he or anybody else tells us can support the conclusion that Pompey 
was not in 70 keeping the public promise he had made the previous year and putting his own weight 
behind the moves for judicial reform’, 217), Vasaly 2009 (Cicero’s ‘connection in the trial of the 
issues of extortion abroad and judicial corruption at home would have provided fuel for popular 
contional orators in the run-up that summer to promulgation of the jury reform bill’, 114). 
315
 Butler 2002: 78. Vasaly 2009, however, puts the trial in context in a year of spectacular triumphs, 
ovations and public banquets (108-110) and argues that while the prosecution of Verres could not 
compete with these, it would have been another ‘extraordinary spectacle’ (110). 
316
 Steel 2001: 23. 
317
 Vasaly 2009: 118. 
318
 Cic. Div. Caec. 70, Ver. 1.1.27. 
319
 Cic. Div. Caec. 6, 7, 64, 71, Ver. 2.2.1, 2.2.117, 2.3.1, 2.5.188, 2.5.189. In contrast, Verres’ 
behaviour in Sicily was very much against the interests of the res publica (Ver. 2.2.137, 2.3.21, 
2.3.38, 2.3.43, 2.3.120, 2.3.161, 2.3.163, 2.4.20, 2.5.50, 2.5.58, 2.5.77, 2.5.179) and would have been 
85 3. RES PUBLICA SALVA 
 
much as the vis gravitasque formerly exhibited by their iudicia
320
 and the only 
solution is for men of integrity to take up the cause of res publica legesque,
321
 as 
Cicero claims to do by prosecuting Verres,
322
 whose acquittal (if acquitted) will 
bring disgrace on the senatorial jurors and ruin to the res publica.
323
 Cicero’s 
handling of the case is superlative: 
 
Ita reieci iudices ut hoc constet, post hunc statum rei publicae quo nunc 
utimur simili splendore et dignitate consilium nullum fuisse.  
 
I challenged the judges such that it is agreed there was never such a court of 
illustrious and acknowledged merit assembled in this state of the res publica 
which we now enjoy. (Cic. Ver. 2.1.18.) 
 
Thanks to Sulla, this claim was not an especially impressive one. Although Cicero’s 
vagueness gives the impression of referring to some dim and misty past, hic status 
indicates Sulla’s res publica constituta of 82–1.324 Consequently the splendor and 
dignitas of Cicero’s carefully selected consilium could compete only with the 
senatorial jurors of the previous decade. 
In 70, Sulla’s restructuring of the public sphere therefore still stood as a fixed 
reference point and those contemporaries who outlived him were arguing over which 
elements of his res publica constituta to retain. That Sulla himself, the civis who 
compelled his fellow citizens to accept his ius and mores through imperium and 
poena rather than reasoned argument, remained a difficult figure is evident from 
Cicero’s discomfort on the subject of the civil wars.325 In 83, when Sulla had been 
fighting in Asia, Verres had become quaestor in Rome and was allotted to the 
Cinnan proconsul Cn. Papirius Carbo. Instead of either doing his duty as Carbo’s 
quaestor or standing aside, Verres had first taken up his post and the allotted public 
funds, and then defected to Sulla, allegedly taking the money with him.
326
 This did 
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not indicate a desire to defend the nobilitas or any particular zeal for their party 
(studio partium); rather, according to Cicero, it was self-motivated: Verres robbed 
consul, army and province and scarpered to Sulla to avoid the consequences,
327
 a 
move that reflected only badly upon him. The money, as Cicero recaps in a different 
Verrine, ‘disappeared in the fog and darkness that at that time overspread the whole 
res publica’.328 Cicero’s problem is clear: when the music stopped, Verres ended up 
on the right (that is, victorious) side of the civil war. He cannot say Verres should 
have fought against Sulla, but he can insist on constancy in political sentiment and 
the duties owed to a commanding officer, a matter of principle that must be upheld 
lest everything turn to chaos.
329
 Sulla himself allegedly kept Verres at arm’s length; 
his generous treatment of Verres during the proscriptions was ‘the fee due to a 
traitor, not the trust due to a friend’.330 This principle should outweigh any goodwill 
Verres might have gained by deserting the dead Cn. Carbo from those who still hate 
the latter.
331
 Cicero’s focus on principle submerges the war and its participants as 
much as possible: 
 
Erat tum dissensio civium, de qua nihil sum dicturus quid sentire debueris: 
unum hoc dico, in eius modi tempore ac sorte statuere te debuisse utrum 
malles sentire atque defendere. 
 
There was then conflict among citizens; I shall say nothing about what you 
should have felt about it; I say only that at such a time, and the lot having 
fallen as it did, you ought to have made up your mind which side to take and 
support. (Cic. Ver. 2.1.34.) 
 
Sulla’s cause is still that of the nobilitas, but this is not stressed; other people might 
say that Carbo was a ‘bad citizen, wicked consul and a seditious person’,332 but 
Cicero himself has nothing to say about the man or his cause. There are two sides to 
the civil wars now and Cicero makes no explicit value judgements between them. 
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Nor is he willing to talk about the Sullan proscriptions. The whole period was a 
mess; everyone will be happier if they have to think about it as little as possible; and 
Verres must not be allowed to use the communal calamity to support his case.
333
 
Cicero does return to Sulla and the proscriptions in a later Verrine: 
 
Unus adhuc fuit post Romam conditam, – di immortales faxint, ne sit alter! – 
cui res publica totam se traderet temporibus et malis coacta domesticis, L. 
Sulla. Hic tantum potuit ut nemo illo invito nec bona nec patriam nec vitam 
retinere posset; tantum animi habuit ad audaciam ut dicere in contione non 
dubitaret, bona civium Romanorum cum venderet, se praedam suam vendere. 
Eius omnis res gestas non solum obtinemus, verum etiam propter maiorum 
incommodorum et calamitatum metum publica auctoritate defendimus: unum 
hoc aliquot senatus consultis reprehensum, decretumque est ut, quibus ille de 
capite dempsisset, ii pecunias in aerarium referrent. Statuit senatus hoc ne 
illi quidem esse licitum cui concesserat omnia, a populo factarum 
quaesitarumque rerum summas imminuere. 
 
There has been one man only since the foundation of Rome – immortal gods 
grant that there may not be another! – into whose hands the res publica, 
compelled by the times and domestic evils, surrendered itself without reserve, 
Lucius Sulla. So great was his power that no one, if he willed otherwise, 
could retain property, fatherland or life. So unshrinking was his audacity that 
in a contio he did not hesitate to say that in selling the goods of Roman 
citizens he was selling the plunder that belonged to him. All acts of his are 
not only in force today, but we even defend them by public authority for fear 
of worse troubles and evils: but this one detail of it has been condemned in 
several decrees of the senate, which has ordered that the amount of the 
deductions made by Sulla must be paid by the purchasers into the state 
treasury. It was the senate’s ruling that it was unlawful, even for him to 
whom nothing had been forbidden, to diminish the total profits thus gained 
and acquired by the people. (Cic. Ver. 2.3.81.) 
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Jupiter-Sulla manifests once more, now lacking Jupiter’s distracting glamour. The 
res publica had been compelled by unspecified difficulties to hand itself over to 
Sulla, who had the power to expropriate property, drive people into exile and put 
people to death, and who explicitly treated the property of Roman citizens as private 
plunder. The degree of initiative attributed to the res publica is telling: rather than 
assigning responsibility (and blame) to the individuals who marched armies against 
their political opponents and took control of the political sphere by force, Cicero 
locates responsibility for Sulla’s takeover of Roman politics within the Roman 
political sphere itself. By casting the res publica as an entity in its own right that 
could ‘wholly surrender itself’ (totam se traderet) to Sulla, albeit acting under the 
compulsion of ‘the times and domestic evils’ (temporibus et malis coacta 
domesticis), the issue of what those evils were and who was to blame for them could 
be carefully ignored. It is hard to interpret this autonomous res publica as anything 
other than a colourful rhetorical fiction, since ‘the public business’ is too limited to 
fit the context and ‘the structured political sphere’ (functioning as the metonymical 
form of those individuals who moved within it) had resisted Sulla’s return. The point 
was not to deceive Cicero’s listeners, who knew what those evils had been and must 
have had their own opinions on the appropriate assignment of guilt, but rather to 
avoid kicking that particular political wasps’ nest in a way that would help neither 
the case at hand nor Cicero’s future career. Cicero had to account for Sulla’s unique 
settlement, which he claims is retained and defended out of fear that worse things 
might result from changing anything, except in one relevant respect, that of short-
changing the treasury by selling proscribed property cheaply to Sulla’s friends. The 
relevance to Verres is the accusation that he likewise short-changed the treasury: 
 
Illum viris fortissimis iudicarunt patres conscripti remittere de summa non 
potuisse: te mulieri deterrimae recte remisisse senatores iudicabunt? Ille, de 
quo legem populus Romanus iusserat ut ipsius voluntas ei posset esse pro 
lege, tamen in hoc uno genere veterum religione legum reprehenditur: tu, qui 
omnibus legibus implicatus tenebare, libidinem tuam tibi pro lege esse 
voluisti? In illo reprehenditur, quod ex ea pecunia remiserit quam ipse 
quaesierat: tibi concedetur, qui de capite vectigalium populi Romani 
remisisti? 
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The conscript fathers, Verres, held that Sulla was not entitled to make such 
deductions in favour of Roman gentlemen; and will these senators hold that 
you were entitled to make them in favour of a worthless woman? Sulla, for 
whose benefit the Roman people passed a law that gave his own will and 
pleasure the force of law, is nevertheless condemned, in this single matter, by 
the solemn sanction of the laws of old; and yet have you, a man liable to 
punishment for breaking every law in the world, deliberately chosen to give 
the force of law to your own wanton will and pleasure? Sulla is condemned 
for allowing deductions from a revenue that he himself gained for us: shall 
you be acquitted for allowing deductions from the yield of the taxes imposed 
by the Roman people? (Cic. Ver. 2.3.82.) 
 
Sulla’s sinister power is stressed to magnify this sole exception to his omnipotence, 
and correspondingly the magnitude of Verres’s misbehaviour. If even Sulla was not 
permitted to get away with this, how could Verres hope to be acquitted? The 
unsavoury details of said revenue source are delicately omitted, despite that 
comment about bona civium/praeda sua, much as the civil war is only alluded to: 
Sulla did not claim the res publica (or reclaim imperium) by force of arms, but 
rather, euphemistically, it was driven to surrender itself to him. 
Now that Sulla was dead and burned, there was no need to flatter him by 
comparisons to Jupiter or to hide unease with the unprecedented power he achieved 
and the settlement he bequeathed. Nonetheless, Cicero remained uncomfortable 
about the wars that had resulted in Sulla’s dictatorial power. His attitude in the 
Verrines suggests a selective communal memory, or perhaps the attempt to create 
one: people should forget the messy past, call the civil wars a shared nightmare, 
throw a veil of shadow over the worst details, defend the current (Sullan) status rei 
publicae for fear of what might happen if it dissolved, and invoke traditional 
principles in order to shut down partisan politics. To some extent, this reflects the 
awkward truth that Verres had been an active participant in the Sullan takeover of 
the res publica. The prosecution of a former Marian might have resulted in a rather 
different rhetorical colouring, and Hortensius’s defence of Verres, had he replied to 
this speech, could well have played on the partisan, anti-Carbo theme that Cicero so 
carefully rejects. But such a prosecution would require there to be some former 
Marians in public life, and given that the proscriptions had removed the major ones 
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and the sons of the proscribed were excluded from public life until Caesar removed 
the bar on their participation in 49,
334
 for the next few decades the splits were 
generally Sullani against Sullani. Even Caesar, for all his vaunted Marianism, 
married Pompeia after Cornelia’s death – a granddaughter of Sulla. 335  The res 
publica constituta was Sullan both in structure (even if bits of its structure were 
dismantled) and because those structures were inhabited by adherents of Sulla’s 
victorious party or by those who could accommodate themselves to Sulla’s victory. 
Reacting to Sulla’s res publica constituta, Cicero therefore supplies the final 
perspective on res publica for this study: res publica as rhetorical fiction, used here 
to disguise the disagreeable fact that hic status rei publicae existed not because of 
the accreted action of amassed maiores but rather thanks to the controversial 
behaviour of one specific person, Sulla, aided and abetted by the senior figures 
currently moving within the structured political sphere. 
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So far, I have used Cicero’s testimony to illuminate specific aspects of the discourse 
concerning res publica. This chapter takes a more systematic approach to his corpus 
from his consulship in 63 to the middle of the next decade, where his manoeuvring 
on the field of available positions on res publica shows how these various 
perspectives could work together and warp into interesting shapes. First, I discuss De 
Lege Agraria 1–3 and Pro Rabirio Perduellionis, in which Cicero engages with the 
challenges presented by proposed agrarian legislation and the trial of Rullus by 
staking out his position as a popularis consul, defining res publica in terms of 
political structures for a contional audience, and casting the SCU as a key pillar of 
the res publica (4.1). Next, I examine how Cicero used the Catilinarians to construct 
the rhetorical fiction of a united res publica that expels Catiline from its midst (4.2). 
Cicero’s dangerous triumphalism on the topic of his consulship (4.3) gave way to 
defensiveness after his brief exile in 58–7, which manifests in increasingly strained 
rhetoric in the mid-50s, where Cicero constructs a personal relationship between 
himself and the personified res publica (4.4–5). 
 
4.1 WARS AGAINST DISORDER 
At the start of his consulship in 63, Cicero faced two difficult incidents: an agrarian 
law proposed by the tribune P. Servilius Rullus,
336
 and the trial of C. Rabirius for the 
obsolete charge of perduellio by another tribune, T. Labienus (with L. Caesar and C. 
Julius Caesar as duumvirs), on the grounds of Rabirius’s involvement in the death of 
Saturninus thirty-seven years earlier.
337
 The agrarian law seems to have addressed a 
practical issue, the needs of Pompey’s impending army of veterans, and involved a 
popularis staple, land redistribution, while the trial of Rabirius is commonly read as 
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a warning shot across the bows and a symptom of uneasy times. It has been taken as 
a direct attack on the use of the senatus consultum ultimum as a political weapon.
338
 
Unusually, all ten tribunes of that year are said to have been identified as 
populares.
339
 
In all his speeches from the first half of 63, especially the contional second 
and third speeches on the agrarian law, Cicero makes a well-known claim to be the 
‘true’ popularis in comparison to his supposedly popularis opponents. As Seager 
observes, ‘One of Cicero’s favourite ways of attacking a popularis opponent is to 
play on the derivation of popularis from populus. In its simplest form this argument 
runs: “X cannot be popularis, because he neglects or opposes the interests of the 
people.”’ 340  Cicero’s strategy may be usefully compared to P. Scipio Nasica’s 
consular response to the difficult tribune of 138, discussed above in section 2.4, 
since the situation was broadly similar: it was shaping up to be a difficult year, the 
tribunes were on manoeuvres, and the consul was in the awkward position of 
denying the populus something it wanted. It is impossible to recover whatever 
arguments Nasica may have made before he was backed into the corner that his 
consular auctoritas got him out of, but it seems reasonable to assume that he was 
less conciliatory than Cicero. In both cases, however, the underlying reasoning is the 
same: although the issue at stake might seem congenial to the populus, it was not in 
the broader interests of the res publica. Because Cicero was the consul, as Nasica 
had been, it was his job to explain this to the potentially resistant populus. 
Cicero is emphatic that both Rullus’s agrarian legislation and the prosecution 
of Rabirius are politically important and potentially detrimental moves, a claim that 
entitles Cicero, as consul, to exploit to the full his consular duty to administer the res 
publica when he comments on Rullus’s proposed legislation and when he defends 
Rabirius. Especially in the senate, Cicero accuses Rullus of undermining the res 
publica: ‘You have given hope to the wicked and inspired the good with fear, you 
have banished credit from the forum and dignity from the res publica’.341 The res 
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publica, he says, will be carved up by Rullus’s agrarian legislation;342 Rullus aims to 
appropriate revenues belonging to the res publica
343
 and if he gets his own way, the 
senate will lose out: 
 
Quid enim existimatis integrum vobis in re publica fore aut in vestra libertate 
ac dignitate retinenda, cum Rullus atque ei quos multo magis quam Rullum 
timetis cum omni egentium atque improborum manu, cum omnibus copiis, 
cum omni argento et auro Capuam et urbis circa Capuam occuparint? 
 
For what do you think will be left to you unimpaired in the res publica or in 
the maintenance of your freedom and dignity, after Rullus and those whom 
you fear much more than Rullus, with all his band of beggars and scoundrels, 
with all his forces, with all his silver and gold, have occupied Capua and the 
surrounding cities? (Cic. Agr. 1.22.) 
 
In the senate, Cicero argues against Rullus as an elite insider debating with other 
elite insiders about the best way to manage Rome’s public property and business. 
The reasoning that underpins his position can be left implicit, because he can take it 
for granted that his audience is attuned to his perspective, even if they disagree with 
his account of Rullus’s bill. Although Cicero stands in the position of manager to the 
res publica, and although it is this meaning of res publica as the object of (Cicero’s) 
management that is foregrounded in his protests about agrarian redistribution and 
appropriated revenues, his claim that the proposed decemvirs would leave the senate 
nothing ‘for you in the res publica’ invokes res publica as political space, an arena 
within which the senate has specific areas of responsibility on which Rullus’s 
decemvirs will encroach. This turns defeating Rullus’s legislation into a matter of 
public policy, all the more important because the problem is not just Rullus but the 
dangerous condition of the res publica as a whole; dark hints are dropped about its 
hidden wounds.
344
 And who better to defeat such dangerous legislation than the 
consul, to whom responsibility for the res publica has just been handed? As Cicero 
promises the senate, 
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Sic me in hoc magistratu geram, patres conscripti, ut possim tribunum plebis 
rei publicae iratum coercere, mihi iratum contemnere. 
 
I will so conduct myself in this magistracy, conscript fathers, that I shall be 
able to control an angry tribune of the plebs for the res publica, and for 
myself, scorn his anger. (Cic. Agr. 1.26.
345
) 
 
Cicero claims to subordinate his personal interests to his public office. On the one 
hand, he expresses his willingness as consul to use his powers of coercitio on behalf 
of the res publica; on the other hand, as Marcus Tullius Cicero, esteemed orator and 
public-spirited gentleman with a bright consularis future ahead, he scorns any 
attacks the tribunes might make on him personally. 
There is a marked shift of emphasis between De Lege Agraria 1, where 
Cicero assures the senate that he will stand up for them, and the contional De Lege 
Agraria 2, where he stresses instead how, as a homo novus consul, his interests lie 
with the populus. Cicero can scare the senators by claiming that Rullus (as a good 
radical tribune) wants to take their position in the res publica away from them, and 
he can soothe them by insisting that Rullus’s claims to be popularis are false, since 
the populus is not interested in what Rullus has to offer. Thus: 
 
Errastis, Rulle, vehementer et tu et non nulli conlegae tui qui sperastis vos 
contra consulem veritate, non ostentatione popularem posse in evertenda re 
publica populares existimari. 
 
You erred, Rullus, you and some of your colleagues, in hoping that by 
opposing a consul who was popular in reality and not in pretence, you could 
be considered popular in overthrowing the res publica. (Cic. Agr. 1.23.) 
 
It is easy enough to tell the senate this; in contione, Cicero has to take a slightly 
more elaborate tack. His election to the consulship suo anno and as homo novus 
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becomes a sign of special favour from the populus,
346
 which both flatters him and 
places him under a special burden of responsibility for upholding the dignity of the 
consulship: any mistakes on Cicero’s part may cause the populus to be blamed for 
electing him.
347
 Rather than bluntly informing the populus of his true popularis 
status, Cicero promises that he will be a popularis consul;
348
 after all, what do people 
like better than pax, libertas and otium? So how could his dedication to maintaining 
the status quo not be popularis?
349
 Cicero stresses his popularis intentions to the 
populus precisely because this is not a quality often associated with consuls: 
 
Non sum autem ego is consul qui, ut plerique, nefas esse arbitrer Gracchos 
laudare, quorum consiliis, sapientia, legibus multas esse video rei publicae 
partis constitutas.  
 
I am not one of those consuls who, like the majority, think it a crime to praise 
the Gracchi, by whose advice, wisdom, and laws I see that many departments 
of the res publica were set in order. (Cic. Agr. 2.10.) 
 
Valerius Maximus’s account of Nasica’s contio in 138 suggests that the consuls were 
perceived as particularly non-popularis not just because of spectacular incidents, 
such as the action taken by L. Opimius against Gaius Gracchus or by Marius against 
Saturninus, but also because, as the most senior magistrates, they were more likely to 
be responsible for rejecting popularis proposals and levying troops for unpopular 
wars. Cicero’s distinction here between himself and the majority of sternly non-
popularis consuls (even though he too is a consul arguing against a popularis 
tribune’s proposal) looks like a case of having his cake and eating it. His position 
rests entirely on his magistracy; he speaks as a public figure entrusted with serious 
responsibilities at a moment of unease and concern: 
 
Ego qualem Kalendis Ianuariis acceperim rem publicam, Quirites, intellego, 
plenam sollicitudinis, plenam timoris. 
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I am aware, Romans, what the condition of the res publica was when I 
received it on the Kalends of January: it was full of anxiety, full of fear. (Cic. 
Agr. 2.8.
350
) 
 
In this speech, however, Cicero credits the populus with having entrusted him with 
the res publica; that is, he casts the res publica as something that belongs to the 
populus and for which the populus selects administrators.
351
 (A comparison with the 
more radical Gaius Gracchus, who dispensed with the administrators altogether, 
indicates the spectrum of positions at play.
352
) The consul’s responsibility for 
safeguarding the res publica is stressed, along with the point that a homo novus 
consul should be particularly painstaking in this respect, having been made consul 
‘not in cradles but on the Campus’.353 As a responsible consul, Cicero makes every 
effort to come to some consensual arrangement with Rullus, ‘for I thought that, since 
we should have to fulfil magisterial functions in the same year, there ought to be 
some bond of union between us, for administering the res publica well’. 354 
Unfortunately, since Rullus is not a responsible tribune, he fails.
355
 He is therefore at 
liberty to deny Rullus’s claim to be a popularis tribune: the law will destroy 
libertas,
356
 raise up kings,
357
 deprive people of their vote,
358
 attack Pompey, that 
guardian of popular liberty,
359
 remove the tribunician veto
360
 and benefit the Sullan 
possessores
361
 – besides all of which, Rullus was rude about the urban plebs in the 
senate.
362
 In short, Rullus is a danger to the populus (because he endangers their res 
publica) and a bad man, despite being a tribune who self-identifies as popularis. 
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Cicero is therefore obliged to take action against the proposed law, both as consul 
and as the true popularis of the two of them. 
Cicero supports his tendentious claim to be a popularis consul by going into 
unusually explicit detail in De Lege Agraria 1–2 on just what constitutes the Roman 
res publica. This is not a neutral or comprehensive definition of “what res publica 
means” (or even “what the Roman res publica was at this historical moment”): 
rather, Cicero stakes out a rhetorically convenient position from the spectrum of 
available meanings in order to explain just what Rullus’s proposals will ruin. In the 
first place, this res publica has a clear geographical location. This is more interesting 
than it might seem, since, as Suerbaum points out, ‘Da die res publica Romana in 
der Interessenvertretung des Staatsvolkes besteht und dieses Staatsvolk nicht auf ein 
bestimmtes Gebiet beschränkt ist, schließt der res-publica-Begriff eine territoriale 
Beschränkung von vornherein aus. Die res publica Romana existiert überall da, wo 
Inhaber der civitas Romana leben’.363 Nonetheless, through the characterisation of 
Capua as a shadow-Rome and both a historic and a potential rival, Cicero locates 
Rome’s res publica firmly within the city of Rome and its established political 
institutions. In her study of Cicero’s use of geography in these speeches, Vasaly 
shows how Cicero names locations in order to create the impression that Rome was 
surrounded by enemies, for which a focal point of antagonism was required, a role 
allotted to Capua.
364
 Capua is where Cicero claims Rullus wants to plant a colony, to 
which his response is hyperbolic: 
 
Iam omnis omnium tolletur error, iam aperte ostendent sibi nomen huius rei 
publicae, sedem urbis atque imperi, denique hoc templum Iovis Optimi 
Maximi atque hanc arcem omnium gentium displicere. 
 
Now every chance of mistake on every side shall be removed; now they shall 
openly show that the name of this res publica, the seat of our city and empire, 
lastly that this temple of Jupiter best and greatest and this citadel of all 
nations meets with their disapproval. (Cic. Agr. 1.18.) 
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By colonising Capua, the decemvirs will demonstrate their contempt for Rome, 
since, 
 
Maiores nostri Capua magistratus, senatum, consilium commune, omnia 
denique insignia rei publicae sustulerunt, neque aliud quicquam in urbe nisi 
inane nomen Capuae reliquerunt, non crudelitate – quid enim illis fuit 
clementius qui etiam externis hostibus victis sua saepissime reddiderunt? – 
sed consilio, quod videbant, si quod rei publicae vestigium illis moenibus 
contineretur, urbem ipsam imperio domicilium praebere posse; vos haec, nisi 
evertere rem publicam cuperetis ac vobis novam dominationem comparare, 
credo, quam perniciosa essent non videretis. 
 
In Capua our ancestors abolished the magistrates, the senate, the popular 
assembly and all the marks of res publica, leaving nothing else in the city 
except the empty name of Capua, not out of cruelty (for who were ever more 
lenient than those who frequently returned their property even to enemies 
outside Italy who had been conquered by them?), but from prudence; for they 
saw that if any trace of a res publica should still be contained within those 
walls, the very city itself might provide a dwelling-place for empire; you, 
unless you desired to overthrow the res publica and furnish a new tyranny for 
yourselves, would not, I imagine, see how that was wholly disastrous. (Cic. 
Agr. 1.19.) 
 
Capua is currently a populus without a res publica. Because the maiores saw Capua 
as a potential rival to Rome, they rendered it incapable of imperium by removing the 
institutions through which the citizens of Capua governed themselves; it has no 
magistrates, senate or popular council, and consequently can claim no res publica 
either. Capua had wavered during the Samnite Wars and its autonomy was 
consequently infringed upon after 318;
365
 it later defected to Hannibal and was 
retaken in the Second Battle of Capua in 211,
366
 following which most of Capua’s 
territory was subsumed into Roman ager publicus, its inhabitants lost their civic 
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rights and its civic institutions were abolished. From 123 the prefects were four 
elected Roman magistrates; to some extent, the lack of indigenous organisation was 
made up by grouping the inhabitants around important shrines, especially one to 
Diana.
367
 Capua survived as a city and the surviving Capuans continued to live there, 
but they no longer posed a threat to the populus Romanus, having lost both their 
autonomy and their capacity to take political initiative.
368
 (In comparison, Cicero’s 
home municipality of Arpinum was certainly not independent of Rome but retained 
its own res publica, as a letter to Brutus about appointing local magistrates to 
manage that res publica shows.
369
) Cicero’s reasoning seems to be that a Roman 
colony in Capua would be equipped with the full set of political institutions that 
were standard for such a colony;
370
 that is, it would be not just a group of people 
cohabiting in the same city, but a full-fledged civitas joined by consensus iuris et 
utilitatis communio and managing its own res publica. By creating such institutions 
in Capua, or at least in the vicinity of Capua, Rullus would reintroduce the capacity 
for independent political decision-making in the region and thereby set up the 
colonised Capua as a potential rival for Rome once again. 
The insignia of res publica here are political institutions: this is res publica 
as political space defined by political structures, and it is the possession of such a res 
publica that confers the capacity for communal political activity on a civitas. It is not 
surprising to find Cicero expressing such an idea in the senate, which is prominent 
among the political structures said to mark a res publica, but it is striking that the 
same reasoning is reprised at somewhat greater length at Agr. 2.76–98, where Cicero 
is obliged to discourage the populus from thinking that colonising Capua will benefit 
them.
371
 His explanation is that a colony in Capua will be a garrison of ne’er-do-
wells rather than a settlement of good, honest people like his audience (2.77), and 
that Rullus positively intends to transfer ‘your’ res publica to this Capuan garrison, 
contrary to the wishes of the maiores (2.87), who had removed territory, magistrates, 
senate and publicum consilium from the city, leaving not even a death-mask (imago) 
of a res publica (2.88). Indeed, 
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si maiores nostri existimassent quemquam in tam inlustri imperio et tam 
praeclara populi Romani disciplina <M.> Bruti aut P. Rulli similem futurum 
– hos enim nos duos adhuc vidimus qui hanc rem publicam Capuam totam 
transferre vellent – profecto nomen illius urbis non reliquissent. 
 
if our ancestors had thought that, in so glorious an empire and in a people so 
admirably organized as the Romans, there would be found anyone like 
Marcus Brutus
372
 or Publius Rullus (for those are the only two men we have 
seen as yet who desired to transfer this res publica entirely to Capua), they 
certainly would not have allowed the name of the city to remain. (Cic. Agr. 
2.89.) 
 
It would be brave to label this “innovation” given the unkind effects of time and 
source survival on our record of the Roman rhetorical tradition. However, Cicero 
does seem to be engaging in some interesting positioning when he defines res 
publica before the populus in a way that goes beyond “your business that you (elect 
magistrates to) manage”. Instead he explains the insider’s perspective – that res 
publica is about more than public property (temples, ager publicus) and everyday 
business (law-courts, festivals, wars) – to an audience of presumed political outsiders 
in order to argue that Rullus’s apparently popularis proposals will take their political 
autonomy away from them and transplant it to the rejuvenated Capuan civitas. His 
argument against Rullus relies on locating this carefully defined res publica of the 
populus Romanus (which was by now a much broader category than simply ‘the 
people living in or very near the city of Rome’) within the political and social 
institutions and the physical spaces of Rome itself. From this perspective, Rome’s 
res publica is conceived of not as the property and revenues belonging to the 
populus Romanus, or even as the overarching umbrella of Roman imperium in Italy 
and beyond, but rather as a sort of political spider-plant rooted in the city of Rome 
that sends out shoots that may spring up into newer and greater spider-plants 
elsewhere. Colonising Capua, and so reintroducing a degree of political autonomy in 
the region, will therefore set up a challenge to the original res publica rather than 
simply expanding its collection of docile satellite communities. Notably, Cicero puts 
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little effort into arguing his case as far as the geographical aspect goes; it seems he 
can take it for granted that the Roman political imagination was fixated on Rome. 
The issue of “what constitutes res publica” takes a new turn in the Pro 
Rabirio Perduellionis, where res publica is bound up with senatorial auctoritas, 
magisterial imperium and the SCU. Once again, Cicero’s office is the foundation for 
his case, now the defence of the hapless Rabirius, on the grounds that Rabirius’s case 
is being used as a political vehicle to undermine all of the aforementioned.
373
 
(Lintott, for one, considers this a misinterpretation of the case, innocent or otherwise, 
and that the prosecutor Labienus aimed not so much to attack senatorial authority as 
‘to establish what the senate had in fact authorized. Even if the decree [the SCU] was 
a blank cheque, it was still worth making clear that it could only be cashed by those 
to whom it was made out. Moreover it could be argued that the amount to be drawn 
was not left completely blank, but limited by a “not more than…” clause’. 374 ) 
According to Cicero, Rabirius admitted to his involvement in the deaths of 
Saturninus and his followers, if not to their actual murders.
375
 Like all good citizens, 
however, Rabirius had been impelled to action by the auctoritas of the senate 
(expressed in the SCU) and the imperium of the consuls (morally supported by the 
SCU), and therefore had no real option other than to do what he did.
376
 To attack 
Rabirius is to attack the consuls who gave the order
377
 and the other eminent 
gentlemen who followed them;
378
 more than that, it attacks the principle that the 
senate’s auctoritas should be obeyed, especially in times of crisis.379 In short, 
 
Agitur enim nihil aliud in hac causa, Quirites, <nisi> ut nullum sit posthac in 
re publica publicum consilium, nulla bonorum consensio contra improborum 
furorem et audaciam, nullum extremis rei publicae temporibus perfugium et 
praesidium salutis.  
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For this case, gentlemen, is nothing less than an attempt to secure that there 
be henceforward no publicum consilium in the res publica, no concerted 
action of good citizens against the frenzy and audacity of wicked men, no 
refuge for the res publica in emergencies, no security for its welfare. (Cic. 
Rab. Per. 4.) 
 
That is, the consul’s call to arms in the event of a crisis, as defined by the senate 
through the SCU, was a key prop for the res publica. Any attack on this principle 
cried out for consular intervention, which Cicero was happy to provide: 
 
si est boni consulis, cum cuncta auxilia rei publicae labefactari convellique 
videat, ferre opem patriae, succurrere saluti fortunisque communibus, 
implorare civium fidem, suam salutem posteriorem salute communi ducere. 
 
if it is the duty of a good consul, when he sees everything on which the res 
publica depends being shaken and uprooted, to come to the rescue of the 
country, to aid it in securing the welfare and the fortunes of the public, to 
plead for the loyal support of the citizens, and to set the public welfare before 
his own. (Cic. Rab. Per. 3.) 
 
Furthermore, his audience is exhorted to follow their consul into the breach, as 
Rabirius followed his.
380
 Where the De Lege Agraria speeches posited magistrates, 
senate and commune/publicum consilium as the constituent parts of a generic res 
publica, the Pro Rabirio Perduellionis posits magisterial and popular obedience to 
senatorial auctoritas as a necessary (if not sufficient) pillar of the specifically Roman 
res publica. This is a stronger and more controversial move, even in conjunction 
with Cicero’s renewed claim to be more-popularis-than-thou on the grounds that 
Rabirius has been saved from the non-popularis threat of the cross.
381
 In general, 
though, the political claims that Cicero makes in the Pro Rabirio Perduellionis are 
slightly more plausible than those of the De Lege Agraria, in the sense that modern 
scholars generally accept that the prosecution was trying to make some sort of point 
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about senatorial power and the SCU, as opposed to Cicero’s claims about Pompey in 
De Lege Agraria, for example,
382
 or the accusation that the decemvirs will be kings, 
or indeed any geographic determinism involving Capua. It is hard to see what other 
reason Labienus and Caesar might have had for resurrecting an obsolete charge for a 
forty-year-old, highly politicised murder case. It is also telling that the case was 
resolved not by Rabirius’s acquittal or condemnation, but rather by the praetor, 
Metellus Celer, lowering the red flag on the Janiculum to summon the populus to the 
Campus Martius, a move as obsolete as the charge of perduellio.
383
 Just which way 
popular judgement would fall was left to hang. 
 
4.2 THE BRAVE, THE BOLD, THE BATTERED 
Cicero had used the agrarian law and the trial to portray himself as the dutiful homo 
novus consul, entrusted with the care of the res publica by the populus Romanus; to 
locate said res publica firmly within Rome’s civic and political spaces by positing 
Capua as Rome’s shadow-self and antithesis, currently lacking a res publica in the 
absence of senate and magistrates; and to uphold the senate’s moral authority to 
recognise a crisis through the SCU as a key prop for the res publica. The trial of 
Rabirius especially foreshadowed the defining moment of Cicero’s consulship: his 
epoch-making salvation of Rome’s res publica from the danger posed by that devil 
incarnate, Lucius Sergius Catilina. 
Substantial scholarly attention has been lavished on the ‘Catilinarian 
Conspiracy’ over the years. The most important question remains whether to accept 
Cicero’s claim that a huge, overarching, premeditated conspiracy was in play,384 or 
whether the various manifestations of political discontent (Manlius’s Etrurian rising, 
slave rebellions at Capua and Apulia, Catiline’s provocative politics, Lentulus and 
the other conspirators) should be taken as just that: disparate expressions of troubled 
times tied together only by Cicero’s misleading rhetoric.385 It is not necessary to 
accept the extreme scepticism of Waters and Seager (tempting though this may be) 
to want to recover a more nuanced Catiline with political ambitions beyond general 
                                                          
382
 Sumner 1966: 578. 
383
 Tyrell 1973: 297-9. 
384
 E.g. Salmon 1935, Phillips 1976, Smith 1966: 105-131, Stockton 1971: 110-142, Mitchell 1979: 
232-42. 
385
 Waters 1970, Seager 1973. 
104 4. RES PUBLICA IPSA 
 
destruction, as Allen does,
386
 or to feel with Yavetz that ‘it is possible that the 
importance of Catiline’s conspiracy is over-estimated by some modern scholars’387 
(a suggestion characterised by Waters as ‘a magnificent understatement’388), or to 
think that ‘the threat of Catiline was both exacerbated and even partly created by 
Cicero, in rhetoric and in actual fact, first in order to win election to the consulate as 
a new man who faced fiercesome odds, and then to appear during that very same 
consulate as the savior of Rome in an hour of extreme crisis’, and that ‘the illegal 
execution of the Catilinarians in December 63 was the not altogether unexpected 
climax of several years of Cicero’s emotional and dramatic pronouncements about 
internal enemies of the Roman state’.389 Indeed, it could be argued both that there 
was no great overarching conspiracy and that Cicero sincerely believed one existed; 
it is easy to be wrong in good faith, especially in politics, and Cicero would not be 
the first politician to get carried away by his own rhetoric. In any case, whether or 
not there was a Conspiracy deserving of the capital letter, it is important for any 
reading of the First Catilinarian that when this speech was delivered on 7 November 
63, no one other than Cicero really seems to have thought so.
390
 Catiline’s rhetoric 
could be inflammatory without being revolutionary (likewise involvement in public 
violence at the elections);
391
 the elections were postponed, but the senate took no 
action against Catiline, who was not debarred from standing in them;
392
 and the 
SCU, which Cicero implies was passed against Catiline,
393
 was actually passed in 
reaction to news of Manlius’s uprising and Crassus’s bundle of anonymous 
threatening letters.
394
 In other words, there was certainly a crisis on hand, but it was 
not yet universally (if even widely) perceived as Catilinarian – except, of course, by 
Cicero. To say this undermines the melodrama of Cat. 1 is to commit Waters’ 
magnificent understatement: even the triumphalism of Cat. 2 is misleading, since the 
senate was more cautious than the consul and did not decree Catiline a hostis until 
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there was confirmation that he had actually joined Manlius.
395
 The first issue is 
therefore Cicero’s disingenuous construction of a united res publica against the 
monstrous Catiline in Cat. 1, a speech that Batstone diagnoses as constructing and 
presenting ‘Cicero’s version of his consular ethos’.396 
From the start, Cicero casts the current crisis as one for which Catiline’s 
responsibility is universally acknowledged. All the unease and military preparations 
within the city are directed at Catiline, whose plans are known to everyone (1.1); 
Catiline, despite still being in Rome, is the not-so-secret leader of Manlius’s camp at 
Faesulae and is plotting against Rome from within (1.5); Cicero’s various 
predictions about Catiline’s plots have been proven by events (1.7; we may think 
with Stockton that these predictions are a little too specific not to have been 
sharpened up by Cicero in revision);
397
 every decent person in the city fears and 
hates Catiline (1.13); no one in the senate will talk to him, or even sit next to him 
(1.16); the patria herself has a very low opinion of him (1.18); and when Catiline 
needed a suitable host to ‘avoid suspicion’ (in fact because of a threatened 
prosecution de vi that seems not to have been brought in the end), no one would take 
him in (1.19).
398
 The passing of the SCU (a decree Cicero characterises as one by 
which various well-known historic trouble-makers had been despatched almost 
instantaneously by various eminent consuls, 1.3–4) becomes proof of the senate’s 
conviction that Catiline is the villain of the story: 
 
Habemus senatus consultum in te, Catilina, vehemens et grave, non deest rei 
publicae consilium neque auctoritas huius ordinis: nos, nos, dico aperte, 
consules desumus. 
 
We have a decree of the senate against you, Catiline, a decree of power and 
authority. Neither the counsel nor the authority of this order is missing from 
the res publica: it is we – I say it openly – we consuls who are lacking. (Cic. 
Cat. 1.3.) 
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If everyone in Rome, especially the senate, is aware of Catiline’s conspiratorial 
activity and hates him for it, only the hesitance of the consuls can explain why no 
action has so far been taken against him. The consuls have been entrusted with 
responsibility for administering and safeguarding the res publica, after all, and yet, 
‘We however, brave men that we are, think we are doing our duty to the res publica 
if we only avoid his frenzy and weapons’.399 What the res publica needs is not the 
ordinary administration of ordinary consuls, but the extraordinary actions necessary 
to suppress an extraordinary danger provoked by an extraordinary villain. Cicero 
takes the blame on himself and his colleague for failing to live up to his rhetoric, 
presumably with the implication (since Cicero has been harping on Catiline’s 
villainy for months) that Antonius is the real reason for the hold-up. The result is 
Lintott’s paradox: a speech devoted to arguing that something should be done 
(specifically, that Catiline should be killed) while simultaneously apologising for not 
having done it.
400
 Having begun by asking why the SCU had not yet been used, 
Cicero eventually finds himself having to justify his own continued failure to use it 
in an imagined exchange with what becomes the res publica itself;
 401
 his not very 
convincing reasoning is that killing Catiline will only hamper this pestis rei publicae, 
whereas forcing Catiline out of Rome along with his associates will remove the 
problem altogether.
 402
 Despite his claim that Catiline, the Enemy Within, deserves to 
die, Cicero therefore urges him to leave Rome and become what everyone knows he 
is already: the public face of the Enemy Without.
403
 
This is all very dramatic and must have been entertaining to watch. But just 
as telling Catiline to leave Rome is an exercise in exciting rhetoric rather than an 
expulsion of Catiline through the consular power of relegatio,
404
 Cicero’s 
embarrassment about the unused SCU suggests a political weakness also apparent in 
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his reluctance to take up Catiline’s suggestion at Cat. 1.20 and put Catiline’s exile to 
a senatorial vote. The depiction of a silent majority mentally willing Catiline into 
exile would be more convincing if Cicero had felt confident enough to put its 
support to the test. Even Cicero is obliged to concede that not everyone in Rome may 
be convinced Catiline is plotting contra rem publicam (1.6); we are entitled to 
suspect him of underreporting contemporary levels of scepticism. The claim to have 
a decree ‘against you, Catiline’ might more accurately be rendered as ‘we have an 
outstanding SCU that we could use against anyone who looks like being a problem’, 
and for Cicero actually to have done so at this point would have made him even 
more vulnerable than executing the conspirators eventually did, not to mention 
validating all the issues that concerned the prosecutors in the Pro Rabirio case. 
Cicero was willing to condemn Catiline in words, but – fortis vir that he was – not 
quite committed enough to Catiline’s guilt to (mis)use the existing SCU while 
lacking both compelling evidence and genuinely comprehensive political support. 
The united res publica of this speech, as its somewhat tentative personification at 
Cat. 1.27–30 suggests, is a rhetorical fiction redolent of the autonomous res publica 
of the Verrines that supposedly surrendered itself to Sulla; and, like that res publica, 
its purpose is to conceal disagreeable facts. Cicero supplements his ‘consular 
ethos’405 with the fiction of a united res publica that actively expels from its midst a 
hostis who should rightfully be put to death. The point is to force Catiline, currently 
a hostis only in Cicero’s rhetoric, out into the open (or perhaps rather to provoke 
Catiline into playing the role assigned to him). What looks like an attempt to put 
pressure on his fellow consul Antonius by extolling the auctoritas of a unanimous 
senate might equally well be viewed as an attempt to convince the senate that it does 
unanimously support action against Catiline, and not a particularly successful 
attempt either. 
Cicero’s rhetoric relies on the here unarticulated presumption that the res 
publica is firmly rooted in Rome itself: it is Catiline’s physical departure from the 
city (and from political life within it) that will remove him and his compatriots from 
the res publica, even though they are only envisaged as going as far as Etruria – not 
even outside Italy, let alone beyond the bounds of Roman imperium.
406
 It is also 
rhetoric that is much more concerned with events within Rome than with dealing 
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with the real uprising and other manifestations of unrest outside Rome’s walls.407 
This feature carries over to the Second Catilinarian, where Catiline’s departure 
becomes proof of all Cicero’s claims thus far, despite continued uncertainty over 
whether Catiline had left to join Manlius or gone into exile in Massilia.
408
 Now that 
Catiline has removed himself, everyone can see there was a coniuratio against the 
res publica (2.6), which is fortunata and beata on account of his departure (2.7, 10), 
while Cicero, the all-seeing consul, is bearing up bravely under the heavy 
responsibility of keeping everything and everyone safe: ‘The preservation of the res 
publica no less than governing it – what a thankless task this is!’409 Such a restricted 
conception of the geographic bounds of the res publica feeds an exaggerated notion 
(or at least exaggerated rhetoric) of the danger posed by the enemy within the city 
and shows what is principally conceived to be at stake, rhetorical fictions aside: the 
structured political space within which elite politicians moved. Furthermore, if 
Catiline had now proven his bad intentions, Cicero might be criticised for not having 
had the courage of his convictions and doing something about him while he was in 
the city. Certainly Lintott detects ‘signs of uncertainty’ in ‘Cicero’s self-justification 
for allowing Catiline to escape’.410 
If Cicero had limited his consular heroics to provoking Catiline into open 
rebellion, he would have been legally and politically in the clear. What got him into 
real trouble was the execution without trial of the five ‘Catilinarian Conspirators’, 
including the praetor P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura, who were condemned only by an 
extra-legal vote in the senate.
411
 They were Roman citizens; Lentulus held an office 
with imperium; and, most importantly, they had not been found guilty in any court of 
law. Their execution violated the lex Sempronia of Gaius Gracchus, the need for 
which had been demonstrated by his brother’s violent death412 and the passing of 
which had failed to prevent him from meeting the same fate.
413
 The issue now 
became the SCU, which Cicero proposed to use in earnest, after all his contortions in 
Cat. 1. Lintott highlights two major grounds of conflict liable to come up after the 
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passing of an SCU: (a) is it an appropriate response to the situation? (b) is the 
responsible magistrate’s action proportionate?414 Cicero had little to worry about as 
far as (a) was concerned, since by now there seems to have been general agreement 
that the situation was a mess, but his Fourth Catilinarian (‘at best a cento of 
Cicero’s introduction to the debate on 5 December and of a subsequent intervention, 
but it may be largely a fiction’415) certainly needed to justify (b), all the more so if it 
should be read mostly as an invention of 60, by which time Cicero’s precarious post-
consular position had become clear. An uneasy awareness of trouble ahead hangs 
over the speech from the opening line: 
 
Video, patres conscripti, in me omnium vestrum ora atque oculos esse 
conversos, video vos non solum de vestro ac rei publicae verum etiam, si id 
depulsum sit, de meo periculo esse sollicitos.  
 
I see, conscript fathers, that the faces and eyes of you all are turned upon me; 
I see you are concerned not only with your own danger and that of the res 
publica but also, if that is averted, my own. (Cic. Cat. 4.1.) 
 
Such anxiety, says their heroically self-sacrificing consul, should be laid aside; the 
senators should think about themselves, their families, their fortunes and the name 
and salus of the Roman people (4.2–3). Cicero himself, having achieved a happy 
tricolon of fortis, consularis and sapiens, will die calmly if it comes to it, despite his 
natural concern for his family, his home, his terrified daughter and ‘my little boy, 
whom the res publica seems to be clasping as a hostage for my consulship’,416 which 
plays on the personal relationship between consul and res publica and is perhaps a 
colourful way to say that if Cicero slips up now, either there won’t be a res publica 
for Marcus Junior to take part in or the memory of Marcus Senior’s failure will 
blight his son’s political career.417 Such personal concerns are relevant only because 
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Cicero is moved to commend his family to the senate, should something happen to 
him to make this necessary, and to wish that no una pestis rei publicae will destroy 
everyone at once. The senators should focus on the salus rei publicae and taking 
precautions against the storms that threaten them (4.4), since, as it now turns out, the 
departure of Catiline from the city was not enough to avert the danger.
418
 Like 
Catiline, these are no mere revolutionaries; rather, ‘their plan is that in the universal 
slaughter there should not survive a single individual even to mourn the name of the 
Roman people or to lament the destruction of so mighty an empire’.419 Surely no 
response to a situation in which the res publica and even the name of the Roman 
people are in danger could be considered disproportionate? 
Two responses have in fact been put forward: one by the consul-designate D. 
Silanus, who thinks these people should be executed, and the other by C. Caesar, the 
praetor-designate last seen dipping his fingers into the Pro Rabirio Perduellionis 
affair, who proposes life imprisonment in the Italian towns. The respectful attitude 
Cicero adopts towards the latter does not conceal his preference for Silanus’s 
proposal,
420
 which was eventually decreed by the senate and carried out by Cicero 
himself. Silanus’s proposal is intended to punish ‘men who have tried to deprive of 
life all of us and the people of Rome, who have tried to destroy the empire and erase 
the name of the Roman people’ (qui nos omnis, qui populum Romanum vita privare 
conati sunt, qui delere imperium, qui populi Romani nomen exstinguere), and 
Silanus remembers that ‘this kind of punishment has often been invoked in our res 
publica against traitorous citizens’ (hoc genus poenae saepe in improbos civis in hac 
re publica esse usurpatum, 4.7). In contrast, the philosophical Caesar considers death 
no punishment (just like the philosophically fortified Cicero, in fact) and suggests 
confiscating the prisoners’ property and distributing them among the Italian towns, a 
course that would be unjust to said towns, although Cicero is fairly sure he can find 
enough people who can be pressured into taking these prisoners, if the senate votes 
for Caesar’s motion (Cat. 4.7–8, 10). Still, says Cicero, it would be in his own 
interests to go along with Caesar, since Caesar has taken the via popularis and so 
Cicero may not have to worry so much about popular attacks. Once again, however, 
an anticipation of trouble for Cicero personally enables him to demonstrate his 
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consular commitment to the public good: the utilitas rei publicae should be placed 
above any thoughts of danger to Cicero himself (4.9). The implication that it would 
be in the interests of the res publica for the conspirators to be executed is clear, and 
will become clearer as the speech goes on. 
Cicero has only praise for Caesar, who has demonstrated his goodwill 
towards the res publica with his sententia, showing himself to be no flighty 
contionator but a true popularis thinking only of the salus populi (4.10). The tip of 
the hat back to the experimental etymology of the speeches De Lege Agraria and Pro 
Rabirio Perduellionis may or may not have pleased Caesar, but it is unlikely that he 
agreed with what follows from it: 
 
At vero C. Caesar intellegit legem Semproniam esse de civibus Romanis 
constitutam; qui autem rei publicae sit hostis eum civem esse nullo modo 
posse: denique ipsum latorem Semproniae legis iussu populi poenas rei 
publicae dependisse. 
 
But Gaius Caesar recognises by his presence that the lex Sempronia was 
passed in the interests of Roman citizens; that an enemy of the res publica 
cannot in any respect be regarded as a citizen: and he knows too that the 
author of the Sempronian law himself paid the supreme penalty to the res 
publica with the authority of the people. (Cic. Cat. 4.10.) 
 
This grossly distorts the relevant lex Sempronia, which prescribed a capital 
punishment for anyone who put a Roman citizen to death without the authorisation 
of the populus,
421
 as the consul-designate Silanus now proposed that Cicero should 
do. Cicero himself had reminded the populus earlier that year that ‘Gaius Gracchus 
carried a law forbidding sentence to be passed on the life of a Roman citizen without 
your consent’.422 Cicero’s reasoning at Cat. 4.10 is that acting against the res publica 
automatically renders the actor a non-citizen who may be punished without scruples. 
This is legally nonsense; it skips the important intermediate step of trial and 
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condemnation by a duly appointed court of law, which the senate was not. 423 
Furthermore, the claim that Gaius Gracchus died iussu populi is a tendentious play 
on the phrasing of the lex Sempronia, since Gaius was certainly not condemned by 
the populus; at most, it may refer to an approving Opimian contio before the event or 
to Opimius’s acquittal after it. 424  Cicero makes Caesar complicit with his own 
deliberate misreading of the law just by attending the senate; and since the law was 
part of the nexus of standard popularis issues involving the SCU and the abuse of 
senatorial auctoritas/magisterial potestas that Caesar had helped stir up with the 
prosecution of Rabirius, this looks like mischief on Cicero’s part, if not quite open 
provocation.
425
 Caesar’s proposal also violated the lex Sempronia, but on a lesser 
scale; it was ‘a mitigated capital sentence about which some equivocation would be 
possible in the event of a subsequent accusation of the consul’ and shows that while 
Caesar recognised the danger of the situation, ‘he was not prepared to violate the 
constitution more than necessary in an emergency’.426 In the speech Sallust gives 
him, he characterises Silanus’s proposal as seeming ‘not cruel (for what could be 
cruel in the case of such men?) but foreign to our res publica’.427 
Presented with a relatively restrained alternative, Cicero responds by 
characterising Caesar’s proposed perpetual house arrest as crueller than a 
straightforward death penalty (4.10–11). He is moved, he says, not by cruelty, but by 
humanitas and misericordia brought on by terrible visions of what the conspirators 
want to do; they intended to commit atrocities against women, children and Vestal 
Virgins, and have attempted to destroy the dwelling-place (domicilium) of the whole 
res publica, that is, Rome. The explicit geographical location of the res publica 
within the city of Rome gives substance to the attack on the conspirators: to act 
contra rem publicam is not an abstract wickedness against political structures and 
metaphorical space, but would have manifested (and still may) in the physical 
destruction of the city and its inhabitants. Any desire to be merciful will result only 
in a reputation for cruelty if patria and cives are ultimately destroyed (4.11–12). This 
is the stick; the carrot follows in the form of a promise that Cicero is prepared for all 
possible eventualities, and that all orders, classes and ages of people are completely 
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united for the first time in history, conspirators aside (4.14). Cicero waxes lyrical on 
that famous unanimity: 
 
Quam si coniunctionem in consulatu confirmatam meo perpetuam in re 
publica tenuerimus, confirmo vobis nullum posthac malum civile ac 
domesticum ad ullam rei publicae partem esse venturum. 
 
If we maintain forever in the res publica this union that we have cemented in 
my consulship, I assure you that hereafter no civil and domestic strife will 
touch any part of the state. (Cic. Cat. 4.15.) 
 
Even the poor, the freedmen and the slaves are out in force to show their communal 
feeling with the res publica (4.16), a claim that illuminates the currently 
unarticulated conception of res publica at play here. It may not be unreasonable that 
those who have little part in public life should be viewed as allies or opponents of 
‘the res publica’ (that is, the structured political sphere) by a political insider like 
Cicero speaking to an audience of fellow insiders in the senate, but it expresses a 
very different model from the community of citizens equally responsible for the 
management of their shared res publica that surfaces in speeches addressed directly 
to the populus. Cicero’s perspective presupposes that the consent of certain classes 
of citizens (and non-citizen urban dwellers) to the decisions emanating from within 
the political sphere cannot always be relied upon, although he insists that the current 
consensus is universal: the rumour that Lentulus had an agent buying support among 
the poor should be dismissed, as this agent certainly tried, but no one was selling 
(4.17). Since everyone is united to preserve the res publica, since citizens, citadel, 
Capitol, altars, temples and lives depend on the senate’s decision, and since its 
consular leader, Cicero, thinks only of the senate and not of himself, the senate must 
take action to make sure no citizen will ever again even think about doing such 
things, let alone get as far as they did (4.18–19). 
Finally, Cicero returns to the more personal note of the opening sections. 
Here the ultimate goal of using his consular achievements as the foundation for his 
own future dignitas becomes transparent: he realises he has made a great many 
enemies, but even if they overcome the dignitas of the senate and res publica in 
future, Cicero will never regret his own actions (4.20). Death is inevitable; the 
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unique praise given to Cicero by the senate will see him shuffle happily from this 
mortal coil: 
 
Ceteris enim semper bene gesta, mihi uni conservata re publica 
gratulationem decrevistis.  
 
Others have received public thanksgivings from you for serving the res 
publica well, none but I for preserving it. (Cic. Cat. 4.20.) 
 
Cicero may therefore take his place among a list of famous generals who have 
earned themselves glory through foreign military exploits, culminating in the current 
golden boy, Pompey (4.21),
428
 even though the lot of a civil war suppressor is less 
happy than that of a conquering hero: he faces ‘an unending war against evil 
citizens’ (cum perditis civibus aeternum bellum), but is confident that the support of 
the senate and all good citizens will see off any attacks, and that the union of senate, 
equestrians and boni will weather any storm (4.22). All he asks in return for saving 
the res publica is that this moment and his whole consulship should be remembered 
(4.23). In conclusion, 
 
Quapropter de summa salute vestra populique Romani, de vestris coniugibus 
ac liberis, de aris ac focis, de fanis atque templis, de totius urbis tectis ac 
sedibus, de imperio ac libertate, de salute Italiae, de universa re publica 
decernite diligenter, ut instituistis, ac fortiter. Habetis eum consulem qui et 
parere vestris decretis non dubitet et ea quae statueritis, quoad vivet, 
defendere et per se ipsum praestare possit. 
 
With the care, therefore, and the courage that you have displayed from the 
beginning, take your decision upon the salvation of yourselves and of the 
Roman people, upon your wives and children, your altars and hearths, your 
shrines and temples, the buildings and homes of the entire city, your 
command and your freedom, the safety of Italy and upon the whole res 
publica. You have a consul who will not shrink from obeying your decrees 
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and, while he lives, from defending your decisions and answering for them in 
person. (Cic. Cat. 4.24.) 
 
Having stressed the current danger to the res publica, foreseen future danger to 
himself, implied his own preferred course and expressed his willingness to do 
whatever may be necessary, Cicero sums up by laying the burden of decision-
making on the senate and portraying himself as an obedient servant of senatorial 
will, not just in the immediate crisis but for the rest of his life. The ‘spirit of the 
heroic aristeia’ 429  is replaced by dutiful devotion; not triumphalism or self-
glorification, but rather the assignment of responsibility for any future illegalities to 
the senate.
430
 If he, the responsible consul, has saved the res publica so far (and he 
has), it is up to the senate to make the hard decision that will safeguard it for the 
future. 
 
4.3 THE FUTURE 
In all the consular speeches, Cicero hops nimbly around the spectrum of meanings 
attached to res publica: not just from speech to speech but also within specific 
speeches, where he exploits the elasticity of this exceedingly elastic term. In general, 
this may just reflect the fact that res publica was capable of bearing multiple 
meanings and it could be in a speaker’s interests not to be too precise about what he 
actually meant. It seems reasonable to assume that Cicero’s terminological 
athleticism was typical of how res publica was generally used in the ordinary 
discourse of ordinary politicians (‘dog-whistle politics’ before dog whistles, 
perhaps), which makes it all the more striking when Cicero discards this advantage, 
as in two of the speeches on Rullus’s agrarian law, and takes the trouble to explain to 
his audience just what he does mean. It is revealing, if perhaps not surprising, that 
Cicero’s preferred perspective on res publica turns out to be that of political space. 
For all that Cicero relied upon and made much of his consulship, which placed him 
in the position of manager to the managed res publica, the predominant perspective 
in all these speeches is that of an elite insider who moves within and is concerned 
about the structured political sphere. This is understandable: political activity was 
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not limited to those in office at any given moment and most ordinary magistrates 
would want to keep one eye on their long-term prospects within the res publica as 
well as on their immediate responsibilities in the administration of the res publica. 
Holding office was an occasional and temporary opportunity, whereas interaction 
with one’s political peers in re publica was a perpetual, ongoing activity, even for 
consuls. This was particularly true of Sulla’s res publica constituta, since whether 
Sulla had mandated it or not the consuls now spent most of their year in office in re 
publica in Rome rather than managing the res publica in the field.
431
 
Like other consuls, Cicero meant to use his year in office to stake out the 
foundations of his future political career. Unlike most consuls, however, he relied on 
his rhetoric to leverage a domestic crisis into a war for the res publica. Cicero 
therefore casts himself as the dux togatus consul who, despite not commanding an 
army, describes his action against Catiline and friends in military language, who 
afterwards is voted a thanksgiving for having saved the res publica (unlike other 
consuls, who get thanksgivings for sterling work administering the res publica, 
mostly in foreign wars)
432
 and who is insistent on the need to transfer the res publica 
to a responsible, militarily-capable consul when his own term is up.
433
 The 
cornerstone of all this is Cicero’s occupation of the consulship and the responsibility 
laid upon him by his office to safeguard the res publica, which Catiline and friends 
were allegedly plotting not just to seize but to destroy.
434
 This conspiracy against 
Rome’s physical and political structures justified the illegal execution of the 
‘Catilinarian Conspirators’. Cicero pursues the line he gave himself in the Pro 
Rabirio Perduellionis to its conclusion and stands forth as a consul obedient to the 
senate’s auctoritas: he is willing to follow whatever the senators recommend and 
consequently executes their illegal policy. He tries, in other words, to shunt 
responsibility for executing the conspirators onto the senate while retaining the 
gloria of having saved the res publica. This was more successful in rhetoric than in 
fact, since the senate was free to decree whatever it pleased; the responsibility for 
any actions taken as a result remained with the responsible magistrate. The 
reappearance of the fictional res publica in Cicero’s rhetoric against Catiline was 
therefore a dangerous sign of things to come. 
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Cicero’s vulnerability became obvious as soon as the new tribunes took 
office and a couple of them passed critical comment on his activities; one of these, 
Q. Metellus Nepos, did his best to spoil Cicero’s triumphant final day of office by 
cutting his eloquence short in a contio. Cicero responded by improving on the usual 
oath: ‘I swore without flinching that this res publica and this city had been saved by 
my sole efforts’.435 The event encapsulates one of the characteristics of Cicero’s 
post-consulship speeches, where ‘his self-praise is in part a reaction to the attacks on 
his actions’:436 attacked by the tribune over his consular heroics, Cicero defended 
himself with the claim that those heroics had saved the res publica. It also 
demonstrates Cicero’s concern to keep the conspiracy from being forgotten in the 
excitement of defeating Catiline in the field and the conflict between the senate and 
Pompey’s friends, Nepos and Caesar.437 Lintott takes the brief exchange of letters 
between Cicero and Nepos’s brother, Metellus Celer, one of the commanders against 
Catiline, to show that ‘in early 62 men like Celer regarded the threat in the city as 
insignificant compared with the conflict with Catiline, Manlius, and the other 
insurgents in the field’, and that Caesar was not alone in thinking the executions an 
inappropriate response to the situation.
438
 
These issues surface in the Pro Sulla, a speech given between May and 
October 62.
439
 As Berry argues, the apologetic content of the Pro Sulla is consistent 
with Cicero’s political position at the trial (and probably would not have helped 
Cicero at a later date), suggesting that the speech may have been published 
substantially unrevised shortly after the trial, which ended with an acquittal.
440
 The 
prosecutor, L. Torquatus, had been one of Cicero’s supporters during his 
consulship,
441
 but was inclined to take Cicero’s defence of his inimicus Sulla 
personally,
442
 although his attack on Cicero may have been strategic: ‘since Cicero’s 
position is crucial, Torquatus could not avoid attempting to undermine it’.443 This 
makes his criticisms particularly interesting, since there is no reason to write him off 
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as a popularis like Caesar or an aggrieved Pompeian like Metellus Nepos; rather, 
such critique was available for anyone who happened to oppose Cicero politically or 
in the law-courts. The first criticism to which Cicero chose to respond was that since 
he had exposed Catiline’s “second” conspiracy, he had no business defending 
anyone accused of being part of it, especially since he had provided evidence against 
various other accused conspirators.
444
 This was followed by the related accusation 
that since all those whom Cicero accused were condemned, and since Sulla only 
dared to stand trial in Rome because Cicero had agreed to defend him, Cicero and his 
political amici were exerting undue influence over the courts; in other words, Cicero 
was misusing his considerable auctoritas in the cause of personal regnum.
445
 
Cicero has two responses to the first accusation: the obvious response, that 
unlike the other defendants Sulla was innocent and that as the exposer of the 
conspiracy he, Cicero, was the best-placed person to know this,
446
 and the complaint 
that he was being unfairly singled out by Torquatus, since his fellow defender 
Hortensius and many other unnamed supporters of Sulla had known just as much as 
Cicero about the conspiracy thanks to Cicero’s efforts.447 This argument is distinctly 
suspect; if Cicero was, as he complained, being singled out, that was mostly because 
he (unlike Hortensius) had singled himself out as the saviour of the res publica. It 
was disingenuous of Cicero to want to blend into the mob of distinguished elder 
statesmen in order to defend Sulla, however true it might be that others had followed 
his lead.
448
 For good or for bad, and no matter how often he described himself as the 
obedient servant of senate and boni,
449
 Cicero took pains to ensure he would be held 
solely responsible for the actions taken against conspiracy and conspirators. 
Torquatus’s second accusation was the more dangerous, since it suggests not just 
popular ill-will but also how those not necessarily ill-disposed towards Cicero or 
inclined to disapprove of the executions may have felt about Cicero’s strident claim 
to a pre-eminent role in saving the res publica during the crisis. It was not just the 
obvious political opponents who might resent Cicero drawing unduly on any 
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political capital gained during his consulship: Torquatus, presumably no popularis, 
called Cicero a rex not because of the executions Cicero oversaw as consul but 
because of how Cicero used his auctoritas once out of office. The accusation seems 
to mean that Cicero and his friends had stitched up the courts; it is not that Cicero is 
really a ‘king’ on the lines of Tarquin Superbus, or even the sort Cicero had accused 
Rullus of planning to install with his agrarian law, but rather that the res publica is 
being illegitimately controlled by the alarming auctoritas of Cicero and friends. 
Cicero replies at length (Sull. 21–9), but his response is strongest on the subject of 
whether his municipal origins make him a foreign rex (Sull. 22–25); the retort that 
Torquatus must be the real rex if the ‘innocent’ Sulla fears to face him is not a very 
convincing argument against Sulla’s reasons for remaining in Rome (Sull. 22). It 
might be suggested that one reason why Cicero spends so much time on what seems 
to have been a passing gibe at his ‘foreign’ origins is precisely because this was a 
passing gibe that could be easily dismissed, whereas it might have been more 
difficult to engage with Torquatus’s criticisms of how Cicero was using his 
auctoritas. (His reasons for defending Sulla perhaps were not the purest; Sulla was 
not a very nice man, but he had lent Cicero money to buy a splendid new house.
450
) 
The accusation that Cicero was running a regnum seems to have been a 
popular one to make. Berry’s view of Cicero’s response is that defending Sulla, ‘a 
man against whom he had made no allegations’, enabled Cicero to respond to a 
litany of other criticisms, giving him a chance ‘to display his lenitas and shake off 
the image of a rex peregrinus, substituting the more congenial picture of himself as 
the merciful saviour of the Roman state’ (not to mention ingratiating himself with 
Sulla’s senatorial friends). 451  Certainly Torquatus’s criticism of Cicero for the 
execution of the conspirators
452
 provoked Cicero into an account of his annus 
mirabilis that contrasts with future versions: Torquatus should not think, he says, 
that the plebs disapprove of Cicero’s actions; no one blames Torquatus’s notoriously 
severe ancestor for his exemplary severity towards his son, so should Torquatus 
blame the res publica for destroying the enemies within its midst?
453
 This striking 
personification is not intended to shift responsibility for the executions from Cicero 
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himself, however much it may contribute to a greatly simplified picture of the res 
publica defending itself against domestici hostes.
454
 Rather than renounce 
responsibility for his actions, Cicero will happily, repeatedly and very loudly tell 
everyone just what he did the previous year: 
 
Ego consul, cum exercitus perditorum civium clandestino scelere conflatus 
crudelissimum et luctuosissimum exitium patriae comparasset, cum ad 
occasum interitumque rei publicae Catilina in castris, in his autem templis 
atque tectis dux Lentulus esset constitutus, meis consiliis, meis laboribus, mei 
capitis periculis, sine tumultu, sine dilectu, sine armis, sine exercitu, quinque 
hominibus comprehensis atque confessis incensione urbem, internicione 
civis, vastitate Italiam, interitu rem publicam liberavi; ego vitam omnium 
civium, statum orbis terrae, urbem hanc denique, sedem omnium nostrum, 
arcem regum ac nationum exterarum, lumen gentium, domicilium imperi, 
quinque hominum amentium ac perditorum poena redemi. 
 
An army of abandoned citizens had been scraped together in a secret plot and 
had prepared for their fatherland the most cruel and grievous destruction, 
Catiline had been placed in command of the camp to destroy and annihilate 
the res publica and Lentulus in command among our temples and homes; but 
I, as consul, by my decisions, by my efforts and at the risk of my life, but 
without any state of emergency, without a levy, without use of arms, without 
an army, by the arrest and confession of five men, I rescued the city from 
burning, the citizens from slaughter, Italy from devastation and the res 
publica from destruction. By the punishment of five demented desperadoes I 
saved the lives of all the citizens, the peace of the world and finally this city, 
which is the home of each one of us, the citadel of foreign kings and nations, 
the light of all peoples and the dwelling-place of imperium. (Cic. Sull. 33.) 
 
By executing the ‘Catilinarian Conspirators’, Cicero saved the city, the citizens, Italy 
and the res publica without levies or army, a ‘strikingly hyperbolic’ claim455 that 
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ignores the efforts of those who had recently commanded armies against Catiline and 
Manlius (who might well have seemed a more obvious threat to Italy at large than 
any urban conspirators) and commits Cicero to a version of events that foregrounds 
the illegal executions. This is furthered by Cicero’s narrow geographical perspective: 
as in the consular speeches, the city of Rome is the sedes and domicilium of just 
about everything that matters. Cicero had saved Rome, and thereby could be held (or 
at least held himself) to have saved everything else along with it. The hyperbole 
might be taken to indicate Cicero’s confident occupation of the political high ground 
in 62, and to some extent it probably does, but the fact that one of his own former 
supporters seems to have accused him of a disproportionate reaction to an admitted 
crisis so soon after the event must have given Cicero reason to be nervous. 
 
4.4 THE WIDOWHOOD OF EVERY GOVERNMENT 
Cicero’s exile and restoration have been thoroughly studied by modern scholars.456 
Robinson shows how careful Cicero was ‘to avoid the E-word’ after his return to 
Rome,
457
 while Rundell points out that the letters show Cicero was most bitter about 
the defection of the boni, which he attributes to their fear and invidia, even though he 
strategically casts himself as a martyr to civic violence in his Post Reditum speeches 
and makes scapegoats out of the consuls, Piso and Gabinius.
458
 In support of 
Cicero’s bitterness, Welch makes an attractive, if perhaps unkind, argument for the 
culpability of Cicero’s friend Atticus.459 The Post Reditum speeches are triumphant 
about Cicero’s recall: the senate’s activities on his behalf have given him a sort of 
immortality,
460
 its unanimity had restored his dignitas before it managed to do the 
same for his corporeal self,
461
 and the goodwill expressed by the populus actually 
seems to have increased Cicero’s dignitas.462 This triumphalism is hollow, however; 
in reality, Cicero was politically indebted to a great many people with inconveniently 
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diverging interests,
463
 had dented his dignitas and lost much of his auctoritas 
through being forced into exile,
464
 and retained a dangerous inimicus in P. Clodius 
Pulcher.
465
 He needed to establish a new political persona.
466
 His immediate 
rhetorical problem was twofold: it would be difficult to restore his dignitas by 
trumpeting his good works as administrator of the res publica, since his most famous 
good works were what had got him into difficulties in the first place, and he needed 
to justify going into exile despite (so he insists) having done nothing wrong.
467
 As 
Nicholson observes, one of Cicero’s solutions was ‘to identify himself and his 
personal well-being with the state as a whole and the health of the entire 
Republic’.468 Cicero does this by abstracting various public statements that commend 
him for saving the res publica and using this public commendation as a peg on 
which to hang his self-identification with the res publica in the absence of any public 
office, glossing over what he did to earn it so that the commendation became 
unproblematic. This is spread over several speeches, so piecing together the logic 
becomes something of a puzzle, but it runs as follows: (1) Cicero saved the res 
publica; (2) consequently he can identify himself with the res publica even as a 
private citizen in exile; (3) Clodius, attacking Cicero, therefore attacks the res 
publica; (4) those working on Cicero’s behalf are champions of the res publica; (5) 
when Cicero is driven out of Rome, the res publica is driven out with him; (6) when 
he returns, the res publica returns with him; (7) this is all confirmed by his 
triumphant return and the various measures various people took to get him back. As 
points (5–6) suggest, the res publica is both implicitly and explicitly personified in 
these speeches: as in the past, but now at much greater length, Cicero resorted to the 
rhetorical fiction of the res publica to make up for his political weakness. 
Following his exile, Cicero developed a certain reticence on the topic of the 
executions so proudly recalled in the Pro Sulla. It is certainly the case (and will be 
the foundation of Cicero’s apologia from now on) that Cicero returns repeatedly to 
his consulship as the moment when the res publica was saved. Post reditum, 
however, the emphasis has changed: Cicero’s public career now has two cruxes, the 
consulship and the exile, and the former recedes as the need to justify the latter takes 
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precedence. Catiline is invoked only in passing,
469
 and while Cicero is happy to 
allude to his consulship as a moment of great crisis in which he played a pivotal role, 
the details are elided. So, for example, Cicero characterises himself as having 
defended the communis salus bloodlessly as consul,
470
 his consulship as a year in 
which the res publica was ‘all but lost’,471 and accuses one group of enemies of 
being inimical to him because they hate the res publica, which he had preserved 
against their wishes.
472
 Lost in all of this is just what got him into so much trouble: 
not his campaign against Catiline, but the execution of the conspirators, which 
receives only delicate references. Clodius’s law prohibited Cicero’s return to Rome 
until ‘those who had so nearly destroyed it should have returned to life’473  and 
Gabinius ‘swore that he would wreak vengeance upon the Roman equestrians for the 
events of the fifth of December in the year of my consulship, and for that punishment 
that was exacted upon the slopes of the Capitol’.474 This is circumlocutory, not to 
mention exculpatory. Cicero’s exile had made him much warier about trumpeting the 
more controversial aspects of his heroic consulship. 
Rather than detail, Cicero foregrounds the claim that his exile had 
endangered, struck down, bereaved or even driven out the res publica, which sprang 
back to life, returned with Cicero or called in propria persona for his return.
475
 This 
is odd: Cicero, a private citizen without any formal claim to represent or administer 
or safeguard public affairs except by providing consilium as a senator (meaning, as 
he had actually said in the Pro Sulla, that he shared his duty to the res publica with 
the rest of the senate
476
), seems to be establishing a personal relationship for himself 
with the res publica that almost foreshadows Augustus and the emperors. As always, 
the lack of comparable material makes it impossible to be certain that Cicero was 
committing a novelty, but his strategy was tailored to a specific set of circumstances 
and anyone with more options would probably have settled for something less 
convoluted (and more convincing). The foundation of this relationship is not the 
simple assertion that Cicero had saved the res publica during his consulship, but 
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rather the more sophisticated point that various other eminent people, including the 
senate as a whole, had said as much. Cicero was not going to pass up the opportunity 
to remind the senate of its decrees in his favour: 
 
Quid enim magnificentius, quid praeclarius mihi accidere potuit quam quod 
illo referente vos decrevistis, ut cuncti ex omni Italia, qui rem publicam 
salvam vellent, ad me unum, hominem fractum et prope dissipatum, 
restituendum et defendendum venirent? 
 
For what could have brought me greater pride or honour than the decree 
which you enacted at his request, that all men to the length and breadth of 
Italy who wished the res publica to be well should concentrate their whole 
resources upon the restitution and defence of a broken and all but shattered 
man like myself? (Cic. Red. Sen. 24.) 
 
As if this were not plain enough, Cicero reinforces it almost immediately: 
 
Quid ego gloriosius meis posteris potui relinquere quam hoc, senatum 
iudicasse, qui civis me non defendisset, eum rem publicam salvam noluisse?  
 
What prouder boast could I have handed on to posterity than that the senate 
had pronounced that the citizen who had not helped me had shown he did not 
want the res publica to be well? (Cic. Red. Sen. 25.) 
 
The phrasing is familiar from Scipio Nasica and the SCU, where the overriding 
principle had also been the res publica salva. The measures taken to procure 
Cicero’s recall from exile here become a triumphant inversion of the usual tragic 
story: rather than an individual appealing to the res publica salva in order to crush 
seditious individuals on the urban stage using irregularly raised forces, the senate 
broadcasts a national call for peaceful political support to save a single, supremely 
important individual for the res publica (a call answered by Italia herself, almost
477
). 
The justification for this extraordinary action on Cicero’s behalf had been given 
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publicly both in the senate and in a follow-up contio, which meant Cicero was able 
to remind everyone about it: 
 
Atque illo die cum rem publicam meis consiliis conservatam gravissimis 
verbis et plurimis iudicassetis, idem consul curavit ut eadem a principibus 
civitatis in contione postero die dicerentur. 
 
On that day too, when in weighty and lengthy terms you had declared that the 
res publica had been preserved by my measures, the same consul saw to it 
that an announcement to the same effect should be made at a mass meeting 
on the following day by the leading men of the state. (Cic. Red. Sen. 26.) 
 
Cicero’s salvation of the res publica during his consulship had earned him this 
(belated) support in his hour of need. More detail on this contio is provided at Red. 
Pop. 16–17, where Cicero singles out Pompey for particular gratitude and specifies P. 
Servilius as having opined that Cicero’s efforts had preserved the res publica, while 
L. Gellius had given not only his opinion but also evidence to the same effect. Even 
the phrasing of Clodius’s law implicitly acknowledged that the res publica would be 
in danger if the hypothetical resurrection of its enemies, the conspirators, were not 
matched by Cicero’s recall.478 Further senatorial decrees supplemented the consul 
Lentulus’s efforts and aimed to ensure Cicero’s restoration: 
 
decrevistis, ne quis ulla ratione rem impediret: qui impedisset, graviter 
molesteque laturos – illum contra rem publicam salutemque bonorum 
concordiamque civium facturum, et ut ad vos de eo statim referretur; meque 
etiam, si diutius calumniarentur, redire iussistis. 
 
you decreed that no contrivance should be employed by anyone to impede 
your end; that any who should impede it should be visited with your deep 
resentment; that such impediment would constitute an act of hostility to the 
res publica, the safety of patriots, and the unity of citizens, and that the man 
responsible for it would be made the subject of an immediate motion to your 
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body; furthermore, you ordered me to return forthwith, even though their 
misrepresentations should continue. (Cic. Red. Sen. 27.) 
 
All of this confirmed Cicero’s political importance (even his misfortunes testified 
that he had conferred ‘divine beneficia’ on the res publica479), which was important 
given how damaging his exile had been. It also gave him a legitimate basis for 
blurring the rhetorical boundary between himself and the res publica. He is indignant 
that the consul Piso had prevented senators from changing their clothes to show their 
support of Cicero prior to him going into exile: 
 
Te consule, tuis edictis et imperiis senatui populi Romani non est licitum non 
modo sententiis atque auctoritate sua, sed ne luctu quidem ac vestitu rei 
publicae subvenire? 
 
It was in your consulship, by your edicts, and in virtue of the powers which 
reposed in you, that the senate of the Roman people was forbidden to aid the 
res publica even by the garb of mourning, let alone by their moral influence 
and the expression of their opinion. (Cic. Red. Sen. 16.) 
 
To help Cicero is to help the res publica – or would have been, if the consuls of that 
year (whose duty it was to manage the res publica!) had allowed the senate to do so. 
Likewise when Cicero was struck down the res publica was struck down with 
him;
480
 C. Septimius, Q. Valerius, P. Crassus, Sex. Quintilius and C. Cornutus had 
contributed their officia ‘to me and the res publica’;481 and it was not only love for 
Cicero but studium in rem publicam that motivated Lentulus to restore Cicero from 
exile.
482
 The relationship becomes personal towards the end of the speech to the 
senate, when Cicero explains that he left Rome because he was unwilling to defend 
himself against force using force and preferred exile to suicide because, 
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cum viderem me non diutius quam ipsam rem publicam ex hac urbe 
afuturum, neque ego illa exterminata mihi remanendum putavi, et illa, simul 
atque revocata est, me secum pariter reportavit. 
 
when I saw that my absence from this city would not outlast the absence 
from it of the res publica itself, I did not think it my duty to remain there 
after its extinction, and, what is more, no sooner was it recalled than it 
brought me back in its company. (Cic. Red. Sen. 34.) 
 
After all the rhetorical energy Cicero had devoted to rooting the (distinctly 
impersonal) res publica physically in Rome in his consular speeches, it now seems 
to be capable of getting up and leaving Rome together with Cicero. Laws, 
quaestiones, magisterial jurisdiction, senatorial auctoritas, liberty, a plentiful corn 
supply, reverence and religio in human and divine matters – all were absent ‘with 
me’, says Cicero, who goes on to explain that he had considered it his duty to return 
with them (cum illis) should they be recalled.
483
 The result is awkward: Cicero is 
‘restored to the res publica along with the res publica’;484 presumably, that is, he 
returns to its physical domicilium, Rome, in company with all the legal and political 
institutions that had supposedly been brought to a standstill by Clodius during 
Cicero’s exile.485 The reasoning is clearer when the same argument appears at Red. 
Pop. 14. Thanks to the brutal measures taken by Cicero’s opponents to maintain his 
exile, 
 
dum ego absum, eam rem publicam habuistis ut aeque me atque illam 
restituendam putaretis. Ego autem in qua civitate nihil valeret senatus, omnis 
esset impunitas, nulla iudicia, vis et ferrum in foro versaretur, cum privati 
parietum se praesidio non legum tuerentur, tribuni plebis vobis 
inspectantibus vulnerarentur, ad magistratuum domos cum ferro et facibus 
iretur, consulis fasces frangerentur, deorum immortalium templa 
incenderentur, rem publicam esse nullam putavi. Itaque neque re publica 
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exterminata mihi locum in hac urbe esse duxi, nec, si illa restitueretur, 
dubitavi quin me secum ipsa reduceret. 
 
such was the condition of the res publica during my absence that you thought 
yourselves called upon to restore me, and, by doing so, the res publica as 
well. But in a civic community where the senate was ineffective, crime 
everywhere unpunished, justice at a standstill, and armed violence at large in 
the forum, at a time when private persons found protection not in the laws but 
in the walls of their houses, when tribunes of the plebs were wounded in full 
view of you all, when swords and torches were carried to the houses of the 
magistrates, when the rods of the consul were broken and the temples of the 
immortal gods set on fire, I could not but hold the res publica to be 
nonexistent. I thought, therefore, that with the res publica expelled there 
could be no place for me in this city, and yet I did not doubt that, if she were 
restored, she herself would bring me back with her. (Cic. Red. Pop. 14.) 
 
The terrible condition of the res publica (that is, civic life and public business 
generally) during and as a direct result of Cicero’s absence shows that the res 
publica was then nulla, non-existent. Read against the De Lege Agraria speeches, 
Cicero is once again providing an account of various elements of the Roman res 
publica (a strong senate, personal safety, a functioning legal system, civil order, 
respect for magistrates and the gods) in order to show what had been threatened. His 
version here encompasses both political structures and ordinary civic life, since his 
point now is not the transference of political power from Rome to a rival city but 
rather that everything had been missing from Rome during his absence; everything, 
that is, that could conceivably be embraced by the term res publica. Nulla slips into 
exterminata: the res publica has been ‘expelled’ from the city, and so Cicero too 
departs, confident in the knowledge that a restored res publica will restore him also. 
His consequent restoration is the proof of his rhetoric: since Cicero has been restored 
to the city, the res publica must have been restored as well in order to intervene on 
his behalf. At the end of the speech in the senate, the res publica is therefore cast as a 
suppliant on Cicero’s behalf along with the senate’s auctoritas, the populus 
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Romanus and the whole of Italia,
486
 while in the speech to the people Cicero is 
inspired to promise that ‘since I have been restored to the civitas by the res publica 
herself, the res publica shall on no occasion find me to fail in my duty to her’.487 
Rhetorical alchemy transmutes the lengthy list of elements proper to functioning 
civil society into a personified unity capable of manifesting itself in the shape of 
Cicero, who becomes a kind of passive avatar of the res publica: he is not so much 
an actor in all this drama, except insofar as he sacrifices his own wellbeing by 
withdrawing from the city,
488
 as the token of supreme civic good for which the 
senate and (responsible) magistrates struggle against the necessary wickedness of 
those who dare to attack him. The familiar concomitant conclusion is that Cicero’s 
opponents cannot just be inimici but must be hostes actively working against the res 
publica, and this is certainly how they are portrayed in the speeches.
489
 
It is not generally necessary to pass judgement on how satisfactory Cicero’s 
rhetorical logic may be at any given point, but it seems fair to say that this particular 
rhetorical rendering of reality is complicated, tortuous and ultimately unconvincing. 
Nicholson summarises a statistical study of Ciceronian oratory as suggesting that 
‘Cicero seems to have less to say in the fifties, yet he says it more ornately’;490 here 
Cicero is bombastic from a position of weakness, which his oratory aims to conceal. 
That Cicero is making the absolute most of his restoration can be gathered from his 
cross-examination of Vatinius during the trial of Sestius in 56, where Vatinius had 
evidently used Cicero’s exile as a gibe (‘For what you have thrown in my face about 
my departure…’)491 and put down his recall to political manoeuvring (‘Oh, but you 
said it was not for my sake that men laboured over my return, but for the sake of the 
res publica (rei publicae causa)’).492 Cicero turns this into a commendation: no one 
who had entered in re publica for good reasons could be sorry to be loved by his 
fellow citizens for the sake of the res publica (rei publicae causa) – and even laying 
aside all the familiar evidence of universal adoration, such as the sorrowful forum 
(forum maestum) and silenced senate (muta curia), ‘what is more desirable for an 
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immortality of glory and everlasting perpetuation of my name, than that every citizen 
should judge that the welfare of the civitas was bound up with the welfare of my 
single self?’493 Although the extraordinary relationship to the res publica Cicero 
develops here foreshadows the rhetoric of the principate, the emperors developed 
their rhetoric in order to make their power palatable to others, whereas Cicero might 
be safely mocked for his: 
 
‘Tune es ille,’ inquit, ‘quo senatus carere non potuit, quem boni luxerunt, 
quem res publica desideravit, quo restituto senatus auctoritatem restitutam 
putabamus quam primum adveniens prodidisti?’ 
 
“Are you the man,” he says, “indispensable to the senate, mourned by good 
men, yearned for by the res publica, whose restoration we thought would 
mean the restoration of senatorial authority, and yet whose first act on your 
return was to betray it?” (Cic. Dom. 4.) 
 
The speaker is Clodius; the reference may be to Cicero’s proposal that Pompey 
should oversee the grain supply.
494
 What certainly is suggestive, as far as real (rather 
than rhetorical) comparisons with the principate go, is Cicero’s treatment of Pompey 
in the Post Reditum speeches, especially the one delivered to the populus. Pompey 
first appears in the speech to the senate as the princeps civitatis whose retreat into 
the safety not of the laws but of his house is the first significant feature of the year 
after Cicero’s exile, a year in which the res publica was without consuls (since 
Cicero is not prepared to admit Piso and Gabinius deserve the title), permanent 
parents or guardians, and when the senate could not express its sententia.
495
 It is one 
of the signs that the light at the end of the tunnel has come on when ‘Gnaeus 
Pompeius, whose courage, fame and achievements are chief (princeps) in the records 
of any nation or age, thought that he could safely venture into the senate’.496 This is 
all modest enough (and probably implies criticism of Pompey’s unvirtuous retreat to 
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his house;
497
 at the very least, Pompey was unlikely to appreciate the reminder
498
), as 
is the exhaustive rendition of how Pompey had assisted Cicero at Red. Sen. 29, 
where Pompey figures as an important figure of outstanding dignitas but remains 
essentially a fellow senator, however significant. In comparison, however, any 
implied criticism of Pompey in the speech to the people is buried in a long list of 
what went wrong that year,
499
 while Cicero tells the people: 
 
Quorum princeps ad cohortandos vos et ad rogandos fuit Cn. Pompeius, vir 
omnium qui sunt, fuerunt, erunt, virtute sapientia gloria princeps: qui mihi 
unus uni privato amico eadem omnia dedit quae universae rei publicae, 
salutem, otium, dignitatem. 
 
Chief of your appellants and suppliants was Gnaeus Pompeius, a man who 
has had, has, and will have, no rival in courage, wisdom and renown; he gave 
to me all that he has ever given to the whole res publica, what no other has 
ever given to a private friend – wellbeing, tranquillity, dignity. (Cic. Red. 
Pop. 16.) 
 
The point of comparison with the principate is not the repeated description of 
Pompey as princeps;
500
 rather, it is the praise of Pompey as someone who has 
essentially acted as patronus to the res publica, as well as to Cicero personally. 
(Within the context of these two speeches, admittedly, there is no clear distinction 
between the two.) The account of Lentulus’s contio at Red. Pop. 16–17 focuses on 
Pompey’s character testimony, which is given in condensed form; the debt Cicero 
owes him is ‘scarcely lawful (fas) for a human to owe a human’ and it was Pompey’s 
consilia together with Lentulus’s sententia and the senate’s auctoritas that convinced 
the people to approve Cicero’s restoration.501 Again, the privatus Pompey is listed at 
Red. Pop. 18 in company with the auctoritas of the senate, the consensio of Italy, all 
the boni, Lentulus, the other magistrates, all mankind and the immortal gods, a list 
that singles out only two individuals, the other of whom was one of the consuls for 
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that year. Pompey is not just another senator. To a striking degree, he stands apart 
from the res publica as a kind of supra-political entity, rather than moving within the 
usual structures of the political sphere. Unlike other magistrates and former 
magistrates, Pompey’s dignitas does not stem from his achievements in the 
administration of the res publica; instead, the res publica owes its salus, otium and 
dignitas to him. If the res publica can be personified, it can be a person with a 
patronus; it can look to a single real individual (not necessarily one who holds an 
official position) for guidance and self-preservation. 
This is foregrounded in the De Domo Sua, which recycles the rhetorical logic 
of the two Post Reditum speeches. Clodius is the labes ac flamma rei publicae
502
 
from whose evils the res publica ipsa called upon the senate and consuls for aid;
503
 
indeed, the res publica ipsa had raised up Cicero, thrown down by the onrush of 
Clodius’s impetus furoris, with her own hands.504 Clodius had no right to pass not 
even a law but a privilegium against a citizen whom all gods and men had judged the 
conservator rei publicae.
505
 Eminent persons had agreed that Clodius’s measures 
marked the death of the res publica, even if they were obliged to concede it was 
legally done to death.
506
 Even after the res publica ‘was expelled with’ Cicero (erat 
exterminata mecum), it nonetheless still ‘fluttered before the eyes of its extinguisher’ 
(obversabatur ante oculos exstinctoris sui) demanding back itself and Cicero (se 
meque) from his madness.
507
 Cicero’s exile had been a voluntary martyrdom on 
behalf of the res publica,
508
 which had departed Rome with him;
509
 his recall was 
based on his services to the res publica, confirmed by senatorial decree: 
 
Summum est populi Romani populorumque et gentium omnium ac regum 
consilium senatus: decrevit ut omnes qui rem publicam salvam esse vellent 
ad me unum defendendum venirent, ostenditque nec stare potuisse rem 
publicam si ego non fuissem, nec futuram esse ullam si non redissem.  
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The supreme deliberative body of the Roman people, and indeed of all 
peoples, nations, and kings, is the senate; and the senate decreed that all who 
wished the res publica to be safe should rally to my sole defence, and 
intimated that the res publica could not have survived had I not existed, and 
would be annihilated should I not be restored. (Cic. Dom. 73.) 
 
No one, Cicero says, has accused him of any crime except for ‘one single act of 
cruelty’ during the durissima rei publicae tempora when Cicero had repelled 
destruction from the patria – that is, the execution of the conspirators.510 
Pompey’s starring role in De Domo Sua came courtesy of the grain supply 
commission, which was the political controversy du jour, temples of Libertas aside, 
and which Clodius seems to have used to accuse its proposer, Cicero, of passing over 
to the populares.
511
 It is not true, Cicero tells Clodius, that the pontifices are angry 
with Cicero for saying recently that the salus civium was joined with honos for 
Pompey,
512
 nor are any of Clodius’s criticisms of Cicero’s recent political activity 
valid.
513
 What is true is that Cicero proposed Pompey for the grain commission 
because Pompey’s fides, consilium, virtus, auctoritas and felicitas would ensure the 
job got done;
514
 and whether this happy outcome was a divine blessing bestowed in 
reward for Cicero’s return or the result of Cicero’s devotion to requiting the populus 
Romanus for their beneficium, the res publica has been spared an impending 
crisis.
515
 Cicero will pass over the obvious reason to give Pompey this extraordinary 
commission (the remarkable number of extraordinary commissions Pompey has 
already completed and through which he augmented the name and imperium of the 
populus Romanus
516) in favour of attacking Clodius’s hypocrisy, Clodius having 
cheerfully given various people extraordinary commands in order to buy their 
support.
517
 The account of Clodius’s misdeeds segues into just what (or rather, who) 
it was that put an end to Clodius’s reign of terror: 
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Sed excitatus aliquando Cn. Pompei – dicam ipso audiente quod sensi et 
sentio, quoquo animo auditurus est – excitatus, inquam, aliquando Cn. 
Pompei nimium diu reconditus et penitus abstrusus animi dolor subvenit 
subito rei publicae, civitatemque fractam malis, imminutam ac debilitatam, 
abiectam metu ad aliquam spem libertatis et pristinae dignitatis erexit. 
 
But the resentment of Gnaeus Pompeius – and, though it is in his hearing, I 
shall speak frankly about what I have felt and what I still feel, whatever may 
be the sentiments with which he listens to me – the resentment of Gnaeus 
Pompeius, I say, which had lain too long dormant in the deep recesses of his 
mind, was roused at length, and came suddenly to the aid of the res publica, 
and bade the civic community, cowed, enfeebled, and cringing though it was, 
to entertain some hope of regaining its freedom and ancient dignity. (Cic. 
Dom. 25.) 
 
It turns out to have been the privatus Pompey who was the driving force behind 
Cicero’s recall from exile – or, as Cicero would have it, who came to the aid of the 
res publica. This justifies Cicero’s proposal to give Pompey the grain commission,518 
despite the (completely unfounded!) rumours put about by malicious persons that 
Pompey had actually abandoned Cicero to Clodius’s attack in the first place.519 
Lentulus might have been the public face of the effort to get Cicero recalled, but it 
was Pompey who put in all the serious work in the shadows.
520
 At Dom. 66, Pompey 
is the princeps civitatis; at Dom. 110, it is the princeps orbis terrae whom Clodius 
had penned up in his own house; by Dom. 129, Pompey has become the propugnator 
et custodis imperii. Pompey is not just significant, but dominant; he holds no office, 
but looms over Roman political life to the point of overshadowing the consul. While 
Cicero puts a great deal of work into establishing his identification with the res 
publica based on the one-off heroics of his consular year, he attributes to Pompey 
more or less in passing the kind of permanent, regularly reinforced, dubiously 
official role of someone who can be expected to intervene in moments of crisis to 
give the res publica a hand if need be – precisely the sort of position that the 
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emperors would come to hold. These rhetorical experiments were compelled by 
Cicero’s personal circumstances, but they point to a larger transformation of what 
res publica can mean and how it was (and would be) conceived. It is ironic that this 
version of Pompey’s role in Cicero’s recall, and the hints dropped about his part in 
Cicero’s exile, is so much more convincing than Cicero’s contorted rhetoric on his 
own account. 
 
4.5 THE BELLS THAT STILL CAN RING 
The self-aggrandising rhetoric Cicero developed in the Post Reditum speeches was 
continued in his other speeches from the 50s: he had saved the res publica in his 
consulship (and this was confirmed by other people),
521
 his exile was contra rem 
publicam and his inimici were hostes (whether explicitly framed in these terms or 
not),
522
 his return was a triumph for the res publica and all good citizens,
523
 although 
Clodius and anyone else who might have agreed with him at any point continued to 
be thorns festering in the res publica,
524
 which took a very personal interest in 
Cicero’s activities.525 In short, Cicero created a special relationship between himself 
and the res publica that could be invoked even when he had no formal 
responsibilities other than attending the senate. This was necessary not just because 
of the damage done by his exile but also because Cicero’s capacity for independent 
political action was now constrained. The weakness of his position is laid bare by his 
anticlimactic promises: despite his dramatic account of saving the res publica, attack 
by domestici hostes, and restoration by senate, the boni and Pompey, his political 
position is the essentially Catonian one that he will conduct himself impeccably in 
ordinary business. At Red. Sen. 36, his political freedom will be deployed in defence 
of the res publica: having been ‘restored to the res publica together with the res 
publica’, he has no intention of remitting his pristina libertas in its defence, but will 
rather increase it. He goes a little further in the Reditum ad Populum, where he 
promises the populus to do the very most possible: firstly, to show to the populus the 
pietas usually given to the immortal gods, and secondly, since the res publica itself 
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has restored him in civitatem, that he will never fail the res publica.
526
 He provides a 
fourfold list of assailants: those who hate him because he had preserved the res 
publica, which he had saved against their wishes; those who pretended to be his 
friends, but had betrayed him; those who envy his reputation and dignitas, which 
they are too lazy to attain for themselves; and those who ought to have been the 
custodes rei publicae, but nonetheless sold his salus, the status civitatis and the 
dignitas of the imperium in their care – this last presumably referring to Piso and 
Gabinius.
527
 Each crime shall be avenged according to its provocation, says Cicero 
grandly: 
 
malos civis rem publicam bene gerendo, perfidos amicos nihil credendo 
atque omnia cavendo, invidos virtuti et gloriae serviendo, mercatores 
provinciarum revocando domum atque ab iis provinciarum rationem 
repetendo. 
 
bad citizens by managing the res publica well; my treacherous friends by 
crediting nothing and suspecting everything; the envious by a devotion to 
glory and virtue; and the traffickers in provinces by recalling them home, and 
holding them responsible for their provincial government. (Cic. Red. Pop. 
21.) 
 
In other words, business as usual, albeit with a paranoid twist. This is not the 
revenge of a man in a position to do much harm to his inimici, even if, as Cicero 
goes on to explain at some length, taking revenge is easier (therefore less important) 
than repaying beneficia, and also subject to rather less social policing.
528
 
Cicero’s letters to Atticus are candid about his vulnerability,529 but his more 
polished epistles to his benefactor Lentulus show him negotiating his rhetorical 
persona and political limitations in the semi-formal space between public rhetoric 
and private communication.
530
 The lengthy retrospective review of his post-exilic 
position and conduct given at Fam. 1.9, written in December 54, is particularly 
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telling. As Mitchell notes, the letter ‘tells no lies, but its ambiguities, subtle 
distortions, omissions, and skill in suggesting false conclusions convey the wrong 
impression if it is considered separately from the fuller and more honest 
contemporary accounts to Atticus and Quintus’.531 Cicero was responding to what 
seems to have been his correspondent’s not-very-veiled criticism of his recent 
defence of Vatinius, whom Cicero had previously attacked in the In Vatinium, and 
perhaps also a subtler criticism of Cicero’s good relations with Caesar and Appius 
Claudius, given how Cicero repeats that Lentulus explicitly was not criticising 
this.
532
 Cicero explains at length that his attempts to demonstrate his political 
independence had upset Crassus, Caesar and the inscrutable Pompey, the last of 
whom had met Quintus Cicero a few days after the conference at Luca in 56 and 
delicately threatened him on Cicero’s account.533 He casts himself as someone who 
had striven to act in public affairs as befitted a consularis of unblemished reputation, 
and who had succeeded to the point of pulling the tail of the biggest, least 
communicative elephant in the room, whereupon the weakness of his position had 
been made abruptly clear. It was not possible, it transpired, to play the part of the 
independent, important consularis, not because Cicero had not done his best but 
because the current political landscape, combined with the debts incurred during 
Cicero’s exile, would not allow it. His detailed account of political manoeuvring 
lapses into oratory: 
 
Conlegi ipse me et cum ipsa quasi re publica conlocutus sum, ut mihi tam 
multa pro se perpesso atque perfuncto concederet ut officium meum 
memoremque in bene meritos animum fidemque fratris mei praestarem, 
eumque quem bonum civem semper habuisset bonum virum esse pateretur. 
 
I collected myself and spoke as if with the res publica itself. Would it not 
allow me, after all I had suffered and gone through for my sake, to behave 
with propriety and gratitude towards my benefactors and to honour my 
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brother’s pledge? Would it not allow him whom it had always held to be a 
good citizen to be a good man? (Cic. Fam. 1.9.10.) 
 
In his moment of revealed weakness, Cicero turns to the personified res publica, 
which he had spent so much rhetorical energy on establishing as client, patron and 
symbolic second self, to provide a way out of his dilemma. What might seem merely 
a petty political embarrassment, Cicero’s changed public attitude towards a publicly 
acknowledged political inimicus, has become a matter of national importance on 
which the res publica may be expected to take a stand, if only because of its interest 
in the unstained character of its champion and avatar, Cicero. The res publica’s reply 
is not recorded, and the brevity of this particular flight of rhetoric may indicate it was 
a bit over the top for even a semi-formal letter, since Cicero goes on to reason his 
own way to a respectable outcome: while he had been carrying on in a way likely to 
annoy the Great Elephant, various ostensible supporters had been whispering behind 
his back about their pleasure that Pompey and Caesar would be alienated from him. 
Not only that, but they had taken up ‘my opponent – mine? surely, indeed, of laws, 
justice, tranquillity, the fatherland, all good men’534 – i.e. Old Nick himself, the 
unnamed Clodius. 
On the one hand, then, those whom Cicero might be perceived as letting 
down stand revealed as hypocrites who had been happy (not for the first time) for 
Cicero to endanger himself in the cause of principled politics while they themselves 
cultivated a serious danger to the usual list of evocative elements. On the other hand, 
Cicero had positive reasons to bow to Pompey’s wishes. If the res publica had been 
controlled by someone like Cinna, neither threats nor promises could have won him 
over, but the current princeps is Pompey, who has earned his power and glory 
through services to the res publica, has helped Cicero in the past and who shares an 
enemy with Cicero. Pompey’s remarkable position is legitimate and his claim to 
Cicero’s loyalty is valid; despite appearances to the contrary, it was not inconstancy 
for Cicero to change course and support this summus vir.
535
 This led Cicero to the 
obvious conclusion that there was nothing wrong with embracing Pompey’s friend 
(and Cicero’s friend, and Quintus’s friend) Caesar, either, not least because: 
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Vehementer etiam res ipsa publica me movit, quae mihi videbatur 
contentionem, praesertim maximis rebus a Caesare gestis, cum illis viris 
nolle fieri et ne fieret vehementer recusare. 
 
Moreover I was strongly moved by the res publica itself, which seemed to 
me not to wish there to be a struggle with these men, especially after Caesar’s 
great achievements, and to protest strongly that this should not happen. (Cic. 
Fam. 1.9.12.) 
 
Once again, a difficult decision is rendered palatable through dialogue with the res 
publica; and once again, as if to tether rhetoric to reality, Cicero follows it up with a 
concrete reason to go along with Pompey: the pledges made by Pompey to Caesar 
and by Quintus to Pompey on Cicero’s behalf.536 
Ad Fam. 1.9 therefore shows Cicero deploying the rhetoric developed post-
exile in a less high-pressure context than public oratory to justify the inconstancy 
forced upon him by his political vulnerability. The basic themes remain intact: 
Cicero trots out the rhetorical fiction of the personified res publica, the familiar 
narrative of his consulship, exile and restoration, and the supreme wickedness of 
Clodius. For Lentulus’s discerning palate, however, there are emendations. The more 
ornate rhetorical passages are curtailed and the narrative focus shifts from the 
unnamed Clodius (who is practically a force of nature) to the culpability of 
anonymous optimates (whose cause Cicero justifies abandoning). An antithesis 
appears: in ordinary political life, Cicero can side either with these treacherous 
optimates or with the princeps Pompey, whose dominant dignitas does not need to 
be explained to Lentulus but benefits from a degree of justification based on 
Pompey’s past services to the res publica. The result is a more nuanced account of 
political skullduggery that winds up with a mostly straightforward account of how 
Pompey and Caesar had arranged Cicero’s reconciliation with Vatinius and Crassus, 
with the result that Cicero had defended the former in court and supported the latter 
in the senate. Even if he had had any choice in the matter, Cicero says, he would 
have done the same thing; after all, it was impossible for him to fight these people 
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and he wouldn’t be in favour of cutting them down to size even if that were possible, 
so respectable accommodation was the only viable path.
537
 This is an open admission 
of weakness, for all Cicero’s attempts to cast his dilemma as the consequence of 
trying to behave independently in a world in which, thanks to the petty treachery of 
his critics, independent behaviour was not possible. The gap between Cicero’s 
rhetorical flourishes and his detailed insider’s perspective on how Roman politics 
actually functioned (X said something to Y, who said something to P, whom 
everyone thought was annoyed; meanwhile various people said various things that 
filtered back to the subject of their gossip, who was definitely annoyed; as a result, 
existing quarrels were resolved and political constellations shifted) shows up 
Cicero’s invocation of the personified res publica to justify embarrassing (rather 
than epoch-defining, or perhaps even very important) decisions forced upon him by 
external actors with real power. 
It is difficult to generalise from ‘what Cicero did’ to ‘what other senators 
might do’ given Cicero’s atypical career. Writing to Appius Claudius in late June 50, 
Cicero expresses his pleasure that ‘you write that the res publica itself defended you’ 
in Appius’s recent trial for maiestas, but it seems likely that Appius was laying claim 
to general political support rather than a particular relationship with the personified 
res publica, even if Cicero promptly elaborated such a relationship on Appius’s 
behalf: the res publica should protect men like Appius in any age, but especially an 
age so bereft of good and strong citizens as the current one.
538
 The pressures driving 
Cicero to associate himself and his well-being with a personified res publica were 
not universal. On the other hand, if Cicero’s particular vulnerabilities were specific 
to his circumstances and history, the limitations imposed by his weakness and the 
existence of political titans like Pompey and Caesar put Cicero in a position 
comparable not just to contemporaries but also to former senators such as the elder 
Cato, who had scrambled for political currency in a res publica dominated by great 
generals. Cato’s valorisation of impeccable conduct in ordinary political life was 
essentially an attempt to reconceptualise the relationship between the individual and 
the res publica. Similarly, Cicero occupied himself with rethinking how individuals 
should relate to the res publica during the latter half of the 50s, most obviously 
through the concept of the rector rei publicae, who first appears in Cicero’s dialogue 
                                                          
537
 Cic. Fam. 1.9.19-22; cf. Balsdon 1960: 50. 
538
 Cic. Fam. 3.11.3. 
141 4. RES PUBLICA IPSA 
 
on oratory and the ideal orator, De Oratore (55 BC). Here the orator Marcus 
Antonius tells his companions, 
 
Sin autem quaereremus quis esset is, qui ad rem publicam moderandam 
usum et scientiam et studium suum contulisset, definirem hoc modo: qui 
quibus rebus utilitas rei publicae pareretur augereturque, teneret eisque 
uteretur, hunc rei publicae rectorem et consili publici auctorem esse 
habendum. 
 
But if we were inquiring who is he that has devoted his experience, 
knowledge and enthusiasm to the guidance of the res publica, I should define 
him thus: “Whoever knows and uses everything by which the advantage of a 
res publica is secured and developed is the man to be deemed the rector of 
the res publica, and the originator of national policy.” (Cic. De Orat. 1.211.) 
 
The current consensus on the rector follows Powell, for whom Cicero’s rector rei 
publicae is simply an ideal statesman.
539
 He reappears in the De Republica, where he 
is placed in direct contrast to the tyrannical Tarquin (Rep. 2.51): whereas the tyrant’s 
abuse of his power overturns ‘that whole kind of regal community’ (totum genus hoc 
regiae civitatis), the rector is ‘good, wise and skilled in civil utilitas and dignitas, the 
guardian and protector (tutor et procurator), as one might say, of the res publica; for 
so may be called someone who is truly the guide and pilot (rector et gubernator) of a 
civitas’.540 Scipio Aemilianus’s audience is advised to be sure they can recognise a 
rector in the wild, ‘for he is the one who, by counsel and work, can safeguard the 
civitas’. 541  According to Scipio the rector’s main duty is to focus on self-
improvement in order to provide an example for others;
542
 he should know about ius 
et leges, but for practical reasons rather than a subject of academic interest, and his 
actual involvement should be strictly limited, since his principal concern is with the 
stewardship of the res publica.
543
 And ‘just as the aim of the helmsman is a 
successful voyage, of the physician, health, and of the general, victory, so this 
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director (moderator) of the res publica has as his aim for his fellow-citizens a happy 
life, fortified by wealth, rich in material resources, great in glory and honoured for 
virtue’. 544  Once the prospect of pro-monarchic political theorising has been 
dismissed, what remains excites interest for Cicero’s apparent conceptualisation of 
politics as a sort of profession to be practised, along with the possibility of a 
professional practitioner.
545
 The rector should probably not be imagined as a single 
figure or official position, but rather as a generic type (after all, as Laelius says at 
Rep. 2.67, there are plenty of such men to be found in the Scipionic circle).
546
 He is 
therefore an ideal statesman whose task it is to contemplate himself and to guide the 
res publica by virtue of being extremely wise; he is to have theoretical knowledge of 
laws and justice, but he is not to involve himself directly, since his task is not the 
administration of details but rather to ensure that the res publica as a whole remains 
salva. His role is fundamentally conservative; he works within the system to 
preserve the traditional res publica; and while circumstances may sometimes 
necessitate structural adjustments, he brings no grand reforms of the mos maiorum to 
the table. Rather, he himself is the embodiment of the political structures transmitted 
to the present by the maiores.
547
 
It seems reasonable to read the ordinary life of Cicero’s rector as a 
philosophically-informed update of the elder Cato’s political persona, especially 
given explicit Catonian influences elsewhere in the dialogue.
548
 On Zetzel’s reading, 
Cicero ‘attempts to combine a historical and traditionalist theory of governmental 
legitimacy with a rationalist one: he combines, to put it in the starkest terms, Cato 
with Plato’.549 This is not to say that Cicero deliberately drew on Cato’s political 
posturing for his rector in De Republica, or not necessarily anyway; rather that, 
given comparable social backgrounds and political weaknesses, it was natural for 
Cicero to resort to similar strategies in response to adverse circumstances. Cicero 
could not lay claim to the military achievements of someone like Pompey or Caesar, 
just as Cato could not have challenged those of the Scipiones; nor, given the stigma 
of exile and Cicero’s vulnerable position on his return, was it easy to make an 
unproblematic claim to fame out of his consulship. Furthermore the domination of 
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the political landscape by much greater monsters rendered even independent political 
action difficult. Cicero, like Cato, responded by valorising a particular attitude 
towards the res publica rather than specific achievements on behalf of the res 
publica. 
It is easy to see how the rector rei publicae aligned with Cicero’s personal 
biography even without the helpful pointer at Rep. 1.6–7, where Cicero, speaking in 
his own persona, includes himself in a list of people held to have suffered for their 
efforts on behalf of the civitas and rejects the possibility of joining the list as a 
reason to avoid participating in the res publica. As in the Post Reditum speeches and 
the letter to Lentulus, Cicero’s difficult political circumstances determined how he 
conceived the relationship between (him)self and the res publica. It is equally 
possible, however, to read this rector against Pompey as he appears in Cicero’s 
speeches and letters: a supremely virtuous individual (admittedly Pompey’s virtue 
fluctuates) who guides the res publica in private life as well as when holding public 
office, and whose capacity to step in during crises has been thoroughly elucidated in 
the Post Reditum and De Domo Sua speeches. And not (Cicero hoped) a king. 
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In January 49, Caesar crossed the Rubicon. So far, I have stressed that different 
perspectives on res publica are more or less equally valid points on a spectrum and 
that speakers (or writers) select whichever perspective best suits the immediate 
circumstances, their political persona and their persuasive goal. My starting point for 
this chapter is that such positioning becomes especially interesting in a civil war, 
when victory potentially means not just the victory of particular individuals but also 
their particular ideological perspectives. Since the evidence for the civil war of the 
80s is mostly limited to responses to Sulla and his eventual victory, it is easier in that 
case to examine the outcome than what people said while the outcome was still in 
doubt. When it comes to Caesar’s civil war, however, we have a much clearer 
window onto contemporary conversation. It is consequently possible to distinguish at 
least five separate strands of relevant discourse. Two stand in outright opposition: 
the explicit ‘Republican’ claim to be fighting in defence of the res publica, a claim 
that foregrounds res publica as public (that is, political) space structured and defined 
by movable political institutions (5.1), is opposed by Caesar’s largely implicit claim 
to have occupied the res publica by virtue of his occupation of Rome, a claim that 
foregrounds res publica as geographically fixed public property/business (5.2). The 
unhappy middle ground is exemplified by Cicero, whose initial hope that the res 
publica might be recovered from Caesar (res publica reciperata) gave way to despair 
over the res publica amissa (5.3). Caesar’s assassination in March 44 revealed the 
political weakness of his res publica, which was premised on his presence; in the 
confused aftermath, the ‘Liberators’ invoked a libera res publica, which expresses 
political freedom (but not much more) as a necessary quality of the political sphere 
(5.4), while Cicero’s First Philippic explained how he thought the res publica should 
operate in future, even though his invocation of res publica as rhetorical fiction in 
later speeches could only undermine this vision (5.5). 
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5.1 COMMAND OF WHAT 
The most clearly defined political position in the Caesarian civil wars of 49–5 BC 
was occupied by the Pompeian camp, which made a convincing claim (how 
convincing is shown by its traditional label of ‘the Republican party’) to be 
defending the res publica.
550
 This is implicit in several letters where Pompey makes 
the same claim to act pro re publica as any magistrate fighting a foreign enemy 
might have made,
551
 and is explicit in a letter written on 17 February 49 to L. 
Domitius Ahenobarbus, who had ignored Pompey’s instructions to evacuate Italy 
and thereby ended up besieged by Caesar at Corfinium.
552
 Domitius had requested 
relief, which Pompey (who had previously written to tell Domitius to evacuate 
Corfinium
553
) now refused: 
 
Neque enim eorum militum quos mecum habeo voluntate satis confido ut de 
omnibus fortunis rei publicae dimicem neque etiam qui ex dilectibus 
conscripti sunt consulibus convenerunt. 
 
I do not have enough confidence in the disposition of the men I have with me 
to fight a battle on which the whole future of the res publica would be staked, 
and the levies raised for the consuls have not yet been mustered. (Cic. Att. 
8.12D.1.) 
 
For Pompey, this was a fight for the res publica – specifically, a fight in which his 
side was fighting for the res publica. A private message from Pompey to Caesar 
transmitted in Caesar’s Bellum Civile similarly emphasises Pompey’s ‘position as 
guardian of the constitution’. 554  It was sent to Caesar at Ariminum care of the 
adulescens L. Caesar, son of one of Caesar’s legates, who explained to Caesar that 
he had been entrusted with a privatum officium: 
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velle Pompeium se Caesari purgatum, ne ea quae rei publicae causa egerit in 
suam contumeliam vertat. Semper se rei publicae commoda privatis 
necessitudinibus habuisse potiora. Caesarem quoque pro sua dignitate 
debere et studium et iracundiam suam rei publicae dimittere neque adeo 
graviter irasci inimicis, ut cum illis nocere se sperat rei publicae noceat. 
 
Pompey wished to explain himself to Caesar, to stop Caesar turning to his 
discredit actions which he had taken for the benefit of the res publica. He had 
always, he said, regarded the advantage of the res publica as more important 
than his private interests. Caesar too had a duty laid on him by his position to 
set aside for the sake of the res publica his passion and resentment, and not to 
be so angry with his enemies that in the hope of harming them he did harm to 
the res publica. (Caes. BC 1.8.
555
) 
 
Wistrand detects ‘unmistakeable irony in Caesar’s careful reproduction of Pompey’s 
characteristically sanctimonious language with its pretension to disinterested loyalty 
to the res publica’ here,556  and certainly the surrounding narrative of Pompeian 
deceit and bad faith undercuts Pompey’s perfectly proper sentiments.557 But it is hard 
to argue, modern attempts to make Caesar into a progressive champion of the Roman 
underclasses aside,
558
 that when Caesar crossed the Rubicon, the cause that was 
legally, morally and politically (if not militarily) stronger did not belong to his 
opponents. Caesar did not go to war to spearhead a popular revolt of the 
downtrodden Roman underclasses; rather, he was a rogue general backed by his 
army in rebellion against the central authority. Cicero’s correspondent Caelius Rufus, 
when choosing sides, notoriously preferred the stronger over the better side in civil 
war,
559
 and even the Caesarian continuator of the Bellum Africanum put speeches 
invoking the res publica into the mouths of ‘Republican’ commanders like Metellus 
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Scipio and Cato the Younger.
560
 The legal and political strength of the ‘Republican’ 
camp derived from: (a) the SCU passed on 7 January 49, through which the consuls, 
praetors, tribunes and local proconsuls were called upon to see that the res publica 
should take no harm, and other senatorial decrees;
561
 (b) the explicit support (or at 
the very least the absence from Rome) of both consuls, a significant number of other 
magistrates and the better part of the senate, whose evacuation Pompey had ordered 
on 17
 
January.
562
 
The latter point is relevant not just because of the credibility these people 
gave the ‘Republican’ cause. Rather, it made it possible for the ‘Republicans’ to 
stake out a compelling position on the spectrum of what res publica could mean. In 
Chapter 1, I argued that one of the basic meanings of res publica is ‘the political 
sphere of a given civic community’ and that when res publica is used in this sense, 
the specifically Roman res publica will be ‘the currently constituted Roman political 
sphere’. Furthermore, the more granular political insider’s reading (as transmitted 
especially by Cicero’s speeches De Lege Agraria and Post Reditum) is that shared 
political institutions, in this case the magistrates, senate and popular assembly, 
together constitute the res publica, without which a given community (civitas) will 
lack both political autonomy and the ability to take political or military initiative. 
Cicero had his own reasons for expatiating on res publica in this particular way in 
these particular speeches, but there is no reason to think that his account was 
fundamentally inaccurate, as partial and skewed as it may have been. This is res 
publica in the sense of political space, and it is space defined and structured by 
inherited (or constituted, as in Sulla’s res publica constituta) political institutions 
within which everyday political activity comprised of horizontal peer-to-peer 
relationships might be channelled and contained. Pompey’s evacuation of the senior 
magistrates and senate, first from Rome and then from Italy, therefore left behind a 
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civitas without a res publica. It was impossible to take the popular assembly too (the 
populus as a whole could not be shipped out of Italy, and probably would not have 
wanted to be anyway; furthermore, as observed above in connection with Sulla’s 
first march on Rome, laws existed to prevent consuls abroad from treating their 
armies as a populus able to vote on measures put to them, so comitia could only be 
held in the designated places in Rome itself
563
), but in the absence of magisterial 
imperium and senatorial consilium, Rome was reduced to the same condition as a 
city like Capua. What remained of the senate was not only unimpressive (note 
Caesar’s efforts to lure the dilatory Cicero back to Rome)564 but also unimpressed by 
Caesar,
565
 and the absence of the consuls left no one to preside over the consular 
elections.
566
 
The implications for how the Roman res publica was, could, or should be 
conceived were tremendous. Cicero had spent the 50s personifying the res publica 
into his own client, protector and alter ego, a rhetorical fiction endowed with quasi-
autonomous agency that might go into exile and return to Rome with him. This was 
the rhetoric of personal weakness and it seems unlikely that anyone other than 
Cicero took it very seriously, let alone literally. Now, though, Rome really was 
without consuls and was rather short on senatorial consilium or auctoritas too. These 
quintessentially Roman institutions were not personifications but were embodied in 
actual persons – and people could move themselves. Caesar might have the buildings, 
but Pompey had most of the constituent political elements. Against the concept of a 
res publica in exile, however, stood the far from minor matter of whether the Roman 
res publica (qua ‘structured political sphere’) could actually exist at a geographical 
distance from Rome. The point of its invocation in the De Lege Agraria speeches 
and the paradox of the Post Reditum speeches had been its physical location in the 
city; a res publica that literally could get up and leave Rome (even if what this meant 
in practice was the movement of magistrates and senators) was more than a 
rhetorical innovation. Cicero, who had previously innovated on the topic to such 
rhetorical effect, was distraught: 
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Per Fortunas! quale tibi consilium Pompei videtur? Hoc quaero quod urbem 
reliquerit; ego enim ἀπορῶ. Tamen nihil absurdius. Urbem tu relinquas? 
Ergo idem, si Galli venirent? ‘Non est,’ inquit, ‘in parietibus res publica.’ At 
in aris et focis. 
 
What do you think, for heaven’s sake, of Pompey’s plan? I mean, why has he 
abandoned the city? I don’t know what to make of it. Yet there was nothing 
more absurd. You abandon the city? I suppose you would have done the 
same if the Gauls were coming? ‘The res publica is not,’ he says, ‘within 
house walls.’ But it is in altars and hearths. (Cic. Att. 7.11.3.567) 
 
This was written possibly from Formiae on about 21 January 49, early in the crisis. It 
is not clear whether the letter records a genuine line of Pompey’s or whether Cicero 
is imagining what Pompey’s argument might be in the circumstances, but the point 
of what Pompey did or might have said is that the res publica is not compulsorily 
coexistent with the urbs: the latter is fixed in space, and therefore has a permanent 
geographical location, whereas the former is vested in individuals and groups, and 
therefore geographically flexible, if not wholly untethered. The res publica belongs 
to (the citizens of) Rome, but need not necessarily be situated within it. Cicero’s 
kneejerk reaction, however, is to reject this eminently pragmatic reasoning: the 
location of the res publica may not be a matter of house walls, but it is tethered to 
the sacred spaces of the city of Rome. Interestingly, Cicero does not choose obvious 
political spaces such as the curia or the forum; unlike political actors, the gods of 
Rome could not be moved. On the face of it, this is a simple rhetorical contrast: what 
Pompey said or might be imagined to have said invokes private property, so Cicero 
retorts by invoking private religion (not just altars, but also hearths). But this should 
not overshadow Pompey’s argument, which seems to be that anyone who jibes at his 
course of action is selfishly clinging to their private property in Rome; Cicero’s 
response is therefore to affirm the importance of such property. Still, Cicero goes on 
to say, the thought of the urbs without magistrates or senate, and of Pompey on the 
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run, has had a marvellous impact (Atticus will tell him whether this is also the case 
in Rome): people now think that nothing should be conceded to Caesar.
568
 
The ‘Republicans’, then, occupied the moral high ground. If the res publica 
could not be evacuated intact from Italy on Pompey’s ships, there was at least very 
little left for Caesar to work with: ‘what he will do or how he will do it, without 
senate or magistrates, I don’t know. He will not be able to put up so much as a 
façade of constitutional behaviour’ (ne simulare quidem poterit quicquam 
πολιτικῶς).569 Caesar, whose cause was himself (‘And he says he is doing all this 
for the sake of his dignitas!’570), was shown up as politically isolated against a mass 
of ideologically-motivated establishment figures, of whom Pompey was only one, 
albeit the greatest.
571
 While some of Caesar’s opponents, notably Cicero, may have 
taken up arms only reluctantly and more as a matter of personal loyalty to 
Pompey,
572
 others, like Cato Uticensis, did not follow Pompey as a person but used 
him to defend an ideological position.
573
 The pardoned enemies L. Domitius 
Ahenobarbus and Lentulus Spinther, for example, were captured and released in 
Italy but went on to join Pompey’s camp.574 (All of this was a political problem for 
Caesar, but the corresponding military problem for Pompey is obvious: his inability 
to treat people like Domitius as subordinates, as Caesar could with his legates.
575
) 
Their position was clear-cut: they were fighting for the rei publicae causa (if not as 
the res publica) against a hostis in a civil war, as Cicero characterised it while still 
vacillating over what he should do, ‘that has arisen not from a conflict in the civic 
body (ex civium dissensione) but from the audacity of one lost citizen (ex unius 
perditi civis audacia)’.576 
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5.2 A DECENT PLACE TO STAND 
Cicero’s characterisation of Caesar as a ‘lost citizen’ is telling, since Caesar’s 
response to the strong ‘Republican’ position was to frame the struggle not as a war 
for the res publica against (Pompeian) hostes, but rather as ‘a matter of personal 
antagonism, inimicitiae’ in which the conflict is really ‘a difference of opinion, a 
dissensio’ within the res publica, 577  Raaflaub’s contentio dignitatis. 578  Wistrand 
observes the absence of res publica from the Caesarian correspondence aiming to 
convince Cicero to stay out of the fight and observes that in its place Caesar and his 
supporters appealed instead to the obligations of amicitia. ‘When Caesar adds that it 
would be correct for Cicero as a bonus civis to stay neutral (abesse a civilibus 
controversiis), this is clearly an implicit denial of his adversaries’ claim that it is 
every good citizen’s duty to defend the res publica, that is to join Pompey’.579 
Likewise, in Caesar’s own account of his grievances, given at BC 1.7–8 in the form 
of a speech supposedly addressed to his soldiers at Ravenna after receiving news of 
the SCU and resulting action against him,
580
 his complaints are essentially political: 
he resents the wrongs done to him by his inimici in the past, that they had turned 
Pompey against him even though he had always supported Pompey’s honor and 
dignitas, that a novelty had been introduced into the res publica (the suppression by 
force of the tribunician veto), and that the SCU was an inappropriate response in the 
current circumstances. The emphasis on Caesar’s inimici and the role of the 
persuadable Pompey makes Caesar’s claim to be defending his dignitas581  more 
palatable and enables him to cast the opposition not as a swath of civic-minded 
citizens but as, first and foremost, Pompey, a former friend poisoned against Caesar 
by an envious mob of petty politicians. Caesar could therefore claim to be fighting 
not ‘Republicans’ but only ‘Pompeians’.582 
In section 2.1, I used Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum to outline the relationship 
that magistrates and promagistrates enjoyed with the res publica. There is a marked 
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shift of emphasis between the Bellum Gallicum and the Bellum Civile, where 
Caesar’s self-justification to Lentulus Spinther takes a different tack: 
 
Cuius orationem Caesar interpellat: se non malefici causa ex provincia 
egressum sed uti se a contumeliis inimicorum defenderet, ut tribunos plebis 
in ea re ex civitate expulsos in suam dignitatem restitueret, ut se et populum 
Romanum factione paucorum oppressum in libertatem vindicaret. 
 
But Caesar interrupted him (Lentulus Spinther): it was not to do harm that he 
had crossed the boundary of his province, but to defend himself from the 
insults of his enemies, to restore to their proper dignity the tribunes who had 
been expelled from the civitas over the matter, and to restore liberty to 
himself and the Roman people, who were oppressed by a faction of the few. 
(Caes. BC 1.22.) 
 
The compound here is no longer Caesar and the res publica but instead Caesar and 
the populus Romanus, both of whom are said to be oppressed and whose libertas 
requires restoration. Caesar’s self-reported claim is programmatic for the Bellum 
Civile as a whole; Carter and, following him, Brown identify a grand ring-
composition created by the speech of the centurion Crastinus at Pharsalus (BC 3.91), 
who exhorts his soldiers to follow him into this final battle so that their imperator 
can regain his dignitas and they can regain their libertas.
583
 This rather improbably 
elegant speech, as Brown points out, is designed to express the ‘popular acceptance 
and support’ for Caesar’s expressed cause 584  and exemplifies how the BC is 
constructed ‘to recall and reinforce Caesar's own political stance’. 585  Raaflaub 
suggests that Caesar’s libertas populi is an expression of his popularis political 
stance,
586
 which may be true, but whatever other political overtones exist here, 
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Caesar’s decision to link himself with the populus Romanus can also be read as a 
forced alternative to the standard ‘self and res publica’ formula of the legitimate 
magistrate. 
Caesar had linked himself with the populus Romanus before in the Bellum 
Gallicum.
587
 There, however, he did so largely in international contexts: twice when 
addressed by non-Roman leaders, where it is those leaders (the pro-Roman 
Diviciacus and the book’s chief anti-Roman antagonist, Ariovistus) who compound 
Caesar with the populus Romanus (BG 1.31 and 1.34), and three times in reference 
to benefits conferred on Ariovistus by the populus Romanus during Caesar’s 
consulship (BG 1.35, 1.40, 1.42).
588
 What these references have in common, other 
than being part of a specific sequence of events in Book 1, is the international 
context. The Roman res publica was not the sort of corporate political entity to 
which outsiders might appeal or which might confer beneficia or auxilium upon 
them. Instead, such interlocutors address the only ‘entity’ that embraces the Roman 
nation as a whole, the populus Romanus. For foreigners (and for Caesar when 
diplomatically engaged with foreigners), to deal with Romans was to deal with the 
populus Romanus. Diviciacus’s appeal and Ariovistus’s provocations gain point 
from the presence right on their doorstep of the populus Romanus as manifested in 
Caesar’s army and represented by its commander, Caesar himself. At 4.17, the last 
Caesar/populus Romanus compound of the Bellum Gallicum explains Caesar’s 
reluctance to let the trans-Rhine Ubii tribe transport his army across the river in boats 
as due not just to considerations of safety but also because he considers it ‘worthy 
neither of his own nor the Roman people’s dignity’;589 it may be that Caesar invokes 
the populus rather than the res publica here because the proposed indignity would 
have an immediate impact on a specific section of the populus (that part of it 
currently enrolled in Caesar’s army). 
When Caesar links himself with the populus Romanus in the Bellum Civile, 
however, the context is not international diplomacy but civil war and the events he 
narrates are part of Rome’s internal political business, in which context it was both 
natural and relevant to talk about the Roman res publica. Caesar does invoke the 
populus Romanus elsewhere in the Bellum Civile: at 1.9, he reports himself writing 
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to tell Pompey that he is upset because, among other things, a favour granted to him 
by the populus has been snatched away, a complaint recapped at 1.32, when Caesar, 
having reached Rome, reiterates it to what remains of the senate.
590
 But set against 
the standard magistrate/res publica relationship, Caesar’s choice of populus 
Romanus at BC 1.22 looks dangerously close to an admission of illegitimacy. Caesar 
cannot now make the magisterial claim to embody the res publica, as he could while 
proconsul in Gaul, because his command has expired and the various measures taken 
by the senate and magistrates in response to his invasion have made it clear that he 
does not. Caesar could have ignored this and claimed to be fighting to liberate 
‘himself and the res publica’ anyway, but given the circumstances that would have 
looked decidedly hollow. Caesar therefore embarks on a subtler strategy: he falls 
back into the arms of the populus Romanus (which also has the attraction of a faint 
popularis flavour) and resorts to implying that he would have had such legitimacy if 
not for the machinations of the opposition, while simultaneously undermining the 
opposition’s claim to represent the res publica themselves. Hence he makes the 
pointed complaint that he had been robbed of a gift bestowed by the populus 
Romanus (six months of his proconsulship and the right to stand for the consulship 
in absentia, which would have covered his legitimacy gap), while the whole opening 
section (BC 1.1–6) is designed to show Pompey and friends behaving as the 
illegitimate factio paucorum Caesar accuses of oppressing the populus at BC 1.22. 
When the ‘self and the res publica’ compound eventually appears in Book 3, 
it is used in quite a different way. Caesar is again communicating with Pompey by 
way of a captured Pompeian prefect, L. Vibullius Rufus; his proposal is that since 
the current state of the war is so evenly balanced it might go either way, it would be 
a good time for them to negotiate peace, for which terms should be sought from the 
(Caesarian rump) senate and people at Rome. The summary of losses on both sides 
leads to the conclusion that ‘they should spare themselves and the res publica, 
because thanks to their reverses they were in their own persons an adequate proof of 
how great the power of fortune was in war’.591 Here Caesar links himself, Pompey 
and the res publica: they should both stop fighting over it, both out of self-interest 
and in the public interest, not because of what (if anything) they represent but 
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because of the damage done to the res publica by their quarrel. This is very much an 
insider’s perspective, one elite Roman civis appealing to another de re publica, and it 
was calculated to put Pompey in a bad light when he rejected Caesar’s disingenuous 
offer.
592
 Meanwhile the legitimacy of Caesar’s cause based on the support of the 
populus Romanus continues to be stressed throughout the text by other people. At 
3.11, when one of Pompey’s lieutenants (Lucius Torquatus) gets besieged by Caesar 
at Oricum, his attempts to convince the locals to defend their own walls are 
unsuccessful, as they are unwilling to fight ‘against the imperium of the populus 
Romanus’. Immediately afterwards, Lucius Staberius at 3.12 fails to persuade the 
people of Apollonia to hand over hostages, ‘close their gates against a consul, or take 
a decision that went against the judgement of all Italy and the Roman people’.593 
Furthermore, Caesar’s continuators go on to compound Caesar with the populus 
Romanus in the Bellum Hispaniense and Bellum Alexandrinum.
594
 Fall-back position 
or not, the resort to the populus had its merits. 
Caesar’s invocation of the populus Romanus at BC 1.22 is therefore both 
marked and a sign of weakness. If Caesar could have made a plausible claim to be 
the champion of the res publica, or at least to deny outright the claim of his 
opponents to represent it, he would presumably have done so. What Caesar claims 
instead, having received Pompey’s confidential message from young L. Caesar, is to 
have swallowed the insult of a lost gift from the populus in the rei publicae causa 
and to be willing ‘to descend to any depths and put up with anything for the sake of 
the res publica’ – if Pompey would only agree to go to his provinces, to universal 
disarmament, and to permit ‘free elections and all the res publica for the senate and 
people of Rome’.595 As in his letters to Cicero, Caesar’s rejection of the opposition 
line is implicit, if also unsubtle. He suggests that the res publica is under the 
illegitimate control of his inimici, presumably the factio paucorum of BC 1.22, and 
the obvious conclusion to be drawn is that those currently claiming to champion the 
res publica are only a fraction of the political elite exerting an illegitimate 
dominance over the political sphere. This serves to undermine the various senatorial 
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decrees passed against Caesar that the ‘Republican’ opposition could use as evidence 
that Caesar was a hostis. Framing the conflict as a struggle within the res publica 
rather than a war for it made it safer to reject the stronger ‘Republican’ position 
through implication rather than outright attack, especially given the state of the 
political sphere in Rome at the time. While the personal angle might be less 
compelling than the ‘Republican’ stance, however, it did mean Caesar could afford 
to acknowledge neutrality and to forgive those who fought against him, which was a 
valuable political tool.
596
 Indeed, Cicero brings up Caesar’s self-presentation to 
defend the Pompeian Q. Ligarius: Caesar had said originally that the war was not a 
bellum but a secessio, not hostile odium but civile discidium in which both sides 
wanted the res publica to be salva but deviated from the communis utilitas, partly 
from consilia and partly from studia.
597
 Even after Caesar had clawed his way to 
victory, it remained a viable defence to say that those fighting against Caesar, 
especially hapless allies like King Deiotarus of Galatia, had thought they were 
fighting on behalf of the res publica; after all, that was what the senate had been 
telling them.
598
 
Implied denunciation continues to be the order of the day throughout the 
Caesarian corpus. I have already mentioned Caesar’s bad faith suggestion at BC 3.10 
that he and Pompey should both stop fighting on behalf of the res publica. This 
might give the correct impression that the most distinctive thing about res publica in 
Caesar’s account of his civil war is its lack of distinction. Res publica is not absent 
from the text (that would have been counterproductive, since the Bellum Civile is a 
work ‘designed to show that his own behaviour was legal and reasonable while that 
of his opponents was a subversion of the principles of the very Republic which they 
claimed to be defending’599), but there is a marked lack of the sort of exciting 
rhetorical tricks to which Cicero resorted in the 50s. Mostly, res publica is used (as 
at BC 3.10) by Caesar’s opponents, with the underlying aim of depicting them as 
hypocrites who appeal to the res publica to maintain their political domination and 
persecute the innocent Caesar.
600
 So, in the abrupt opening section, the delivery of 
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Caesar’s letter is followed by a senatorial debate in which both consuls have 
something to say about the res publica: 
 
L. Lentulus consul senatui rei publicae se non defuturum pollicetur, si 
audacter ac fortiter sententias dicere velint; sin Caesarem respiciant atque 
eius gratiam sequantur, ut superioribus fecerint temporibus, se sibi consilium 
capturum neque senatus auctoritati obtemperaturum; habere se quoque ad 
Caesaris gratiam atque amicitiam receptum. In eandem sententiam loquitur 
Scipio: Pompeio esse in animo rei publicae non deesse, si senatus sequatur; 
si cunctetur atque agat lenius, nequiquam eius auxilium, si postea velit, 
senatum imploraturum. 
 
Consul Lucius Lentulus promised the senate that he would not fail the res 
publica, if they were willing to express their opinions boldly and forcefully; 
but if they kept an eye on Caesar and tried to please him, as they had done on 
previous occasions, he would decide for himself what to do and would not 
obey the authority of the senate; he too could take refuge in Caesar’s favour 
and friendship. Scipio spoke to the same effect: Pompey’s intention was to do 
his duty to the res publica, if the senate would follow him; but if they 
hesitated and procrastinated they would beg in vain for his help if they 
wanted it later. (Caes. BC 1.1.) 
 
Both consuls are shown to be making a show of traditional behaviour while trying to 
coerce the senate into make a firm declaration against Caesar.
601
 Lentulus is open 
about his intention to ignore any pro-Caesarian sententia and drops a not-very-veiled 
threat to go over to Caesar, while Scipio channels the intentions of the inscrutable 
Pompey, currently lurking outside the pomerium so as not to sacrifice the imperium 
attached to the Spanish proconsulship he continues to exercise through legates.
602
 
This is compounded by the ‘abuse’ (convicium) hurled by Lentulus at more moderate 
views,
603
 which, together with the ‘fear of the looming army’ (terror praesentis 
exercitus) and the threats of Pompey’s friends, is said to have forced the majority to 
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vote ‘unwilling and compelled’ (inviti et coacti) for Scipio’s motion: ‘that Caesar 
should dismiss his army before a certain date; and if he did not, he would be judged 
to be committing an act hostile to the res publica’.604 Later, in the second book, the 
‘Republican’ M. Varro is shown terrorising the frightened (perterriti) Roman 
citizens in Spain into promising money, silver and wheat ‘to administer the res 
publica’ (ad rem publicam administrandam), exacting more from those civitates he 
suspects of being friends with Caesar and putting privati on trial ‘who might have 
spoken in conversation or speeches against the res publica’.605 In contrast, Caesar 
depicts himself seeking a meeting with Pompey in the interests of res publica et 
communis salus,
606
 while the citizens of Auximum refuse to fortify the city against 
‘Gaius Caesar, imperator, who deserved well of the res publica’.607 Whereas the 
‘Republicans’ invoke the res publica hypocritically, Caesar’s nine years of working 
for the res publica
608
 are recognised by the communities in the path of Caesar’s 
armies.
609
 In sum, Caesar constructs ‘a contest for Rome and whether it will remain 
Rome, the republic, the possession of the public, protected by “our men”, or become 
the private possession of his enemies, men who abandon Rome and throw away their 
insignia of office’,610 but he does so through innuendo and narrative implication in 
the Bellum Civile, rather than stating it outright in his letters or reported speeches. 
Rhetorically, this is elegant; conceptually, it might seem to add little to res 
publica. But Caesar’s reserve is striking: it is the challenger in this civil war who 
stakes his position on a restrained, conceptually conservative version of ‘political 
reality’. The obvious reason, as suggested above, is that Caesar would have had to 
strain so hard to make res publica relevant to his actions that he was better off saying 
as little as possible about it. Understandably, however, his opponents were strident 
on the topic of their fight for the res publica, so Caesar responded by pretending as 
far as possible that his pet civil war was a heightened version of ‘politics as normal’, 
a pretence furthered by keeping the invocation of res publica to an acceptable 
minimum on his own behalf and also by downplaying as much as possible just how 
far Pompey’s evacuation had dismantled the structures of Rome’s political sphere. 
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Caesar’s deliberate textual conservatism does not, however, mean that his 
conceptualisation of res publica added nothing to the debate that no one really knew 
they were having. This becomes apparent at BC 1.32–3, where Caesar’s unsatisfying 
first return to Rome (he failed to sweet-talk the senate, faced tribunician opposition, 
crossed the pomerium to plunder the treasury in the Temple of Saturn against the 
opposition of that same tribune, got cold feet about addressing the people and 
departed the city in anger) becomes an orderly, if largely wasted, visit. Caesar claims 
to have dismissed his soldiers beforehand, shunts the summoning of the senate into a 
discreet ablative absolute (coacto senatu) that conceals just who was doing the 
summoning and on what authority,
611
 and reports the speech he had given (docet) to 
the senate laying out his grievances and proposing a senatorial peace mission to 
Pompey. This the senate as a body agrees to send, but as individual senators refuse to 
join, since, according to Caesar, they were afraid of Pompey, who had already made 
it clear that he did not recognise political neutrality.
612
 The plunder of the treasury is 
omitted (‘Caesar’s bad conscience is evident’613); three days of dilly-dallying and the 
obstruction of the tribune L. Metellus, ‘put up by Caesar’s enemies (inimici) to 
disrupt this business and to interfere with whatever else he decided to do’, eventually 
cause Caesar to abandon his original aims and to leave Rome for Gaul.
614
 Pompey’s 
threats had rendered this last attempt on Caesar’s part to make peace futile: 
henceforth ‘it will be war, and the terms that refer to governmental processes are, for 
the most part, abandoned’.615 
Caesar gives the impression that routine channels for public business and 
communication remain available, albeit blocked by political deadlock, an impression 
underscored by Caesar’s report of his own speech, in which he complains at length 
about his inimici (Cato and Pompey are both named), makes disingenuous gestures 
to his own proven willingness to compromise, and: 
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Pro quibus rebus hortatur ac postulat ut rem publicam suscipiant atque una 
secum administrent. Sin timore defugiant illi, se oneri non defuturum et per 
se rem publicam administraturum. 
 
For these reasons he encouraged and requested them to take responsibility for 
the res publica and administer it with him. But if they were frightened and 
ran away, he would not shirk the task and would administer the res publica 
by himself. (Caes. BC 1.32.
616
) 
 
On the face of it, telling the senate to ‘take up’ the res publica should not be 
controversial. Naturally, though, Caesar’s account is misleading. Firstly, there was 
the problem of whether the handful of largely undistinguished senators remaining in 
Rome could really be considered the ‘senate’. Cicero’s opinion was that it was only a 
‘gathering of senators’ (consessus senatorum),617 hence his refusal to attend. This is 
therefore Caesar asking a body of doubtful legitimacy to collude in administering the 
res publica ‘with him’, he being a dubiously legitimate proconsul in open revolt 
against the res publica, as proclaimed by previously passed senatorial decrees and 
the actions of the consuls. Exactly what Caesar might mean in practical terms by 
‘administering the res publica’, other than ‘passing decrees against my inimici, 
whose unfairness towards me I have just explained’ and ‘sending a “senatorial 
delegation” to Pompey so that his inevitable refusal will undermine his claim to 
represent the res publica’, is not obvious, especially given the dearth of magistrates 
willing and able to carry out the usual civic business. The fundamental point of 
addressing “the senate” must have been to get its endorsement of Caesar’s take on 
the civil wars, and the refusal of the senators to comply with this was a definite 
problem. Caesar implies that fear (of Pompey, presumably) is the only reason the 
remaining senators might have to be unwilling to work with him; his willingness to 
shoulder the burden of administering the res publica if they fled might be taken as a 
pledge to ensure political stability whether or not other political figures were willing 
to help, but looks a lot more like a threat in the turbulent context indicated by other 
sources. 
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What this implies for the conceptualisation of res publica requires some 
rather fine hair-splitting, because the conception being used here is entirely 
unarticulated, but a number of useful points may be made. The lack of articulation 
and the refusal to pontificate over whether or not Caesar is dealing with “the senate” 
or merely an unrepresentative gaggle of senators conceal a problem: what, and where, 
is the Roman res publica when a significant proportion of the people who embody 
its constituent institutions have removed themselves from Rome? This might be 
resolved by taking Cicero as the outlier – by arguing, in other words, that Cicero’s 
occasional, not very detailed attempts to articulate just what constituted the res 
publica should not be taken as typical of Roman political thought, which might be 
more typically represented by Caesar’s understated use of res publica here. If so, any 
concern for constituent elements might be abandoned and the standard Roman 
understanding of res publica reduced to an indefinite, unitary, easily personified 
concept (or, as Morgan prefers, slogan
618
) that genuinely resisted articulation, except 
perhaps in a single sentence that boils down to ‘this is a good thing’. This solution 
might be tempting, or at least simple, but it does Caesar the injustice (he might not 
see it this way) of accepting uncritically his claim to present a plain, objective, non-
innovative account of events. Instead, it seems more fruitful to distinguish between 
res publica as ‘space’ (the insider’s perspective, the res publica as an arena within 
which politicians move and which is defined by its political institutions) and res 
publica as ‘business’ (the public property and affairs magistrates were elected to 
administer, a perspective that fed into popularis/contional oratory in which the literal 
meaning of res publica is stressed and magistrates are cast as stewards selected by 
the populus to look after its property). Caesar’s opponents clearly viewed res publica 
from the former perspective, as the political structures that Caesar’s invasion had 
displaced, whereas res publica as it appears at BC 1.32 looks more like the latter: the 
public business routinely administered by magistrates and senate, including sending 
peace embassies to revolting citizens. 
It is important to remember that these are differences of perspective, not 
policy. In ordinary circumstances, these different perspectives on the res publica 
would be complementary rather than contradictory; after all, rem publicam 
administrare (or gerere) was a standard term for any magistrate’s activities that 
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carried no particular political connotations, whatever use the populares made of the 
implicit relationship between magistrates, public business and the populus. In 
periods of political turbulence, however, differences of perspective become 
significant, and this is particularly true of a civil war in which one side staked its 
position on the defence of the res publica. Once ordinary political activity gave way 
to war, pushing both perspectives to their logical extremes resulted in two 
distinctively different conceptions of what res publica meant. Quite apart from any 
lingering popularis sympathies, the advantages to Caesar of adopting this 
perspective were considerable. Caesar and past populares faced similar obstacles 
(opposition from the senate and fellow magistrates) and so shared a similar strategy 
even if in pursuit of different aims. The populares had appealed directly to the 
populus in order to bypass the opposition of senate and fellow magistrates; Caesar in 
49, meanwhile, faced the awkward problem that a substantial proportion of the 
people who constituted the structures of the spatial res publica had removed 
themselves from Rome. On his chosen perspective, the res publica looks less like a 
combination of political institutions and more like an amorphous amalgamation of 
public property (revenues, temples, public monuments) and routine civic business 
(justice, wars, provincial government), all of which remained to be administered 
whether the magistrates and senators were present in Rome or not. Consequently, the 
most charitable version of the reasoning underpinning BC 1.32 seems to be that 
Caesar, as the most senior quasi-magistrate (troublesome issues of non-prorogued 
imperium and crossed pomerium aside) currently in Rome, was left with the 
responsibility of administering the res publica, which would ideally be done in 
consultation with the senate but was ultimately the business of the magistrates. The 
co-operation of the senate (what remained of it) would therefore be appreciated, and 
was certainly to be expected from appropriately dutiful senators, but was not actually 
necessary: Caesar was competent to keep routine public business ticking over 
without it. The less charitable reading is that Caesar’s army ensured his competence 
to administer the res publica whether the senate liked it or not. 
Against the untethered ‘Republican’ res publica, then, Caesar opposes a res 
publica vested in the civic business of the urbs, which he held. To return to a 
quotation cited in Chapter 1, when Caesar said that ‘the res publica is nothing, a 
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mere name without body or form’,619 this may be his response to the ‘Republican’ 
claim that the res publica could get up and leave Rome with them. Wistrand puts it 
most generously: ‘Caesar’s adversaries thought – or rather some thought and others 
may have pretended to think – that the war was a war for or against the res publica, 
that is, on their part, a holy war in defence of a sacred ideal. Caesar saw the war as a 
conflict between rivals and personal enemies: on one side were himself and his 
friends, on the other Pompey and his allies. They had corporeal existence, they could 
be seen. I would like to think that the phrase quoted was Caesar’s spirited answer to 
those who – as Cicero said – rei publicae sanctissimum nomen opponebant’.620 
Spirited or not, it would have been more convincing if the senate had been willing to 
go along with Caesar at the time. Technically he had relinquished his proconsular 
imperium by crossing the pomerium to seize the treasury, but he bolstered his 
position at the end of the year with a dubiously legal fudge (Cicero was not 
impressed
621
) that saw him appointed dictator by the praetor M. Lepidus in order to 
oversee his own election as consul in December 49.
622
 It is doubtful whether the 
‘Republicans’ accepted the validity of this election, but Caesar’s line must have been 
that propounded uncritically by Meier: ‘Caesar was now consul. His opponents 
could no longer claim to be the lawful rulers. The republic was with him’.623 In the 
third book of the Bellum Civile, Caesar’s occupation of the consulship is therefore 
promoted by the narrative: ‘both foreign and citizen groups recognize Caesar as the 
legitimate holder of Roman consular power’ and ‘the emphasis on his consulship is 
aimed at clarifying his position as the civil war against Pompey culminates’.624 It 
also appears in a letter from Dolabella encouraging Cicero to abandon the 
‘Republican’ side: 
 
Satis factum est iam a te vel officio vel familiaritati, satis factum etiam 
partibus et ei rei publicae quam tu probabas; reliquum est, ubi nunc est res 
publica, ibi simus potius quam, dum illam veterem sequamur, simus in nulla.  
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You have done enough for obligation and friendship; you have done enough 
for your party too and for that res publica which you approved. It is time now 
to take our stand where the res publica actually is, rather than, by following 
after that old one, to find ourselves in none. (Cic. Fam. 9.9.2.) 
 
For Caesar and his supporters, the physical occupation of Rome and the consulship 
gave him a claim to occupy and derive legitimacy from the res publica. Meier sees it 
as ‘a bold use of language to localize the republic in this way; it was no longer just a 
question of the legitimacy of the magistrates’.625 In fact, locating the res publica 
firmly and physically in Rome was an obvious counterpoint to the untethered 
‘Republican’ alternative, which had fled the city to end up – where? in nulla. 
Furthermore, focusing on the administration of public business conceals how 
dramatically Caesar had disrupted Rome’s political structures. This can be seen in 
the works of Caesar’s continuators, not just in the characterisation of docile pro-
Caesarian communities and kings as keen supporters of the res publica
626
 or Caesar’s 
reported invocation of the res publica while dismissing a military tribune, C. 
Avienus, during his African campaign,
627
 but also in two passages in the Bellum 
Alexandrinum that echo Dolabella’s location of the res publica in Caesar’s camp. 
The first concerns the chaotic situation in Rome in Caesar’s absence: 
 
Cum in Syriam Caesar ex Aegypto venisset atque ab eis qui Roma venerant 
ad eum cognosceret litterisque urbanis animadverteret multa Romae male et 
inutiliter administrari neque ullam partem rei publicae satis commode geri. 
 
On his arrival in Syria from Egypt Caesar learned from those who had joined 
him there from Rome, as well as from information contained in dispatches 
from the city, that there was much that was bad and unprofitable in the 
administration at Rome, nor was any part of the res publica being really 
efficiently conducted. (B. Alex. 65.) 
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The reason given was rivalry among the tribunes and lax legionary commanders; the 
solution, Caesar reportedly saw, would be his immediate return to Rome; and the 
excuse given for his failure to do so was his belief that it was more important to 
organise the provinces thoroughly. On the one hand, then, the res publica and its 
administration is located in Rome, whither Caesar will have to return if he wants to 
sort out the mess his subordinates have made of the situation. On the other hand, the 
res publica now requires Caesar’s presence to function properly, since the political 
isolation that gave Caesar his military edge left him without competent managers to 
oversee the routine business of the res publica in Rome and Italy. What had 
previously been administered by the magistrates and senate together, in conjunction 
with the will of the populus as expressed formally through the comitia, was now 
reliant on Caesar personally. As long as Caesar still had wars to fight abroad, this 
would continue to be a problem. So in December 46 Cicero wrote to Trebonius, then 
on his way to Spain with Caesar, that ‘whereas in the old days people in Rome used 
to write to their friends in the provinces de re publica, it is now for you to write to 
me, for the res publica is over there with you’.628 Caesar becomes the avatar of the 
res publica that Cicero had once considered himself to be, but in a rather more 
concrete way, since Caesar was now (at least as far as those who supported him, or at 
least conformed to his regime, were concerned) the sole source of meaningful 
political initiative. Both public business and political activity had warped around a 
single figure, and he was only irregularly in Rome. 
The second passage reports Caesar’s tart remarks to King Deiotarus, who 
begged Caesar’s pardon for siding with Pompey on the grounds that he had been 
compelled to do so by the nearness of Pompey’s armies – and after all, it was not 
Deiotarus’s business to pass judgement on the disputes (controversaria) of the 
populus Romanus, only to obey the present possessor of imperium.
629
 According to 
the continuator, 
 
Contra quem Caesar, cum plurima sua commemorasset officia quae consul ei 
decretis publicis tribuisset, cumque defensionem eius nullam posse 
excusationem eius imprudentiae recipere coarguisset, quod homo tantae 
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prudentiae ac diligentiae scire potuisset quis urbem Italiamque teneret, ubi 
senatus populusque Romanus, ubi res publica esset, quis denique post L. 
Lentulum, C. Marcellum consul esset. 
 
In his reply Caesar reminded him of all the many loyal services he himself as 
consul had rendered to him by official decrees, and went on to point out that 
his apology could not be accepted as any excuse for his imprudence; a man, 
in fact, as wise and careful as he was could have known who held the city 
and Italy, where the senate and people of Rome were, where the res publica 
was, and finally who was consul after L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus. (B. Alex. 
68.) 
 
Senate, people and res publica are all located in Rome and Italy, which had been 
held by Caesar at the time when Deiotarus took up arms for Pompey; and not only 
had Caesar therefore held all three by virtue of occupation, but to cap it all off he had 
been the consul of 48. (Deiotarus would presumably be forgiven for forgetting 
Caesar’s colleague, P. Servilius Isauricus.) Caesar presents two claims to have held 
the res publica, one de facto and one de iure, and dismisses completely any 
implication that there might have been a case to have been made for the legitimacy 
of the opposition’s claims. When he pardons Deiotarus, the pardon (as represented 
by Caesar’s continuator) is therefore based on the king’s pre-existing personal ties to 
Caesar rather than his political excuses.
630
 
It is no coincidence that subtlety slips when the narrative escapes Caesar’s 
control. Cluett diagnoses the continuators as ‘Romans on campaign abroad’ who saw 
themselves as fighting foreign enemies and ‘enemies who behaved as foreigners’,631 
a combination that ‘gives Caesar’s cause a double legitimacy: not only is he a 
legitimate commander, as one of his centurions retorts to Scipio (Afr. 45), but he is 
engaged in a legitimate assertion of Roman power abroad’. 632  The authors were 
personally loyal to Caesar, who emerges from the texts as omniscient, ubiquitous 
and supremely rational, even if his troops do not always appreciate this, a portrayal 
that implies ‘an assumption and acceptance that all power – at Rome and in the field 
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– ultimately rests with Caesar’.633 This was not likely to mollify Caesar’s opponents, 
but reflects at the very least the views of Caesar’s supporters and, increasingly, 
reality. Caesar himself was less winning in person than in text, as White’s study of 
the correspondence between Caesar and Cicero shows: whereas the limitations of 
letters tended to work out to Caesar’s advantage, especially when he was absent from 
Italy,
634
 in face-to-face encounters ‘it was not so easy to pretend that peer 
relationships were simply dyadic, or to elude direct encounters indefinitely, or to 
leave requests and controversies unsettled’. 635  Caesar’s remark on the 
insubstantiality of res publica, for example, was transmitted to show his inpotentia 
by one of his enemies, Titus Ampius, whatever Caesar himself meant by it.
636
 His 
abrasiveness was on full display in his response to the tribune Pontius Aquila, who 
refused to rise for the triumphal procession for Caesar’s Spanish victory in October 
45: 
 
indignatus sit, ut proclamaverit: ‘Repete ergo a me Aquila rem publicam 
tribunus!’ Nec destiterit per continuos dies quicquam cuiquam nisi sub 
exceptione polliceri: ‘Si tamen per Pontium Aquilam licuerit.’ 
 
he was so incensed that he cried: “Come then, Aquila, take back the res 
publica from me, you tribune!” For several days he would not make a 
promise to any one without adding, “That is, if Pontius Aquila will allow 
me.” (Suet. Jul. 78.) 
 
There is no ambiguity here. The res publica is something to be possessed, as it is 
currently possessed by Caesar, who is not going to give it up to a mere tribune or 
indeed to anyone else. This is the least charitable version possible of what Caesar 
represents himself as promising to what remained of the senate after marching on 
Rome: a straightforward vertical relationship between himself (in possession of the 
potestas formerly exercised by the magistrates as a body, now concentrated on 
Caesar by virtue of military superiority) and the res publica. There was space in this 
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worldview for senators and other magistrates, but only insofar as they were willing 
to assist and accommodate themselves to Caesar. (He expanded the senate and 
increased the magistracies, after all.
637
) Against both the basic premise of popularis 
activity and Caesar’s own remarks in the Bellum Civile on the topic of returning the 
res publica to the senatus populusque Romanus, however, there was very little space 
for the comitia.
638
 In this new world, the elite owed magistracies and dignitas not to 
the beneficia of the populus Romanus but to the gratia of Caesar himself.
639
 
 
5.3 COMPLAIN, COMPLAIN 
If Caesar and his ‘Republican’ opponents each adopted different perspectives on 
what constituted the res publica, there lay between them a convincing middle ground: 
despair. Cicero’s letters, some of which have been cited above, provide ample 
evidence of this.
640
 He has a great deal to say about the res publica, which is dearer 
to him than anything else;
641
 he would happily have sacrificed himself to save it from 
civil war;
642
 he is uncertain whether ulla res publica will survive,
643
 or whether there 
is anything he or anyone else can now do to help it.
644
 No one had been more 
affected than he by this disaster to the res publica.
645
 His perception of res publica 
here is consistent with that expressed in his less experimental rhetoric: ordinary 
political structures rooted in a specific civic locale, in this case Rome. He, like L. 
Domitius Ahenobarbus, had complicated Pompey’s plans for the evacuation of Italy, 
although unlike Domitius he had not taken up arms in Italy but had instead refused to 
take command of Sicily and then done very little in defence of the Campanian 
coast.
646
 Writing to Atticus from Formiae in December 50, he had protested that the 
plan of Pompey and his consilium to send him to Sicily because he had imperium 
was senseless: 
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Nec enim senatus decrevit nec populus iussit me imperium in Sicilia habere; 
sin hoc res publica ad Pompeium refert, qui me magis quam privatum 
aliquem mittit?  
 
For the senate has not decreed nor has the populus ordered me to hold 
command in Sicily. If on the other hand the res publica refers this to 
Pompey, why send me rather than a private individual? (Cic. Att. 7.7.4.) 
 
This was written before Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Res publica here functions as a 
compression of ‘the decrees of the senate and the orders of the populus’, or at least 
‘the political will of the community’. It is purely political; there is nothing to tie this 
concept of res publica down to any specific place, should the senate and populus 
decide to take to the road. It is also a casual usage, if a slightly odd one. The 
complaint is that Cicero has not received any formal instruction from any competent 
element of the political res publica to take his imperium to Sicily, and if Pompey has 
been empowered to issue such commands then he is not limited to persons in 
possession of imperium and could choose anyone he wants for a task that Cicero 
certainly did not want. To say that the res publica had referred the matter to Pompey 
was another way to say that Pompey had been given overall responsibility for the 
issue, a minor act of personification that harks back to Cicero’s depiction of 
Pompey’s relationship with the res publica in the speeches after his exile. 
On the face of it, Cicero should have been open (at least on a theoretical basis) 
to the decision taken by Pompey, and supported by senatorial decrees, to evacuate 
the political res publica from Rome. The various despairing letters cited above show 
that this was not the case; Cicero was intensely unhappy about the evacuation of 
Rome and Italy and eventually threw in his lot with Pompey more as a matter of 
personal loyalty than political commitment (so he said).
647
 This is certainly the claim 
of his Caesarian speeches, which tactfully reflect Caesar’s chosen explanation of the 
civil wars. In the Pro Marcello, for example, Cicero claims to have followed an 
individual (Pompey) as a matter of privatum officium
648
 and describes the war as a 
confused situation in which both sides had good qualities and many people were 
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unsure what to do.
649
 His letters bear out the confusion and uncertainty of the time, 
even if they are less charitable about the participants: Caesar’s supporters are a mob 
of desperadoes,
650
 while Pompey’s actions ‘have throughout been destitute alike of 
wisdom and of courage (nihil actum… sapienter, nihil fortiter); and, I might add, 
contrary throughout to my advice and influence (consilium auctoritatemque meam)’, 
Cicero told Atticus, before going on to rehash Pompey’s previous involvement with 
Caesar at considerable length.
651
 At this point, Cicero was distinctly unwilling to 
accept a wandering res publica. This particular letter was written on 18–19 February 
49, while Cicero was still coming to terms with the prospect that Pompey might 
really abandon Italy, and features a revealing theme: rem publicam reciperare, ‘to 
recover the res publica’. In considering whether to remain in the city, Cicero 
identifies two issues: the first practical, how far Caesar was to be trusted, and the 
second moral, 
 
sitne viri fortis et boni civis esse in ea urbe in qua cum summis honoribus 
imperiisque usus sit, res maximas gesserit, sacerdotio sit amplissimo 
praeditus, non futurus <sit qui fuerit>, subeundumque periculum sit cum 
aliquo fore dedecore, si quando Pompeius rem publicam reciperarit. 
 
whether it is the part of a brave man and a good citizen to remain in a city in 
which he has held the highest offices and commands, has done great things, 
and been invested with an exalted priestly function, in a reduced status and in 
prospect of danger along perhaps with some discredit should Pompey ever 
recover the res publica. (Cic. Att. 8.3.2.) 
 
Since the basic meaning of reciperare is ‘to recover’ (money, persons, territory, 
things), the phrase either concerns or at least has connotations of an actual 
repossession: that is, recovering a concrete thing from, it is implied, some other 
people who have improperly possessed it.
652
 As Cicero uses it, that thing is clearly 
located in ea urbe, Rome. Pompey will recover the res publica only when he 
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recovers the city. This is clear from the way Cicero sets out the case against leaving 
Italy, which turns on Pompey’s imprudence to date and the insufficiency of his 
preparations for a war in Italy. Having vented his feelings on Pompey’s past political 
alliances, Cicero expresses a deep pessimism about the war to come. ‘But he may 
recover (reciperabit) the res publica’, he imagines Atticus saying, to which he retorts: 
how? ‘Picenum has been lost, the road to the city left open, its entire wealth, public 
and private, handed over to the enemy. To cap it all, there is no organisation (causa), 
no power (nullae vires), no rallying-point (sedes quo concurrant) for those who want 
the res publica defended’.653 As far as Cicero was concerned, the res publica to be 
recovered or defended, insofar as it existed at all, was located in the urbs Roma. This 
supports the point that the ‘Republicans’ and Caesar should be seen as pushing 
complementary perspectives to extremes (or perhaps trying to divorce the opposite 
ends of a spectrum) rather than staking their claims on genuinely opposing 
theologies of state. Cicero, wholly convinced by neither side, was torn between them; 
he ‘equated the city with the fatherland, and viewed Pompey’s withdrawal, which 
left the city without Senate or magistrates, laws or courts, and a prey to arson and 
pillage, as a virtual dissolution of the Republic’.654 
Ultimately, rem publicam reciperare was a mirage. The phrase reappeared 
when Cicero’s decision to stay put was wavering in a letter to Atticus on 2 March 49, 
in which he balances the horrors of an overseas war against Pompey’s claims to his 
loyalty. He does not, he says, consider those who have gone abroad to prepare war 
laudable, although the situation in Italy was unbearable, but he is moved by the 
thought of Pompey, whose companion in flight and fellow in recovering (reciperans) 
the res publica Cicero feels he ought to be.
655
 The result of this sentiment was not 
happy and the phrase next appears in the Brutus of 46, where it is used in relation to 
the tumultus for recuperanda re publica during Cicero’s youth, that is to say Sulla’s 
return from the east, during which various orators died but the leges et iudicia were 
constituta and recuperata res publica, an interesting party-political stance on the 
Sullan civil wars in a dialogue containing a not-very-hidden hint that its addressee 
should imitate his illustrious tyrant-killing ancestors.
656
 Meanwhile, the contrast 
between Cicero’s speeches and his letters following Caesar’s victory at Pharsalus, 
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when Cicero had given up the fight for the res publica, is marked. What stands 
revealed is resistance on the part of even lukewarm ‘Republicans’ to Caesar’s 
account of what the res publica was. 
This tension underlies the Pro Marcello of 46,
657
 where Cicero casts 
Marcellus’s pardon as the return of both Marcellus and himself (his long silence 
having finally broken) to the res publica,
658
 just as restoring Ligarius would be a gift 
to the res publica as well as to Ligarius’s brothers.659 Caesar, he says, has raised a 
standard (signum) for all those present to hope well (ad bene… sperandum) for the 
res publica and has shown that he places senatorial auctoritas and the dignitas rei 
publica before his own dolor or suspiciones;
660
 it is to his credit that he had wished 
to see Cicero and the salvaged Pompeians with him in the res publica.
661
 This praise 
is undercut as the speech goes on: the welfare of all citizens is now bound up with 
the welfare of Caesar, which gives Cicero cause for dolor, since the res publica, 
which should be immortal, is now dependent on the anima of one mortal man.
662
 It is 
consequently vulnerable – what if Caesar should fall prey to chance or ill-health or 
(heaven forbid!) human treachery? How could any god help the res publica then, 
even if s/he wanted to?
663
 Caesar should therefore raise up everything that had been 
overturned by the war: he should restore iudicia and fides, rein in bad behaviour, 
encourage people to have children,
664
 and, since his res gestae had embraced cuncta 
res publica, he should devote himself to ensuring its salus.
665
 Should Caesar leave 
the res publica in its current condition, his divina virtus would win only admiration, 
rather than gloria.
666
 It remained for Caesar to constituere rem publicam, as Sulla 
had done, and so win the tranquillitas et otium that Sulla had won.
667
 
Although Sulla is not named, his precedent stands behind the course Cicero 
advocates: put things back the way you found them, then get out of the way.
668
 
Cicero acknowledges the existence of a res publica, but only one in poor shape. 
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Meanwhile, his private commentary for Servius Sulpicius Rufus was even less 
sanguine: he had been inspired to speak by the impression of seeing ‘some 
semblance’ (species aliqua) of ‘a reviving (reviviscens) res publica’ and had thereby 
forfeited his honestum otium, while escaping Caesar’s displeasure, since Caesar 
‘might have thought I did not consider this a res publica if I was silent in 
perpetuity’.669 This implies that Caesar was still rather sensitive about what people 
like Cicero thought of his res publica and that he suspected they were not too 
impressed by it, as indeed Cicero’s underwhelming impression of green shoots 
confirms.
670
 Cicero had written to Marcellus too to encourage him to come home: if 
there was going to be any sort of res publica, he said, Marcellus should be in it; and 
if not, well, Rome was still the best place to be in exile.
671
 
It might be tempting to read defensiveness into Cicero’s letter to Sulpicius, 
i.e. that Cicero felt a need to justify his broken silence, in which case this is all the 
more telling, since Cicero had at least gone so far as to join Pompey abroad. 
Sulpicius, on the other hand, had remained in Rome after Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon, was one of the two consulares who had attended the desultory senate 
meeting that Cicero refused to attend,
672
 and spent the war quietly outside Italy.
673
 
Furthermore, Caesar had appointed Sulpicius as the proconsul of Achaia;
674
 he was 
barely even a lukewarm ‘Republican’ like Cicero, let alone a diehard like Cato. All 
the same, after Tullia’s death the following year, Sulpicius wrote to console Cicero 
with the thoughtful recommendation to tell himself that 
 
illam, quam diu ei opus fuerit, vixisse, una cum re publica floruisse, te, 
patrem suum, praetorem consulem augurem vidisse, adulescentibus primariis 
nuptam fuisse, omnibus bonis prope perfunctam esse, cum res publica 
occideret vita excessisse.  
 
she lived as long as it was well for her to live, and that she and the res 
publica flourished together. She saw you, her father, praetor, consul and 
augur. She was married to young men of distinction. Almost all that life can 
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give, she enjoyed, and she left life when the res publica was ruined. (Cic. 
Fam. 4.5.5.) 
 
Cicero should not, he adds, give people reason to think his mourning is for Tullia so 
much as for the rei publicae tempora and the victory of others.
675
 Sulpicius’s attitude 
is mirrored in Cicero’s reply, in which he points out that the loss of the res publica 
only makes his condition worse. Whereas former bereaved statesmen could be 
consoled by their dignitas derived ex re publica, this had been snatched away from 
Cicero; his sole remaining comfort, given the current state of the forum and the 
curia, had been his daughter. In the past, he had withdrawn a re publica to the 
sanctuary of his domus, but he could not now seek refuge ad rem publicam from his 
domestic grief. Both domus and forum gave him dolor, and so he avoided both.
676
 
He was looking forward to seeing Sulpicius soon, however, so that they could 
discuss how best to behave at a time when everything had to be accommodated to 
the wishes of a single man – a man prudens and liberalis, no enemy of Cicero’s and 
very friendly to Sulpicius, but nonetheless in need of consideration.
677
 This is res 
publica perceived as political space, as Cicero’s liberal use of prepositions indicates. 
Stockton observes that on the evidence of Sulpicius’s former letters ‘his blank 
despair at the seemingly irretrievable loss of the Republic is no polite pose’, but 
rather the result of ‘the continuing arbitrariness of Caesar’s rule, understandable and 
acceptable for a comparatively brief period of emergency but increasingly difficult to 
bear as time hardened it and bedded it deeper in the soil of the Republic’.678 For men 
such as Cicero and Sulpicius, the res publica of Caesar’s regime was either a very 
poor shadow of itself or did not exist at all, however much routine business might be 
conducted in Rome. 
 
5.4 AGAINST THE SIDE OF HEAVEN 
 
‘To sum up, even those who reject the idea that Caesar tried to establish a 
monarchy and a divine cult must admit that he was much more than just a 
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Roman dictator. They must also agree that his performance and achievements 
made restoration of the old Republic impossible once and for all.’ (Yavetz 
1983: 212.) 
 
It is uncontroversial that Caesar was more than ‘just’ a Roman dictator; the only 
other dictator like him had been Sulla, whose precedent Caesar had pointedly not 
followed, both in his policy of clementia and in his disregard for res publica. If the 
impact of Nasica’s murder of Tiberius Gracchus manifested in the general concern 
afterwards for res publica salva, and if Sulla’s dictatorship was similarly 
remembered in the res publica constituta, the mark of Caesar’s divorce of res 
publica as participatory political arena from res publica as routine political business 
must be the modern catchphrase for the traditional Republic: libera res publica. The 
term is both rare and late; while the res publica is regularly ‘liberated’ from various 
pestes and perils in Cicero’s rhetoric,679 it is libera only on three secure occasions 
that I have been able to find: (1) at Fam. 11.3.4, a letter sent by Marcus Brutus and C. 
Cassius to Antony on 4 August 44; (2) in Cicero’s Thirteenth Philippic, delivered on 
20 March 43 (Phil. 13.6); (3) in Velleius Paterculus, writing under the Principate 
(2.32).
680
 The distinction between liberata and libera is fine but revealing: the res 
publica might be liberated as many times and from as many minor or major perils as 
individual orators required, since ‘liberation’ is an event and events may be repeated. 
Libera, however, expresses an essential quality. So, for example, the category of 
‘freedmen’ (libertini) stands in contrast to ‘free men’ (liberi): a libertinus is defined 
by having once been freed, whereas a liber is a man who has always been free. To 
cast the res publica as libera both expresses freedom as an essential quality of the 
Roman res publica and implies that this quality (since it needs to be expressed) may 
be contingent. In other words, libera res publica is a discursive reaction to the very 
recent past when the Roman res publica had not been free. It defines res publica 
against an alternative, specifically an alternative that had only occurred before in 
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Rome as ancient history, political rhetoric or under Sulla, who, however, had 
resigned his dictatorship and ostentatiously retired into ordinary life. 
After Sulla, the res publica was constituta rather than libera because it 
preserved at least the outwards form of the traditional res publica of the maiores; 
there was a lively quarrel to be had over libertas within the res publica,
681
 but not so 
much over liberty as an essential quality of the res publica. Furthermore, res publica 
constituta expresses a single event (the Sullan settlement of 82–1), whereas res 
publica libera echoes the concern over res publica salva which appeared with Nasica 
and never really went away. That, too, was not just an innocent phrase but indicated 
a strong concern that the res publica was not or soon would not be salva and that 
something must be done about this. The appearance of libera res publica after 
Caesar’s death indicates a new twist resulting from the conflict between Caesar’s 
limited conception of res publica, wherein the political organisation is subordinated 
to routine public business, and the more expansive version espoused by his 
opponents, who saw Caesar as a rex or tyrannus oppressing the res publica and who 
intended his assassination to reset the Roman res publica to its default factory 
setting, that is, libera. Whereas res publica salva implies an extended metaphor (the 
‘body politic’), res publica libera makes a political claim about how the res publica 
should be organised. 
For Caesar and his opponents, the situation at the start of the civil wars was 
relatively clear-cut, both as far as legitimacy went (he lacked it) and for the war more 
generally (those fighting were fighting for or against Caesar). Caesar’s biggest non-
military challenge was to manoeuvre himself into an ideological position where he 
could make the same claim to legitimacy that he had made in the Bellum Gallicum, 
even though it was highly questionable whether he could now claim any relationship 
with the res publica. This clarity was missing after Caesar’s death, when his various 
fellow magistrates were left to haggle over the future shape of Rome’s political 
sphere and their places in it.
682
 The impact of Caesar’s regime and the lack of 
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forethought on the part of the ‘Liberators’ resulted in a confused and difficult period 
in which Cicero complained to Atticus, not long after the assassination in April 44, 
that ‘I can only be sorry that the res publica has not been recovered (reciperata) at 
the same time as liberty, a thing that has never happened in any civitas’.683 Note the 
reappearance of res publica reciperare, now in the negative: the removal of Caesar, 
which restored libertas, was not sufficient to restore a functioning political sphere.
684
 
Although Caesar was dead, his supporters were not, most prominently the other 
consul of 44, Marcus Antonius, and the magister equitum, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus. 
Additionally, some inadvisable realpolitik had induced the senate to confirm 
Caesar’s appointments (which ensured the ‘Liberators’ their offices, but also 
confirmed various Caesarians in theirs) and acta (which could be tampered with by 
Antony, who acquired Caesar’s notebooks from Caesar’s wife Calpurnia).685 As a 
result, not only were most of the legions commanded by Caesarians,
686
 but those 
commands had been confirmed by senatorial auctoritas, so the position of the senate 
(which Caesar had packed with loyalists anyway) was compromised. This 
resurrected an old problem: how to rein in magistrates, especially those at a distance 
from Rome? Cicero’s letters show just how complicated this could get in a situation 
where the central authority (now Caesar) had been abruptly removed and multiple 
managers of the res publica were left to float free in a contentious vacuum. 
Senators were supposed to consulere rei publicae, that is, to serve as a well 
of practical wisdom (consilium) for the guidance of the magistrates in the 
management of the res publica.
687
 The fact that magistrates and promagistrates 
writing home from their provincia typically address their official reports to the 
magistrates, senate and people of Rome indicates that while individual magistrates 
might embody the res publica abroad, this particular combination of elements 
traditionally comprised the (caretakers, advisors and possessors of the) res publica at 
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home.
688
 Those in the field or governing provinces had considerable freedom, but 
were tethered to the central hub in Rome – until Caesar’s regime collapsed the 
individual elements into a single source of publicum consilium, himself, which then 
dissolved on Caesar’s death. In the aftermath, it was not clear what had or should 
replace him. For the ‘Liberators’ and those who, like Cicero, applauded Caesar’s 
death, it was a particular problem that many of the magistrates and senators were 
Caesarians. This is clear from Fam. 11.3.4, a joint letter from Marcus Brutus and 
Gaius Cassius to the consul Marcus Antonius written in August 44: 
 
Deos quaesumus consilia tua rei publicae salutaria sint ac tibi; si minus, ut 
salva atque honesta re publica tibi quam minimum noceant optamus. 
 
We pray to the gods that your counsels should be salutary for the res publica 
and for you. If not, then we pray they may bring you as little hurt as possible 
without detriment to the welfare and honour of the res publica. (Cic. Fam. 
11.3.4.) 
 
Antony, as consul, was intimately linked with the res publica, a reality reflected in 
the careful formalities of this letter. The difficulty of distinguishing between a 
disaster for the consul (even if that consul is Antony) and a disaster for the res 
publica is apparent, as is the fact that Brutus and Cassius were in the awkward 
position of having to do so. 
These contortions indicate the dangerous fragmentation of legitimacy derived 
from the magistrate’s traditional relationship with the res publica in what was 
shaping up to be a new civil war. There were people on all sides with some claim to 
represent the res publica. It will come as no surprise that Cicero and his various 
friends among or supporting the ‘Liberators’ used this discourse; so in a letter from 
March 43, Cicero informs Q. Cornificius that he has been attacking someone 
(Calvisius) who had formerly been acting as a provincial governor in absentia, a 
gross insult to Cornificius and the res publica.
689
 Elsewhere, on 7 May 43, Cassius 
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wrote to Cicero from Syria, a province where he was not supposed to be, to 
commend his dignitas and questionably raised army to Cicero’s care, since Cicero 
‘would appear not only to wish me well, as you have always done both for my sake 
and that of the res publica, but to have taken a grave responsibility upon yourself and 
to be very anxious on my account’. 690  Again, the younger Cornelius Lentulus 
Spinther, who had originally gone to Asia as Trebonius’s quaestor, wrote a letter to 
Cicero and a dispatch to the senate and people from Perge at the end of May 43 to 
update them on his activities in the region as proquaestor propraetor after 
Trebonius’s death in Smyrna at Dolabella’s hands.691 He resented the efforts of the 
Rhodians to obstruct his pursuit of Dolabella, who had a proconsular command in 
Asia and whom the Rhodians seem to have taken more seriously than Lentulus: ‘The 
contempt which the Rhodians have displayed for me and for the res publica you will 
see from my official dispatch’,692 he told Cicero, and asked Cicero to try to get him 
appointed to govern Asia in the period until one or other of the consuls (to whom 
Asia had been assigned) was able to take up the command in person. ‘I want to 
collect and make good the sums I gave Cassius and lost by Trebonius’ death, also by 
Dolabella’s ruthlessness or the bad faith of those who broke their word to me and to 
the res publica’.693 Similarly, in the dispatch Lentulus protests his devotion to the 
senate and res publica and promises to keep them updated: ‘As soon as I have made 
a rapid tour of the province and found out who has kept faith with me and the res 
publica in preserving intact the funds I deposited, as well as the villains who went to 
Dolabella with the public money in their hands as an offering with which to buy their 
way into a partnership of crime, I shall apprise you accordingly’.694 The language in 
all these passages is that of rightfully appointed magistrates of unquestionable 
legitimacy, even though the actions they describe are dubious, to say the least. 
The misuse of legitimacy becomes an open conflict in a three-way 
conversation during March and May 43 between Cicero, L. Munatius Plancus 
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(proconsul of Gallia Comata and consul-designate) and Caesar’s former magister 
equitum M. Aemilius Lepidus (proconsul of Gallia Transalpina and Hispania 
Citerior).
695
 The main unknown quantity was Lepidus, a Caesarian of exceedingly 
uncertain loyalties moving around in the shadows in possession of an army, although 
Plancus too commanded an army and had fought for Caesar both in Gaul and during 
the civil war. Plancus, who was in the field and in open dialogue with Lepidus, 
claimed to be friendly to Cicero, loyal to the senate, and doing his best to persuade 
Lepidus onto the side of all that was good and proper; meanwhile Lepidus himself 
teetered dangerously between being at best fickle and at worst outright 
treacherous.
696
 Cicero, writing from Rome, aimed to yoke Lepidus to the senatorial 
cause; his efforts are attested by the Fifth and Thirteenth Philippics, where he 
expounds his theory that educating Lepidus on his duties and rewarding Lepidus for 
behaving dutifully would have the happy effect of making this behaviour continue.
697
 
The reward in question was a vote of thanks and a gilded equestrian statue on the 
Rostra; when Lepidus sent a letter arguing for peace in which he failed to thank the 
senate for this, Cicero wrote on 20 March 43 to chide him. He was glad Lepidus 
wanted to restore pax inter civis, but not altogether sanguine about Lepidus’s long-
term plans: ‘If you draw a line between peace and slavery, you will take thought 
(consules) both for the res publica and your own standing (dignitas)’.698 Cicero’s 
language concedes a degree of qualified legitimacy to Lepidus: if Lepidus behaves as 
Cicero thinks appropriate, Cicero will allow and confirm his legitimacy in return. In 
linking Lepidus’s dignitas with the res publica, self-interest with public-spiritedness, 
Cicero uses the standard, self-reinforcing duality in an attempt to convince Lepidus 
to do as Cicero says. Lepidus should refrain from making peace with his fellow 
citizen Antony, because civil war with Antony is in the interests of both the res 
publica and of Lepidus. Lepidus’s positive relationship with the res publica, in other 
words, was contingent on his behaviour. 
Plancus, who had sent a similar letter to the senate, received a somewhat 
more nuanced response: ‘our Furnius’ had reported good things about Plancus’s 
political sentiments (de animo tuo in rem publicam) to an approving senate and 
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people, but Plancus himself had written to advocate for peace when D. Brutus was 
besieged by Antony. Unless Plancus dissociated himself from his Caesarian 
correspondents and joined himself with the libertas populi Romani and the senatus 
auctoritas, all his gradus dignitatis would be meaningless.
699
 An elaborate and self-
justifying letter from Plancus survives, written at about the same time to the 
magistrates, senate and people, in which Plancus explains his various delays and 
deceptions as perfectly understandable responses to the constraints of the 
situation;
700
 he also wrote to Cicero insisting on his ambition to be recognised and 
remembered as someone who had been a great guard for the res publica,
701
 in 
furtherance of which he kept Cicero updated on his progression towards Mutina and 
the opening of communications with Lepidus after the deaths of the consuls at 
Mutina.
702
 By 18 May, Plancus was willing to risk negotiating directly with Lepidus, 
in the hope (so he said) of bolstering the waverer and his army; he was striking camp 
on the Isara and going to meet Lepidus.
703
 A day later, Lepidus himself wrote Cicero 
a brief, informative letter: hearing that M. Antony and his brother Lucius were on the 
move, he had started to advance against them; various people had joined or deserted 
Antony; and ‘as for this war, I shall not fail the senate or the res publica’.704 
Addressing a senator in residence at the central hub of public activity, Lepidus 
genuflected towards the senate as a legitimate locus of consilium on the res publica’s 
behalf. 
The culmination to all this careful diplomacy came at the end of the month. 
On 30 May, after the exchange of more letters by all and sundry,
705
 Lepidus wrote to 
the praetors, tribunes of the plebs, senate, people and plebs to inform them that 
although his heart was in the right place (deos hominesque testor, patres conscripti, 
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qua mente et quo animo semper in rem publicam fuerim), his army, dedicated as it 
was to preserving Roman citizens, had mutinied: 
 
In qua re ego vos, patres conscripti, oro atque obsecro ut privatis 
offensionibus omissis summae rei publicae consulatis neve misericordiam 
nostram exercitusque nostri in civili dissensione sceleris loco ponatis. quod 
si salutis omnium ac dignitatis rationem habueritis, melius et vobis et rei 
publicae consuletis. 
 
Therefore, conscript fathers, I beg and implore you to put private offences 
aside and to consult the supreme interests of the res publica. Do not treat the 
compassion shown by me and my army in a conflict between fellow 
countrymen as a crime. If you take account of the welfare and dignity of all, 
you will better consult your own interests and those of the res publica. (Cic. 
Fam. 10.35.2.) 
 
Lepidus again yokes the senate and res publica together: it will be in the interests of 
both for the senators to take into account the salus ac dignitas of all players and to 
treat his alliance with Antony as mercy shown in a civil dissension rather than a 
crime. This is perhaps a response to Cicero: whereas Cicero casts the struggle as 
slavery versus freedom, Lepidus talks of civil war, misericordia and the duties owed 
to fellow citizens; this, he says, is what taking thought for the res publica (the 
senate’s duty) is all about. There may also be an echo of Caesar’s disingenuous 
proposal to Pompey at BC 3.10 and the threat is not particularly veiled, especially as 
Lepidus links himself with his army, misericordiam nostram exercitusque nostri. 
When political life had fragmented to this extent, traditional claims to legitimacy 
became largely meaningless because people on all sides could reasonably make 
them: what mattered was whether or not such claims could be backed up with force. 
The instability of all political constellations at this point is illustrated by the 
diplomatic consul-designate Munatius Plancus, whose impending office gave him a 
reasonable claim to represent the res publica and who joined the triumvirs and held 
the consulship as Lepidus’s colleague in 42. 
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To return to my starting point, then, the explicitly libera res publica is a 
symptom of this crisis. As a concept, it stands in pointed contrast not just to Caesar’s 
regime but also to the impending resumption of the civil war Caesar had begun. For 
this, we need only look at my first reference, Fam. 11.3, that tart letter from M. 
Brutus and Cassius to Antony written at Naples on 4 August 44. I cited it above to 
highlight the difficulty of divorcing the consul from the res publica at a time when 
people claiming to champion the res publica were developing a stance of public (and 
potentially military) opposition to that very consul. This letter, and the associated 
correspondence from which the vagaries of source survival exclude us, are therefore 
part of a universal renegotiation of all aspects of (and perspectives on) res publica in 
the crisis of legitimacy created by Caesar’s death. This makes for some interesting 
tension in the text, where Brutus and Cassius are at pains to be perfectly proper in a 
situation that is not at all proper and looks likely to get even less so in the very near 
future. Since the popular (Caesarian) reaction in Rome had given the ‘Liberators’ the 
idea that it might be prudent to leave town, Brutus had been lurking near Naples for 
about a month, hoping to hear good news from Rome of the response to the ludi 
Apollinares that he was responsible for organising as the urban praetor (albeit an 
urban praetor at a safe distance from the urbs).
706
 At the end of July, he and Cassius 
had issued an edict offering to leave Italy and refrain from starting any more civil 
wars;
707
 this had provoked a sharp public and private response from Antony, to 
which Fam. 11.3 is their ‘firm and dignified reply’.708 
The formality of the address (‘Brutus and Cassius, Praetors, to Antonius, 
Consul, greetings’) establishes that the letter is being written by two magistrates to a 
third, while the opening paragraph offers a critique of Antony on grounds of 
appropriate conduct. Antony’s letter, like his edict, was ‘offensive and menacing’ 
(contumeliosas, minacis), and scarcely worthy (minime dignas) of being sent ‘by you 
to us’, not simply because of the offensive content but because this attack had been 
unprovoked. The letter is couched in the language of traditional political activity. 
Brutus and Cassius had ‘attacked you with no insult’ (te nulla lacessi<i>mus iniuria) 
and had supposed that Antony would not be surprised ‘if, as praetors and men of that 
dignitas we should ask something in an edict from a consul (si praetores et ea 
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dignitate homines aliquid edicto postulassemus a consule)’. If Antony should resent 
(si indignaris) them for daring to issue their edict, he must concede to them a 
corresponding dolor that even this was not granted by him to Brutus and Cassius.
709
 
In short, Antony’s overbearing behaviour is not how a consul should interact with 
praetors; they therefore have every right to hold a grudge against him. Antony’s 
accusations are untrue; and since, as Antony says, he has made no protest about these 
alleged actions, it is surprising that Antony could not contain his anger (iracundia) 
so far as not to throw Caesar’s death at them. 710  Furthermore, Antony should 
consider how tolerable it was that ‘praetors should not be permitted in the interests of 
concord and liberty to abate the rights of their office by edict without a consul 
threatening military violence’. Brutus and Cassius will not be intimidated by 
Antony’s threats and Antony should not ‘order around those by whose labour he is 
free’ (iis imperet quorum opera liber est), not least because it will not work: ‘free 
men are not impressed by threats’ (nulla enim minantis auctoritas apud liberos 
est).
711
 So, 
 
Nos in hac sententia sumus ut te cupiamus in libera re publica magnum atque 
honestum esse, vocemus te ad nullas inimicitias, sed tamen pluris nostram 
libertatem quam tuam amicitiam aestimemus. Tu etiam atque etiam vide quid 
suscipias, quid sustinere possis; neque quam diu vixerit Caesar sed quam 
non diu regnarit fac cogites. 
 
To summarise our position, we are desirous to see you an important and 
respected member of a libera res publica. We are not fastening any quarrel 
upon you. At the same time, our liberty means more to us than your 
friendship. On your part, consider well what you undertake and what you can 
sustain. Bear in mind not only the length of Caesar’s life, but the brevity of 
his reign. (Cic. Fam. 11.3.4.) 
 
                                                          
709
 Cic. Fam. 11.3.1. 
710
 Cic. Fam. 11.3.2. 
711
 Cic. Fam. 11.3.3. 
185 5. RES PUBLICA RECIPERATA 
 
The res publica of the letter is libera in the first place because the rhetoric of libertas 
suffuses the whole letter, as it does Brutus and Cassius’s rhetoric in general.712 Thus 
Antony’s use of the assassination of Caesar as an accusation (one which, unlike the 
other accusations, Brutus and Cassius do not deny, but merely use to point up the 
hypocrisy of what was presumably praeteritio on Antony’s part) is transformed into 
a commendation with the pointed remark that Antony is free thanks to Brutus and 
Cassius; from free men the letter then moves to a free res publica. This libera res 
publica looks both backwards and forwards: backwards to the condition of the non-
libera res publica under Caesar, from whose regnum the ‘Liberators’ had freed it, 
and forwards to a highly uncertain future in which Antony might be a great and 
respected man among other great and respected men in a res publica that remains 
libera – or the civil wars may resume, the res publica might lose its freedom, and 
Antony could prove to be a new Caesar (in which case he should consider Caesar’s 
fate). Even though libera res publica expresses an essential quality, it invokes a past 
when the res publica had not been libera (although it should have been) and evokes 
a future in which free men may have to act to keep it libera. It stands, in other words, 
as a standard for a future fight. 
It seems reasonable to conclude from this letter that an explicitly libera res 
publica belongs to the rhetoric of the ‘Liberators’ and is anchored in this specific and 
ephemeral context. It is a res publica principally perceived as (free) political space 
and (free) movement within the political structures that Caesar’s regime had 
disregarded. Cicero invoked it the following year in an argument against peace 
initiatives that carries the same implications of contingent libertas: if Sapientia 
advised self-preservation above all, even at the cost of slavery, then he would ignore 
her, but he would obey as if obeying a god if she told him instead: 
 
Tu vero ita vitam corpusque servato, ita fortunas, ita rem familiarem, ut haec 
libertate posteriora ducas itaque his uti velis, si libera re publica possis, nec 
pro his libertatem, sed pro libertate haec proicias tamquam pignora iniuriae. 
 
Preserve your life and body, your fortunes and property, but only as valuing 
them less than freedom and as desiring to enjoy them only if you can do so in 
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a libera res publica, and do not sacrifice liberty in exchange for these things 
but them for liberty, regarding them as pledges exposed to ill-usage. (Cic. 
Phil. 13.6.) 
 
By the time Velleius Paterculus had Q. Lutatius Catulus argue against the lex 
Gabinia on the grounds that Pompey was certainly great but was becoming too great 
for a libera res publica, the lively debate of 44–43 and the preceding decades had 
crystallised into tragic history.
713
 There are, however, broader points to be gleaned 
from Fam. 11.3, of which the most important concerns its authors’ dimly perceived 
shape of the future. In the contentious vacuum created by Caesar’s sudden removal 
from the scene, everyone was obliged to renegotiate not just how they related to each 
other but also (because the ‘Liberators’ had wrongly thought that the old ways would 
snap back into place with Caesar dead and therefore took no measures to ensure that 
the former structures of the res publica would be re-established) just what sort of 
political system they were going to end up with. The libera res publica defines the 
sort of res publica Brutus and Cassius want to have: one not dominated by a single 
man or clique, as opaque a definition as anything Caesar came up with (which might 
be charitably attributed to the fact that this is a letter rather than a political pamphlet). 
It is distinct from Pompey’s rallying cry: he and the ‘Republicans’ had fought for the 
res publica, whereas the ‘Liberators’ express their willingness to fight for the res 
publica to be free. They make, it might be said, a purer claim: not a res publica for 
themselves and their allies, but a libera res publica in which everyone, including 
Antony and the Caesarians (if they are willing to go along with this) can 
participate.
714
 
Against this claim, Antony’s communications seem to have struck a personal 
chord. In Fam. 11.3, he is reported to have made personal attacks on the ‘Liberators’, 
to have accused them outright of preparing for a new civil war, and to hold Caesar’s 
assassination against them. This fits with what we hear about the former Caesarians 
elsewhere; Cicero had previously written on 14 May 44, after a dinner with A. 
Hirtius, that ‘they are scared of peace (otium). Their theme and slogan is that a great 
man (clarissimum <virum>) has been killed, that the whole res publica has been 
plunged into chaos by his death, that all he did will be null and void the moment we 
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cease to be afraid, that clemency was his undoing, but for which nothing of the sort 
could have happened to him’.715 Antony’s own self-justification is expressed in a 
letter sent to Hirtius and Octavian a year later in March 43, sarcastically dissected 
and so preserved by Cicero at Phil. 13.22–48; Lintott supplies the reconstruction and 
translation I use here.
716
 Given the care taken by Brutus and Cassius to use the 
proper formulae, it is worth noting the abruptness of the letter, which begins ‘Antony 
to Hirtius and Caesar’. Cicero takes the opportunity to comment on the lack of titles, 
observing that ‘rather than give them their proper titles, he has chosen to drop one 
that is not rightfully his’ (that of imperator).717  But Antony’s implication is the 
reverse: he means that Hirtius, having been ‘honoured through Caesar’s generosity 
and left by him such a figure that you are amazed at yourself’, and Octavian, a puer 
who owes everything to the name inherited from Caesar, do not deserve the titles 
they claim, since they are actively hindering attempts to exact revenge for Caesar’s 
murder. The importance of exacting punishment on the assassins of Caesar is the 
keynote of the letter, where Antony reproaches Hirtius and Octavian for siding with 
the senate (which he calls the castra Pompeii), for taking the victus Cicero as their 
leader and for doing or deliberately overlooking many dubiously legal things: in 
short, Antony asks, had they done anything that Pompey himself, if revived, or his 
son Sextus, had he the power, would not have done? He describes the recent death of 
the assassin C. Trebonius at Dolabella’s hands, which Cicero regarded as a crime,718 
as Trebonius’s penalty ‘to the ash and bones of a supremely distinguished man’ and 
an indication that the numen deorum was in action after less than a year, since a 
parricide had already been partially revenged; however, 
 
Iudicatum hostem populi Romani Dolabellam eo quod sicarium occiderit, et 
videri cariorem rei publicae filium scurrae quam C. Caesarem, patriae 
parentem, ingemiscendum est. 
 
It is a matter for grief that Dolabella has been declared an enemy of the 
Roman people on the ground that he killed an assassin, and the son of a 
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comedian seems dearer to the res publica than Gaius Caesar, the father of his 
fatherland. 
 
It was worse, though, that Hirtius and Octavian should justify Dolabella’s treatment 
and try to liberate the venefica D. Brutus from siege so that Cassius and M. Brutus 
should be potentissimi. Hirtius and Caesar represented themselves as intervening on 
behalf of the soldiers interned by Antony’s siege; Antony’s response was that the 
soldiers could leave – all he wanted was ‘the death of the man who deserved it’. Nor 
did Antony believe that the senate had talked of reconciliation. Hirtius and Octavian 
should therefore consider whose death they should be avenging and whom they 
should be fighting. They are all on the same side, Antony tells them: that is to say 
Caesar’s side, which should now devote itself to hunting down Caesar’s assassins 
and repressing the resurrected castra Pompeii. Fortune herself had so far avoided the 
spectacle of two armies from the same side fighting with Cicero (who is felix to have 
deceived Hirtius and Octavian with the honours he once boasted of having used to 
deceive Caesar) for a lanista.
719
 Antony would not abandon his men, the party 
Pompey hated, or his allies Lepidus and Plancus; if he survives, he will rejoice, but if 
he falls, he can at least die rejoicing in anticipation of the punishment of Hirtius and 
Octavian by the Pompeians. Ultimately, however, he expresses a willingness to 
forgive actions taken against him and his men if those concerned (his correspondents 
are implied) will join him in seeking revenge for Caesar. 
‘One may question Cicero’s wisdom in reading this to the senate’, Lintott 
remarks, noting that while for Cicero, ‘the letter proved that Antonius was an 
irreconcilable enemy to the res publica, as indeed he was to Cicero’, his ‘largely 
Caesarian audience’ must have found it less comfortable to hear – especially those 
references to Lepidus and Plancus.
720
 The contrast with the sentiments expressed by 
Brutus and Cassius is striking. Whereas the ‘Liberators’ staked their cause on an 
abstract political principle, Antony stakes his on a very personal principle: revenge 
for that clarissimus vir, Caesar. He has little to say about the res publica, but a great 
deal to say about the dead Pompey, whose defeated causa he depicts as dominating 
the senate under Cicero’s treacherous leadership. If the contrast between political 
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and personal principles seems reminiscent of the ‘Republicans’ against Caesar, it is 
unsurprising that the themes of the first round of civil wars should be echoed by the 
successors to that struggle. Like the ‘Liberators’, Antony inherits an apologia to 
which he adds his own twist. For the ‘Liberators’ it was libertas; for Antony, 
revenge. This came with the happy bonus that Antony was free to ignore senatorial 
decrees, fight fellow magistrates and in general pursue his own interests at the 
expense of anything that could be considered the res publica, since the senate was 
only the castra Pompeii and anyone who had been involved in Caesar’s 
assassination or got in the way of Antony’s personal mission deserved whatever they 
got. The res publica, meanwhile, features only as a word used to discredit those who 
wanted to avenge Caesar; it remains as the spoils, presumably, for whichever party 
wins out in the end. For Antony, the civil war was one to be fought over the res 
publica, not in aid of a particular vision of it. 
 
5.5 THE CAPTAIN 
It remains to discuss someone who did make a detailed attempt to define what res 
publica should mean amid all this confusion: the Pompeian lanista Cicero, who had 
had a very gloomy summer but who by late October 44 was starting to feel a little 
more hopeful: ‘it seems’, he wrote to Atticus, ‘the res publica may recover its ius’.721 
My starting point for the Philippics, then, is that in these difficult and conflicted 
times there was a real place for argument over the shape of Rome’s shared political 
space, if only because the structures of the res publica constituta had been seriously 
eroded, if not displaced altogether, by Caesar’s regime. Delivered on 2 September 44, 
Cicero’s First Philippic is concerned, consciously or not, with working out 
parameters for the (libera) res publica that he calls upon Antony as consul to 
administer and will spend the rest of the Philippics calling on the senate to defend 
against Antony.
722
 By praising Antony’s actions from 15 March to 1 June, and by 
passing comment on what should and should not be acceptable, he aimed (or at least 
managed) to establish a set of working guidelines for the post-Caesar future. This 
begins with the narrative of events after Caesar’s assassination at Phil. 1.1–5 and 
Cicero’s hope that the res publica had now been recalled (revocare) to the consilium 
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and auctoritas of the senate. At the time, Antony had been the model of a consul in 
difficult times: he had helped calm things down during the senate meeting on 17 
March and had continued on the same fine lines, laying admirable proposals before 
the senate, discovering no unexpected material in Caesar’s papers, restoring only a 
single exile, granting no exemptions from taxes and approving an approvable motion 
moved by Servius Sulpicius on the topic of Caesar’s decrees. He also ‘regularly 
brought the principes civitatis to those deliberations de re publica which he was 
holding in his home’. Best of all, Antony had wholly removed the dictatorship (an 
office that had gained the ‘force of regal power’, vis regiae potestatis) from the res 
publica, through a bill that he had put to the senate, which had naturally cheered him 
all the way to a decree of thanks.
723
 He and his colleague Dolabella had saved the 
senate from a massacre, and Dolabella by himself had taken action to stop riots.
724
 It 
seemed, Cicero says, as if some light had dawned (lux quaedam videbatur oblata), 
 
non modo regno, quod pertuleramus, sed etiam regni timore sublato, 
magnumque pignus ab eo rei publicae datum, se liberam civitatem esse velle, 
cum dictatoris nomen, quod saepe iustum fuisset, propter perpetuae 
dictaturae recentem memoriam funditus ex re publica sustulisset. 
 
with the removal not only of the monarchy which we had endured, but even 
of the fear of its recurrence; it seemed as if Antony had given the res publica 
a mighty pledge of his desire for a libera civitas when, because of the 
recollection of the recent dictator perpetuus he totally removed from our res 
publica the office of dictator, legitimate though it had often been. (Cic. Phil. 
1.4.) 
 
The future res publica that Cicero wants is one where the traumatic immediate past 
is forgotten (he himself argued for an amnesty along the lines of ‘the ancient 
Athenian precedent’ in which discordia are laid to rest, he says),725 Caesar’s decrees 
are not rejected wholesale but are handled carefully, the magistrates consult with 
leading statesmen (principes) before doing anything, a traditional (albeit 
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controversial) magistracy is removed entirely, and the senate’s safety is ensured. 
This is a mix of the traditional and the not-so-traditional; and, crucially, it is a res 
publica tucked snugly under a senatorial wing. 
Against the positive view of what the res publica should be, the activity that 
allegedly made for a sharp break after 1 June stands as a negative foil. ‘Nothing was 
enacted through the senate, but many important measures were put per populum – in 
the absence of the people and against their will’; the consuls-designate claimed they 
dared not attend the senate; the ‘liberators of the fatherland (patriae)’ were missing 
from the city ‘from whose neck they had cast off the yoke of slavery’, even though 
the consuls still praised them hypocritically in public; and the veterans (who had 
been carefully cultivated by the senate) were incited to hope for fresh plunder.
726
 
Cicero presents this as his reason for leaving Rome, but the account also functions as 
an alternative res publica dominated by rogue consuls backed up by greedy troops, 
where people with a right (indeed an obligation) to take part in public business dare 
not do so, while public heroes dare not stay in the city at all. Rather than overt 
opposition, Cicero’s reaction was to retreat. He returned to Rome, he claims, only 
when a chance delay gives him time to find three reasons to be hopeful: a speech of 
Antony’s, Brutus and Cassius’s edict, and a somewhat exaggerated account of what 
was going on in Rome according to which Antony would repudiate his evil advisors, 
give up Gaul and ‘return to the guidance of the senate (ad auctoritatem senatus esse 
rediturum)’.727 He hoped, in other words, that his preferred version of the res publica 
(one firmly guided by senatorial auctoritas, rather than the whims of magistrates) 
had been adopted by those currently in a position to make or break it. He therefore 
rushed back towards Rome to present his congratulations,
728
 which, however, turned 
out to be premature. A meeting with M. Brutus at Velia enlightened Cicero and gave 
him a model, that of L. Piso, who had made a (not very well supported) speech 
against Antony in the senate. By the time he arrived in Rome, his intention was to 
follow Piso’s lead, ‘not in order to achieve anything – that was not in my hopes or 
power to guarantee – but so that I might leave the words I speak today as witnesses 
to the res publica of my abiding loyalty (mea perpetua voluntas)’.729 
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What follows is a fairly tactful argument that Antony should adopt Cicero’s 
preferred res publica, in the course of which Cicero provides detail for his political 
vision by listing what should and should not be carried over from Caesar’s regime. 
Like Brutus and Cassius in Fam. 11.3, he critiques Antony and the senate on the 
grounds of appropriate behaviour. Cicero’s amicus Antony should not have been 
harsh about Cicero’s failure to attend a meeting of the senate devoted to voting on a 
thanksgiving; the proposal at hand was a bad one anyway; and the failure of any 
other consulares to talk about the other mali rei publicae or to support L. Piso 
indicates a sort of voluntary slavery that Cicero himself rejects: whereas in the past 
(that is, under Caesar) some such slavery was unavoidable, things are different 
now.
730
 These criticisms apply the standards of the pre-Caesar era: had the populus 
Romanus made Cicero and the other consulares consuls in order that ‘we in so 
exalted a station, the highest in the land, might set the res publica at naught?’731 In 
contrast, Piso is thanked as someone ‘who did not think about how much he could 
achieve in the res publica but about what he ought to do’,732 a credit that marks the 
transition to Cicero’s positive recommendations on Caesar’s acta,733 the retention 
and rejection of specific laws,
734
 and the suggestion that any laws that may in future 
be passed in a forum surrounded by armed guards should not be considered laws.
735
 
Furthermore, Cicero suggests limits on how the consuls should conduct themselves 
in office – not just in how they pass laws, but in how they behave towards other 
inhabitants of the political sphere. The consuls should not be angry with Cicero for 
speaking pro re publica like this, he tells Dolabella; he has no problem incurring 
Antony’s inimicitia if he attacks Antony personally, but 
 
sin consuetudinem meam quam in re publica semper habui tenuero, id est si 
libere quae sentiam de re publica dixero, primum deprecor ne irascatur; 
deinde, si hoc non impetro, peto ut sic irascatur ut civi. Armis utatur, si ita 
necesse est, ut dicit, sui defendendi causa: eis qui pro re publica quae ipsis 
visa erunt dixerint ista arma ne noceant. 
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if I hold to my invariable practice in re publica, that is, if I speak my mind 
freely de re publica, in the first place I beg him not to be angry: and if that 
plea fails, then I ask him to be angry with me as a fellow citizen. Let him use 
arms, if that is necessary (as he says it is) for his own defence, but let those 
arms do no injury to people who speak their own minds on behalf of the res 
publica. (Cic. Phil. 1.27.) 
 
Cicero argues not just for the structures of the old res publica to be restored, but also 
for the restoration of its culture. Against this plea, he reports that Antony’s friends 
have told him Antony is inclined to be deeply offended by contrary views and will 
not grant Cicero the same licence as Piso, who, after all, had been Caesar’s father-in-
law: death is as good a reason not to attend the senate as illness.
736
 Whatever the 
truth of this, there was evidently some renegotiation of traditional patterns of 
behaviour versus inconvenient realities underway, and Cicero was pushing for the 
reinstatement of the former (or at least an idealised version of it). He substantiates 
this push with a brief discursion on the nature of gloria, which ‘consists in the credit 
for honourable deeds (laus recte factorum) and the reputation (fama) for great 
services benefiting the res publica, approved by the testimony of the best among us 
and also by that of the multitude’.737 Dolabella and Antony both seek gloria,738 but 
are ignorant of the ‘true path of glory’, which may lead them wrongly to think that 
supreme power is glorious and to prefer fear over esteem. What is actually glorious 
is ‘to be a dear citizen, to deserve well of the res publica, to be praised and courted 
and esteemed’, whereas to be feared is invidiosum, detestabile, imbecillum, 
caducum.
739
 Antony and Dolabella should therefore change course and ‘so guide the 
res publica that your fellow countrymen will be glad that you were born’740 – all the 
way back to the version of the res publica preferred both by Cicero and by the 
populus Romanus, as various manifestations of popular will have shown.
741
 
What Phil. 1 proposes, then, is a combination of the old and new. Cicero 
recommends a res publica that incorporates Caesar’s measures selectively, is 
founded on the free interaction of peers, adheres to traditional political etiquette and 
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subordinates the magistrates to the senate’s auctoritas.742 The redefinition of gloria 
is telling: it was not the first time Cicero had played this particular semantic game,
743
 
but with everything in flux, criticism of ‘the motivational nexus that drove political 
competition at Rome’ began to look like a genuine manifesto for change.744 This sort 
of gloria valorises ordinary political activity over an extraordinary political position 
and is linked to ‘social approval on the part of the good’;745 in political terms, it adds 
conceptual glitz to the hope that the consuls will return to a senatorial fold. Stressing 
the authority of the senate was not new, of course, and it would be cynical to suggest 
Cicero stressed it now because his ability to influence events was mostly limited to 
his influence in the senate; the particular emphasis given to it in Phil. 1, however, 
starting with Cicero’s hope that the res publica had been returned not to the populus 
Romanus but to the senate’s consilium and auctoritas, indicates something beyond 
the fact that Cicero was addressing a senatorial audience. Rather, it reflects the 
trauma of the recent past, in which excessively powerful magistrates had disregarded 
senatorial authority all the way to civil war and regnum, and the uncertainty of the 
present, in which the most senior magistrates were former Caesarians and the 
champions of libertas rei publicae lacked the military support to back up their 
principles. Subordinating the magistrates to the senate was one way with at least a 
reasonable claim to traditionalism to reduce the (high) risk of this happening again. 
This strategy became more problematic as events unfolded and Cicero’s 
hopes turned out to rest on the unauthorised military exploits of magistrates and 
private citizens acting on their own initiative. The actions taken to “save” or 
“recover” the res publica746  (and saving/recovering the res publica is the major 
theme of the Philippics
747) could only undermine Cicero’s orderly vision of what the 
res publica should be. It is therefore worth considering Cicero’s resort to a somewhat 
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gelatinous rhetorical fiction at certain key moments in the texts. Dawes points out the 
intangibility implied by Cicero’s expression in the Second Philippic: 
 
Habet populus Romanus ad quos gubernacula rei publicae deferat: qui 
ubicumque terrarum sunt, ibi omne est rei publicae praesidium vel potius 
ipsa res publica, quae se adhuc tantum modo ulta est, nondum recuperavit. 
 
The Roman people has men to whom it can commit the helm of the res 
publica: wherever in the world they are, there is the entire defence of the res 
publica, or rather, there is the res publica itself, which has so far only 
avenged itself, not recovered itself. (Cic. Phil. 2.113.) 
 
Whereas Phil. 1 provided concrete criticism and recommendations, this formula 
returns us to the realm of a wandering res publica, which ‘defies locality and a 
definite semantic meaning’ and is defined more in ‘moral rather than constitutional’ 
terms.
748
 It is superficially similar to the claims of the ‘Republicans’ in the Caesarian 
civil wars, but there are significant differences. I argued above that Pompey’s 
evacuation of Rome had dismantled the res publica in a rather concrete way, 
whereas Cicero’s identification here of the res publica with the ‘Liberators’ (most of 
whom were wandering around in other people’s provinces in the east on very little 
authority whatsoever) is a purely rhetorical move based on the premise that they had 
liberated the res publica from Caesar. This is closer to Cicero’s rhetoric of the 50s, 
in that the surface glitter of the oratory is intended to conceal the weakness of the 
actual argument, but the weakness then had been personal rather than structural: in 
the 50s, Cicero had been defending himself against personal attacks, rather than 
arguing for his conception of the res publica and the men he conceived to be 
defending it during a civil war. Cicero might have wanted to end up with the res 
publica of the First Philippic, but he was willing to take it down some very unlikely 
rhetorical paths to get there. This mattered because once the dust settled, those left 
standing were likely to need some decent apologia to stand on; and the further Cicero 
pushed his rhetoric, the more rhetorical ground he gave them. 
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The unlikely rhetorical path that demonstrates this most clearly is Cicero’s 
argument in the Tenth Philippic that the legality or otherwise of M. Brutus’s claim to 
his Eastern armies was immaterial, since all armies belonged to the res publica, 
which Brutus was fighting to defend.
749
 Cicero had previously argued in the Fourth 
Philippic that the resistance of D. Brutus’s Gallic province to Antony showed that 
Antony was not a consul, on the ‘outrageously sophistic argument’ that all provinces 
ought to acknowledge the ius and imperium of the consul.
750
 Even if Gaul had been 
entitled to decide for itself who was or was not the consul, this argument ‘neglects 
the fact that in the late Republic the root of the Roman conception of provincia was 
the separation of the fields of action of magistrates when they were not specifically 
required to cooperate’;751 it was not in fact true that the consuls could exert imperium 
in whichever provincia they pleased, only in those entrusted to them by the senate. 
While the point is to deny Antony’s legitimacy as consul, taking Cicero’s argument 
seriously breaks down the boundaries between different areas of responsibility and 
transforms the whole res publica into a consular province, which increases the 
consuls’ powers dramatically and opens the way for conflict between the consuls 
themselves. The same dangerous blurring of legal protocol appears at Phil. 10.11–14, 
where Cicero distinguishes between the illegal activities of M. Brutus and C. 
Antonius in Illyricum on the basis that 
 
Omnes legiones, omnes copiae quae ubique sunt rei publicae sunt: nec enim 
eae legiones quae M. Antonium reliquerunt Antoni potius quam rei publicae 
fuisse dicentur. Omne enim et exercitus et imperi ius amittit is qui eo imperio 
et exercitu rem publicam oppugnat. 
 
All legions, all forces, wherever they are, belong to the res publica: and the 
legions that abandoned Marcus Antonius will not be said to have belonged to 
Antonius rather than to the res publica. For all right to an army and authority 
is forfeited by a man who uses his military authority and his army to attack 
the res publica. (Cic. Phil. 10.12.
752
) 
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This is a very grand perspective. Rather than legitimately elected and appointed 
magistrates administering specific provincia of the res publica, Cicero edges towards 
a res publica that appoints its own heroes to take whatever action required in 
whichever province requires it. Indeed, 
 
Quod si ipsa res publica iudicaret aut si omne ius decretis eius statueretur, 
Antonione an Bruto legiones populi Romani adiudicaret? 
 
If the res publica itself were to judge, or if all rights were determined by its 
decisions, would it judge the legions of the Roman people to Antonius or to 
Brutus? (Cic. Phil. 10.12.) 
 
This is a rhetorical fiction, but it expresses something interesting about the 
conception of res publica developing in these speeches. Cicero’s goal in Phil. 10 was 
to convince the senate (which was still full of Caesarians) that in a situation of at best 
murky legality, and at worst outright illegality, his preferred champions were doing 
the right thing. He evaded the problem by skipping the details, resorting instead to a 
rhetorical personification that ‘holds Macedon, holds Illyria, and safeguards Greece’ 
through its avatars in the region.
753
 The legal status of individuals here matters less 
than their attitude towards the res publica, which Cicero takes it upon himself to 
illumine, and magistrates are subordinate not just to the senate but to the res publica, 
which is free to strip them of their magistracies whenever it pleases, a superficially 
attractive claim, except that (a) it was untrue; and (b) to echo Caesar and misquote 
Margaret Thatcher,
754
 there was no such thing as the Roman res publica. Except as a 
tendentious rhetorical extension, the res publica did not exist in any way that would 
allow it to make such spontaneous decisions (or indeed any other decisions, lacking 
critical decision-making faculties). Traditionally it had magistrates, who took action 
after consultation with the senate and affirmation from the populus in the form of 
voting assemblies. But since the traditional res publica was in flux, Cicero was free 
to remake it in his rhetoric, which elides legal constructs into ‘a more coloured 
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narratio and argumentatio which develop around ethical argument’.755 Stripped of 
colour, the implication is that Cicero adds to the prescriptions of Phil. 1 a firm, not to 
say arbitrary, control over magistrates and military commands; he attributes this 
control rhetorically to the res publica, but in practice presumably assumes that 
decisions will be referred to the consilium of the res publica’s critical decision-
making faculty, which he wants to be the senate. This is a sharp divergence from the 
traditional res publica where honores are the beneficia of the populus. Like the 
adaptation of consular imperium for Phil. 4, it dramatically enlarges the competence 
of the political element entrusted with such decisions – in this case, whichever 
element ended up in control of the res publica. 
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Annos undeviginti natus exercitum privato consilio et privata impensa comparavi, 
per quem rem publicam a dominatione factionis oppressam in libertatem 
vindicavi. 
 
At the age of nineteen years, I raised an army on my private initiative and at my 
private expense, with which I restored the liberty of the res publica, oppressed by 
the domination of a faction. (Aug. RG 1.1.
756
) 
 
The element that eventually ended up in control of the res publica was the wildcard, 
Octavian, the grand-nephew and dubiously adopted son of Julius Caesar. How the 
concept of res publica developed during the triumviral period and under the 
Augustan principate cannot be considered here, but what is relevant for a study on 
the Republican res publica (and has already been foreshadowed by the rhetorical 
relationship Cicero constructed between himself, Pompey and the res publica after 
his exile) is expressed in the opening line of Augustus’s Res Gestae: private 
individuals taking action outside the political structures of Rome’s res publica in 
order to save it. Although Pompey’s reported actions in 58–7 remained within 
standard political and legal practice (he advocated for Cicero’s return, and his 
avocation was so powerful that it had a significant influence on the outcome), this 
was not true of the activities proudly recalled by Augustus at RG 1.1. Furthermore, 
the precedents for privatum consilium in public matters were problematic. My final 
chapter therefore examines the Republican background to Augustus’s claim, starting 
with (6.1) the claim itself and the exemplum that stands behind it, P. Scipio Nasica, 
who was lauded by Cicero as a privatus who acted to keep the res publica salva. The 
interplay between the exemplum of Nasica and that provided by the consul who 
suppressed Gaius Gracchus can be traced in Cicero’s corpus from 63 and the 50s, 
when Cicero came under attack for failing to apply Nasica’s remedy to Clodius. 
Despite Caesar’s demonstration of the dangers of privatum consilium in 49 (6.2), 
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Cicero went on to praise the actions of Octavian and the ‘Liberators’ using the 
language of this tradition (6.3). In doing so, he faced opposition from both opponents 
of war (particularly Q. Fufius Calenus) and his own allies (specifically M. Brutus) 
and was obliged to talk fast when the discourse seemed dangerously close to 
escaping his control (6.4). 
 
6.1 AN ANTHEM OF FORGIVING 
Augustus exploits Republican themes throughout his Res Gestae, a feature of the text 
that is concentrated in its opening sentence, which foregrounds the young Octavian’s 
raising of an army, privato consilio et privata impensa, at the age of nineteen. The 
starting point is therefore the autumn of 44, rather than the aftermath of Caesar’s 
assassination when Octavian had been eighteen, presumably because the credibility 
of Octavian’s claim to have liberated the res publica rested on his military 
intervention against Antony. Velleius Paterculus’s summation, which echoes the Res 
Gestae,
757
 is clear enough: although Antony’s domination was universally resented, 
no one was willing to take action ‘until Gaius Caesar, shortly after his nineteenth 
birthday, with marvellous daring and supreme success, on his private initiative 
(privatum consilium) showed a courage on behalf of the res publica which exceeded 
that of the senate. He summoned his father’s veterans first from Calatia then from 
Casilinum; other veterans followed their example, and in a short time they united to 
form a regular army’.758  By raising an army, Octavian made himself politically 
relevant, but his move was strikingly illegal in two respects: he was too young (the 
entrance of politicians into public life had been subject to regulation since the 
formalisation of the cursus honorum in 180;
759
 Octavian, entering public life at the 
age of nineteen, was too young to have set foot on the lowest rung of the ladder, the 
quaestorship, for which the minimum age was thirty
760
) and he was a private citizen 
with no authorisation to do anything of the sort. 
Rather than the public authorisation that he lacked, Augustus emphasises his 
younger self’s privatum consilium. Given the importance of public consultation and 
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concerted action to conventional political activity, this is awkward; after all, the 
Romans themselves believed there was an etymological link between the title 
‘consul’ and the word consilium.761 There was space for privatum consilium in the 
system: privately a consilium of family members and friends would be convened by 
the paterfamilias in matters involving capital punishment or the manumission of 
slaves;
762
 likewise any prominent Roman was expected to consult his consilium prior 
to taking important decisions, as Tiberius Gracchus did in 133 on the matter of his 
planned legislation and as M. Brutus did in 44 after Caesar’s assassination failed to 
produce the desired results.
763
 Similarly, magistrates were obliged to consult their 
consilia, although here the institution was more formal: the urban and peregrine 
praetors were probably assisted in their official duties by consilia,
764
 provincial 
governors consulted their judicial councils,
765
 a general in the field was obliged to 
consult his consilium (sometimes consilium castrense),
766
 and the role of the senate 
in relation to the magistrates, in particular the consuls,
767
 earned it the occasional 
name of publicum consilium.
768
 A magistrate who sought the consilium of the senate 
(like a paterfamilias who sought the consilium of friends and family) was not 
obliged to accept its advice; however, given the senate’s auctoritas,769 it was usually 
in his interests to gain its approval. On the flipside, people are commonly said to act 
publico consilio (or nullo consilio), where publicum consilium takes on the technical 
aspect of the outcome of senatorial consultation, a motion that lacked legal backing 
(which could only be conferred by a vote of the people) but carried considerable 
auctoritas, being voted on, written down, publicly posted and stored in the treasury 
as the senatus consultum.
770
 An action taken publico consilio has the full weight of 
the civic body behind it;
771
 the lack of publicum consilium delegitimizes 
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actions/actors;
772
 and civic bodies may disclaim responsibility for the actions of 
individuals who work nullo publico consilio.
773
 
Augustus’ claim to have acted privato consilio is therefore obtrusive; it lays 
stress on precisely what his younger self had lacked, the authority of publicum 
consilium and the public office that would have enabled him to gain such consilium 
from the senate. As a private citizen (privatus), Octavian acts on his own instigation 
(consilium); he may seek the advice (consilium) of his personal advisors, but what he 
does not do and, as a privatus, could not have done, is to follow the usual rules of 
Republican politics by convening the senate, requesting their advice (consilium), and 
acting in accordance with publicum consilium as provided in the form of a senatus 
consultum. Instead, RG 1.1 foregrounds the fact that the young Octavian’s actions 
were outside the usual sphere of public action, which enables Augustus to advertise 
the measures that the senate was obliged to take (imperium mihi dedit, RG 1.2) to 
reconcile his actions with the established political framework. He thereby promotes 
his youthful army-raising as an event of such importance that the rules had to be bent 
to accommodate his illegal activities. 
Augustus’s justification for having taken action very much outside the res 
publica is that the res publica had been oppressed by a dominatio factionis: its 
political structures had not been functioning properly and so he had been justified in 
embarking on an unauthorised civil war in order to remove the political blockage, a 
justification accepted and approved by the senate when it belatedly voted him 
imperium. Two sources are generally thought to stand behind Augustus’s formula 
here: Caesar’s self-defence at BC 1.22, with its stress on liberation,774 and Cicero’s 
defence of Octavian’s privatum consilium as a laudable liberation of the res publica 
from Antony in the Third Philippic,
775
 where Cicero had claimed: 
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Qua peste privato consilio rem publicam – neque enim fieri potuit aliter – 
Caesar liberavit: qui nisi in hac re publica natus esset, rem publicam scelere 
Antoni nullam haberemus. 
 
From this scourge Caesar by his private initiative – there was no other way – 
delivered the res publica: had he not been born in this res publica, through 
the criminality of Antonius we would no longer have a res publica. (Cic. 
Phil. 3.5.
776
) 
 
Whereas Julius Caesar had complained about those oppressing the populus Romanus, 
Cicero’s focus is on the oppressed res publica. Caesar’s self-justification has been 
examined above in section 5.2; as for Cicero, however, I want to flag up another 
piece of privatum consilium he praised at about the same time in very similar 
language: 
 
Nec plus Africanus, singularis et vir et imperator, in exscindenda Numantia 
rei publicae profuit quam eodem tempore P. Nasica privatus, cum Ti. 
Gracchum interemit.  
 
Nor did Africanus, though a great man and a soldier of extraordinary ability, 
do more for the res publica by destroying Numantia than was done at the 
same time by the private citizen Publius Nasica, when he killed Tiberius 
Gracchus. (Cic. Off. 1.76.
777
) 
 
There was a precedent for taking action outside the res publica in order to save the 
res publica – or, at least, P. Scipio Nasica’s murder of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (the 
original ‘sporadic anticipation of imminent danger’ and the first time res publica 
salva can be seen to spring up as a nervous catchphrase, discussed above in section 
3.1) could be pressed into action as such a precedent. 
In his 1972 review of the scholarship on Tiberius Gracchus’s tribunate, 
Badian observes that ‘It is becoming increasingly difficult to give an exhaustive 
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survey of work even in a tiny corner of our field’,778 and the challenge has not 
become easier since then. All the same, a brief survey of the various opinions on just 
what precedents the year 133 did set may be useful. Passing over Tiberius’s earlier 
history,
779
 the question of whether he aimed ‘to redress social misery’780 or was 
principally concerned with the crisis in military recruitment,
781
 the eminence and 
significance of such supporters as the consul Scaevola and Appius Claudius, 
princeps senatus,
782
 and finally the arguments that putting legislation straight to the 
concilium plebis was a strikingly radical move
783
 or that Tiberius should have 
expected to meet with a veto from a fellow tribune,
784
 the key points remaining are 
the deposition of his colleague Marcus Octavius, the acquisition of Pergamum, the 
legality of iterating the tribunate and Tiberius’s violent end. Two basic positions can 
be discerned for most of these issues: (a) the ‘context’ view: Tiberius’ tribunate, 
viewed in its historical context, was the explosive culmination of existing trends; it 
focused and refined them into the turbulent future that resulted;
785
 and (b) the 
‘departure’ view: Tiberius’ tribunate broke wholly with and was a complete 
departure from all existing precedent.
786
 
Traditionally, the deposition of Octavius was interpreted as the destruction of 
the tribunician veto (supposedly a key tool enabling the senate to maintain its pre-
eminence), thereby unleashing the forces of demagogy upon an unsuspecting and 
hitherto satisfactorily (i.e. senatorially) managed res publica.
787
 Slightly more 
recently, it has been argued that the deposition of Octavius departed drastically from 
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both established constitutional precedent and legality, and that ‘whatever else 
Tiberius did, the deposition of M. Octavius was the crucial, the unpardonable, 
mistake’: after the deposition, his inimici were watching eagle-eyed for him to trip 
up.
788
 In contrast, Astin’s contextualisation of the deposition by reference to 
contemporary political behaviour, specifically the dubiously legal career of Scipio 
Aemilianus, leads him to argue that ‘if the Populus could in effect override electoral 
regulations, it could certainly take action which was not explicitly in conflict with 
any law, even though it was contrary to the mos maiorum; and at the same time these 
events had propagated the notion that the Populus had the right to have whomsoever 
it wished in office’.789 Badian likewise notes among other things the failure of the 
other tribunes to veto Octavius’s deposition and suggests that they thought ‘Octavius 
had been in the wrong to persist in his veto, and certainly that, when it came to his 
own peril, the People must be allowed to decide’. 790  Badian takes Tiberius’s 
justification of his action against Octavius
791
 to show Tiberius thought it was 
impermissible to use the veto in the popular assemblies, because that prevented the 
people from exercising their power of decision, and suggests that ‘what evidence we 
have makes it likely that this, with some qualifications, was part of the conventions 
of concordia during the Classical Republic’.792 However, the view of Octavius’s 
deposition as a major departure from contemporary custom has been developed by 
those who hold that the deposition was a violation of Octavius’s tribunician 
sacrosanctitas that could be used (whether at the time or after the event) to justify 
Tiberius’s violent death. The case is put most vividly by Linderski, who 
characterises the encounter as ‘one tribune claiming the will of the people, the other 
the protection of the gods, of his sacrosancta potestas. The will of the people 
prevailed, for a moment, but after that time nothing remained in Rome safe, sacred 
or secure – as Tiberius was soon to learn’.793 
On a ‘departure’ account, then, Tiberius’s tribunate is usually viewed as a 
grotesque and unprecedented violation of established principle from the deposition 
of Octavius onwards. Proponents of a more contextual approach, on the other hand, 
tend to place more weight on the annexation of Pergamum; so Astin and Badian 
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stress the importance of Tiberius’s disruption of senatorial control over public 
finances and foreign affairs in order to fund legislation that the senate had 
deliberately snubbed. Although ‘seen in its context, it certainly was not intended as a 
revolutionary step, a conscious attack on the senate as such’,794 all the same, this 
startling violation of senatorial privileges was asking for trouble. So for Badian, 
while deposing Octavius might have been considered ‘a legitimate reaction to an 
impossible situation’, this was not true of Tiberius’s solution to his financial woes: 
even if Tiberius could not hope to get his funding legitimately (and he probably 
could not), he had not even tried; and his pronounced failure to proceed by the usual 
channels of consensus politics was compounded by his exploitation of inherited 
Pergameme clientelae ‘to seize this vast treasure left to Rome; to seize it, practically, 
for himself and then distribute it to the People, in some form, as his personal bounty’ 
– behaviour reminiscent of a would-be tyrant.795 Worse still, Tiberius’s failure to 
respect the will’s stipulation of freedom for the cities involved Rome in the revolt of 
Aristonicus.
796
 After Pergamum’s annexation, therefore, while Astin can compare 
Tiberius’s attempt to stand a second time for the tribunate with the dubious elections 
of Nasica Corculum to the censorship and consulship within the ten-year limit, or 
Scipio Aemilianus’s exemption (twice) from the lex Villia annalis,797 the legality of 
iterating the tribunate may be only of tangential relevance. In the broader historical 
context, such politicians as Nasica Corculum and Scipio Aemilianus had proven that 
the laws were negotiable given sufficient popular support; in the immediate political 
context, however, Tiberius’s canvass for a second tribunate could be interpreted in 
the worst possible way by an already hostile senate and his earlier actions could be 
cast in a much nastier light in hindsight.
798
 So Badian adds to the destruction of 
collegiality (Octavius’s deposition) and Tiberius’s tyrannical affectations (the 
Pergameme bequest, the acquisition of a bodyguard) the intended destruction of 
annual tenure (iteration of the tribunate), and concludes that ‘Regnum, in this sense, 
was not a mere term of abuse or a slogan’; rather, it ‘was a reflection of a genuine 
and deep-seated fear’.799 
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All this sets the scene for the moment when Rome’s political consensus was 
ruptured beyond any precedent, legendary would-be-tyrant killers such as Servilius 
Ahala aside: Tiberius’s untimely and violent death. At this point, the convenient 
context/departure dichotomy breaks down; it is generally agreed that the death set a 
new and horrible precedent for political conduct in Rome. Five positions on said new 
and horrible precedent can be identified, however. (1) First, and most 
straightforwardly, that the death of Tiberius Gracchus and some three hundred 
supporters at the hands of a senatorial mob led by Scipio Nasica was a chaotic 
mess,
800
 to which may be added Astin’s argument that the slaughter was 
unpremeditated, although after the event neither side had an interest in admitting 
this; premeditated slaughter was a useful charge for the Gracchans against their 
opponents, who could only plausibly justify their actions (which had really aimed to 
break up the assembly and thereby prevent Tiberius from being re-elected) by 
pretending that they had behaved in an appropriately thoughtful and consensual 
fashion.
801
 (2) That in addition to this, the arrangement of Nasica’s toga as reported 
by Plutarch and Appian (draped over his head, possibly in the sacrificial cinctus 
Gabinus dress) had vaguely religious connotations, since the privatus Nasica’s claim 
to authority could only be his position as pontifex maximus.
802
 (3) That the religious 
connotations were clear and distinct, although there is no consensus among those 
who hold this view as to what those connotations were. For Earl, the arrangement of 
Nasica’s toga indicates that Tiberius was being offered up for sacrifice; 803  he 
explains its ‘obliteration’ from the Latin tradition and replacement with a ‘military 
interpretation’ on the rather dubious grounds that Nasica’s claim was untenable and 
could not be allowed to set a precedent.
804
 For Linderski, a particularly eloquent 
proponent of this line of argument, Tiberius was not offered up as a sacrifice;
805
 
rather, Nasica covered his head for the archaic consecratio capitis rite: ‘when Nasica 
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displayed the purple border on his veiled head this was a striking arrangement: he 
was loudly proclaiming that he, the pontifex maximus, was proceeding to consecrate 
Tiberius and his followers to the wrath of the gods. The old religious and public 
regulations of the Republic, the leges sacratae, prescribed that the heads of those 
who attempted to establish tyranny (adfectio regni), and of those who injured the 
tribunes of the plebs, be forfeited to Jupiter, the guarantor of the constitution. And 
who was better qualified to pronounce the curse than the pontifex maximus’?806 (4) A 
corollary to the third view, building primarily on the arguments of Spaeth and 
Linderski: since Nasica (it is argued) claimed the authority of his religious office to 
take action against Tiberius on religious grounds, the murder must have been 
premeditated even before the senatorial meeting took place. So for Flower, ‘these 
deaths were deliberately caused by Nasica, who went to the senate that day with a 
plan he intended to put into action, and surely also with some accomplices who were 
fully aware of the plan. Should Scaevola fail to take the lead against Tiberius – and 
even that cannot itself have been completely unexpected in senatorial circles – 
Nasica had every intention of intervening’.807 (5) Lastly, and to some extent reacting 
against views (2) – (4), Wiseman argues that Nasica’s actions were purely political. 
Contra Linderski (and following Badian), the constitutional impropriety was 
Octavius’ veto; if Nasica justified his actions at all by reference to Octavius’s 
wounded sacrosanctitas, his was probably a minority viewpoint.
808
 It is unwise to 
place much, if any, faith in the authenticity of the leges sacratae, which were 
supposedly enacted very early in the history of the Republic and which belong to a 
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historiographical tradition demonstrably subject to reworking;
809
 and finally (the 
‘fatal’ objection), any ritualistic implications are totally absent from Cicero’s 
speeches and writings: for Cicero, ‘Gracchus’ crime was political, and Nasica 
punished him for it not as a pontifex but as a private citizen’, a view Wiseman thinks 
may reasonably be taken as ‘evidence for an optimate way of thinking that had 
hardly changed since the time of the event itself’.810 It is implicit in Wiseman’s 
analysis that the slaughter was premeditated: ‘the rich unilaterally defined legislation 
against their financial interests as “seeking to reign”, an act that must activate the 
oath sworn after the expulsion of Tarquin’.811 
No matter how the events of 133 are explained, the year’s broader 
significance is undisputed. For ancient authors such as Appian, Tiberius’s death 
sparked the troubles that threw the Republic into disarray and eventually brought 
Augustus to sole power: after the (legendary) Coriolanus, ‘the sword was never 
carried into the assembly, and there was no civil butchery until Tiberius Gracchus, 
while serving as tribune and bringing forward new laws, was the first to fall a victim 
to internal commotion’.812 Similarly, for Last the tribunate ‘opens a new epoch in the 
affairs of Rome’,813 while Stockton likens the ‘chief themes’ of the years dominated 
by Tiberius and his brother Gaius to ‘the leading motifs in the first movement of a 
Sibelius symphony, stated there only to be worked out fully in those that follow’.814 
When Cicero came down on Nasica’s side, in any case, it was a strategic choice 
rather than a necessary or inevitable rhetorical move, since the anti-Gracchan 
position was not the only option available.
815
 In fact, the pro-Gracchan tradition was 
a strong one, as the Rhetorica ad Herennium shows.
816
 It supplies a vivid account of 
Tiberius Gracchus’s death in which Tiberius features as a martyred hero; his killer, 
Scipio Nasica, is ‘filled with wicked and criminal designs (scelere et malis 
cogitationibus)’ and appears on the scene ‘in a sweat, with eyes blazing, hair 
bristling, toga awry (sudans, oculis ardentibus, erecto capillo, contorta toga)… 
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frothing crime from his mouth, breathing forth cruelty from the depth of his lungs 
(spumans ex ore scelus, anhelans ex infimo pectore crudelitatem, contorquet 
brachium)’. After the death, Nasica is ‘bespattered with the pitiable blood of the 
bravest of men (iste viri fortissimi miserando sanguine asperses), looks about him as 
if he had done a most admirable deed (quasi facinus praeclarissimum fecisset), gaily 
extends his murderous hand to his followers as they congratulate him (hilare 
sceleratam gratulantibus manum porrigens), and betakes himself to the temple of 
Jupiter.’817 Such rhetoric was available to anyone who wanted to ingratiate himself 
with the populus, not just to confirmed populares; in his early career, Cicero had 
cited Gaius Gracchus as ‘in my opinion, by far the ablest and most eloquent 
(ingeniosissimi atque eloquentissimi) of our fellow-countrymen’, even though his 
point concerned Gaius’s unjustly attacked opponent Piso Frugi.818  It is therefore 
noteworthy that Cicero turned to Nasica’s exemplum during and after the Catilinarian 
crisis, not least given that Nasica was hardly feted as a hero in the aftermath: even 
though the pontifex maximus was supposed to remain in Italy, the death of Tiberius 
Gracchus made him so unpopular that he left the country and eventually died in 
Pergamum.
819
 
Since Publius Mucius Scaevola, the consul of 133, had declined to sign up to 
Nasica’s call for all good men to preserve the res publica from harm, Nasica could 
claim no public backing for his lynching spree; it was unarguable that Tiberius 
Sempronius Gracchus was killed by a political privatus acting privato consilio, 
whatever Nasica’s religious office and for all that Nasica and his supporters (then 
and later) claimed action had been taken on the res publica’s behalf. A decade later, 
the resort to violence against Gaius Gracchus, Fulvius Flaccus and their supporters 
was not left to a privatus but was carried out by L. Opimius, one of the consuls of 
121, and sanctioned by the senate through the SCU.
820
 The distinction between 
privatum consilium and senatorially sanctioned homicide is clear from the different 
uses Cicero makes of these exempla from the very start of the Catilinarians, where 
Nasica is invoked as a negative foil (Cat. 1.3). For Cicero as consul, faced with an 
arch-nemesis in the form of Catiline and a handicap in the form of a reluctant 
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colleague and a doubting senate,
821
 the privatus discourse was secondary at best. 
Consequently, the more significant historical touchstone of the Catilinarians is 
Lucius Opimius,
822
 while the inbuilt contradictions of the First Catilinarian
823
 allow 
Cicero to use the heroic privatus Nasica as a foil for the actions of such decisive 
consuls and so establish a sharp contrast: 
 
An vero vir amplissimus, P. Scipio, pontifex maximus, Ti. Gracchum 
mediocriter labefactantem statum rei publicae privatus interfecit: Catilinam 
orbem terrae caede atque incendiis vastare cupientem nos consules 
perferemus?  
 
Publius Scipio, a man of distinction and the pontifex maximus, was a private 
citizen when he killed Tiberius Gracchus even though he was not seriously 
undermining the condition of the res publica. Shall we, the consuls, then 
tolerate Catiline whose aim is to carry fire and the sword throughout the 
whole world? (Cic. Cat. 1.3.
824
) 
 
Nasica killed Tiberius Gracchus, a minor nuisance, even though Nasica was only a 
private citizen and Tiberius a sacrosanct tribune. Cicero and Antonius Hybrida are in 
possession of consular office and the SCU, so how much more secure should they 
feel in acting against Catiline, who wants to destroy the world? This striking 
collection of contrasting pairs has drawn attention since Quintilian, who isolates the 
comparison of Catiline with Gracchus, the res publica with the orbem terrae, a 
slightly rocked boat with slaughter, fire and devastation, and finally a private citizen 
(Nasica) with the consuls (Cicero and Antonius Hybrida).
825
 Opening with Nasica 
indicates Nasica’s commanding position in the tradition of justifiable political 
murder (and Tiberius Gracchus’s corresponding position in the victim stakes), but 
the stress is on the possession of office and senatus consultum, which Cicero goes on 
to claim gives the consuls everything they need to act except the will to do so.
826
 
Nasica the heroic privatus really serves as a backdrop for the heroic consuls who 
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followed him and who disposed of seditious citizens not on their private initiative, 
but (as Cicero and Antonius will do, if they will only take action) with the full 
support of the senate’s auctoritas: 
 
Decrevit quondam senatus uti L. Opimius consul videret ne quid res publica 
detrimenti caperet: nox nulla intercessit: interfectus est propter quasdam 
seditionum suspiciones C. Gracchus, clarissimo patre, avo, maioribus, 
occisus est cum liberis M. Fulvius consularis. Simili senatus consulto C. 
Mario et L. Valerio consulibus est permissa res publica: num unum diem 
postea L. Saturninum tribunum plebis et C. Servilium praetorem mors ac rei 
publicae poena remorata est? At vero nos vicesimum iam diem patimur 
hebescere aciem horum auctoritatis. Habemus enim eius modi senatus 
consultum, verum inclusum in tabulis, tamquam in vagina reconditum, quo ex 
senatus consulto confestim te interfectum esse, Catilina, convenit. 
 
Once the senate passed a decree that the consul Lucius Opimius should see 
that the res publica came to no harm: not a single night intervened: Gaius 
Gracchus, for all the distinction of his father, grandfather and ancestors, was 
killed on vague suspicions of sedition; Marcus Fulvius, an ex-consul, was 
killed together with his children. A similar decree of the senate entrusted the 
res publica to the consuls, Gaius Marius and Lucius Valerius: did the tribune 
of the plebs, Lucius Saturninus, and the praetor, Gaius Servilius, have to wait 
a single day for the death penalty imposed by the senate? For twenty days 
now we have been allowing the edge of the senate’s authority to grow blunt. 
We have a decree of the senate like theirs, but it is locked up with the records 
like a sword buried in its sheath; yet it is a decree under which you, Catiline, 
ought to have been executed immediately. (Cic. Cat. 1.4.) 
 
When the senate had issued the SCU in the past, the incumbent consuls moved 
against the offending persons at once, no matter how eminent the victim. The 
consuls thereby executed the will of the senate. Cicero and his fellow consul have an 
SCU but have taken no action against Catiline; this inaction undermines the senate’s 
auctoritas and should be remedied as soon as possible. Political assassination is 
justified on this account by publicum consilium, the possession of office and the 
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support of senatorial auctoritas, which must be upheld by treating and using the SCU 
as a weapon against a specific individual, in this case Catiline. This passage offers a 
convenient schematic for the relationship between private heroics (Nasica’s murder 
of Tiberius Gracchus) and senatorially sanctioned homicide (L. Opimius, the SCU 
and Gaius Gracchus). Nasica is separated off from the list of heroic consuls, since as 
a privatus he stands in a different relationship to the sticky issue of political 
assassination, but he is nonetheless the first in the list of exempla relevant to Cicero’s 
campaign against Catiline, since he is the first person in historical (rather than 
legendary, hence illa nimis antiqua examples Cicero passes over) Roman memory to 
have resorted to violence to suppress a turbulent citizen. And it is precisely because 
he is a privatus that he exemplifies how swiftly and decisively great men had acted 
in the past, compared to the hesitant consuls of the modern era.
827
 
Cicero’s citation of Scipio Nasica in the Catilinarians invokes the ideology 
of the privatus who steps forwards to safeguard the endangered state, as Béranger 
argues,
828
 but it should be noted that this was not the point of the Catilinarians 
(Cicero was not a privatus and would not have thanked any privatus who stepped up 
at to steal his thunder), and moreover that Cicero’s rhetorical aims changed over the 
course of the corpus. His point at Cat. 1.3 was to justify the hypothetical use of 
senatorially sanctioned violence against Catiline, which never happened, or at least 
never happened in quite this way, since Catiline was declared a hostis only after it 
became known he had joined Manlius and then fell in battle. The senatorially 
sanctioned suppression of citizens that did take place in 63 involved the ‘Catilinarian 
Conspirators’ arrested inside the city after Catiline’s flight, who were cleanly and 
illegally strangled in the Tullianum rather than bludgeoned to death in the forum.
829
 
It was these deaths that Cicero eventually had to justify, and his defence rested on a 
much more straightforward claim than anything involving Nasica or heroic privati: 
his consular office and the collective responsibility of the senate, expressed in the 
form of the senatus consultum ultimum. As long as Cicero occupied a public office, 
the privatus Scipio Nasica’s action against Tiberius Gracchus was not a directly 
relevant exemplum and therefore appears only as an a fortiori argument for Cicero’s 
much stronger position during this much more terrifying time. The crisis was still 
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underway when Cicero declared in the Pro Murena that ‘if only the res publica is 
furnished with its proper means of defence, all these plans, so long contrived, will 
easily be crushed by the measures taken by the magistrates and the watchful care of 
private citizens (et magistratuum consiliis et privatorum diligentia)’. 830  Here 
consilium belongs to the magistrates; privati are required only to be diligentes. As 
long as Cicero was consul, in possession of legitimate imperium and also, thanks to 
the SCU and the senate’s vote for the execution of the conspirators, publicum 
consilium, there was no need to resort to the figure of the heroic privatus except in 
the general context of actions taken against dangerous (that is, popularis) figures. 
Cicero’s most important historical referents for his consular activities were those of 
his predecessors in the consulship who had broken the law backed by an SCU: 
Lucius Opimius and those who followed him. 
The strength of the parallel with L. Opimius is clear from Cicero’s speeches 
of the 50s. Opimius, like Cicero, had eventually gone into exile, even though 
Opimius’s condemnation in 110 was unrelated to his action against Gaius 
Gracchus.
831
 Scipio Nasica had died in Pergamum, despite the religious restrictions 
on the pontifex maximus that should have confined him to Italy,
832
 but it is Opimius 
who features in the Pro Sestio as the sole example of a statesman who came to an 
unhappy end after earning general gratitude.
833
 Elsewhere, although Nasica is 
referenced positively in passing at Pro Plancio 51, where Cicero holds that ‘the state 
has had no more gallant citizen’, overall he takes second place to Opimius and other 
such brave consuls. The prosecutor Cassius had raised the topic of Opimius,
834
 
perhaps unwisely, since this gave Cicero a chance to dwell at length on the very sad 
story of a man whose conviction should be considered a disgrace to res publica, 
imperium and the populus Romanus rather than iudicium: 
 
quam enim illi iudices, si iudices et non parricidae patriae nominandi sunt, 
graviorem potuerunt rei publicae infligere securim quam cum illum e civitate 
eiecerunt qui praetor finitimo, consul domestico bello rem publicam liberarat? 
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what deadlier blow could those judges, if judges they are to be called, and not 
rather unnatural children of their fatherland, have inflicted upon the res 
publica, than to eject from the citizen body the man who as praetor had 
liberated the res publica from war with a neighbouring people and as consul 
from civil war? (Cic. Planc. 70.) 
 
There is an interesting elision here between Opimius’s consulship and exile: even 
though Opimius earned his condemnation on an unrelated charge of repetundae, 
Cicero relates his exile to his services to the res publica during his troubled 
consulship.
835
 His focus is on the unfairness of the iudices for condemning a 
consularis who had saved his country as a consul and praetor, even though 
Opimius’s earlier actions were technically unrelated to the charge at hand. Opimius’s 
consulship, it seems, was so glorious that it should have given him a blank cheque 
for the future – either that or someone so heroic could never have been guilty of any 
capital charge.
836
 
Cicero, then, relied on the tradition of senatorially sanctioned homicide to 
justify his consular actions. The self-help tradition associated with Nasica, on the 
other hand, was not only little use to Cicero but seems to have been used against him 
during this period. A letter from Cicero to his brother Quintus, written at some point 
between 25 October and 10 December 59, survives in which Cicero anticipates 
problems with Clodius and expresses his willingness to use force. People have been 
offering their support and Cicero is confident that he will win: 
 
Sed tamen se res sic habet: si diem nobis dixerit, tota Italia concurret, ut 
multiplicata gloria discedamus; sin autem vi agere conabitur, spero fore 
studiis non solum amicorum sed etiam alienorum ut vi resistamus. Omnes et 
se et suos amicos, clientis, libertos, servos, pecunias denique suas pollicentur. 
 
Anyway, this is how things stand: if Clodius takes me to court, all Italy will 
rally and I shall come out of it with much additional glory; if he tries force, I 
trust to oppose him with force, supported not only by my friends but by 
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outsiders as well. Everyone is pledging himself and his friends, dependents, 
freedmen, slaves, even money. (Cic. Q. fr. 1.2.16.) 
 
Whether the prospect of direct (violent) action against Clodius was realistic is not the 
point; rather, for all Cicero’s claims, nothing came of it. The option of resistance was 
flagged up and then abandoned. Pompey’s excuse for not acting, at least as reported 
after the event in Cicero’s invective against L. Calpurnius Piso, is telling: Pompey 
himself said that he ‘did not wish to match himself against an armed tribune of the 
people without publicum consilium; but should the consuls act upon a decree of the 
senate and defend the res publica, then he would take up arms’.837 Cicero depicts 
Pompey as willing to follow a consul playing Opimius or Marius, but declining to 
play Nasica. Nasica’s exemplum had been vital to the justification of political murder 
since Tiberius Gracchus’s death, and he remained a powerful element of the 
discourse, but his successors did their best to keep within a legalised (if not exactly 
legal) framework by seeking senatorial approval of their actions. Cicero’s Pompey 
refuses to step outside that framework and in the end Cicero himself was not willing 
(or lacked the support) to do so either. Nonetheless the model of Nasica remained as 
a counterfactual precedent: Cicero might have acted so, but did not. Cicero was left 
vulnerable to those of his supporters who felt betrayed (or just felt able to use the 
accusation of treachery against him) by his decision not to stand up to Clodius’s 
turbulence, as his repeated and elaborate justifications in the following years show. 
Cicero’s most explicit explication of his flight into exile appears in the Pro 
Sestio of 56 and the Pro Plancio of 53. In 57, P. Sestius had been a tribune and one 
of Cicero’s supporters; he was charged with vis in connection with the events of that 
year and Cicero volunteered to defend him out of gratitude for Sestius’s efforts on 
his behalf. The Pro Sestio is based on a lengthy exhumation of recent political 
history and contemporary woes, since Cicero’s strategy was to argue that everything 
Sestius did was done on his behalf and therefore on behalf of the res publica.
838
 As 
part of this strategy involved the outright slandering of the consuls for that year, 
whom Cicero accused of having given way to Clodius and thereby permitted 
Cicero’s exile, the year is depicted as one in which the elected magistrates (unworthy 
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even to be called consuls
839
) had failed utterly to defend the public interest.
840
 
Cicero’s recap of the events of his consulship lays stress on collective responsibility; 
in office, his measures had been 
 
quarum non unus auctor sed dux omnium voluntatis fuissem, quaeque non 
modo ad singularem meam gloriam sed ad communem salutem omnium 
civium et prope gentium pertinerent; ea condicione gesseram ut meum 
factum semper omnes praestare tuerique deberent. 
 
not grounded on my sole authority, but I had carried out the general will; they 
not only concerned my personal glory, but the general welfare of all citizens, 
I might say of all peoples; in carrying them out I fully expected that all men 
would make it a duty always to uphold and defend what I had done. (Cic. 
Sest. 38.
841
) 
 
Cicero channelled the general will, omnium voluntas, in order to safeguard all (good) 
citizens. Because he did only what everyone wanted, he had expected everyone to 
support his actions. Unfortunately, the opposition of 58 was utterly barbarous: so 
what, Cicero asks, could he have done? ‘Was I, a private individual, to contend with 
arms against a tribune of the plebs (contenderem contra tribunum pl. privatus 
armis)?’842 That is, did people seriously think he should have followed the example 
of the privatus Scipio Nasica against the tribune Tiberius Gracchus? Granted, the 
right side would have won, but who would take responsibility for the aftermath? ‘In 
short, who could doubt that the blood of a tribune, especially if shed without public 
authority (nullo praesertim publico consilio profusus), would find avengers and 
defenders in the consuls?’843 Not only did a private citizen have no business taking 
up arms against a tribune of the plebs, but doing so could only have ended badly, 
lacking consular support. The consuls of 58 were scoundrels who would have rushed 
to arms to defend the tribune (or, indeed, public order and legal proprieties).
844
 Even 
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victory would have been pitiful: ‘but they were citizens, but it would have been by 
that private citizen who even as consul had saved the res publica without arms!’845 
By emphasising that his consular salvation of the res publica had been carried out 
sine armis, Cicero rises above the standard consul’s claim to military gloria and 
makes this heroic pacifism a standard from which military action as a privatus (on 
the Nasican model) would only detract. For good measure, he lays stress on his 
opponents’ status as fellow citizens, something that had not deterred him from 
executing the Catilinarian conspirators. The counterpart to this depiction of a bitter 
victory is a defeat that would have left the res publica to be possessed by slaves.
846
 
This was unthinkable. Cicero had therefore gone into exile for the common good.
847
 
There had been privatum consilium action going on that year, however: 
 
Hic subito cum incredibilis in Capitolium multitudo ex tota urbe cunctaque 
Italia convenisset, vestem mutandam omnes meque iam omni ratione, privato 
consilio, quoniam publicis ducibus res publica careret, defendendum 
putarunt.  
 
And then, straightaway, when an amazing throng had assembled on the 
Capitol from the whole city and from the whole of Italy, all deemed it their 
duty to put on mourning, and to defend me also in every possible way, by 
private initiative, since the res publica had lost its public leaders. (Cic. Sest. 
26.) 
 
That is, the consuls had refused to put the matter of Cicero’s recall before the 
senate.
848
 This supports their characterisation as bad men unwilling to sign up to 
senatorial auctoritas, an emphasis that covers up both their limited options for 
dealing with a tribune and the inactivity of everyone else, especially Clodius’s nine 
allegedly pro-Ciceronian colleagues and Gabinius’s patron Pompey.849 The action 
taken here is uncontroversial, especially compared with political murder or raising 
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private armies, and the point is to stress the unanimous, spontaneous support offered 
to Cicero by private individuals. This is picked up in the following section: 
 
Quid enim quisquam potest ex omni memoria sumere inlustrius quam pro 
uno civi et bonos omnis privato consensu et universum senatum publico 
consilio mutasse vestem?  
 
For what greater distinction can anyone choose out of all the history of the 
past than that, to save one citizen, all good men personally by common 
consent, and the whole senate by public resolution, put on mourning? (Cic. 
Sest. 27.) 
 
The unofficial privatum consilium that mourning clothing should be donned mutates 
into official publicum consilium, once the senate has finally been able to meet.
850
 
While the privatum consensum of (privati) boni omnes is acknowledged, it is capped 
by the publicum consilium of the whole senate, against which the consuls are said to 
have reacted.
851
 A similar account appears in the In Pisonem, where Cicero argues 
that it would have been unbearably cruel for Piso to have forbidden the senators to 
wear mourning per interdicta potestatis even if they had done so ‘not by official 
resolution but out of private duty or compassion (non publico consilio… sed privato 
officio aut misericordia)’.852 Again, the stress lies on official public action. In the 
absence of a senatorial resolution, the changing of clothes would have been only a 
privatum officium; but since that resolution was passed, it was publicum consilium, 
so Piso’s attempt to thwart the general mourning is not just intolerable cruelty but 
something that no barbarian tyrant ever did.
853
 Notably, publicum consilium is 
contrasted to privatum officium; privatum consilium has dropped out of the rhetoric, 
since in this speech Cicero elides the details set out in the Pro Sestio. The important 
point is that the senate issued publicum consilium to the effect that senators should 
don mourning clothes and that Piso intervened on the basis of his consular authority 
to prevent this. How this stand-off was reached is not particularly important to the 
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point Cicero wants to make, which is that Piso was a bad and profoundly un-Roman 
consul. 
After his exile, then, Cicero emphasises his lack of public office and the 
potentially terrible consequences of winning or losing in order to justify his failure to 
act on the will to violence expressed in Q. fr. 1.2, as he might have been expected to 
do had Clodius really been the horror and scourge of the res publica that Cicero 
describes. In effect, Cicero makes the legal and ethical argument against the privatus 
heroics of Scipio Nasica. This is explicit in De Domo Sua, where Cicero stresses that 
his failure to act does not reflect a negative opinion of Nasica’s action: 
 
Sed publicam causam contra vim armatam sine populi praesidio suscipere 
nolui: non quo mihi P. Scipionis, fortissimi viri, vis in Ti. Graccho privati 
hominis displiceret, sed Scipionis factum statim P. Mucius consul, qui in 
gerenda putabatur fuisse segnior, gesta multis senatus consultis non modo 
defendit, sed etiam ornavit: mihi aut te interfecto cum consulibus aut te vivo 
et tecum et cum illis armis decertandum fuit. 
 
But without a bodyguard of the people I was reluctant to undertake the 
people’s cause against armed lawlessness; not that I disapproved of the 
violence employed against Tiberius Gracchus by Publius Scipio, the bravest 
of men, when he acted in a private capacity; on that occasion Publius Mucius 
the consul, who was considered to have been somewhat lacking in energy 
when the deed was in contemplation, when it had been accomplished 
immediately defended Scipio’s action by several decrees in the senate, and 
even complimented him upon it; but in my case I had the prospect of an 
armed struggle with the consuls had you been slain, or, had you survived, 
with you and them combined. (Cic. Dom. 91.) 
 
A discussion of vis committed in the publica causa raised the spectre of Nasica; 
careful footwork on Cicero’s part was therefore required to lay the ghost to rest. 
Cicero was obliged to justify his failure to follow Nasica’s example without 
denigrating it, since Nasica was too important an exemplum to wipe out of the 
tradition and could not be made into the villain of the tale. The consuls again become 
Cicero’s scapegoats. Nasica, in this iteration of the tale, had been energetically 
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supported after the event by Mucius Scaevola, the previously languid consul; Cicero, 
however, would have had to face up against the consuls in the event that Clodius had 
been slain, or against Clodius and the consuls together if Clodius had survived. 
It is not clear whether Cicero had the option of avoiding Nasica or whether he 
was forced to engage with the exemplum, either because someone else had raised the 
parallel or because leaving it unspoken would have left it to be exploited by other 
people. Either way, Cicero uses the same themes in the Pro Plancio of 53. Once 
again, he makes heavy weather of his own career and his debts to his client, in court 
on a charge of ambitus: the prosecution, he says, claims (a) that Plancius’s services 
were less significant than Cicero is making out and (b) that however important they 
were, they should not weigh with the jury.
854
 Cicero has to defend both counts, hence 
the prominence of his exile; moreover his friend Laterensis, a disappointed candidate 
and one of the prosecutors, accuses him of having abandoned his supporters by 
going into exile, rather than standing his ground in Rome.
855
 Another recap of the 
events that led to Cicero’s exile therefore features at Pro Plancio 86–90. Cicero 
argues that Clodius had the (evil) consuls onside; that the (supportive) senate, 
equestrian order and all of Italy was cowed; and that standing up for himself would 
have meant a recourse to arms and civil war, which he would not allow. As glorious 
as a victory over Clodius would have been, it would only have been the precursor to 
a worse conflict, as long as the consuls supported Clodius: 
 
Ubi enim mihi praesto fuissent aut tam fortes consules quam L. Opimius, 
quam C. Marius, quam L. Flaccus, quibus ducibus improbos cives res 
publica vicit armatis, aut, si minus fortes, at tamen tam iusti quam P. Mucius, 
qui arma quae privatus P. Scipio ceperat, ea Ti. Graccho interempto iure 
optimo sumpta esse defendit? 
 
For where could I have found at hand to help me consuls as brave as Lucius 
Opimius, Gaius Marius, or Lucius Flaccus, under whose armed leadership the 
res publica quelled traitorous citizens, or, if brave men were lacking, consuls 
so upright as Publius Mucius, who proved that Publius Scipio, though a 
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private citizen, was amply justified in his resort to arms by his destruction of 
Tiberius Gracchus? (Cic. Planc. 88.) 
 
The line of the Pro Sestio is resumed, but now the various senatorial heroes of the 
past make an explicit appearance: Cicero could not count on consular backing, as 
could Nasica, and had no authority of his own, as had Opimius and Cicero himself 
during his own consulship; therefore, rather than resorting to civil war, he fled.
856
 It 
is noticeable that the consul Scaevola’s role in the Gracchan debacle and its 
aftermath inflates as the decade draws on, rather dubiously in the context of 
Scaevola’s express refusal to take action, his previous Gracchan sympathies and 
Nasica’s accusation (witty or not) that Scaevola was prejudiced against him at his 
trial.
857
 Cicero’s attempts to press Scaevola into service against Gabinius and Piso as 
a shining counter-example of a virtuous consul require a rather awkward historical 
distortion to cover the fact that Scaevola had not supported Nasica’s initial call to 
arms. In general, in any case, resorting to arms in the absence of public authority is 
cast in a poor light whether the battle is won or lost.
858
 For all Cicero’s protestations, 
it seems his opponents on the senatorial end of the political spectrum were exploiting 
the charge of cowardice to which Cicero’s preferred version of his exile made him 
vulnerable.
859
 
 
6.2 LIVING WITH DEFEAT 
The conversation of the 50s was very flexible, but it was also largely hypothetical (if 
you had done this, why didn’t you do this, I didn’t do this because…). Furthermore, 
although the privatum consilium tradition was eventually used to justify civil war 
activities, it originated as something rather different: a justification of political 
murder that developed as the result of and in order to legitimise an illegal act after 
the event, rather than as a way to lever privati into positions that they were not 
technically qualified to hold. Whatever significance was attached to Scipio Nasica’s 
name, no one was at any time eager to elevate private persons to positions of public 
authority. Thus in November 51, Caelius Rufus reported to Cicero in Cilicia that 
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although there was general concern about the recent news of a Parthian crossing, no 
one was willing to see privati appointed by senatorial decree to deal with the 
problem.
860
 Such elevations happened anyway, of course, and were usually justified 
by reference to the enormity of the situation and the relevant privatus’s unique 
qualities, such qualities usually belonging to Pompey to a positively astounding 
degree: so, notoriously, the panegyric embedded in Cicero’s Pro Lege Manilia of 66, 
given to support the extraordinary command proposed for Pompey against 
Mithridates. Pompey deserved the command, according to Cicero, because he 
possessed the four qualities necessary for a successful general (and all in the 
superlative): knowledge of warfare (Leg. Man. 28), ability (Leg. Man. 29–42), 
prestige (Leg. Man. 43–6) and luck (Leg. Man. 47–9).861 Concrete evidence for the 
first of these qualities is furnished by Pompey’s early career, rendered elliptically: 
who knew more or had ever needed to know more about warfare than Pompey, who 
had gone from the games and lessons of childhood to his father’s army in order to 
study military matters in a great war (bellum maximum) against the most savage 
enemies (acerrimi hostes)? who, as a mere boy, had served as soldier in a summus 
imperator’s army, and as an adulescens commanded a great army; who had ‘more 
often with his country’s enemies (cum hoste conflixit) than any other man has 
quarrelled with his own (cum inimico concertavit), fought more wars than others 
have read of, discharged more public offices (provinciae) than other men have 
coveted; who, in his youth (adulescentia), learned the lessons of warfare not from 
the instructions of others but under his own command (suis imperiis), not by reverses 
in war but by victories, not through campaigns but through triumphs’.862 Pompey 
had engaged in all types of warfare and so gained universal competence: ‘The civil 
war, the wars in Africa, Transalpine Gaul and Spain, the slave war and the naval war, 
wars different in type and locality and against foes as different, not only carried on 
by himself unaided but carried to a conclusion, make it manifest that there is no item 
within the sphere of military experience which can be beyond the knowledge of 
Pompeius’.863 
This glorious account tarnishes when rephrased as what it was: a series of 
victories achieved against Roman citizens. Cicero disguises this by portraying the 
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wars waged outside Italy as foreign wars, rather than extensions of the initial civil 
war sparked by Sulla’s return from the east.864 Pompey’s meteoric career had begun 
with the raising of a private army for use during the Sullan civil wars of 83; between 
82–70 he went on to hold commands against the Marian remnants in Sicily and 
Africa, was involved in action against the proto-Catiline consul of 79, M. Aemilius 
Lepidus, and against Q. Sertorius in Spain, helped to mop up the remnants of 
Spartacus’s revolt and celebrated two triumphs as an equestrian,865 all before an 
exemption from the lex annalis enabled his election as consul.
866
 Pompey was the 
prime example of a privatus occupying public positions he was not technically 
eligible to hold. Cicero emphasises the novelty of his career: 
 
Quid tam novum quam adulescentulum privatum exercitum difficili rei 
publicae tempore conficere? Confecit. Huic praeesse? Praefuit. Rem optime 
ductu suo gerere? Gessit. 
 
What is so novel as that a young privatus should raise an army at a time of 
crisis for the res publica? He raised it. Or that he should command it? He 
commanded it. Or that he should achieve a great success under his own 
leadership? He achieved it. (Cic. Leg. Man. 61.) 
 
Young, a private citizen and in command of an army: Pompey was the very image of 
Octavian in 44–43. In 66, however, Pompey’s early exploits were flagged up by 
Cicero as an aberration during crisis conditions, even if the nature of that crisis and 
its resolution are left carefully unstated. Earlier in the speech, while arguing that 
Pompey would have deserved command even if he were a privatus, Cicero stresses 
that in fact, thanks to the command against the pirates conferred by the lex Gabinia 
of 67, at that very moment Pompey was not.
867
 Even for a man as remarkable as 
Pompey, such promotion was a tricky issue and Cicero makes no appeal to any 
existing tradition to justify Pompey’s remarkable early career; rather, the point is 
explicitly that Pompey is his own precedent for novel commands. Moreover, Cicero 
is starry-eyed but not delusional; he portrays Pompey not as Athena, leaping into the 
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world as a fully-fledged imperator, but as a student of war from an unusually early 
age who studied under a summus imperator (Sulla’s name is delicately elided868) and 
learned scientia rei militaris through commanding his own men. It is conceded, at 
the very least, that Pompey’s first bellum was civile, even if the civil nature of the 
wars that followed in Africa, Transalpine Gaul and Spain is carefully glossed over. 
This reflects the significant detail that Pompey began his career as a Sullan 
lieutenant. His army-raising might have been done as a privatus, but he fought first 
on Sulla’s behalf and then at the behest of the Sullan senate. He commanded his 
father’s veterans as a private citizen, but not on his private initiative, and there is no 
trace in Cicero that the privatum consilium discourse stemming from Nasica’s 
heroics in 133 was ever needed to justify Pompey’s early career. 
There was an excellent reason why action outside the res publica, whether 
demonstrably pro re publica or not, was rare and highly controversial, and that 
reason was eloquently demonstrated by Caesar when he crossed the Rubicon. It is 
worth reading Cicero’s later rhetoric in the context of a letter he wrote to Atticus in 
January 49: 
 
Quaeso, quid est hoc? Aut quid est agitur? Mihi enim tenebrae sunt. 
‘Cingulum’ inquit ‘nos tenemus, Anconem amisimus; Labienus discessit a 
Caesare.’ Utrum de imperatore populi Romani an de Hannibale loquimur? O 
hominem amentem et miserum, qui ne umbram quidem umquam τοῦ καλοῦ 
viderit! Atque haec ait omnia facere se dignitatis causa. Ubi est autem 
dignitas nisi ubi honestas? Honestum igitur habere exercitum nullo publico 
consilio, occupare urbis civium quo facilior sit aditus ad patriam, χρεῶν 
ἀποκοπάς, φυγάδων καθόδους, sescenta alia scelera moliri, ‘τὴν θεῶν 
μεγίστην ὥστ' ἔχειν Τυραννίδα’? 
 
Pray, what’s all this? What is going on? I am in the dark. ‘We hold Cingulum, 
we’ve lost Ancona, Labienus has deserted Caesar. Is it a Roman commander 
or Hannibal we are talking of? Deluded wretch, with never in his life a 
glimpse of even the shadow of Good! And he says he is doing all this for his 
honour’s sake! Where is honour without moral good? And is it good to have 
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an army without public authority, to seize Roman towns by way of opening 
the road to the mother city, to plan debt cancellation, recall of exiles, and a 
hundred other villainies ‘all for the greatest of gods, Tyranny’? (Cic. Att. 
7.11.1.) 
 
Caesar, acting nullo publico consilio (or, in other words, privato consilio) had 
neither constitutional legitimacy nor honestas on his side; he provided a timely 
illustration of how, with positive law swept away, a free-for-all could result. Praise 
of privatum consilium in public affairs was therefore a dangerous rhetorical game to 
play, however much modifying factors such as honestas or virtus might be stressed. 
In the confused situation after Caesar’s death, however, Cicero spent a great deal of 
time playing catch-up; while his rhetoric impresses us as a record of events in which 
he played a major part and contributed significantly to how things unfolded, in 
reality he spent most of his time trying to justify the decisions of others.
869
 It was the 
nature of the game that those decisions were increasingly taken without recourse to 
standard methods of confirmation and legitimation, in other words as privatum 
consilium. The rest of this chapter therefore examines Cicero’s attempt to fold not-
at-all hypothetical and politically divisive privatum consilium into what had once 
been a res publica premised on consensus and concerted action. 
 
6.3 A MAN OF VISION 
Cicero’s rhetorical strategy in 44–3 both drew on and reinforced his efforts to 
reconstruct a res publica in which the auctoritas of the senate could curb the 
arbitrary action of magistrates generally. His insistence in the Philippics that the 
senate should reward the arbitrary action of specific magistrates and individuals by 
voting them honours and commands, and thereby confirming that their actions had 
been taken pro re publica, might seem counterproductive (and certainly had 
counterproductive implications) but it does foreground the senate as the source of 
political legitimacy. This is apparent from Augustus’s probable Ciceronian 
inspiration for RG 1.1, the Third Philippic, a speech given in the senate on 20 
December 44. Manuwald, following Stroh, proposes this speech as the first of 
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Cicero’s intended Philippic corpus. 870  Antony and Dolabella were still in office 
when the speech was given, but Antony had departed Rome on 28 November after 
learning that the legio Martia and legio Quarta had defected to Octavian. Cicero was 
impelled to deliver the Third Philippic by a dispatch from Decimus Brutus in which 
Decimus (appointed governor of Cisalpine Gaul by Julius Caesar and in occupation 
there since April) declared his intention of illegally defending ‘his’ province against 
Antony, who had reassigned it to himself during the distribution of the provinces at 
the beginning of June. Cicero was sufficiently heartened to discard his original plan 
of disavowing public activity until Antony’s vacation of office in January. He 
therefore attended a meeting of the senate chaired by the new tribunes and hijacked 
the original discussion (which concerned security for inaugurating the new consuls) 
to propose the confirmation of Decimus Brutus’s policy in Gaul, the maintenance in 
office of the present provincial governors and honours for Octavian, his veterans, 
and the legions who had mutinied against Antony.
871
 It was in this context that 
Cicero declared Octavian’s private initiative had saved the res publica from Antony, 
and his words are worth repeating: 
 
Qua peste privato consilio rem publicam – neque enim fieri potuit aliter – 
Caesar liberavit: qui nisi in hac re publica natus esset, rem publicam scelere 
Antoni nullam haberemus.  
 
From this plague, Caesar by his private initiative – there was no other way – 
delivered the res publica: had he not been born in this res publica, through 
the criminality of Antonius we would no longer have a res publica. (Cic. Phil. 
3.5.) 
 
Cicero praises young Octavian’s illegal actions (the raising of the private army ‘to 
liberate the res publica’ from Antony) and argues that Octavian should be invested 
with publica auctoritas to back up his privatum consilium.
872
 The similarity between 
this passage and RG 1.1 is indeed striking; Galinsky notes the parallels of private 
initiative and Antonian oppression (that is, the deliverance from), the similarity of 
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the clause endings (comparavi/comparavit to match in libertatem vindicavi/liberavit) 
and the emphasis on the res publica.
873
 That said, however, Cicero’s emphasis that 
there was no other way to save the res publica is important: certainly Octavian is 
praised for his actions privato consilio, but this is flagged up by Cicero as a 
necessary measure taken in desperate times, rather than the sort of behaviour that 
would necessarily be commendable in the world of everyday politics. At 3.3, Cicero 
had echoed the quo usque tandem abutere opening of his first consular speech 
against Catiline: 
 
Quo enim usque tantum bellum, tam crudele, tam nefarium privatis consiliis 
propulsabitur? Cur non quam primum publica accedit auctoritas? 
 
How long then is such a great war, such a cruel, such a wicked one, to be 
beaten back by private initiatives? Why is not public authority added as soon 
as possible? (Cic. Phil. 3.3.
874
) 
 
The private initiatives are plural because this refers not only to Octavian but also to 
Decimus Brutus, whose activities in Gallia Citerior are central to the speech. 
Significantly, privatum consilium is paired with publica auctoritas: certainly those 
currently acting privatis consiliis are acting correctly but Cicero stresses the vital 
importance of confirming and backing up these private actions with public authority 
as soon as possible.
875
 That the heroes of Cicero’s speech are obliged to act privato 
consilio denotes their lack of publicum consilium, which damns the senate’s inaction, 
rather than Decimus or Octavian’s unscrupulous and illegal behaviour, and must be 
remedied as swiftly as possible. The rhetoric recalls the sheathed SCU of the first 
speech against Catiline that brings shame on the inactive consuls (Cat. 1.2–4). By 
rhetorically revisiting his own consulship, Cicero seeks to couch a rather different 
debate in the same terms, although rather than claiming the authority of an pre-
existing SCU as legitimacy for dubiously legal consular actions, he calls here upon 
the senate to support the waging of (civil) war by private persons on a Roman 
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consul.
876
 It is not now the consuls that are failing the res publica (in fact, there is a 
large, consul-shaped hole in the political equation), but rather the senate, which 
withholds its consilium and auctoritas from the res publica (or, more precisely, from 
the private initiatives of Decimus and Octavian) in this crisis. 
 At 3.12 the point is reiterated and elaborated. By barring Antony from Gaul 
(and that on his private initiative!), Decimus Brutus judges that Antony is not consul 
– correctly. The senate must therefore approve Decimus’s actions: ‘it is for us to see 
that we approve Decimus Brutus’ private initiative with our public authority (ut D. 
Bruti privatum consilium auctoritate publica comprobemus)’.877 This is pointed. The 
important elaboration is the claim that Decimus’s judgment (that Antony is not 
consul) outweighs the legal reality (that Antony still is consul, actually). ‘Cicero 
asserted that not the official status, but the deeds of the consul determined his 
assessment; by this logical construction he justified Antonius’ opponents and proved 
unconstitutional actions to be constitutional ones’.878 Since Decimus is correct (and 
apparently infallible), it follows that the senate must provide its stamp of approval to 
his judgement, a stamp that will thenceforth serve to confirm the correctness of 
Decimus’s judgement. The argument culminates at 3.14, where Cicero considers the 
consequences of a hypothetical and plainly ridiculous scenario in which Antony is 
legally the consul, in which case ‘the legions that deserted the consul deserve to be 
beaten to death, Caesar is a criminal and Brutus a villain for having raised armies 
against a consul by private initiative (privato consilio)’.879 Hitherto the legal status of 
actions taken privato consilio has been elided; here Cicero contemplates the flagrant 
illegality of taking action against those in office in the absence of any form of public 
office or authority. If Antony is the consul, those acting against him privatis consiliis 
do so in defiance of law and contra consulem. But this is intended to be purely 
hypothetical within the context of the speech; and since Antony obviously cannot be 
considered a consul, given that honours are sought (by Cicero) for the soldiers who 
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deserted him and their commanders who oppose him, the private initiatives of 
Decimus Brutus and Octavian remain a force for good in troubled times. 
What appears as an argument in the Third Philippic (that voting senatorial 
auctoritas and honours to the soldiers and their commanders will legalise their 
technically illegal actions) becomes a basic premise in the fifth and tenth Philippics, 
by which time Cicero can claim that said auctoritas and honours had indeed been 
voted; he therefore stresses that the actions of Octavian and Brutus taken privato 
consilio have received the stamp of publica auctoritas as proof for his argument that 
the war against Antony is not a civil war between partes but one against a public 
enemy (hostis).
880
 The Fifth Philippic is situated at an important junction for Cicero; 
it was given on 1 January 43, when Antony and Dolabella vacated the consulship 
and were succeeded by A. Hirtius and C. Vibius Pansa.
881
 This relieved Cicero of 
one of his most pressing political difficulties; with Antony out of office, Cicero was 
no longer championing a private war against a Roman consul, although war had not 
yet been officially declared and Antony now held proconsular status. (A letter 
written as late as mid-April 43 reports Cicero and Sestius being obliged to point out 
just how embarrassing it would be for all those who had taken up arms against 
Antony if it was admitted that Antony was a proconsul.
882
) However, the first 
consularis called upon to speak was Pansa’s father-in-law, Q. Fufius Calenus, who 
proposed sending envoys to Antony, then besieging Decimus Brutus at Mutina. 
Cicero opposed this, arguing instead for the declaration of a tumultus
883
 and pushing 
for a war against Antony. Part of his strategy was to claim that earlier senatorial 
commendations for military actions meant a war was already in progress. At 5.3 he 
reminds the senate of the commendations given to ‘those commanders who had 
taken up arms against him [Antony] on their private initiative (qui contra illum 
bellum privato consilio suscepissent)’ and the veterans who had ‘preferred the 
freedom of the Roman People to his benefaction (illius beneficio libertatem populi 
Romani anteposuerunt)’. Why had the mutinying legions been commended, unless 
Antony was a hostis rather than a consul?
884
 This is spelled out in greater detail 
further in the speech: 
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Constituistis ut haec ad vos Kalendis Ianuariis referrentur quae referri 
videtis, de honoribus et praemiis bene de re publica meritorum et merentium. 
Quorum principem iudicastis eum qui fuit, C. Caesarem, qui M. Antoni 
impetus nefarios ab urbe in Galliam avertit, deinde milites veteranos qui 
primi Caesarem secuti sunt, tum illas caelestis divinasque legiones, Martiam 
et quartam comproba<s>tis quibus, cum consulem suum non modo 
reliquissent, sed bello etiam persequerentur, honores et praemia spopondistis; 
eodemque die D. Bruti, praestantissimi civis, edicto adlato atque proposito 
factum eius conlaudastis, quodque ille bellum privato consilio susceperat, id 
vos auctoritate publica comprobastis. 
 
You determined that on the Kalends of January a discussion be initiated in 
the House (as you see, it is done) concerning honours and rewards for those 
who have deserved and are deserving well of the res publica. First among 
those you judged to be (and first he was) Gaius Caesar, who turned Marcus 
Antonius’s wicked onset away from the city to Gallia; next you gave your 
approval to the veteran soldiers who were the first to follow Caesar and after 
them to those wonderful and god-inspired legions, the Martian and the Fourth, 
to whom you pledged honours and rewards after they had not only 
abandoned their consul but were actually making war on him. And on the 
same day the edict of Decimus Brutus, a great citizen, arrived and was 
published; you praised what he had done and you endorsed by public 
authority his venturing upon war on his private initiative. (Cic. Phil. 5.28.) 
 
Whereas 5.3 merely points out that the senate had praised the actions privato consilio 
of Brutus, Octavian and their soldiers against Antony and on behalf of the libertas of 
the Roman people, 5.28 separates off Decimus Brutus for special mention, so that 
Cicero can make the strongest case possible out of this conferral of auctoritas 
publica on a war waged privato consilio: it becomes ‘a full authorization of the 
private initiatives against Antonius’ and ‘implies that the Senate has committed itself 
to a certain policy and is required to follow that consistently’.885 It is noteworthy that 
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Cicero here admits the legions were making war on their consul, given his previous 
efforts to argue that Antony was not a consul at all; this makes more damning the 
judgement of his own legions against Antony. The theme is resumed in the Tenth 
Philippic, where the subject shifts to the other Brutus, then squatting with his and 
several other people’s armies in Macedonia (originally allotted to Antony’s brother 
Gaius), Illyricum and Greece.
886
 The speech deals with the issue of whether Marcus 
Brutus should be given formal command in these provinces. Pansa, the consul in 
residence at Rome, had summoned the senate and again called on Calenus to speak 
first; Calenus then spoke against bestowing imperium on Marcus Brutus. Cicero 
disagreed with the Tenth Philippic, in which the example of commendations for 
Decimus and Octavian serves as a significant precedent: the senators were now 
obliged to do the same for Marcus Brutus as they had already done at Cicero’s 
instigation for Decimus and Octavian, ‘whose private undertaking and action for the 
res publica was by your authority approved and commended’.887 Since the action 
privato consilio of Decimus Brutus and Octavian had been commended by the senate, 
it followed that the senate should commend the privatum consilium of Marcus 
Brutus likewise. 
Throughout Cicero’s public speeches during this extremely confused period, 
then, praise of actions taken privato consilio is consistently paired with a stress on 
the need to confirm such actions with publica auctoritas. Victory is optimistically 
declared in the Fourteenth Philippic: Octavian’s activities had justified the 
hopefulness with which the senate had bestowed imperium upon him.
888
 Cicero’s 
claim in its barest form was that actions taken privato consilio were justified on a 
level superior to strict legality, as long as they benefited the res publica. Because 
they were actions that benefited the res publica, they should be confirmed by publica 
auctoritas, i.e. by senatorial decree. Such decrees would thereafter show that the 
actions (and actors) had been beneficial to the res publica. This establishes a 
convenient self-reinforcing circle that enables Cicero to further his hawkish policy 
by brandishing such decrees as proof of his claims as soon as the senate has been 
persuaded to grant them. The repeated stress on the evils of the times results in 
rhetorical nuances quite unlike Augustus’s self-aggrandising proclamation of his 
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youthful privatum consilium at RG 1.1, which is not surprising, given the 
implications of Cicero’s rhetorical moves. Cicero’s delegitimation of a sitting consul 
and championing of action privato consilio ‘is not just a slight adaptation for 
immediate purposes, but attacks the basis of political life’, since ‘positive law is not 
replaced by hallowed and perpetual divine law, but by an arbitrarily defined law of 
nature according to the beliefs of individuals’.889 
The general line of the speeches can be supplemented by Cicero’s more 
theoretical works, especially at De Officiis 1.74–78, cited above,890 where Cicero 
illustrates the superiority of domestic politics to military glory through a selection of 
such contrasting exempla as Themistocles versus Solon, Pausanias and Lysander 
versus Lycurgus, Marius versus Marcus Scaurus and Pompey versus Quintus Catulus. 
The section culminates in a far from subtle comparison of Cicero’s own consulship 
with Pompey’s concurrent military campaigns.891 Other than Cicero’s year in office, 
the exemplum that receives the most lavish discussion and which immediately 
precedes the inevitable climax is the comparison of Scipio Aemilianus Africanus to 
his contemporary Scipio Nasica, whose murder of Tiberius Gracchus was admittedly 
not just a domestic affair (ex domestica ratione), but one that ‘partakes of the nature 
of war also, since it was effected by violence; but it was, for all that, executed as a 
political measure without the help of an army (attingit etiam bellicam, quoniam vi 
manuque confecta est – sed tamen id ipsum est gestum consilio urbano sine 
exercitu)’.892 The point of the passage overall is to push the supremacy of domestic 
political action over even a legally glorious war. Nasica therefore features as a 
politician engaging in domestic politics to remove an unlovable citizen from the res 
publica, in contrast to the imperator Scipio Aemilianus Africanus’s 
contemporaneous military campaign against Numantia. This requires a certain 
amount of careful semantic manoeuvring, given that what Nasica in fact did was to 
lead a mob on a lynching spree on no authority other than (at most) whatever he 
could claim as pontifex maximus. Thus Cicero is obliged to note that bellicosity was 
involved, but all the same he claims Nasica as a suitable precedent by virtue of the 
absence of an army. The death of Tiberius Gracchus may therefore be described as 
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having been accomplished consilio urbano – as, perhaps, an urban initiative. 
Cicero’s odd phrase looks like a somewhat forced attempt to get around two 
problems posed by Scipio Nasica for the scheme of this passage: (1) that in Nasica’s 
case arms did not yield to the toga; after all, Tiberius and some three hundred 
followers were brutally and illegally done to death; and (2) that Nasica was not a 
magistrate in possession of office; rather, he was a privatus, a detail somewhat 
defensively conceded. 
Nasica’s action is not described as privatum consilium in De Officiis, but the 
phrase lurks behind his regular identification as a privatus in the 40s, a detail that 
Cicero had formerly included to highlight the dilatory conduct of those in office, 
especially his colleague Antonius, and which now stands as virtually a Homeric 
epithet. So in the Brutus Nasica is cited twice as the privatus (or dux privatus) who 
took action against Tiberius Gracchus
893
 and in the Tusculan Disputations he 
becomes a living example of the principle outlined in the De Republica that no one is 
only a privatus when it comes to preserving the salus of the res publica:
894
 
 
Mihi ne Scipio quidem ille pontufex maxumus, qui hoc Stoicorum verum esse 
declaravit, numquam privatum esse sapientem, iratus videtur Ti. Graccho 
tum, cum consulem languentem reliquit atque ipse privatus, ut si consul esset, 
qui rem publicam salvam esse vellent se sequi iussit. 
 
To my mind even that Scipio, the pontifex maximus, who verified the truth of 
the Stoic maxim that the wise man is never a privatus, does not seem to have 
been angry with Tiberius Gracchus when he left the spiritless consul and, 
though he himself was a privatus, called, as though he were consul, upon all 
who desired the safety of the res publica to follow him. (Cic. Tusc. Disp. 
4.51.) 
 
There is no discussion here of the awkward legality of Nasica’s action, nor of any 
unpleasant fallout from Tiberius Gracchus’s death: it is taken as given that the 
introduction of death-by-senatorial-lynch-mob into the political sphere was a 
positive benefit for the res publica. Nor is there any hint of the popularis tradition 
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concerning the deaths of Tiberius and his younger brother. Given the date of the 
Tusculan Disputations and the focus of this particular section, it might be thought 
that Cicero hoped to encourage some modern privati to get on with dispatching 
Caesar.
895
 It is also worth noting that the Gracchi become decidedly less nuanced in 
Cicero’s treatment of them from this period. Tiberius in particular becomes a 
dominus
896
 who sought (and briefly achieved) regnum, and who was rightfully slain 
by Nasica, the dux privatus.
897
 In any case, the principle that murder by private 
citizens pro re publica may be justified is put into practice in the Philippics to justify 
the flagrantly illegal actions of privati and stretched to its limits to make waging war 
privato consilio on a Roman consul not only permissible but praiseworthy. The 
justification of murder became a justification of civil war. 
 
6.4 THE FREEDOM TO REFUSE 
The political debate during 44–43 was heated. Cicero’s voice (as usual) is the loudest 
to have survived, but something of the broader conversation may be recovered from 
his speeches. Opposition from fellow senators pushed Cicero’s rhetorical 
exploitation of Scipio Nasica and the privatum consilium discourse in two opposing 
directions. This appears in the Eighth Philippic, where Cicero resorts to Nasica to 
argue the hawkish line against his dovelike fellow consularis Q. Fufius Calenus, and 
in the Eleventh Philippic, where Cicero is forced to disagree with a motion his own 
pro-privatum consilium stance might seem to justify. In the Eighth Philippic, Cicero 
cites Scipio Nasica explicitly in order to disagree with the more temperate proposals 
of a fellow senator. On 2 February 43, two of the three ambassadors sent to Antony 
returned (the third, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, having died on the way) and reported 
that Antony was disinclined to accept the senate’s conditions and had proposed some 
conditions of his own. During the following debate, Calenus seems to have proposed 
a second embassy and a push for peace, whereas Cicero wanted an official 
declaration of bellum against a hostis (Antony) and a moratorium on any further talk 
of embassies. The position eventually taken by the senate was that of Antony’s uncle, 
L. Julius Caesar, supported by the consul Pansa, who suggested the substitution of 
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tumultus for Cicero’s bellum. Shortly afterwards a report from Hirtius arrived; this 
was read out in a meeting of the senate called by Pansa on 3 February, when Cicero 
delivered the Eighth Philippic in which he criticised the tumultus decision and 
claimed that Hirtius’s despatch amounted to a state of war.898 
 A substantial amount of the speech is directed at Calenus. Calenus, according 
to Cicero at 8.13, proclaims his peaceful intent and desire to preserve all citizens, but 
this desire is problematic because it lacks discrimination; the sentiment is honourable 
only if Calenus means good citizens (that is to say those useful and for the res 
publica). Wanting to preserve citizens whose actions make them hostes dissolves the 
difference between Calenus and such men: by arguing for peace on the wicked 
Antony’s behalf, Calenus too acts as a hostis. Calenus’s wise old father, Cicero 
continues, always used to give pride of place to Scipio Nasica, ‘holding that his 
courage (virtus), judgement (consilium) and greatness of spirit (magnitudo animi) 
had brought freedom to the res publica’.899 Judging by his current position, Calenus 
would not have approved of the great man as a citizen; Nasica, after all, had not 
wanted every citizen to be salvus.
900
 Ditto Opimius and those who took action 
against Gaius Gracchus; ditto Marius, Valerius and those who took action against 
Saturninus and Glaucia; and ditto Cicero as consul taking action against Catiline, 
none of whom wished to preserve all citizens.
901
 In short,  
 
Hoc interest, Calene, inter meam sententiam et tuam: ego nolo quemquam 
civem committere ut morte multandus sit; tu, etiam si commiserit, 
conservandum putas. 
 
The difference between my view and yours, Calenus, is this: I wish that no 
citizen should act so that he must be punished with death; you think a citizen 
should be preserved even if he did so act. (Cic. Phil. 8.15.) 
 
Cicero positions himself as a realist and successor to a long line of realists: a citizen 
who acts as a hostis should be treated as one, as such citizens had been treated since 
the supreme exemplum of Scipio Nasica against Tiberius Gracchus, whom everyone 
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(except Calenus) agrees saved the res publica. Furthermore, to protect and enable 
bad citizens is to be a bad citizen oneself. The only thing one can do (says Cicero) 
with such bad citizens is to remove them from the body politic, as one removes 
noxious elements from the body.
902
 This is a smokescreen: enabling X (whether the 
senate or an individual magistrate or politician) to distinguish between good and bad 
citizens, and to say that bad citizens have forfeited their civic rights – ‘badness’ 
being defined not by recourse to law-courts and legal judgements, but through the 
application of lurid rhetoric – makes a mockery of citizenship, which was a matter of 
law rather than morals. All Roman citizens, whatever their morals, were theoretically 
subject to the same laws and in possession of the same basic rights; just as the 
Catilinarian ‘conspirators’ had not become hostes simply on Cicero’s say-so (and 
just as Catiline himself had not become a hostis until the senate, having confirmed 
that he had joined Manlius’s army, formally declared him so),903 Antony and his 
followers remained cives until formal processes were enacted against them. Cicero’s 
accusation, however, is that Calenus, by arguing for peace, enables bad citizens and 
therefore is one himself, which is tantamount to declaring that everyone who takes 
issue with Cicero’s hawkishness is a hostis. This is more than creative rhetoric; it 
reflects Cicero’s consistent refusal ‘to recognize the positions of his adversaries as 
genuine political positions’.904  Taken seriously, it implies a wish to curtail free 
senatorial debate (what debate can there be over the treatment of hostes?) and may 
also be considered a threat: if bad citizens can be considered hostes and eradicated 
without repercussion, what can anyone labelled a ‘bad citizen’ by Cicero expect? 
Shutting down opposing viewpoints was one obvious way to exploit Nasica’s 
exemplum in a senatorial context, but not the only one; the discourse carried other 
implications and the risk of losing control of the debate was high. In the Eleventh 
Philippic, Cicero was obliged to challenge a motion for which his own arguments 
helped prepare the way. In 51, everyone had been nervous about Parthians but no 
one had wanted to see privati appointed by senatorial decree; the general consensus 
then had been against the appointment of a new Nasica to deal with an external 
enemy.
905
 By late February 43, however, things had changed: news had arrived of 
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Dolabella’s seizure of Smyrna and execution of Gaius Trebonius, for which the 
senate (this time on Calenus’s motion) voted Dolabella a hostis. This required the 
prosecution of a war and the issue then became who should command it. Lucius 
Julius Caesar proposed an extraordinary command for Publius Servilius Isauricus, 
who had preceded Trebonius as governor of Asia (46–44), while someone else 
(probably Calenus) moved that the sitting consuls should draw lots for Asia and 
Syria, relieve Decimus Brutus at Mutina, and then head out east against Dolabella.
906
 
Cicero disagreed with both proposals in the Eleventh Philippic and found himself 
obliged to argue against command being handed to a privatus, P. Servilius. In this 
speech, the prospect of military commands for private citizens therefore becomes a 
problem. At Phil. 11.17–18, Cicero lists particularly dangerous wars in which privati 
were almost, but not quite, granted extraordinary imperium. Such commands had 
been given before, in particular to Pompey; but those (says Cicero, temporarily 
forgetting the Pro Lege Manilia) were proposed by turbulent tribunes, apart from the 
one against Sertorius, which Pompey was assigned because the consuls refused it.
907
 
Lucius Caesar’s proposal that the command against Dolabella should be assigned to 
the privatus P. Servilius might seem the logical extension of Cicero’s argument 
(once the rules are broken, why not break them again?) and certainly put Cicero in an 
awkward position, since he had proposed young Octavian’s extraordinary 
command.
908
 His method of escape is laudatory: 
 
Ille enim mihi praesidium extraordinarium dederat: cum dico mihi, senatui 
dico populoque Romano. A quo praesidium res publica, ne cogitatum quidem, 
tantum haberet ut sine eo salva esse non posset, huic extraordinarium 
imperium non darem? Aut exercitus adimendus aut imperium dandum fuit. 
Quae est enim ratio aut qui potest fieri ut sine imperio teneatur exercitus? 
Non igitur, quod ereptum non est, id existimandum est datum. Eripuissetis C. 
Caesari, patres conscripti, imperium, nisi dedissetis. Milites veterani qui 
illius auctoritatem, imperium, nomen secuti pro re publica arma ceperant 
volebant sibi ab illo imperari; legio Martia et legio quarta ita se contulerant 
ad auctoritatem senatus et rei publicae dignitatem ut deposcerent 
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imperatorem et ducem C. Caesarem. Imperium C. Caesari belli necessitas, 
fascis senatus dedit. Otioso vero et nihil agenti privato, obsecro te, L. Caesar 
– cum peritissimo homine mihi res est – quando imperium senatus dedit? 
 
Yes, for he had given me extraordinary protection; and when I say “me”, I 
mean the senate and the Roman people. When the res publica had received 
from a man such protection as had been not even imagined, such that without 
it there could be no safety, was I not to give him an extraordinary command? 
I had either to take away his army, or to give him the command; for what 
method is there, or can be, of holding an army together without a command? 
What is not wrested away should not therefore be regarded as given: you 
would have wrested from Gaius Caesar his command, Conscript Fathers, if 
you had not given it. The veteran soldiers who, attaching themselves to his 
authority, his command, and his name, had taken up arms on behalf of the 
State, wished to be commanded by him; the Martian legion and the fourth 
upheld the authority of the State only to demand as their general and leader 
Gaius Caesar. His command the necessities of war gave Gaius Caesar, the 
Senate its fasces. But to a private person, unoccupied and doing nothing – I 
beg you to tell me, Lucius Caesar, for I have to deal with a man well-versed 
in precedents – when has the Senate ever given command? (Cic. Phil. 11.20.) 
 
Cicero was obliged to impose limits on the discourse of privatum consilium in order 
to prevent it from validating unwelcome motions. He had to dispose of the awkward 
precedent set by his own promotion of Decimus Brutus and Octavian, who becomes 
a very special case indeed. Because of his extraordinary services to the res publica, 
the senate bestowed the symbol of imperium on Octavian (that is, the fasces), but its 
reality had already been granted by necessitas belli, the necessity of war: all the 
senate did was to confirm this.
909
 For Cicero, this is a completely different case from 
arbitrarily bestowing imperium on a privatus who is at leisure and doing nothing. It 
bypasses the complicated matter of precisely what imperium entails (not just 
command, but legitimate command) and the constitutional mechanisms in place for 
assigning it to legitimately appointed commanders. Traditionally, military imperium 
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seems to have required the ratification of a special lex curiata,
910
 which was passed 
by the comitia centuriata, by the late Republic an archaic remnant represented by 
thirty lictors;
911
 it seems to have been connected with auspicia publica, the right to 
consult the gods on behalf of the res publica, although the details are debated.
912
 
Richardson argues that these leges curiatae were what conferred imperium, rather 
than mere election to the magistracy,
913
 although Appius Claudius in 54 claimed not 
to require a lex curiata to hold imperium in his Cilician province,
914
 so if Richardson 
is correct this point was rather losing force by the late Republic.
915
 Appius’s claim 
may have been tendentious, however, since the response to Cicero’s survey of 
opinions on the matter was that without a lex curiata Appius had no right to the 
province and the incumbent promagistrate need not give way.
916
 In any case, 
Cicero’s argument in the Philippics stands in striking contrast to his contribution to 
the former debate. By separating military command from its constitutional 
embroidery (fasces, senatorial decree, lex curiata), it becomes possible to possess 
imperium even in the absence of what was traditionally required for a military 
command to be legitimate. Cicero now takes the strong line of Appius and sweeps 
any nuances under the carpet. Indeed, he goes further: if the senate had not 
confirmed Octavian in his illegal command, according to Cicero, it would have 
removed from him imperium that he already possessed, despite his lack of office, 
despite his lack of publica auctoritas, despite his technical ineligibility for either of 
these. There is no middle ground between possessed imperium and its removal by 
senatorial non-confirmation in which Cicero’s young hero might stand revealed as an 
opportunistic warlord with an army of Caesar’s veterans illegally at his disposal. 
 Having disposed of the argument that the consuls should draw lots (11.21–
25), the point about private action is picked up again at 11.26–7, where Cicero 
argues that the war should be given to a man already engaged, with full resources 
and a legitimate command, imperium legitimum, which is presumably to be 
distinguished from the mere imperium possessed by Octavian prior to his 
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confirmatory senatorial decree. (One consequence of redefining imperium as 
synonymous with merely ordering soldiers around is that a new qualification is 
required to distinguish our warlords from their warlords, i.e. to specify a command’s 
legitimacy, a quality originally explicit in imperium alone.
917
) He proposes M. 
Brutus and/or C. Cassius Longinus as fulfilling these criteria. This is interesting 
because not only were Brutus and Cassius not meant to be occupying Macedonia, 
Greece and Asia (it seems likely that Brutus was assigned Crete and Cassius 
Cyrene
918
), but in general their actions in the East were taken privato consilio, a 
phrase that does not appear in this section of the speech, even though Cicero notes 
approvingly that Brutus will take action without waiting for senatorial authorisation 
if he believes that pursuing Dolabella will serve the res publica.
919
 Cicero provides 
evidence for this assertion by pointing out that ‘both Brutus and Cassius have been 
already their own senate in many things’,920 which is a commendation rather than a 
criticism. Given the careful limitations Cicero now wishes to place on the privatum 
consilium discourse in order to argue against a command for the privatus Servilius 
Isauricus, he seems to be treading rather carefully around admitting that Brutus and 
Cassius have been doing just that in building up their forces in the east and dealing 
with Antony’s brother Gaius. Certainly their actions lack the stamp of positive law: 
 
Necesse est enim in tanta conversione et perturbatione omnium rerum 
temporibus potius parere quam moribus. Nec enim nunc primum aut Brutus 
aut Cassius salutem libertatemque patriae legem sanctissimam et morem 
optimum iudicavit. 
 
In such great and complete upheaval and confusion one must be guided by 
the circumstances, not by standard procedures. This will not be the first time 
that either Brutus or Cassius has judged the safety and freedom of the 
fatherland as the most sacred law and the best possible procedure. (Cic. Phil. 
11.27.) 
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Brutus went to someone else’s province, rather than Crete; once in residence in 
Macedonia, he raised new legions, seduced Dolabella’s cavalry and judged Dolabella 
a hostis by his personal decision, sua sententia, even before Trebonius had reached 
his sticky end – for otherwise, ‘what right had he to draw cavalry away from a 
consul?’921 The case is put even more starkly for Cassius, who had set out from Italy 
intending to keep Dolabella out of Syria: 
 
Qua lege, quo iure? Eo quod Iuppiter ipse sanxit, ut omnia quae rei publicae 
salutaria essent legitima et iusta haberentur. Est enim lex nihil aliud nisi 
recta et a numine deorum tracta ratio, imperans honesta, prohibens 
contraria. Huic igitur legi paruit Cassius, cum est in Syriam profectus, 
alienum provinciam, si homines legibus scriptis uterentur, eis vero oppressis 
suam lege naturae. 
 
Under what law, by what right? By the right which Jupiter himself 
established, that all things beneficial to the res publica be held lawful and 
proper. Law is nothing but a code of right conduct and derived from the will 
of the gods, ordaining what is good, forbidding the contrary. This law, then, 
Cassius obeyed when he went to Syria; another man’s province, if people 
were following written laws, but such laws having been overthrown, his by 
the law of nature. (Cic. Phil. 11.28.) 
 
Cassius’s actions against Dolabella on behalf of the res publica, Cicero concludes, 
should be strengthened by the senate’s auctoritas.922 It would be inconvenient to 
admit now that his heroes acted privato consilio (although they did); he appeals 
instead to the lex naturae that stands higher in the grand scheme of things than plain 
old lex.
923
 Among other things, this saves him the embarrassment of arguing for the 
promotion of one or more privati at the expense of another. His point is practical: at 
this point a Nasica without a loyal mob is no use at all.
924
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 When Cicero cheers on the spontaneous action of his various privati heroes, 
this means only that they are acting without the senate’s approval, since behind the 
scenes he was encouraging them to break the law at every step of the way. Consider 
Fam. 11.7.2, a letter written by Cicero to Decimus Brutus in mid-December 44 and 
virtually contemporaneous with Phil. 3: 
 
Caput autem est hoc, quod te diligentissime percipere et meminisse volumus, 
ut ne in libertate et salute populi Romani conservanda auctoritatem senatus 
exspectes nondum liberi, ne et tuum factum condemnes (nullo enim publico 
consilio rem publicam liberavisti, quo etiam est res illa maior et clarior) et 
adulescentem, vel puerum potius, Caesarem iudices temere fecisse qui 
tantam causam publicam privato consilio susceperit, denique homines 
rusticos sed fortissimos viros civisque optimos dementis fuisse iudices, 
primum milites veteranos, commilitones tuos, deinde legionem Martiam, 
legionem quartam, quae suum consulem hostem iudicaverunt seque ad 
salutem rei publicae defendendam contulerunt.  
 
The main point, which we want you thoroughly to grasp and remember in the 
future, is that in safeguarding the liberty and welfare of the Roman people 
you must not wait to be authorised by a senate which is not yet free. If you 
did, you would be condemning your own act, for you did not liberate the 
commonwealth by any public authority – a fact which makes the exploit all 
the greater and more glorious. You would also be implying that the young 
man, or rather boy, Caesar had acted inconsiderately in taking upon himself 
so weighty a public cause at his private initiative. Further, you would be 
implying that the soldiers, country folk but brave men and loyal citizens, had 
taken leave of their senses – that is to say firstly, the veterans, your own 
comrades in arms, and secondly the Martian and Fourth Legions, which 
branded their consul as a public enemy and rallied to the defence of the 
commonwealth. (Cic. Fam. 11.7.2.) 
 
While arguing in the senate that the privatum consilium of Decimus Brutus and 
Octavian should be formally approved, Cicero advises in a semi-private letter that 
Brutus need not wait for his privatum consilium to be authorised by the senate. In 
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fact, that is the last thing he should do, since the senate is not yet liber and to wait 
would be to highlight the weakness of his own case: the illegality of the 
assassination of Caesar, the equally privatum consilium of the young Caesar 
Octavianus and the soldiers whose desertion, according to Cicero’s tendentious logic, 
branded Antony as a hostis. Decimus should do anything necessary to preserve the 
res publica regardless of legality; approval can be gained once the senate and res 
publica are again free to bestow it appropriately. After all, as Cicero goes on to say, 
‘the will of the senate should be accepted in lieu of authority when its authority is 
trammelled by fear (voluntas senatus pro auctoritate haberi debet, cum auctoritas 
impeditur metu)’. 
 Cicero’s advice offers a template for any politician who wishes to ignore 
anything the senate says: it was not the true will of the senate, which was not free to 
express its own opinions. Further, he undermines his own model of what the res 
publica should be by effectively removing the senate as a source of auctoritas or 
public legitimacy independent of the incumbent magistrates.
925
 Instead, he puts 
himself forward as the mouthpiece, if not ventriloquist, of the voluntas senatus. 
Decimus should listen not to what the senate decrees but rather to what Cicero 
believes the senate would decree, if only it dared. Such behaviour is highhanded 
enough to illuminate why people might talk of Cicero as a potential tyrant.
926
 
Moreover, the fact that Decimus was acting privato consilio is flagged up in the 
letter as something that makes his preservation of the res publica more illustrious, 
rather than a necessary evil in troubled times. Decimus Brutus, remarkably, is 
commended for acting without the backing of a senatorial decree (publicum 
consilium), presumably because in doing so he bucked the general and deplorable 
trend towards dilatoriness. Shackleton Bailey remarks on the parallels between this 
passage and RG 1.1 without suggesting any significance;
927
 the precedent might be 
considered to have relevance for Octavian, however, given the importance placed on 
the ‘restoration’ of the res publica and the senatorial settlements after Antony’s 
eventual defeat. Nor was Decimus the only person to receive such encouragement. 
At Fam. 12.7.2 Cicero reports to Cassius that he had been telling the senate and 
contiones that Cassius would not delay after receiving authorisation; he hopes 
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Cassius will go right ahead. Similarly at Fam. 10.16.2 Plancus is exhorted to be his 
own senate. Cicero was doing his bit to make sure that all this action privato consilio 
went ahead: at ad Brut. 1.15.6, he claims that the young Caesar’s actions (thanks to 
which everyone is still alive, if they care to admit it) were taken not privato consilio 
but rather ex fonte consiliorum meorum. Cicero himself is (or claims to be) the 
ultimate source of this private war. 
The constitutional danger of such an approach is highlighted by Marcus 
Brutus in a letter written ca. 7 May 43 from Dyrrachium. Brutus takes issue with 
Cicero declaring Antony and friends hostes: 
 
statuo nihil nisi hoc, senatus aut populi Romani iudicium esse de iis civibus 
qui pugnantes non interierint. ‘At hoc ipsum’ inquies ‘inique facis qui hostilis 
animi in rem publicam homines civis appelles.’ Immo iustissime; quod enim 
nondum senatus censuit nec populus Romanus iussit, id adroganter non 
praeiudico neque revoco ad arbitrium meum. 
 
my only conclusion is that the senate or the people of Rome must pass 
judgement on those citizens who have not died fighting. You will say that my 
calling men hostile to the res publica ‘citizens’ is an impropriety in itself. On 
the contrary, it is quite proper. What the senate has not yet decreed, nor the 
Roman people ordered, I do not take it upon myself to prejudge, I do not 
make myself the arbiter. (Cic. ad Brut. 1.4.2.) 
 
Brutus pinpoints and implicitly critiques Cicero’s underlying philosophy. By 
transplanting the term hostis from the legal realm into the moral one through the 
claim that bad citizens are hostes and no citizens at all, Cicero removes the 
judgement from the traditional sources of authority and legality (the senate and 
people) and takes it upon himself to decide who may and who may not be called a 
citizen. Brutus’s criticism holds up a similar mirror to the privatum consilium 
argument, through which actions are justified not by legality (strict or otherwise) but 
instead by appeal to the virtus of the agent as judged against the needs of the res 
publica.
928
 It is the virtus of Decimus Brutus, Caesar Octavianus, Marcus Brutus, 
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Gaius Cassius and their armies that justifies their illegal privatum consilium on 
behalf of the res publica; and it is Cicero who takes it upon himself, as an infallible 
arbiter of morals and the morality of actions, to proclaim their all-important virtus. 
Although Cicero proposed to (re)construct a res publica founded on senatorial 
auctoritas, he had few qualms about subverting his own ideals when the senate as it 
actually existed proved slow or unwilling to see things his way. It is reasonable to 
excuse this, and perhaps not very hard: ‘extenuating circumstances are easy to find; 
the situation was extreme and required extreme measures; success or failure would, 
in the end, determine right and wrong’.929 The eventual appropriation of Cicero’s 
rhetoric by Augustus at RG 1.1, however, indicates how such subversion and 
innovation in extreme situations might be used to justify very different political 
philosophies once the dust had settled. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
Let me now draw some broad conclusions about the uses and abuses of the concept 
of res publica during the Roman Republic. I began by establishing the principle that 
in this period, res publica referred neither to a system of political organisation (‘a 
republic’) nor to the specific political superstructure that existed between the Roman 
monarchy and the principate (‘The Republic’), but rather has the literal meaning of 
‘the public property/business’, which takes on the extended meaning of ‘the public 
space within which those involved in managing the public property/affairs move’. 
This carries the important implication that res publica could mean different things to 
different people, which makes the ways in which speakers and writers positioned 
themselves in relation to the res publica (and how such positioning affected res 
publica as a concept) an interesting topic for study. 
My first chapter discussed res publica as public business, which forms a 
conceptual nexus centred on the magistrates and the need to manage this public 
business. The magistrates themselves had a particularly intimate relationship with 
the res publica, especially when responsible for administering it in the field and 
therefore at a distance from the rest of Rome’s political world. The testimony of 
Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum and Cicero’s letters from Cilicia suggests that such 
magistrates were entitled to depict themselves essentially as the res publica. This is 
understandable (after all, the success of their operations abroad did impact on the res 
publica as a whole), but should not be taken as an indication that the individual 
magistrate is subsumed into his office; in particular, the extensive use that former 
magistrates made of achievements carried out while in office suggest otherwise. 
Since an individual’s dignitas rested on his public office and achievements, however, 
ways naturally developed in which such dignitas could be challenged. In general, 
people were less likely to challenge the principle (from which everyone could hope 
to benefit) than the achievement on which an individual’s claim to dignitas rested. 
All the same, there were ways to subvert the principle: firstly the elder Cato’s, which 
shifted attention from great achievements to impeccable behaviour, and secondly the 
popularis paradigm shift that did try to subsume the magistrate to his office by 
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assigning responsibility and credit for the administration of the res publica to the 
electing body, the populus. 
From res publica as public business, I moved to various concerns about the 
long-term wellbeing of the res publica as the structured political sphere, from the 
general fear of moral decline expressed by people like Cato to the specific fear that 
the res publica was endangered by the specific activities of specific individuals. The 
first clearly historical such incident seems to be P. Scipio Nasica’s murder of 
Tiberius Gracchus in the interests of maintaining the res publica salva, which was 
followed a decade later by the formalisation of this concern in the senatus ultimum 
consultum first issued against Tiberius’s brother Gaius. A more generalised concern 
in the interim may be traced in the fragments of the annalist historians and the sole 
surviving relict of the laudatio for Scipio Aemilianus. Sulla’s res publica constituta 
shows what happens when sporadic violence is not sufficient to prevent outright civil 
war: having contributed to the implosion of the traditional res publica, he used his 
victory to rebuild a political system that had a superficial resemblance to the 
previous version, even if, as Flower argues,
930
 it should really be read as a sharp 
break with the past. In any case, this was an uneasy situation, as Cicero’s rhetorical 
res publica, which was compelled to surrender itself to Sulla, indicates. 
The complete spectrum of meanings can be found in Cicero’s speeches, 
treatises and letters. Over the course of one particularly eventful year, as I outlined in 
Chapter 4, he used the pivot of consular responsibility for managing the res publica 
to shut down disagreeable legislation and a politicised trial; defined res publica in 
terms of political structures to an audience that was probably more inclined to think 
of it as the public business; gave res publica a firm and explicit geographical 
location within the public and political spaces of Rome itself; spearheaded a sporadic 
outbreak of violence intended to prevent (what he claimed was) an imminent danger; 
constructed the optimistic rhetorical fiction of a unified res publica that expelled 
Catiline from the city; and ended on an uneasy note that looked forward to the 
problems he was going to face after his consulship. When these problems became 
insurmountable, the triumphalism of Pro Sulla transmuted into the elaborate and 
unconvincing rhetorical fiction of the Post Reditum and De Domo Sua speeches, 
which threw the res publica into exile along with Cicero and brought it back with 
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him as well. Amid all this rhetorical flannel, however, the relationship Cicero 
constructs more or less in passing between Pompey and the res publica provides an 
interesting foreshadow of the Augustan principate. 
Chapter 4 is essentially concerned with rhetorical positioning. What took 
place during the Caesarian civil wars also involved positioning, but a less rhetorical 
sort: whereas the ‘Republicans’ positioned themselves explicitly as defending the res 
publica even after their flight from Rome and Italy, which involved a geographical 
dislocation that Cicero, for one, found extremely upsetting, Caesar downplayed res 
publica on his own behalf, implied heavily (without actually coming out and saying 
as much) that the opposition’s claim was illegitimate and cynical, and restricted 
himself to administering a res publica that remained firmly in Rome. The disjunction 
between these two versions left those uncommitted to either side, such as Cicero and 
his correspondent Sulpicius, in a state of despair, especially after the ‘Republican’ 
armies were progressively defeated and it became increasingly obvious that Caesar 
was not going to imitate Sulla by producing a new res publica constituta out of his 
rather tatty hat. In response to Caesar’s unfree res publica, the ‘Liberators’ referred 
pointedly to the libera res publica, a phrase that expresses a specific (political) 
condition for the public sphere they wanted to recover from the wreckage: freedom. 
Cicero, meanwhile, provided more detailed recommendations for rearranging the 
deckchairs on the public sphere in the First Philippic. (His recommendations were 
somewhat undermined, however, by his attempts to get around the misbehaviour of 
his preferred champions by resorting to the fictional res publica in later speeches.) 
Finally, I looked at privatum consilium on behalf of the res publica, which 
was one of Cicero’s euphemisms for the grossly illegal behaviour of his preferred 
champions during the post-Caesar phase and was later expropriated by Augustus for 
the Res Gestae, his end-of-life review. Cicero wrenched what was originally an 
uneasy justification of political homicide (thanks to P. Scipio Nasica, whose example 
was generally commended but not imitated) into a justification of civil war activities. 
This was not wholly straightforward, since Caesar had acted on his privatum 
consilium when he crossed the Rubicon, and it is clear both that Cicero faced 
opposition and that he risked this particular argument rushing off in unwelcome 
directions. Cicero was playing catch-up with events during a confused and difficult 
period; although it may be unfair to blame him too much for the things he said, RG 
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1.1 shows how Cicero’s claims were later picked up by Augustus in a very different 
climate that Cicero would not have approved at all. 
To wrap up, then, this thesis is not an exhaustive account of the ways in 
which people understood and related to res publica in the Roman Republic. It would 
take more space and time than I possess to produce such an account, which would 
explore several issues I have treated lightly or passed over altogether, such as 
religion and res publica, how non-Romans related to the res publica, the defence of 
the res publica from external threats, the fear of political monopoly within the res 
publica (regnum, dominatio), and the rhetorical transfiguration of Pompey and 
various people Cicero claimed had been born ‘for the res publica’, such as Decimus 
and Marcus Brutus and Octavian. Cicero in particular drew the short straw for this 
study. He is by far the most important source for the study of res publica (or indeed 
any other aspect of political life in the late Republic) and taking a thematic approach 
meant treating his vast corpus brutally, which is perhaps not just a pity but also a 
pitfall. I have been systematic where possible, but the inevitable cherry-picking of 
arguments and episodes is a poor way to handle Cicero, who reflects and reinvents 
the political world he inhabits. A thorough analysis of how Cicero engaged with res 
publica throughout his career, especially in his theoretical works, would repay 
anyone who wanted to make the effort, if not for the greater understanding of res 
publica then at least for the greater understanding of Cicero himself. 
251 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Ancient texts are abbreviated as in the Oxford Latin Dictionary (OLD) and the 
Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon (LSJ). Journal titles are abbreviated as in 
L’Année Philologique. 
 
TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS CITED 
 
APPIAN 
Mendelssohn L. (ed.), Viereck P. (rev.) 1905. Appiani Historia Romana. Vol. II. B.G. 
Teubner: Leipzig.  
White H. (ed. and trans.) 1913. Appian’s Roman History. Vol. III. The Loeb 
Classical Library: London. 
AUGUSTUS 
Cooley A.E. (ed., trans. and comm.) 2009. Res Gestae Divi Augusti. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
CAESAR 
Carter J.M. 
- (ed., trans. and comm.) 1991. Julius Caesar. The Civil War Books I & II. Aris 
& Phillips: Warminster. 
- (ed., trans. and comm.) 1993. Julius Caesar. The Civil War Book III. Aris & 
Phillips: Warminster. 
Edwards H.J. (ed. and trans.) 1917. Caesar. The Gallic War. The Loeb Classical 
Library: London. 
du Pontet R.  
- (ed.) 1900a. C. Iuli Caesaris Commentariorum. Pars Prior Qua Continentur. 
Libri VII De Bello Gallico cum A. Hirti Supplemento. Oxford University 
Press: Oxford. 
- (ed.) 1900b. C. Iuli Caesaris Commentariorum. Pars Posterior Qua 
Continentur. Libri III De Bello Civili cum Libris Incertorum Auctorum De 
Bello Alexandrino Africo Hispaniensi. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Way A.G. (ed. and trans.) 1955. Caesar. Alexandrian, African and Spanish Wars. 
252 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
CICERO 
Atzert C. (ed.) 1963. M. Tullius Cicero. Fasc. 48. De Officiis de Virtutibus. B.G. 
Teubner: Leipzig. 
Clark A.C.  
- (ed.) 1905. M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes. Pro Sex. Roscio. De Imperio Cn. 
Pompei. Pro Cluentio. In Catilinam. Pro Murena. Pro Caelio. Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. 
- (ed.) 1909. M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes. Pro P. Quinctio. Pro Q. Roscio 
Comoedo. Pro A. Caecina. De Lege Agraria Contra Rullum. Pro C. Rabirio 
Perduellionis Reo. Pro L. Flacco. In L. Pisonem. Pro Rabirio Postumo. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
- (ed.) 1910. M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes. Pro Tullio. Pro Fonteio. Pro Sulla. 
Pro Archia. Pro Plancio. Pro Scauro. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
- (ed.) 1916. M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes. Pro Milone. Pro Marcello. Pro 
Ligario. Pro Rege Deiotaro. Philippicae I–XIV. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
Freese J.H. (ed. and trans.) 1930. Pro Publio Quinctio. Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino. 
Pro Quinto Roscio Comoedo. De Lege Agraria I., II., III. The Loeb Classical Library: 
London. 
Gardner R. 
- (ed. and trans.) 1958. Pro Sestio and In Vatinium. The Loeb Classical Library: 
London. 
- (ed. and trans.) 1965. Cicero. Pro Caelio – De Provinciis Consularibus – Pro 
Balbo. The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
Greenwood L.H.G. 
- (ed. and trans.) 1928. Cicero. The Verrine Orations. Vol. I. The Loeb 
Classical Library: London. 
- (ed. and trans.) 1935. Cicero. The Verrine Orations. Vol. II. The Loeb 
Classical Library: London. 
Hendrickson G.L. and Hubbel H.M. (ed. and trans.) 1962. Cicero. Brutus. Orator. 
The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
Hodge H.G. (ed. and trans.) 1927. Cicero. Pro Lege Manilia. Pro Caecina. Pro 
Cluentio. Pro Rabirio Perduellionis. The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
253 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Hubbel H.M. (ed. and trans.) 1949. Cicero. De Inventione. De Optimo Genere 
Oratorum. Topica. The Loeb Classical Library: Loeb. 
Kaster R.A. (trans. with intr. and comm.) 2006. Cicero. Speech on behalf of Publius 
Sestius. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
Keyes C.W. (ed. and trans.) 1928. Cicero. De Re Publica. De Legibus. The Loeb 
Classical Library: London. 
King J.E. (ed. and trans.) 1945. Cicero. Tusculan Disputations. The Loeb Classical 
Library: London. 
Macdonald C. (ed. and trans.) 1976. Cicero. In Catilinam I–IV; Pro Murena; Pro 
Sulla; Pro Flacco. Loeb Classical Library: London. 
Manuwald G. (ed. with intro., trans. and comm.) 2007a. Cicero, Philippics. Vol. I: 
Introduction, Text and Translation. Walter de Gruyter: Berlin. 
Miller W. (ed. and trans.) 1913. Cicero. De Officiis. The Loeb Classical Library: 
London. 
Pohlenz M. (ed.) 1965. M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta Quae Manserunt Omnia. Fasc. 44. 
Tusculanae Disputationes. B.G. Teubner: Stuttgart. 
Powell J.G.F. (ed.) 2006. M. Tulli Ciceronis De Re Publica; De Legibus; Cato 
Maior De Senectute; Laelius De Amicitia. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Peterson W.  
- (ed.) 1907/1916. M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes. Divinatio in Q. Caecilium. In 
C. Verrem. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
- (ed.) 1910. M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes. Cum Senatui Gratias Egit. Cum 
Populo Gratias Egit. De Domo Sua. De Haruspicum Responso. Pro Sestio. In 
Vatinium. De Provinciis Consularibus. Pro Balbo. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
Rackham H. (ed. and trans.) 1942. Cicero. De Oratore (Book 3). De Fato. 
Paradoxica Stoicorum. De Partitione Oratoria. The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
Shackleton Bailey D.R. 
- (ed.) 1961. M. Tulli Ciceronis Epistulae. Vol. II.2. Epistulae ad Atticum. Pars 
Posterior Libri IX–XVI. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
- (ed. and trans.) 1999a. Cicero. Letters to Atticus. Vol. I. The Loeb Classical 
Library: London. 
- (ed. and trans.) 1999b. Cicero. Letters to Atticus. Vol. II. The Loeb Classical 
Library: London. 
254 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
- (ed. and trans.) 1999c. Cicero. Letters to Atticus. Vol. III. The Loeb Classical 
Library: London. 
- (ed. and trans.) 1999d. Cicero. Letters to Atticus. Vol. IV. The Loeb Classical 
Library: London. 
- (ed. and trans.) 2001a. Cicero. Letters to Friends. Vol. I. The Loeb Classical 
Library: London. 
- (ed. and trans.) 2001b. Cicero. Letters to Friends. Vol. II. The Loeb Classical 
Library: London. 
- (ed. and trans.) 2001c. Cicero. Letters to Friends. Vol. III. The Loeb 
Classical Library: London. 
- (ed. and trans.) 2002. Cicero. Letters to Quintus and Brutus; Letter 
Fragments; Letter To Octavian; Invectives; Handbook of Electioneering. The 
Loeb Classical Library: London. 
Shackleton Bailey D.R. (ed. and trans.), Ramsey J.T. and Manuwald G. (rev.) 
- 2009a. Cicero. Philippics 1–6. The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
- 2009b. Cicero. Philippics 7–14. The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
Sutton E.W. and Rackham H. (ed. and trans.) 1942. Cicero. De Oratore (Books 1 
and 2). The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
Watts N.H. 
- (ed. and trans.) 1923. Cicero. Pro Archia; Post Reditum in Senatu; Post 
Reditum ad Quirites; De Domo Sua; De Haruspicum Responsis; Pro Plancio. 
The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
- (ed. and trans.) 1953. Cicero. Pro Milone. In Pisonem. Pro Scauro. Pro 
Fonteio. Pro Rabirio Postumo. Pro Marcello. Pro Ligario. Pro Rege 
Deiotaro. The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
Watt W.S. 
- (ed.) 1958. M. Tulli Ciceronis Epistulae. Vol. III. Epistulae ad Quintum 
Fratrem. Epistulae ad M. Brutum. Fragmenta Episularum. Accedunt 
Commentariolum Petitionis et Pseudo-Ciceronis Epistula ad Octavianum. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
- (ed.) 1965. M. Tulli Ciceronis Epistulae. Vol. II.1. Epistulae ad Atticum. Pars 
Prior Libri I–VII. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
- (ed.) 1982. M. Tulli Ciceronis Epistulae. Vol. I. Epistulae ad Familiares. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Wilkins A.S. (ed.) 1901. M. Tulli Ciceronis Rhetorica. Tomus I. Libros De Oratore 
Tres Continens. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
255 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
PS.-CICERO AND COMMENTATORS 
Caplan H. (ed. and trans.) 1954. Cicero. Ad C. Herennium de Ratione Dicendi. The 
Loeb Classical Library: London. 
Marx F. (ed.) Incerti Auctoris De Ratione Dicendi Ad C. Herennium Libri IV. Georg 
Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung: Hildesheim. 
Stangl T. (ed.) Ciceronis Orationum Scholastae. 1964. Georg Olms 
Verlagsbuchhandlung: Hildesheim. 
CORPUS INSCRIPTIONUM LATINARUM 
Degrassi A. and Krummrey J. (edd.) 1986. Inscriptiones Latinae Antiquissimae ad C. 
Caesaris Mortem. Vol. I.ii.iv. Walter de Gruyter & Co.: Berlin. 
Mommsen A.T. and Lommatzsch E. (edd.) 1918. Inscriptiones Latinae 
Antiquissimae ad C. Caesaris Mortem. Vol. I.ii. Georg Reimer: Berlin. 
ENNIUS 
Skutsch O. (ed. with intr. and comm.) 1985. The Annals of Q. Ennius. Clarendon 
Press: Oxford. 
Warmington E.H. (ed. and trans.) 1956. Remains of Old Latin. I. Ennius and 
Caecilius. The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
FRAGMENTS OF ROMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Beck H. and Walter U. 
 
- (ed., trans. and comm.) 2001. Die Frühen Römischen Historiker I. 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Stuttgart. 
 
- Beck H. and Walter U. (ed., trans. and comm.) 2004. Die Frühen Römischen 
Historiker II. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Stuttgart. 
LIVY 
Ogilvie R.M. (ed.) 1974. Titi Livi Ab Urbe Condita Tomus I. Libri I–V. Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. 
Foster B.O. (ed. and trans.) 1919. Livy With an English Translation in Fourteen 
Volumes. Vol. I, Bks. 1 and 2. The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
ORATORUM ROMANORUM FRAGMENTA 
Malcovati H. 
- (ed.) 1953. Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta Liberae Rei Publicae. Aug. 
Taurinorum: Paravia. 
256 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
-  (ed.) 1979. Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta Liberae Rei Publicae. II – 
Index Verborum. Aug. Taurinorum: Paravia. 
PLAUTUS 
Lindsay W.M. (ed.) 1903. T. Macci Plauti Comoediae. Vol. I. Oxford University 
Press: Oxford. 
de Melo W. (ed. and trans.) 2011. Plautus. Amphitryon; The Comedy of Asses; The 
Pot of Gold; The Two Bacchises; The Captives. The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
PLUTARCH 
Lindskog Cl. and Ziegler K. (ed.) 1971. Plutarchi Vitae Parallelae. Vol. III. Fasc. 1. 
B.G. Teubner: Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Perrin B. (ed. and trans.) 1921. Plutarch’s Lives. Agis and Cleomenes, Tiberius and 
Caius Gracchus, Philopoemen and Flaminius. Loeb Classical Library: London. 
RUTILIUS LUPUS 
Brooks E.B. 1970. (ed. with prolegomena and comm.) P. Rutilii Lupi De Figuris 
Sententiarum et Elocutionis. E.J. Brill: Leiden. 
Halm C. 1863. (ed.) Rhetores Latini Minores. B.G. Teubner: Leipzig. 
SALLUST 
Reynolds L.D. 1991. (ed.) C. Sallusti Crispi Catilina; Iugurtha; Historiarum 
Fragmenta Selecta; Appendix Sallustiana. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Rolfe J.C. (ed. and trans.) 1920. Sallust. The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
SUETONIUS 
Rolfe J.C. (ed. and trans.) and Bradley K.R. (intr.) 1998. Suetonius. Vol. I. The Loeb 
Classical Library: London. 
Butler H.E. and Cary M. (ed. with commentary); Townend G.B. (reprinted with new 
introduction, bibliography and additional notes). 1982. Suetonius. Divus Julius. 
Bristol Classical Press: Bristol. 
SYLLOGE INSCRIPTIONUM GRAECARUM 
Dittenberger D. 1917. Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum II. Third Edition. S. Hirzel: 
Leipzig. 
VALERIUS MAXIMUS 
Briscoe J. 1998. (ed.) Valeri Maximi Facta et Dicta Memorabilia. Vol. I. Libri I–VI. 
B.G. Teubner: Stuttgart. 
257 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Shackleton Bailey D.R. 
- (ed. and trans.) 2000a. Valerius Maximus. Memorable Doings and Sayings. 
Vol. I. The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
- (ed. and trans.) 2000b. Valerius Maximus. Memorable Doings and Sayings. 
Vol. II. The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
VARRO 
Kent R.G. (ed. and trans.) 1938. Varro. On The Latin Language. Vol. I. Books V.–VII. 
The Loeb Classical Library: London/Cambridge, Massachussetts. 
VELLEIUS PATERCULUS 
Shipley F.W. (ed. and trans.) 1924. Velleius Paterculus. Compendium of Roman 
History. Res Gestae Divi Augusti. The Loeb Classical Library: London. 
Woodman A.J. (ed. with comm.) 1983. Velleius Paterculus. The Caesarian and 
Augustan Narrative (2.41–93). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
258 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
SECONDARY LITERATURE 
 
Adcock F.E. 1956. Caesar as a Man of Letters. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Alexander M.C. 1976. ‘Hortensius’ Speech in Defense of Verres’. Phoenix 30.1: 46–
53. 
Allen W. 1938. ‘In Defense of Catiline’. CJ 34.2: 70–85. 
Ando C. 1999. ‘Was Rome a Polis?’ CA 18.1: 5–34. 
Annas J. 1997. ‘Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property’ in Griffin 
M. and Barnes J. (edd). Philosophia Togata I. Oxford. 151–173. 
Ansuategui A.D. 1990. ‘El “senatus consultum ultimum”: ¿medida de salvación 
pública o práctica de depuración política?’ Latomus 49.1: 75–80. 
Arena V.  
- 2007. ‘Invocation to Liberty and Invective of Dominatus at the End of the 
Roman Republic’. BICS 50: 49–73. 
- 2012. Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic. 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Asmis E. 2005. ‘A new kind of model: Cicero’s Roman constitution in the De 
Republica’. AJPh 126: 377–416. 
Astin A.E. 
- 1956. ‘Scipio Aemilianus and Cato Censorius’. Latomus 15.2: 159–180. 
- 1958. The Lex Annalis before Sulla. Latomus: Brussels. 
- 1967. Scipio Aemilianus. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
- 1978. Cato the Censor. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
Badian E. 
- 1954. ‘Lex Acilia Repetundarum’. AJPh 75.4: 374–384. 
- 1956. ‘Review of Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta Liberae Rei Publicae 
Iteratis Curis Recensuit Collegit by Henrica Malcovati’. JRS 46.1&2: 218–
221. 
- 1962a. ‘From the Gracchi to Sulla (1940–59)’. Historia 11.2: 197–245. 
- 1962b. ‘Waiting for Sulla’. JRS 52.1 & 2: 47–61. 
- 1969. ‘Quaestiones Variae’. Historia 18.4: 447–491. 
259 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
- 1972. ‘Tiberius Gracchus and the Beginning of the Roman Revolution’ in 
Temporini H. (ed.) ANRW 1.1. De Gruyter: Berlin. 668–731. 
- 1990. ‘Review of Caesar by Christian Meier’. Gnomon 62.1: 22–39. 
- 2004. ‘The Pig and the Priest’ in Heftner H. and Tomaschitz K. (edd.) Ad 
fontes!: Festschrift für Gerhard Dobesch. Vienna. 263–272. 
Balsdon J.P.V.D. 
- 1957. ‘The Veracity of Caesar’. G&R 4.1: 19–28. 
- 1960. ‘Auctoritas, Dignitas, Otium’. CQ 10.1: 43–50. 
- 1972. ‘L. Cornelius Scipio: A Salvage Operation. Historia 21.2: 224–234. 
Barlow J.J. 
- 1987. ‘The Education of Statesmen in Cicero’s “De Republica”‘. Polity 19.3: 
353–374. 
- 1998. ‘Noble Gauls and their Other in Caesar’s Propaganda’ in Welch K. and 
Powell A. (edd.) Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter. Gerald Duckworth & Co.: 
London. 139–170. 
- 2012. ‘Cicero on Property and the State’ in Nicgorsky W. (ed.) Cicero’s 
Practical Philosophy. University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, Indiana. 
212–241. 
Barton C.A. 2003. ‘The Emotional Economy of Sacrifice and Execution in Ancient 
Rome’. Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques 29.2: 341–360. 
Batstone W.W. 
- 1991. ‘A Narrative Gestalt and the Force of Caesar’s Style’. Mnemosyne 
44.1/2: 126–136. 
- 1994. ‘Cicero’s Construction of Consular Ethos in the First Catilinarian’. 
TAPhA 124: 211–266. 
Batstone W.W. and Damon C. 2006. Caesar’s Civil War. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
Beard M. and Crawford M. 1985. Rome in the Late Republic. Gerald Duckworth & 
Co. Ltd.: London. 
Beck H. 
- 2007. ‘The Early Roman Tradition’ in Marincola J. (ed.) A Companion to 
Greek and Roman Historiography Vol. I. Oxford. 259–265. 
- 2011. ‘Consular Power and the Roman Constitution: The Case of Imperium 
Reconsidered’ in Beck H., Duplá A., Jehne M., Pina Polo, F. (edd.) Consuls 
and Res Publica: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic. Cambridge 
260 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
University Press. Available from: <http://lib.myilibrary.com?ID=331665> 2 
May 2012. 77–96. 
Bell A.J.E. 1997. ‘Cicero and the Spectacle of Power’. JRS 87: 1–22. 
Beness J.L. 2005. ‘Scipio Aemilianus and the Crisis of 129 B.C.’ Historia 54.1: 37–
48. 
Béranger J. 
- 1972. ‘Les jugements de Cicéron sur les Gracques’ in Temporini H. (ed.) 
ANRW 1.1. De Gruyter: Berlin. 732–763. 
- 1973. ‘L’accession d’Auguste et l’idéologie du “privatus”‘ in Principatus: 
Etudes de notions et d’histoire politiques dans l’Antiquité gréco-romaine. 
Geneva. 243–258. 
Bernstein A.H. 
- 1972. ‘Prosopography and the Career of Publius Mucius Scaevola’. CPh 67.1: 
42–46. 
- 1978. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. Cornell University Press: London. 
Berry D.H. 
- 1996. Cicero. Pro P. Sulla Oratio. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
- 2004. ‘The Publication of Cicero’s “Pro Roscio Amerino”. Mnemosyne 57.1: 
80–87. 
Binot C. 2001. ‘Le role de Scipion Nasica Sérapion dans la crise gracquienne, une 
relecture’. Pallas 57: 185–203. 
Bleicken J. 1975. Lex Publica. Gesetz und Recht in der römischen Republik. Walter 
de Gruyter: Berlin. 
van der Blom H. 2010. Cicero’s Role Models. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Boatwright M.T. 1988. ‘Caesar’s Second Consulship and the Completion and Date 
of the “Bellum Civile”’. CJ 84.1: 31–40. 
Boren H.C. 
- 1961. ‘Tiberius Gracchus: The Opposition View’. AJPh 82.4: 358–369. 
- 1968. The Gracchi. Twayne: New York. 
Braunert H. 1974. ‘Zum Eingangssatz der res gestae Divi Augusti’. Chiron 4: 343–
58. 
261 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Bringmann K. 2002. ‘Von der res publica amissa zur res publica restituta. Zu zwei 
Schlagworten aus der Zeit zwischen Republik und Monarchie’ in Spielvogel J. (ed.) 
Res Publica Reperta. Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart. 113–123. 
Briscoe J. 1974. ‘Supporters and Opponents of Tiberius Gracchus’. JRS 64: 125–135. 
Broughton T.R.S.  
- (with the collaboration of Patterson M.L.) 1951. The Magistrates of the 
Roman Republic. Vol. 1. The American Philological Society: New York. 
- 1952. The Magistrates of the Roman Republic. Vol. 2. The American 
Philological Society: New York. 
Brown R.D. 1999. ‘Two Caesarian Battle-Descriptions: A Study in Contrast’. CJ 
94.4: 329–357. 
Brunt P.A. 
- 1965. ‘Review’. Gnomon 37.2: 189–192. 
- 1982. ‘Nobilitas and Novitas’. JRS 72: 1–17. 
- 1986. ‘Cicero’s Officium in the Civil War’. JRS 76: 12–32. 
- 1988. The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays. Clarendon Press: 
Oxford. 
Brunt P.A. and Moore J.M. (edd., intro. and comm.) 1967. Res Gestae Divi Augusti. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Bulst C.M. 1964. ‘“Cinnanum Tempus”: A Reassessment of the “Dominatio Cinnae”. 
Historia 13.3: 307–337. 
Burckhardt L.A. 
- 1988. Politische Strategien der Optimaten in der Späten römischen Republik. 
Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH: Stuttgart. 
- 1990. ‘The Political Elite of the Roman Republic: Comments on Recent 
Discussion of the Concepts “Nobilitas and Homo Novus”‘. Historia 39.1: 77–
99. 
Burns A. 1966. ‘Pompey’s Strategy and Domitius’ Stand at Corfinium’. Historia 
15.1: 74–95. 
Butler S. 2002. The Hand of Cicero. Routledge: London and New York. 
Cape R.W. Jr. 
- 1995. ‘The Rhetoric of Politics in Cicero’s Fourth Catilinarian’. AJPh 116.2: 
255–277. 
262 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
- 2002. ‘Cicero’s Consular Speeches’ in May J.M. Brill’s Companion to 
Cicero. Oratory and Rhetoric. Brill: Leiden. 113–158. 
Carawan E.M. 1990. ‘Cato’s Speech against L. Flamininus: Liv. 39.42–3’. CJ 85.4: 
316–329. 
Churchill J.B. 
- 1995. ‘On The Content and Structure of the Prologue to Cato’s “Origines”’. 
ICS 20: 91–106. 
- 1999. ‘Ex qua quod vellent facerent: Roman Magistrates' Authority over 
Praeda and Manubiae’. TAPhA 129: 85–116. 
- 2000. ‘Cato Orationes 66 and the Case against M’. Acilius Glabrio in 189 
B.C.’ AJPh 121.4: 549–557. 
Clackson J. and Horrocks G. 2011. The Blackwell History of the Latin Language. 
Wiley-Blackwell: Oxford. 
Clark A.F. 2007. ‘Nasica and Fides’. CQ 57.1: 125–131. 
Clarke M.L. 
- 1953. Rhetoric at Rome. Cohen & West Ltd: London. 
- 1981. The Noblest Roman. Thames and Hudson Ltd.: London. 
Cluett R. 2003. ‘In Caesar’s Wake: The Ideology of the Continuators’ in Cairns F. 
and Fantham E. (edd.) Caesar Against Liberty? Francis Cairns: Cambridge. 118–131. 
Collins J.H. 1959. ‘On the Date and Interpretation of the Bellum Civile’. AJP 80.2: 
113–132. 
Corbeill A. 2002. ‘Rhetorical Education in Cicero’s Youth’ in May J.M. Brill’s 
Companion to Cicero. Oratory and Rhetoric. Brill: Leiden. 23–48. 
Cornell T.J. 2001. ‘Cicero on the Origins of Rome’ in Powell J.G.F. and North J.A. 
Cicero’s Republic. BICS Supplement 76. 41–56. 
Cowan E. 2008. ‘Libertas in the Philippics’ in Stevenson T. and Wilson M. (edd.) 
Cicero’s Philippics. Polygraphia Ltd: Auckland. 140–152. 
Crawford M.H. 
- 1992. The Roman Republic. Fontana Press: London. 
- (ed.) 1996a. Roman Statutes Vol. I. BICS Supplement 64. 
- (ed.) 1996b. Roman Statutes Vol. II. BICS Supplement 64. 
Crook J. 1955. Consilium Principis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Damon C. 1993–1994. ‘Caesar’s Practical Prose’. CJ 89.2: 183–195. 
263 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Dawes T. 2008. ‘The Encomium of Brutus in Philippic 10’ in Stevenson T. and 
Wilson M. (edd.) Cicero’s Philippics. Polygraphia Ltd: Auckland. 266–281. 
Degraff T.B. 1940. ‘Plato in Cicero’. CPh. 35. 2: 143–153. 
Develin R. 
- 1977. ‘Lex curiata and the Competence of Magistrates’. Mnemosyne 30.1: 
49–65. 
- 1978. ‘Scipio Aemilianus and the Consular Elections of 148 B.C.’. Latomus 
37.2: 484–488. 
Drexler H. 
- 1957. ‘Res Publica (Teil 1)’. Maia 9: 247–181. 
- 1958. ‘Res Publica (Teil 2)’. Maia 10: 3–37. 
Douglas A.E. 
- 1960. ‘Clausulae in the Rhetorica ad Herennium as Evidence of Its Date’. 
CQ 10.1: 65–78. 
Dunkle R. 1967. ‘The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late 
Republic’. TAPhA 151–171. 
Duplá A. 2011. ‘Consules populares’ in Beck H., Duplá A., Jehne M., Pina Polo, F. 
(edd.) Consuls and Res Publica: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic. 
Cambridge University Press. Available from: 
<http://lib.myilibrary.com?ID=331665> 2 May 2012. 279–98. 
Dyck A.R 
- 1996. A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. University of Michigan Press: 
Ann Arbor. 
- 2003. ‘Evidence and Rhetoric in Cicero’s “Pro Roscio Amerino”: The Case 
against Sex. Roscius’. CQ 53.1: 235–246. 
- 2004. ‘Cicero’s “Devotio”: The Rôles of Dux and Scape-Goat in His “Post 
Reditum” Rhetoric’. HSPh 102: 299–314. 
Dyer R.R. 1990. ‘Rhetoric and Intention in Cicero's Pro Marcello’. JRS 80: 17–30. 
Earl D.C. 1963. Tiberius Gracchus. Latomus: Brussels. 
Eckstein A.M. 1997. ‘Physis and Nomos: Polybius, the Romans, and Cato the Elder’ 
in Cartledge P., Garnsey P. and Gruen E. (edd.) 1997. Hellenistic Constructs. Essays 
in Culture, History and Historiography. University of California Press: London. 
175–198. 
264 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Eder W. 1990. ‘Augustus and the Power of Tradition: The Augustan Principate as 
Binding Link between Republic and Empire’ in Raaflaub K.A. and Toher M. (edd.) 
Between Republic and Empire. Interpretations of Augustus and His Principate. 
University of California Press: Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford. 71–122. 
Evans R.J. and Kleijwegt M. 1992. ‘Did the Romans like Young Men? A Study of 
the Lex Villia Annalis: Causes and Effects’. ZPE 92: 181–195. 
Fantham E. 2004. The Roman World of Cicero’s De Oratore. Oxford University 
Press: Oxford. 
Flaig E. 
- 1993. ‘Politisierte Lebensführung und ästhetische Kultur. Eine semiotische 
Konstruktion bei Jacob Burkhardt und Theodor Mommsen’. 
Rechtshistorisches Journal 12: 405–42. 
- 1994. ‘Repenser le politique dans la République romaine’. Actes de la 
recherche en sciences sociales 105 : 13–25. 
- 1995. ‘Entscheidung und Konsens. Zu den Feldern der politischen 
Kommunikation zwischen Aristokratie und Plebs' in Jehne M. (ed.) 
Demokratie in Rom? Steiner: Stuttgart. 77–127. 
Flower H.I 
- 1996. Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture. Clarendon 
Press: Oxford. 
- 2006. The Art of Forgetting. University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill. 
- 2010. Roman Republics. Princeton University Press: Oxford. 
Forsythe G. 1994. The Historian L.Calpurnius Piso Frugi and the Roman Annalistic 
Tradition. University Press of America: London 
Fox M. 
- 1996. Roman Historical Myths. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
- 2007. Cicero’s Philosophy of History. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Frazel T.D. 2004. ‘The composition and circulation of Cicero’s In Verrem’. CQ 54.1: 
128–142. 
Frederiksen M.W. 1959. ‘Republican Capua: A Social and Economic Study’. PBSR 
27: 80–130. 
Frier B.W. 
- 1971. ‘Sulla’s Propaganda: The Collapse of the Cinnan Republic’. AJPh 92.4: 
585–604. 
265 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
- 1979. Libri Annales Pontificum Maximorum: The Origins of the Annalistic 
Tradition. The American Academy in Rome: Rome. 
 
Frisch H. 1946. Cicero’s Fight for the Republic. Boghandel Nordisk Forlag: 
Copenhagen. 
von Fritz K. 
- 1941. ‘The Mission of L. Caesar and L. Roscius in January 49 B.C.’ TAPhA 
72: 125–156. 
- 1942. ‘Pompey’s Policy before and after the Outbreak of the Civil War of 49 
B.C.’ TAPhA 73: 145–180. 
Fronda M.P. 2007. ‘Hegemony and Rivalry: The Revolt of Capua Revisited’. 
Phoenix 61.1/2: 83–108. 
Gabba E. 1991. Dionysius and the History of Archaic Rome. University of California 
Press: Oxford. 
Galinsky K. 1996. Augustan Culture. Princeton University Press: Chichester. 
Gallagher R.L. 2001. ‘Metaphor in Cicero’s “De Re Publica”’. CQ 51.2: 509–519. 
Geiger J. 1984. ‘Contemporary Politics in Cicero’s De Republica’. CPh 79.1: 38–43. 
Gelzer M. (tr. Needham P.) 1968. Caesar. Basil Blackwell: Oxford. 
Genovese E.N. 1974. ‘Cicero and Sallust: Catiline’s “Ruina”’. CW 68.3: 171–177. 
Gildenhard I. 
- 2007. Paideia Romana. Cambridge Philological Society: Cambridge. 
- 2011. Creative Eloquence. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Girardet K.M. 1983. Die Ordnung der Welt: Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen und 
politischen Interpretation von Ciceros Schrift ‘de legibus’. Wiesbaden. 
Goldsworthy A.K. 1998. ‘“Instinctive Genius”: The Depiction of Caesar the 
General’ in Welch K. and Powell A. (edd.) Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter. Gerald 
Duckworth & Co.: London. 193–219. 
Goodwin J. 2001. ‘Cicero’s Authority’. Ph&Rh 34.1: 38–60. 
Gotter U.  
- 1996. Der Diktator ist tot! Politik in Rom zwischen den Iden des März und 
der Begründung des Zweiten Triumvirats. Stuttgart. 
266 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
- (tr. von Glinski M.L.) 2010. ‘Cato’s Origines: The Historian and his 
Enemies’ in Feldherr A. The Cambridge Companion to Roman Historians. 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 108–22. 
Greenhalgh P. 
- 1980. Pompey. The Roman Alexander. Weidenfield and Nicolson: 
London. 
- 1981. Pompey. The Republican Prince. Weidenfield and Nicolson: 
London. 
Greenidge A.H.J. 1970 (1904). ‘The First Sign of a Great Awakening’ in Riddle J.M. 
Tiberius Gracchus. Heath: Lexington, Mass. 20–23. 
Griffin M. 1973. ‘The Tribune C. Cornelius’. JRS 63: 196–213. 
Grillo L. 2012. The Art of Caesar’s Bellum Civile. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Gruen E.S. 
- 1968. Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts 149–78 B.C. Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
- 1990. Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policy. E.J. Brill: Leiden. 
- 1992. Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome. Cornell University 
Press: Ithaca, NY. 
- 1993. ‘Cultural Fictions and Cultural Identity’. TAPhA 123: 1–14. 
- 1995. The Last Generation of the Roman Republic. University of California 
Press: London. 
- 1996. ‘The Roman Oligarchy: Image and Perception’ in Linderski J. (ed.) 
Imperium Sine Fine: T. Robert S. Broughton and the Roman Republic. Franz 
Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart. 215–225. 
Gwatkin W.E. 1934. ‘Cicero in Catilinam 1, 19 – Catiline’s Attempt to Place 
Himself in Libera Custodia’. TAPhA 65: 271–281. 
Gwynn A. 1926. Roman Education. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
Habicht C. 1990. Cicero the Politician. The John Hopkins University Press: 
Baltimore/London. 
Habinek T. N. 1998. The Politics of Latin Literature. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton. 
Hall L.G.H. 1998. ‘Ratio and Romanitas in the Bellum Gallicum’ in Welch K. and 
Powell A. (edd.) Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter. Gerald Duckworth & Co.: 
London. 11–43. 
267 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Hantos T. 1988. Res Publica Constituta. Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH: 
Stuttgart. 
Hardy E.G. 1916. ‘A Catilinarian Date’. JRS 6: 56–58. 
Hellegouarc’h J. 1963. Le Vocabulaire Latin des Relations et des Partis Politiques 
sous la République. Les Belles lettres: Paris. 
Henderson J. 1996. ‘XPDNC/Writing Caesar (“Bellum Ciuile”)’. CA 15.2: 261–288. 
Hillard T.W. 2005. ‘Res Publica in Theory and Practice’ in Hillard T.W. and Welch 
K. (edd.) Roman Crossings. The Classical Press of Wales: Swansea. 1–48. 
Hölkeskamp K-J. 
- 1995. ‘Oratoris maxima scaena: Reden vor dem Volk in der Politischen 
Kultur der Republik‘ in Jehne M. (ed.) Demokratie in Rom? Steiner: 
Stuttgart. 11–50. 
- 2000. ‘The Roman republic: government of the people, by the people, for the 
people?’ Scripta Classica Israelica 19: 203–23. 
- (tr. Heitmann-Gordon H.) 2010. Reconstructing the Roman Republic. 
Princeton University Press: Oxford. 
Hopkins K. 1983. Death and Renewal. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Hopkins K. and Burton G. 1983. ‘Political Succession in the Late Republic (249–50 
BC)’ in Hopkins K. Death and Renewal. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
31–119. 
Hurlet F. 1993. La Dictature de Sylla: Monarchie ou Magistrature Republicaine? 
Institut Historique Belge de Rome: Brussels/Rome. 
Huzar E.G. 1986. Mark Antony. Croom Helm: London. 
Imholtz A.A. (Jr.) 1972. ‘Gladiatorial Metaphors in Cicero’s “Pro Sex. Roscio 
Amerino”’. CW 65.7: 228–230. 
Jefferson E. 2012. ‘Problems and Audience in Cato’s Origines’ in Roskelaar S.T. 
(ed.) Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic. Brill: 
Leiden. 311–326. 
Jehne M. 
- 1995. ‘Die Beeinflussung von Entscheidungen durch “Bestechung": Zur 
Funktion des Ambitus in der römischen Republik' in Jehne M. (ed.) 
Demokratie in Rom? Steiner: Stuttgart. 51–76. 
Kaster R.A. (trans. with intr. and comm.) 2006. Cicero. Speech on behalf of Publius 
Sestius. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
268 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Katz B.R. 1977. ‘Caesar Strabo’s Struggle for the Consulship – And More’. RhM 
120.1: 45–63. 
Keaveney A. 
- 1979. ‘Sulla, Sulpicius and Caesar Strabo’. Latomus. 38.2: 451–460. 
- 1982. Sulla. The Last Republican. Croom Helm: London. 
- 1992. Lucullus. A Life. Routledge: London. 
Kempshall M.S. 2001. ‘De Re Publica 1.39 in Medieval and Renaissance Political 
Thought’ in Powell J.G.F. and North J.A. (edd.) Cicero’s Republic. BICS 
Supplement 76. 99–135. 
Kennedy G. 1972. The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World. Princeton University 
Press: Princeton. 
Kingsley M.H. 2003. Travels in West Africa. Dover Publications, Inc.: New York. 
Kinsey T.E. 
- 1966. ‘A dilemma in the Pro Roscio Amerino’. Mnemosyne 19.3: 270–271. 
- 1967. ‘The Dates of the “Pro Roscio Amerino” and “Pro Quinctio”. 
Mnemosyne 20.1: 61–67. 
- 1968. ‘Cicero, “Pro Roscio Amerino,” 125’. Mnemosyne 21.2/3: 290–292. 
- 1985. ‘The Partitio of Cicero's Pro Roscio Amerino’. Mnemosyne 38.3/4: 
387–388. 
Kunkel W. 1995. Staatsordnung und Staatspraxis der Römischen Republik. C. H. 
Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung: München. 
Last H. 1951. ‘Tiberius Gracchus’ in Cook S.A., Adcock F.E. and Charlesworth M.P. 
(edd.) The Cambridge Ancient History IX. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1–39. 
Leach J. 1978. Pompey the Great. Croom Helm: London. 
Leeman A.D. 1963. Orationis Ratio Vol. 1. Adolf M. Hakkert: Amsterdam. 
Lewis R.G. 1998. ‘P. Sulpicius’ Law to Recall Exiles, 88 B.C.’. CQ 48.1: 195–199. 
Levene D.S. 2000. ‘Sallust’s “Catiline” and Cato the Censor’. CQ 50.1: 170–191. 
Levick B. 
- 1982. ‘Sulla’s March on Rome in 88 B.C.’ Historia 31.4: 503–508. 
- 1998. ‘The Veneti Revisited: C.E. Stevens and the Tradition on Caesar the 
Propagandist’ in Welch K. and Powell A. (edd.) Julius Caesar as Artful 
Reporter. Gerald Duckworth & Co.: London. 61–83. 
269 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Lind L.R. 1989. ‘The Idea of the Republic and the Foundations of Roman Morality’ 
in Deroux C. (ed.) Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History. Collections 
Latomus 206. Revue D’Études Latines: Bruxelles. 5–34. 
Linderski J. 2002. ‘The Pontiff and the Tribune: The Death of Tiberius Gracchus’. 
Athenaeum 90: 339–366. 
Lintott A. 
- 1970. ‘The Tradition of Violence in the Annals of the Early Roman 
Republic’. Historia 19.1: 12–29. 
- 1971. ‘The Tribunate of P. Sulpicius Rufus’. CQ 21.2: 442–453. 
- 1992. Judicial Reform and Land Reform in the Roman Republic. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
- 1997. ‘The Theory of the Mixed Constitution at Rome’ in Griffin M. and 
Barnes J. (edd.). Philosophia Togata II. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
70–85. 
- 1999a. Violence in Republican Rome. 2nd edn. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
- 1999b. The Constitution of the Roman Republic. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
- 2008. Cicero as Evidence. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Long A.A. 1995. ‘Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis’ in Laks A. and Schofield M. 
Justice and Generosity. Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy 
Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 213–40. 
Lovano M. 2002. The Age of Cinna: Crucible of Late Republican Rome. Franz 
Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart. 
Luce T.J. 1970. ‘Marius and the Mithridatic Command’. Historia 19.2: 161–194. 
Mackay C.S. 2000. ‘Sulla and the Monuments: Studies in His Public Persona’. 
Historia 49.2: 161–210. 
Mackie N. 1992. ‘“Popularis” Ideology and Popular Politics at Rome in the First 
Century B.C.’. RhM 135.1: 49–73. 
Manuwald G. (ed. with intro., trans. and comm.) 2007b. Cicero, Philippics. Vol. 2: 
Commentary. Walter de Gruyter: Berlin. 
Márquez X. 2012. ‘Between Urbs and Orbis. Cicero’s Conception of the Political 
Community’ in Nicgorsky W. (ed.) Cicero’s Practical Philosophy. University of 
Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, Indiana. 181–211. 
270 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Marshall A.J. 1967. ‘Verres and Judicial Corruption’. CQ 17.2: 408–413. 
Mattingly H.B. 
- 1969a. ‘The Two Republican Laws of the Tabula Bembina’. JRS 59.1/2: 
129–143. 
- 1969b. ‘Saturninus’ Corn Bill and the Circumstances of His Fall’. CR 19.3: 
267–270. 
May J.M. 1988. Trials of Character. The University of North Carolina Press: Chapel 
Hill and London. 
McDermott W.C. 1970. ‘In Ligarianam’. TAPhA 101: 317–347. 
McDonald A.H. 
- 1938. ‘Scipio Africanus and Roman Politics in the Second Century B.C.’. 
JRS 28.2: 153–164. 
- 1944. ‘Rome and the Italian Confederation (200–186 B.C.)’. JRS 34.1&2: 
11–33. 
McGushin P. 1992. Sallust. The Histories. Vol. I, Books i–ii. Clarendon Press: 
Oxford. 
Meadows A. and Williams J. 2001. ‘Moneta and the Monuments: Coinage and 
Politics in Republican Rome’. JRS 91: 27–49. 
Mehl A. (tr. Mueller H.-F.) 2011. Roman Historiography. Blackwell Publishers Ltd.: 
Chichester. 
Meier C. 
- 1966. Res Publica Amissa. Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH: Wiesbaden. 
- (tr. McLintock D.) 1996. Caesar. Fontana Press: London. 
Millar F. 
- 1984. ‘The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic, 200–151 
B.C.’ JRS 74: 1–19. 
- 1986. ‘Politics, Persuasion and the People before the Social War (150–90 
B.C.)’. JRS 76: 1–11. 
- 1998. The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic. The University of Michigan 
Press: Michigan. 
- 2002. The Roman Republic in Political Thought. University Press of New 
England: London. 
Mitchell T.N. 
271 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
- 1969. ‘Cicero before Luca (September 57 – April 56 B.C.)’. TAPhA 100: 
295–320. 
- 1971. ‘Cicero and the Senatus “consultum ultimum”‘. Historia 20.1: 47–61. 
- 1975. ‘The Volte-Face of P. Sulpicius Rufus in 88 B.C.’ CPh 70.3: 197–204. 
- 1979. Cicero. The Ascending Years. Yale University Press: New York and 
London. 
- 1991. Cicero. The Senior Statesman. Yale University Press: New Haven and 
London. 
Moir K.M. 1986. ‘The Epitaph of Publius Scipio’. CQ 36.1: 264–266. 
Mommsen T. 1970 (1895). ‘A Well-Meaning Conservative Who Leads A 
Revolution’ in Riddle J.M. Tiberius Gracchus. Heath: Lexington, Mass. 14–17. 
Montague H.E. 1992. ‘Advocacy and Politics: The Paradox of Cicero's Pro Ligario’. 
AJPh 113.4: 559–574. 
Morford M. 2002. The Roman Philosophers. Routledge: London. 
Morgan L. 1997. ‘“Levi Quidem de re...”: Julius Caesar as Tyrant and Pedant’. JRS 
87: 23–40. 
Morgan M.G. and Walsh J.A. 1978. ‘Ti. Gracchus (TR. PL. 133 B.C.), The 
Numantine Affair, and the Deposition of M. Octavius’. CPh 73.3: 200–210. 
Morstein-Marx R. 
- 1998. ‘Publicity, Popularity and Patronage in the “Commentariolum 
Petitionis”’. CA 17.2: 259–288. 
- 2011. ‘Consular Appeals to the Army in 88 and 87: the Locus of Legitimacy 
in Late-Republican Rome’ in Beck H., Duplá A., Jehne M., Pina Polo, F. 
(edd.) Consuls and Res Publica: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic. 
Cambridge University Press. Available from: 
<http://lib.myilibrary.com?ID=331665> 2 May 2012. 259–278. 
Mouritsen H. 2001. Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
Nap J.M. 1927. ‘Ad Catonis librum de re militari’. Mnemosyne 55.1: 79–87. 
Nicgorski W. 1991. ‘Cicero’s Focus: From the Best Regime to the Model Statesman’. 
Political Theory 19.2: 230–251. 
Nicholls J.J. 1967. ‘The Content of the Lex Curiata’. AJPh 88.3: 257–278. 
Nicholson J. 1992. Cicero’s Return from Exile. Peter Lang: New York. 
272 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Nicolet C. (tr. Falla P.S.) 1980. The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome. 
Batsford Academic and Educational: London. 
Nippel W. 1995. Public Order in Ancient Rome. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
North J.A. 1990. ‘Democratic Politics in Republican Rome’. P&P 126: 3–21. 
Osgood J. 2009. ‘The Pen and the Sword: Writing and Conquest in Caesar’s Gaul’. 
CA 28.2: 328–358. 
Pagola E.T. 2002. ‘Contribución al estudio de la memoria como instrumento en 
Historia Antigua La transmisión de la memoria de los “Cornelii Scipiones”. Latomus 
61.2: 295–311. 
Parenti M. 2003. The Assassination of Julius Caesar. The New Press: New 
York/London. 
Paterson J. 2004. ‘Self-Reference in Cicero’s Forensic Speeches’ in Powell J. and 
Paterson J. (edd.) Cicero the Advocate. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 79–95. 
Phillips E.J. 1976. ‘Catiline’s Conspiracy’. Historia 25.4: 441–448. 
Pina Polo F. 2011. The Consul at Rome. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Powell A. 1998. ‘Julius Caesar and the Presentation of Massacre’ in Welch K. and 
Powell A. (edd.) Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter. Gerald Duckworth & Co.: 
London. 111–137. 
Powell J.G.F. 
- 1990. ‘The Tribune Sulpicius’. Historia 39.4: 446–460. 
- 2001. ‘Were Cicero’s Laws the Laws of Cicero’s Republic?’ in Powell J.G.F. 
and North J.A. Cicero’s Republic. BICS Supplement 76. 17–39. 
Raaflaub K. 
- 1974. Dignitatis Contentio. C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung: München. 
- 2003. ‘Caesar the Liberator? Factional Politics, Civil War, and Ideology’ in 
Cairns F. and Fantham E. (edd.) Caesar Against Liberty? Francis Cairns: 
Cambridge. 35–67. 
- 2009. ‘Bellum Civile’ in Griffin M. (ed.) A Companion to Julius Caesar. 
Blackwell Publishing: Chichester. 175–191. 
Raditsa L. 1973. ‘Julius Caesar and his writings’. ANRW 1.3. 417–56. 
Radke G. 1991. ‘Beobachtungen zum Elogium auf L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus’. 
RhM 134.1: 69–79. 
273 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Ramage E.S. 1987. The Nature and Purpose of Augustus’ “Res Gestae”. Franz 
Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH: Stuttgart. 
Raschke W.J. 1987. ‘“Arma pro amico”: Lucilian Satire at the Crisis of the Roman 
Republic’. Hermes 115.3: 299–318. 
Rawson E. 1976. ‘The First Latin Annalists’. Latomus 35.4: 689–717. 
Reay B. 2005. ‘Agriculture, Writing, and Cato’s Aristocratic Self-Fashioning’. CA 
24.2: 331–361. 
Richardson J.H. 2012. The Fabii and the Gauls. Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart. 
Richardson J.S. 1991. ‘Imperium Romanum: Empire and the Language of Power’. 
JRS 81: 1–9. 
Richardson K. 1976. Daggers in the Forum. Book Club Associates: London. 
Ridley R. 2003. The Emperor’s Retrospect. Peeters: Leuven. 
Riggsby A.M. 2002. ‘The Post Reditum Speeches’ in May J.M. Brill’s Companion to 
Cicero. Brill: Leiden. 
Robb M. A. 2010. Beyond Optimates and Populares. Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart. 
Robinson A. 1994. ‘Cicero’s References to His Banishment’. CW 87.6: 475–480. 
Roller M.B. 2011. ‘The Consul(ar) as exemplum: Fabius Cunctator’s Paradoxical 
Glory’ Consuls’ in Beck H., Duplá A., Jehne M., Pina Polo, F. (edd.) Consuls and 
Res Publica: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic. Cambridge University 
Press. Available from: <http://lib.myilibrary.com?ID=331665> 2 May 2012. 182–
210. 
Rosenstein N. 
- 1990. Imperatores Victi. University of California Press: Oxford. 
- 2007. ‘Military Command, Political Power, and the Republican Elite’ in 
Erdkamp P. (ed.) A Companion to the Roman Army. Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd.: Oxford. 132–147. 
Rossi A. 2000. ‘The Camp of Pompey: Strategy of Representation in Caesar’s 
Bellum Ciuile’. CJ 95.3: 239–256. 
Rundell W.M.F. 1979. ‘Cicero and Clodius: The Question of Credibility’. Historia 
28.3: 301–328. 
Ruebel J.S. 1977. ‘Cato and Scipio Africanus’. CW 71.3: 161–173. 
Salmon E.T.  
- 1935. ‘Catiline, Crassus, and Caesar’. AJPh 56.4: 302–316. 
274 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
- 1967. Samnium and the Samnites. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
- 1969. Roman Colonization under the Republic. The Camelot Press: London. 
- 1982. The Making of Roman Italy. Thames and Hudson: London. 
Santangelo F. 
- 2007. Sulla, the Elites and the Empire. Brill: Leiden. 
Schofield M. 1999. Saving the City. Routledge: London. 
Sciarrino E. 
- 2004. ‘Putting Cato the Censor’s “Origines” in Its Place’. CA 23.2: 323–357. 
- 2011. Cato the Censor and the Beginnings of Latin Prose. The Ohio State 
University Press: Columbus. 
Scullard H.H. 
- 1960. ‘Scipio Aemilianus and Roman Politics’. JRS 50.1 & 2: 59–74. 
- 1970. Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician. Thames & Hudson: Bristol. 
Seager R. 
- 1972a. ‘Factio: Some Observations’. JRS. 62: 53–58. 
- 1972b. ‘Cicero and the Word Popularis’. CQ 22.2: 328–338. 
- 1973. ‘Iusta Catilinae’. Historia 22.2: 240–248. 
- 1977. ‘‘Populares’ in Livy and the Livian Tradition’. CQ 27.2: 377–390. 
- 2002. Pompey the Great. 2nd edn. Blackwell Publishing: London. 
Sedgwick W.B. 1934. ‘Cicero’s Conduct of the Case Pro Roscio’. CR 48.1: 13. 
Shackleton Bailey D.R. 
- 1956. ‘Expectatio Corfiniensis’. JRS 46.1&2: 57–64. 
- 1977. Cicero. Epistulae ad Familiares. Vol. II, 47–43 B.C. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
- 1986. ‘Nobiles and Novi Reconsidered’. AJPh 107.2: 255–260. 
Sherwin-White A.N. 
- 1956. ‘Violence in Roman Politics’. JRS 46.1&2: 1–9. 
- 1972. ‘The Date of the Lex Repetundarum and Its Consequences’. JRS 62: 
83–99. 
- 1982. ‘The Lex Repetundarum and the Political Ideas of Gaius Gracchus’. 
275 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
JRS 72: 18–31. 
Shatzman I. 1972. ‘The Roman General's Authority over Booty’. Historia 21.2: 177–
205. 
van Sickle J. 1987. ‘The Elogia of the Cornelii Scipiones and the Origin of Epigram 
at Rome’. AJPh 108.1: 41–55. 
Smith R.E. 
- 1940. ‘Cato Censorius’. G&R 9.27: 150–165. 
- 1966. Cicero the Statesman. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Smith C. 2006. ‘Adfectatio regni in the Roman Republic’ in Lewis S. (ed.) Ancient 
Tyranny. Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh. 49–64. 
Spaeth B.S. 1990. ‘The Goddess Ceres and the Death of Tiberius Gracchus’. 
Historia 39.2: 182–195. 
Stanton G.R. 2003. ‘Why Did Caesar Cross the Rubicon?’ Historia 52.1: 67–94. 
Stark R. 1967. 'Res Publica' in Oppermann H. Romische Wertbegriffe. Darmstadt. 
42–110. 
Steel C.E.W. 
- 2001. Cicero, Rhetoric and Empire. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
- 2004. ‘What Really Happened at Lampsacus?’ in Powell J. and Paterson P. 
(edd.) Cicero the Advocate. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 233–51. 
- 2005. Reading Cicero. Duckworth: London. 
- 2007. ‘Name and Shame? Invective Against Clodius and Others in the Post-
Exile Speeches’ in Booth J. (ed.) Cicero on the Attack. The Classical Press of 
Wales: Swansea. 105–128. 
Stevenson T. 
- 2005. ‘Readings of Scipio’s Dictatorship in Cicero’s “De Re Publica” 
(6.12)’. CQ 55.1: 140–152. 
- 2008. ‘Tyrants, Kings and Fathers in the Philippics’ in Stevenson T. and 
Wilson M. (edd.) Cicero’s Philippics. Polygraphia Ltd: Auckland. 95–113. 
Stockton D. 
- 1971. Cicero. A Political Biography. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
- 1973. ‘The First Consulship of Pompey’. Historia 22. 2: 205–218. 
- 1979. The Gracchi. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
276 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Strisino J. 2002. ‘Sulla and Scipio ‘not to be trusted’? The Reasons why Sertorius 
captured Suessa Aurunca. Latomus 61.1: 33–40. 
Suerbaum W. 1977. Vom Antiken zum Frühmittelalterlichen Staatsbegriff. 
Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung: Münster Westfalen. 
Sumner G.V. 
- 1963. ‘Lex Aelia, Lex Fufia’. AJPh 84.4: 337–358. 
- 1966. ‘Cicero, Pompeius, and Rullus’. TAPhA 97: 569–582. 
Syme R. 
- 1938. ‘Caesar, the Senate and Italy’. PBSR 14: 1–31. 
- 1939. The Roman Revolution. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
Tan J. 2008. ‘Contiones in the Age of Cicero’. CA 27.1: 163–201. 
Tatum W.J. and Moir K.M. 1988. ‘The Epitaph of Publius Scipio Reconsidered’. CQ 
38.1: 253–259. 
Tatum W. J. 1999. The Patrician Tribune. University of North Carolina Press: 
London. 
Taylor L.R. 
- 1942. ‘Caesar and the Roman Nobility’. TAPhA 73: 1–24. 
- 1949. Party Politics in the Age of Caesar. University of California Press: 
London. 
- 1962. ‘Forerunners of the Gracchi’. JRS 52.1&2: 19–27. 
Thatcher M. and Keay D. 1987. ‘Interview for Women’s Own (“no such thing as 
society”)’. The Margaret Thatcher Foundation. Available from 
<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689> Monday 17 June 2013. 
Thein A. 2006. ‘Sulla the weak tyrant’ in Lewis S. (ed.) Ancient Tyranny. Edinburgh 
University Press: Edinburgh. 238–249. 
Tod M.N. 1924. ‘Three Notes on Appian’. CQ 18.2: 99–104. 
Tracy C. 2012. ‘Cicero’s Constantia in Theory and Practice’ in Nicgorsky W. (ed.) 
Cicero’s Practical Philosophy. University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 
Indiana. 79–112. 
Turcan R. 2011. ‘Notions Romaines de l’État: de la Res Publica au Status Romanus’. 
Latomus 70. 621–641. 
Tyrell W.B. 
277 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
- 1973. ‘The Trial of C. Rabirius in 63 B.C.’ Latomus 32.2: 285–300. 
- 1978. A Legal and Historical Commentary to Cicero’s Oratio Pro C. Rabirio 
Perduellionis Reo. Verlag Adolf M. Hakkert: Amsterdam. 
von Ungern-Sternberg J. 1973. ‘Die popularen Beispiele in der Schrift des Auctors 
ad Herennium’. Chiron 3: 143–162. 
Vasaly A. 
- 1985. ‘The Masks of Rhetoric: Cicero’s Pro Roscio Amerino’. Rhetorica 3.1: 
1–20. 
- 1988. ‘Ars dispositionis: Cicero's Second Agrarian Speech’. Hermes 116.4: 
409–427. 
- 1993. Representations. Images of the World in Ciceronian Oratory. 
University of California Press: Oxford. 
- 2002. ‘Cicero’s Early Speeches’ in May J.M. Brill’s Companion to Cicero. 
Oratory and Rhetoric. Brill: Leiden. 71–111. 
- 2009. ‘Cicero, Domestic Politics, and the First Action of the Verrines’. CQ 
28.1: 101–137. 
Feig Vishnia R. 
- 1996. State, Society and Popular Leaders in Mid-Republican Rome 241–167 
BC. Routledge: London. 
- 2012. Roman Elections in the Age of Cicero. Routledge: New 
York/Abingdon. 
Wallace-Hadrill A. 2008. Rome’s Cultural Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ward A.M. 1970. ‘Cicero and Pompey in 75 and 70 B.C.’ Latomus 29.1: 58–71. 
Waters K.H. 1970. ‘Cicero, Sallust and Catiline’. Historia 19.2: 195–215. 
Weigel R.D. 1992. Lepidus: The Tarnished Triumvir. Routledge: London. 
Welch K.E. 
- 1996. ‘T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?’ Historia 45.4: 450–471. 
- 1998. ‘Caesar and his Officers in the Gallic War Commentaries’ in Welch K. 
and Powell A. (edd.) Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter. Gerald Duckworth & 
Co.: London. 85–110. 
White P. 2003. ‘Tactics in Caesar’s Correspondence with Cicero’ in Cairns F. and 
Fantham E. (edd.) Caesar Against Liberty? Francis Cairns: Cambridge. 68–95. 
278 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Williams P. 2004. ‘The Roman Tribunate in the “Era of Quiescence” 287–133BC’. 
Latomus 63.2: 281–294. 
Williamson C. 1990. ‘The Roman Aristocracy and Positive Law’. CPh 85.4: 266–
276. 
Winkel L. 1979. ‘Some Remarks on the Date of the “Rhetorica ad Herennium”’. 
Mnemosyne 32. 3/4: 327–332. 
Wirszubski Ch. 1950. Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic 
and Early Principate. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Wiseman T.P. 
- 1985. ‘Competition and Co-operation’ in Wiseman T.P. (ed.) Roman 
Political Life 90 B.C.–A.D. 69. University of Exeter: Exeter. 3–19. 
- 1998. ‘The Publication of De Bello Gallico’ in Welch K. and Powell A. (edd.) 
Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter. Gerald Duckworth & Co.: London. 1–9. 
- 2009a. Remembering the Roman People. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
- 2009b. ‘Augustus, Sulla and the Supernatural’ in Smith C. and Powell A. 
(edd.) The Lost Memoirs of Augustus and the Development of Roman 
Autobiography. The Classical Press of Wales: Swansea. 111–123. 
Wistrand E. 
- 1978. Caesar and Contemporary Roman Society. Kungl. Vetenskaps- och 
Vitterhets-Samhället: Göteborg. 
- 1981. The Policy of Brutus the Tyrannicide. Kungl. Vetenskaps- och 
Vitterhets-Samhället: Göteborg. 
Wood N. 1988. Cicero’s Social and Political Thought. University of California Press: 
London. 
Worthington I. 1989. ‘The Death of Scipio Aemilianus’. Hermes 117.2: 253–256. 
Yakobson A. 
- 1992. ‘Petitio et Largitio: Popular Participation in the Centuriate Assembly 
of the Late Republic’. JRS 82: 32–52. 
- 1995. ‘Secret Ballot and Its Effects in the Late Roman Republic’. Hermes 
123.4: 426–442. 
- 2006. ‘Popular Power in the Roman Republic’ in Rosenstein N. and 
Morstein-Marx R. (edd). A Companion to the Roman Republic. Blackwell 
Publishing: Oxford. 383–400. 
Yavetz Z. 
279 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
- 1963. ‘The Failure of Catiline’s Conspiracy’. Historia 12.4: 485–499. 
- 1971. ‘Caesar, Caesarism, and the Historians’. Journal of Contemporary 
History. 6.2: 184–201. 
- 1983. Julius Caesar and his Public Image. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 
New York. 
Zetzel J.E.G.  
- (ed. and comm.) 1995. Cicero. De Re Publica, Selections. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
- 2001. ‘Citizen and Commonwealth in De Re Publica Book 4’ in Powell J.G.F. 
and North J.A. Cicero’s Republic. BICS Supplement 76. 83–97. 
Zevi, F. 1970. “Considerazioni sull’elogio di Scipione Barbato.” Studi Miscellanei 
15.63–74. 
Ziolkowski A. 1988. ‘Mummius’ Temple of Hercules Victor and the Round Temple 
on the Tiber’. Phoenix 42.4: 309–333. 
